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Chapter 1:  Introduction and Overview   
 
“.... corruption is not a new phenomenon. 
It is as old as government itself.”2 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption has become a deep-rooted feature of many economies and 
societies around the world3.  Amongst the main drivers of this spread, and 
deepening, of corruption are shortcomings in economic and political 
governance, in market institutions, in public administration, and in 
commercial and economic policy settings, as well as the globalisation of 
commerce, investment and production4.  Corruption is, generally, not a 
costless or victimless crime: the economic, legal and social costs can be, and 
often are, substantial5.  Nor is corruption, once firmly established, easy to 
eradicate6.  Taken as a whole, corruption has few redeeming features: 
insofar as there may be any ‘benefits’ arising from corruption, such as  
 
 
                                                 
2  Ali and Isse (2003) at 449. 
3  So much so, a number of cultures and nations have their own terminologies for it:  
‘modida’ in Mexico, ‘arreglo’ in The Philippines, ‘baksheesh’ in Egypt, dishan’ in India, 
‘dash’ in Kenya, and ‘pot-de-vin’ in France, to name just a few. 
4  Endogenous and exogenous are used in the economic sense of meaning ‘within or 
internal to’ and ‘outside or external to’, respectively.   The globalisation of trade and 
commerce has the potential to act as a conduit for the spread of corruption from ‘infected’ 
to ‘clean’ countries. 
5 (Wei (1999) at 10), for example, in terms of lost per capita economic growth and higher-
than-otherwise taxation burdens. 
6  Ehlrich and Lui (1999) at 272; Barreto (2000) at 35; Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 15 
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defeating inefficient regulations, these are likely to be more than offset by 
the costs of corruption. Indeed, corruption is valence issue: one on which 
(almost) everyone agrees is an economic, legal and social ‘bad’, with little 
dissensus7 on the preferred outcome (preferably eradication or failing that 
minimisation).  
 
The law, whether international or municipal8, has made numerous and 
various efforts to tackle, if not eliminate, corruption, with differing degrees 
of commitment and success9. A number of important international legal 
instruments specifically targeting corruption have been negotiated and 
entered into force over the past two decades.  Amongst the most prominent  
of these legal instruments are those from international organisations such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
the United Nations (UN), as well as regional integration bodies such as the 
Council of Europe (CE) and the African Union (AU)10. 
                                                 
7  That is, in the context of being the antonym of consensus. 
8 Some of these municipal endeavours have been driven by endogenous (within-the-
nation) factors, whilst others have been motivated by exogenous (outside-the-nation) 
factors, such as pressure from multilateral lending institutions and from trade/investment 
partners, and and conformity obligations under international legal instruments.   
Consideration of these different motivations, and the effectiveness of the municipal laws 
they generate, is outside the scope of this study. 
9 One of the most prominent municipal laws designed to tackle corruption is the United 
States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1).  Shortcomings in the 
effectiveness of the FCPA appear to have played a seminal role in the development of a 
number of the international instruments considered in this study. See, for example:  
Martin (1997/98) at 420-428; Corr and Lawler (1999) at 1255-1296; Posadas (1999/2000) at 
348-365; Salbu (2001) at 445–453; Landmeier (2002) at 594-605; Krever (2007/08) at 87- 
96.    
10 The key features of which will be considered in the section “Tackling Corruption Under 
International Law”, in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 14 
  
There is no single cause of corruption11.  Amongst the main drivers of 
corruption are deficiencies in: economic and political governance (evident, 
for example, in a lack of transparency and accountability in public 
administration)12, and in market institutions (in the absence of a strong 
competitive marketplace)13; public sector taxation and spending policies and 
practices (where there is broad discretion for taxation collectors or for extra-
budgetary public spending)14; public sector employment practices (where 
appointments and promotions can be bought and sold)15; and, in the nature 
of government commercial and economic policy settings (such as activist 
industry policies which involve preferential treatment for some firms/ 
industries over others)16.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Similarly, the individual causes of corruption are not mutually exclusive of one another, 
and indeed can be interactive – that is, influencing each other – and differentially so 
across time and space.  These spatio-temporal differences are a research focus of the 
empirical legal analyses undertaken in this study.  
12 For example: Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 3; Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) at 196; 
Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) at 278; Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) at 212. 
13 Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 39; Boardman and Recanatini (2000) at 1; Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2008) at 21; Goel and Nelson (2010) at 444. 
14 Kaufmann (1997) at 128;  Tanzi (1998) at 11 - 13; Chand and Moene (1999) at 1138; 
Hindriks et al (1999) at 396 – 397. 
15 Hillman and Katz (1987) at 129; Alam (1989) at 444; World Bank (1998) at 3; Murphy et 
al (1991) at 521; Wei (1999) at 18; Wamey (1999) at 1; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 595. 
16 Ades and Di Tella (1997) at 1023; Mauro (1998a) at 11; Khan (1996) at 685; Moran 
(1999) at 575; Cheung et al (2011) at 5. 
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The broader economic, political and social consequences of corruption are 
generally contextual17, reflecting factors such as the incidence of corruption, 
cultural and social attitudes, the nature and rigor of institutional structures, 
and the state of economic and social development and growth, with impacts 
ranging from marginal (where corruption is petty and isolated) to 
potentially quite substantial (contributing to ‘State failure’ where it is 
pervasive and sizeable)18.   
 
From an economic perspective, corruption, inter alia, deters foreign direct 
investment19, results in inefficient patterns of domestic private and public 
sector investment20, distorts foreign aid flows21, adds to inflation and 
economic uncertainty22, and through these channels impairs economic 
growth and development. The legal costs of corruption include its capacity  
 
 
                                                 
17 As will be seen in Chapter 2 which dicussses “The Corruption Problem”. As this study 
will show, there is ‘no magic, single bullet’ for tackling corruption in all places at all times.  
18 According to one study (Wei (1999) at 10), if corruption in Bangladesh had been 
reduced to that of (relatively ‘clean’) Singapore in the 25 years to 1985 then Bangladesh’s 
average annual per capita economic growth rate would have been almost 2 per centage 
points higher than otherwise.   
19 Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 31 – 32; Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 695; Smarzynska 
and Wei (2000) at 12; Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 687; Wei and Wu (2001) at 19; Wei 
(2001) at 12; Besancenot and Vranceanu (2002) at 231; Lambsdorf (2003) at 240; Vinod 
(2003) at 886; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 12; Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 687. 
20 Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 1; Tanzi (1998) at 12; World Bank (1997) at 103; Goudie 
and Stasavage (1998) at 134; Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 11; Thede and Gustafsen (2012) 
at 662.  
21 Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 8; Alesina and Weder (2002) at 1126. 
22 Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Kaufman and Wei (1999), Gupta et al, 1998) at 
26; Ehlrich and Lui (1999); Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 22; Braun and Di Tella (2001); 
Paldam (2002) at 215; Al-Marhubi (2002) at 202; Paldam (2002) at 215; Aidt, Dutta and 
Sena (2008) at 196. 
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to undermine the rule of law, whilst social costs involve greater income 
inequality and poverty (especially in developing countries)23.  However, 
some claim corruption can have beneficial effects in certain situations, such 
as being efficiency-enhancing where regulatory interventions by 
governments are excessive and/or inefficient, although such voices are very 
much in the minority24. 
 
Controlling Corruption 
 
Against these backgrounds, a number of options have emerged for tackling 
corruption, whether just constraining its rate of growth and spread, or 
winding it back. Such approaches include: ‘leadership by example’ from 
political, bureaucratic corporate and civil society elites25; more effective 
legal processes and stiffer penalties for those engaged in corruption, such as 
disqualification from public office for bribe-takers26, and/or from 
government tendering for bribe-payers27; the introduction and/or expansion 
of liberal institutional arrangements, such as more competitive domestic 
markets28, as well as meaningful freedom of the press29 and freedom of 
                                                 
23 Gupta et al (1998) at 1; Li et al (2000) at 155; Mauro (1998) at 263; Wei (1999) at 2; 
Olofsgaard and Zahran (2008) at 166; Hodge et al (2011) at 482. 
24 Leys (1965) at 220, Khan (1996) at 683, Colombatto (2003) at 375, Mendex and 
Sepulveda (2006) at 96, where there is government failure; Leff (1964) at 11, Leys (1965) 
at 223, Huntington (1968) at 386, Barreto (2000) at 37, Dutt and Traca (2010) at 857,  Jong 
and Bogmans (2010) at 385, in situations of excessive or inefficient regulation; and, 
Braguinsky (1996) at 14, Cheung (1996) at 1, where corruption can help to accelerate the 
demise of totalitarian States.  For a more expansive discussion of the ‘beneficial grease’ 
debate, see Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
25 Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 9; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 133; Chand and Moene 
(1999) at 1130; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590 – 592; Kingston (2008) at 90. 
26 World Bank (1997) at 107; Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 1. 
27 For a good discussion, see Seiler and Madir (2012). 
28 Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 3; Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) at 196; Clausen, Kraay and 
Nyiri (2011) at 212. 
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information laws30; wider use of externally imposed measures, in the form of 
conditional foreign aid31 and membership of international organisations32; 
and, substantive commitment to international anti-corruption, legal 
instruments.  The nature, the extent, the causes, and the consequences of 
corruption are examined in Chapter Two of this study. 
 
Despite its wide geographic dispersion, the footprint of international law in 
corruption matters has, until fairly recently, been modest, at best33.  
Traditionally, international law has been a bounded system of rights and 
obligations for States34, dealing with issues such as definition of territory, 
relations between States and processes for dealing with disputes35.  In this 
framework, key issues in international law have largely revolved around 
procedural elements such as sources of international law (most notably the 
role of custom and practice, and of treaties), the subjects of international law 
(States and non-State persons) and the relationships between international 
and municipal law36.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
29 Lederman et al (2001) at 2; Treisman (2000) at 404; Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 10; 
Naim (1995) at 247; Frelie et 1l (2007) at 838; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
30 World Bank (1997) at 108; Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) at 278. 
31 Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 8; Tavares (2003) at 104. 
32 Sandholtz and Gray (2003) at 767.   
33 For a short history of co-ordinated international legal efforts to combat corruption over 
the past century see Anechiarica (1999) at 380 – 387. 
34 Shearer (1994) at 4; Dixon and McCorquodale (2003) at 1. 
35 Blay (2003) at 2. 
36 Which are reviewed in Chapter 3, “International Law and Corruption”, of this thesis. 
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However, since the mid-twentieth century, and reflecting a shift toward 
positivist legal approaches by States at the international level and the spread 
of globalisation, the subjects of international law have expanded to include 
the creation of international institutions with legal personality (such as the 
United Nations), while the topics have broadened to include the natural 
environment, space exploration, intellectual property and, more recently, 
corruption.  Indeed, over the past two decades, the global community of 
nations has adopted a broad suite of international legal instruments aimed at 
tackling corruption, at both the multilateral and plurilateral (regional) 
level37.  Prominent amongst the multilateral instruments are the United 
Nations’ Convention Against Corruption38, and the OECD’s Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions39, and their related Commentaries, while regional initiatives 
have included the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council 
of Europe40, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption41, and the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption42.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 While the quantity of international legal instruments targeting corruption surged 
during the decade following the mid-1990s, the quality of these mechanisms varied 
considerably, for example in their foci, their reach and their rigor  Scholars of corruption 
have pointed to a plethora of gaps in these instruments: see, for example: Gantz (1998); 
Nichols (1999); George et al (2000); Webb (2005). 
38 43 ILM 37 (2004). 
39 37 ILM 4 (1998). 
40 38 ILM 505 (1999). 
41 35 ILM 724 (1996). 
42 43 ILM 5 (2004). 
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Assessing the coverage, the rigour, the impact and the effectiveness of such 
international legal instruments involves a number of challenges, not least of 
which are identifying the various forms of corruption43, and assessing its 
differing causes and consequences in developing, transitional and developed 
economies and societies44. While corruption essentially involves the 
(mis)use of public office for private gain, there is no single practical form of 
corruption.  Rather, corruption can take a number of forms, including: petty 
versus grand, the difference being the magnitude of the benefit conferred 
(usually measured in money amounts); demand versus supply driven, often  
referred to as extortion and bribery respectively; centralised versus 
decentralised, the former imposing a structured framework, the latter 
involving more atomistic and opportunistic arrangements; and, greasing 
compared to blocking corruption, where illicit payments are made to ensure 
or prevent an action or outcome occurs, respectively.    
 
The scope and depth of these instruments, although varying, address 
elements such as definitions of key concepts (for example, ‘public official’ 
and ‘corruption’), jurisdiction (whether nationality or territorial), treatment 
of the private and the public sectors, the establishment of criminal liability 
for a range of offences, and enforcement and sanctions.  While legal scholars 
have generally commented positively on the content and direction of these 
                                                 
43 For example, only two of the main international legal instruments examined in this 
study (AUCPCC, 2003, and the OECD – FPO, 1997) contain explicit definitions of 
corruption. 
44 A number of scholars regard the mere existence of such international legal instruments 
as making a substantial contribution to tackling corruption, regardless of its causes and/or 
consequences: see for, example, Sutton (1996/97) at 1470; Gantz (1998) at 481; Perrios and 
Hudson (1998) at 86; and Low (1998) at 154; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 76; Unzicker 
(1999/2000) at 655; George et al (2000); Wehrle (2000) at 31; Webb (2005) at 210; 
Udonbana (2003) at 447. 
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various instruments45 (in particular, regarding provisions covering peer-
based monitoring and review programs, and mutual legal assistance 
measures46), they are not without shortcomings (notably in the treatment of 
bribe-takers47, and of political parties and party officials48).  Chapter 3 of this 
study reviews the main theories of international law, and the main 
international legal instruments dealing with corruption. 
 
Law and Economics 
 
These international economic law instruments, and indeed the prevalence 
of corruption, reflect the interface of law and economics: economics because 
corruption involves a serious distortion to the allocation of resources49, 
usually from better to lesser advantageous uses; and, the law because 
corruption is generally illegal in mature legal systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Inter alia, Corr and Lawler (1999) at 1309; Gantz (1998) at 483; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) 
at 75; Tronnes (2000) at 130; Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 367; Henning (2001) at 822; Shams 
(2001) at 107; Udonbana (2003) at 459; Webb (2005) at 192. 
 46 Tronnes (2000) at 121; Gantz (1998) at 489. 
47 George et al (2000) at 518; Miller (2000) at 160; Loren (2001) at 328; Harms (2000) at 
161; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 99; Nesbit (1998) at 1305. 
48 Shams (2001) at 100; George et al (2000) at 516; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 97; Corr 
and Lawler (1999) at 1305; Posadas (1999/2000) at 381; Webb (2005) at 196; Nesbit (1998) 
at 1305; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19. 
49 Murphy et al (1993) at 409; Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 10–11; Brunetti et al 
(1997b) at 23; Barreto (2000) at 47; Lambsdorff (2002a) at 121; Ahlin and Bose (2007) at 
465; Salinas-Jiminez et al (2007) at 913. 
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The economic dimension of the law and economics discourse focuses largely 
on micro-economics: that is, the economics of the individual, the household 
and/or the firm50, with a pivotal role being given to the price mechanism as 
a signal of both past and future decision-making by those economic actors51.  
Such price signals can be explicit (the ticket price for a good such as a motor 
car or a service such as that provided by an accountant) or implicit (where 
an economic actor has to make a choice between alternatives, such as 
whether or not to engage in illegal activities52).    
 
The legal dimension of law and economics recognises the law contains both 
explicit and implicit prices.  In this framework, explicit prices can take the 
form of pecuniary penalties for the breach of the law (say, a speeding fine), 
while implicit prices arise from the economic consequences of a legal 
decision or rule borne by those impacted (say, changes to consumer 
preferences in response to a new law or regulation)53.  The interface of such 
explicit and implicit prices, whether from the economic or the legal 
perspective, and how economic and legal actors responded to them is the 
foundation of law and economics. 
 
                                                 
50 There is scant scholarship on the interaction of law and economics from the macro-
economic perspective.  The seemingly (single) exception is Hume (2003). 
51 In particular, in the law and economics context, in the imposition of pseudo-prices (for 
example, pecuniary penalties) on non-market (for example, illegal) activities: Posner 
(1985) at 192; Posner (1987) at 5; Ulen (1992) at 114 – 118; Parisi (2004) at 5. 
52 Several studies have sought to estimate ‘implicit prices’ for different forms of corrupt 
activity: World Bank (1998) at 3; Alam (1989) at 444; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590; 
Carrilla (2000) at 258–259. 
53 The pervasive role ascribed to implicit prices in law and economics (see, for example, 
the various works of Richard Posner) could also be its Archilles Heel, in the sense implicit 
prices are difficult to expressly observe and measure, and so may lack tangibility for black 
letter judges and lawyers. Developments in econo-/lexi-metrics, such as state space and 
structural equation modelling, which focus on measuring such latent (also known as 
unobserved) variables, may help bridge this gap. 
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While a law and economics movement has emerged within economics and 
legal scholarship (although tending to reside within the legal academy), 
there is no single ‘school of law and economics’.  Rather, there are a number 
of schools of thinking on the interface of law and economics. 
 
The dominant school, at least by volume of scholarship, is the Chicago 
School of law and economics, which sees a maximal role for markets and 
competition, and a minimal role for government and regulation, a maximal 
role for efficiency54 with distributional issues being of second-order status55,  
and a superior role for the common over the statute law56.  The New Haven 
School takes a more moderate view, favouring individual choice and market 
forces where they work properly, with a role for government intervention 
to remedy demonstrable instances of market failure57, and to address issues 
of justice and fairness58. To the New Haveners, law and economics should 
focus on the maximisation of net national benefit (as distinct from that of 
the individual)59. The Virginia (or Public Choice) School makes its 
contribution to law and economic analysis by providing insights into the  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Posner (1985) at 192; Posner (1987) at 5; Landes and Posner (1987); Posner (1992). 
55 Kaplow and Shavell (1994) at 675. 
56 Coase (1960) at 19; Director (1964); Coase (1974); Rubin (1977) at 55; Priest (1977) at 65; 
Posner (1987a) at 5. 
57 Rose-Ackerman (1992) at 6-9; Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 59. 
58 Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 54; Cooter (2005) at 222; see also Kaplow and Shavell (1994) 
at 667. 
59 Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 60. 
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creation and implementation of statute law through the political system60.  
Key elements of the Virginia School include the balance-of-outcomes 
resulting from interaction of the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats 
with the rational decision-making (or otherwise) of the electorate/voter61. 
 
Economic and legal institutions are central to the thinking of the 
Institutional and Neo-Institutional Schools of law and economics. To the 
Institutionalists, institutions (such as legislatures and the courts) are 
mechanisms of collective action used to frame individual action62.  In 
essence, legal institutions exist to set boundaries for persons, legal or 
natural, to engage in economic exchange63, with the relationship between 
law and economics being bi-directional (that is, each influencing the 
other)64.  The Neo-Institutionalists share the emphasis on institutions with 
their eponymous antecedents, but see them (institutions) as being formed 
and evolving to better discern and allocate property rights65, and to facilitate 
the exchange of those rights66. 
 
The Rational Choice School of law and economics is based on the processes 
of human decision-making, and in particular cost-benefit/risk-reward 
analysis67.  In short, a person will engage in a criminal act, like corruption, 
where the costs/risks are less than the benefits/rewards.  An important  
                                                 
60  Most notably the seminal work of Buchanan (1975); also, Parisi and Klick (2004) at 437. 
61 McLean (1987) at 81-102; McNutt (1996) at 99-137. 
62 Starting with the seminal work of Commons (1934). 
63 Hale (1952). 
64 Samuels (1975) and (1989). 
65 North (1990); Barzel (1989); Libecap (1989 a and b). 
66 North (1990) at 34; Eggertsson (1990) at 317; North (1993) at 245. 
67 Veljanovski (1980) at 177; Hoffman and O’Shea (2002) at 342. 
 24 
  
challenge for Rational Choice theorists, however, has been defining the key 
concept of rationality, and whether it is stable across contexts and time even 
for the same individual68.  The stability of rationality is also a key pillar of 
the Behaviourialist School, who regard individuals as essentially rational but 
imperfectly so69.  To the Behaviourialists, the responses of individuals to 
changes in the law cannot be predicted with absolute precision70, with such 
reactions bounded, for example, by the cognitive abilities of the persons 
concerned (that is, potential offenders)71. 
 
Game theory, whilst not offering a discrete theoretical framework of law 
and economics, has resonance for its capacity to offer rigorous methods of 
quantitative analysis of the law72, and the criminal law in particular73.  In 
essence, game theory uses conditional probability, taken from econometrics 
and statistics, to build models (systems of equations) of the behaviour of 
decision-makers whose choices impact on each other in a sequential 
manner74, 75.   
 
                                                 
68 Nozick (1993); Ulen (2000) at 792–794. 
69 Mitchell (2002) at 67; Rachlinksi (2011) at 1676. 
70 Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1055–1056. 
71 Jolls et al 1998 at 1476; Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1075 – 1102; Jones (2001) at 1150–
1156; Epstein (2006) at 113; Jolls (2007) at 10–15. 
72 Kattan and Vigdor (1996) at 441–442. 
73 Grossman and Katz (1983), Reinganum (1988) and (1993); Kobayashi and Lott (1996); 
Baker and Mezzetti (2001); Khalil et al (2010); 
74 Ayres (1989) at 1297; Katz (1990a) at 233-238. 
75 In a manner, game theory has been a victim of its own intellectual rigor and success, 
moving to the ‘outer edges’ of complex conditional probability, challenging even better 
econometricians and likely bewildering to many lawyers who may otherwise be 
interested in its potential, practical application to legal, and law and economics, cases and 
situations.  However, the emergence of software, such as GLLAMM and GAMET, an add-
in for the popular STATA program, should facilitate the wider access to game theory tools 
in the law, and in law and economics. 
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Unfortunately, none of the different schools of law and economics explicitly 
theorise how corruption would fit within their respective frameworks.   
However, it is possible to speculate the Chicago school would see corruption 
as indicative of government failure, the Austrians would consider it as just 
another feature of the marketplace the entrepreneur may have to confront, 
while the Public Choice (Virginia) school would likely see corruption as 
reflecting the triumph of the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats over 
the broader voter-public. 
 
The Institutionalists would likely concede corruption as a metric of 
institutional failure, while advocates of the Critical Legal Studies view 
would see corruption as reflecting the inherent freer market, libertarian 
approach to law, economics, politics and society.  The Rational Choice and 
the Behaviourialists would see corruption as the outcomes of cost-
benefit/risk-reward assessments by participants, although differing in the 
underlying decision-making processes.   Game Theorists and the Empirical 
Legal Studies stream would likely be normatively indifferent to corruption, 
regarding it as just another situation to be modelled/ quantitatively 
analysed, while exponents of International Law and Economics would like 
view corruption in positivist terms, as a threat to the effectiveness of 
international law.  Chapter 4 reviews the main theories of law and 
economics.  
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While scholars have put forward a number of theories of law and 
economics, their application to crime and criminal behaviour (of which 
corruption is one form) is challenged by the absence of a single, 
homogeneous form of ‘the criminal’76.  Sources of heterogeneity extend 
beyond the usual socio-demographic indicators such as age, income, gender  
and social status, to include factors such as intensity of criminal behaviour 
(professional and tactical versus occasional and opportunistic), attitudes to 
risk (risk-takers versus risk-mitigators)77, and elements of the criminal law 
chain such as enforcement, punishment and deterrence78. 
 
Rational Choice theory has tended to dominate scholarly thinking on and 
analyses of the law and economics approach to crime and criminal 
behaviour at the level of the individual.  In this framework, individuals will 
engage in criminal activity when the benefits/rewards exceed the 
costs/risks, with such metrics (costs/benefits; risks/rewards) being the price 
signals of crime and criminal behaviour.  For an individual, criminal activity 
will take place up to the point where the marginal cost of such behaviour 
equates to the marginal benefit (when the marginal cost exceeds the 
marginal benefit, the criminal will desist)79. 
 
                                                 
76 Indeed, it is moot whether some of the direct participants in corrupt relationship (that 
is, one facilitating corruption) even consider themselves as being criminals, regarding 
corruption either as an ostensibly victimless crime, at least in the sense of there being no 
crime of violence, or as a necessary or even virtuous activity.  In the latter regard, see the 
‘beneficial grease’ view of corruption, which is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
77 Ehrlich (1973) at 528 and (1977) at 742.   
78 Becker (1968) at 177; Stigler (1970) at 530; Viscusi (1986) at 330; Rose-Ackerman (2010) 
at 234. 
79 Becker (1968) at 176; Stigler (1970) at 529; Ehrlich (1972) at 262; Ehrlich (1973) at 522; 
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 15. 
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Rational Choice theory has also had a dominant role in scholarship on the 
law and economics of crime at the level of society-as-a-whole, in particular 
the allocation of scarce public resources to different elements of the 
criminal law chain, most notably between enforcement and punishment.  
An increase in the relative resourcing of enforcement (in the form of lifting 
the probability of conviction) is likely to have a greater impact on criminal 
behaviour than committing the marginal resources to punishment (making  
the penalty regime more severe).  This has prompted further thinking on 
the relative merits of maximal versus optimal enforcement80 – the former 
being enforcement to the point of point of exhaustion, the latter to the point 
of greatest efficiency.  Scholarship on punishment has followed similar lines, 
looking initially at the relative effectiveness of pecuniary versus custodial 
penalties, and within them maximal versus optimal punishment81. 
 
The Rational Choice approach to the law and economics of crime regards 
the underlying objective of deterrence as modifying the ‘price of crime’ for 
actual and potential offenders – that is, intervening in the marginal 
cost/benefit (or risk/reward) equation82. Such issues are themselves 
embedded in the enforcement-punishment debate, and at the individual 
level are likely to be conditional on factors such as perceived certainty of  
 
 
 
                                                 
80 Stigler (1970) at 527; Easterbrook (1983) at 295; Polinsky and Shavell (2000) at 49. 
81 Becker (1968) at 207; Ehrlich (1982) at 5; Baik and Kim (2001). 
82 Ehrlich (1981) at 312; Easterbrook (1983) at 309; Bar-Gill and Gazal (2004) at 2. 
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apprehension, prosecution and conviction83, the social status and wealth of 
the offender (higher social status/wealth individuals tend to be less/more 
concerned with pecuniary/custodial penalties84), attitudes to stigma from 
conviction and penalty (again more acute for higher social status/wealth 
individuals85). 
 
Taken together, this has led some scholars to consider whether there is a 
‘market model of crime’, involving a supply of actual and potential 
offenders, the demand for offences (the purchase or on-selling of ‘ill-gotten 
gains’ such as stolen goods), and explicit and implicit prices of crime (in the 
form of the penalty regime)86.  In this framework, the ‘market for crime’ will 
be in equilibrium when criminals, considering the net expected return from 
crime, and society, represented by law enforcement looking at net social 
welfare, do not feel any need to change their own behaviours and thus the 
prevailing price of crime.  Theories of law and economics of crime are 
examined in Chapter Five. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Block and Lind (1975a) at 484; Harel and Segal (1999) at 277; Polinsky and Shavell 
(2000) at 68. 
84 Polinsky and Shavell (1991) at 618; Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 2. 
85 Block and Lind (1975a) at 488; Witte (1980) at 80; Posner (1980) at 414. 
86 Ehrlich (1996) at 44. 
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Empirical Legal Analysis 
 
While the entry into force of international legal instruments, the enactment 
of statutes and the creation of jurisprudence may well create new law, such 
events may not be sufficient of themselves to alter the behaviour of targeted 
persons.  In short, the mere existence of a law does not necessarily mean it 
has an impact, let alone that the law is effective87. 
 
This study was motivated by the intersection and potential integration of a 
number of threads in the author’s mind: an interest in the effects of 
corruption on business and economic performance; a deep intellectual 
interest in the interaction of the law and economics88, and in ‘quantitative 
law’ (also becoming known as Empirical Legal Analysis/Studies89); and, a 
questioning of the implicit assumption that the law – in particular municipal 
statute and international economic law - is necessarily effective in changing 
the behaviour of the targeted parties. 
 
                                                 
87 The usual, ipso facto, assumption of many ‘black letter’ lawyers.  That is, the law exists, 
therefore it is effective.  A key value-add of this thesis is challenging this assumption, and 
showing how it can be tested and that is does not necessarily hold in all situations. 
88 In particular, the more market-oriented schools of law and economics, such as the 
Chicago (reflected in the works of inter alia Coase, Gary Becker and Richard Posner), the 
Austrian (Crespi, Kirzner and Sechrest) and the Rational Choice (Gary Becker, Polinsky 
and Shavell, and Veljanovski) approaches, and subsequently with the development of this 
thesis the Behaviourialist (in particular, Sunstein and Jolls) perspectives.  
89 Some of the early exponents of which include Eisenberg and Heise, and a sub-field of 
law, and of law and economics with substantial growth potential, not least of which 
because of the large areas of currently unoccupied, but still fertile, space.   The merging of 
Emprical Legal Studies with Game Theory, to form, say, a hybrid Empirical Game Theory 
stream would likely make a major, practical contribution to the evolution of ‘quantitative 
law’. 
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Chapter Six examines the effectiveness of the law in dealing with corruption 
through the use of leximetrics90 to assess the impact of a key international 
legal instrument – the OECD’s Convention on the Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions – on the incidence of 
corruption in a sample of developed countries over a period of time.    
 
The leximetric testing of the effectiveness of the OECD Convention is 
undertaken in two stages. The first stage involves applying a suite of 
quantitative analytical tools to, and developing and evaluating an aggregate 
model of, the broad pattern of corruption in a sample of 22 developed 
(largely OECD member) countries.  The leximetric procedures used involve 
tests of equality and analysis of variance (ANOVA), with modelling-based 
methods using structural break analysis and breakpoint tests, testing for 
parameter stability and regime-shift specification.  The second stage 
involves more intensive application of dynamic (time series) leximetric 
methods to three particular countries (Denmark, Italy and the United 
States), extending the procedures used in the first, broad and general stage 
of the analysis, to include techniques such as autocorrelation, dummy 
variable methods, and general-to-specific modelling. In both stages, 
research interest was focused on both practical (whether there was a step-
movement in the incidence of corruption) and statistical (whether any such 
movement was ‘real’ or could otherwise be attributable to chance alone) 
significance – the former measuring the impact of the law, the latter the 
effectiveness of the law91. 
                                                 
90  The application of econometric techniques to the law. 
91 There is potentially a vast toolkit from econ-/lexi-metrics which could be applied to the 
empirical legal analysis undertaken in this thesis – for example, in the estimation of 
breakpoints and discontinuities in time series data, in model estimation (for example, 
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The leximetric analyses and modelling undertaken for, and reported in, this 
study indicate a key anti-corruption legal instrument - the OECD 
Convention - has had only a very small practical effect on corruption, 
seemingly only raising awareness of, and concern about, the incidence of 
corruption rather than resulting in a step-shift reduction in corruption in 
the panel of countries studied.  In short, the OECD Convention does not 
appear to have been the extensive remedy for corruption which some had 
hoped.  This message was echoed in a more intensive examination of a 
sample of three case study-nations. 
 
The main conclusion of this leximetric analysis and modelling is broad-scale 
international legal instruments are not per se effective in tackling 
corruption in applicable countries.  However, this does not necessarily mean 
international law has no role to play in the fight against corruption, rather it 
should be considered as part of a broader suite of anti-corruption initiatives.  
 
Ultimately, this study seeks to make a substantial contribution to research 
and scholarly knowledge of the effectiveness of laws by using leximetric 
techniques to undertake innovative and rigorous statistical analysis and 
modelling to assess the impact of a key international legal instrument on  
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
levels versus logarithms, and in different combinations) and model specification (for 
example, systems or vector designs).  An exhaustive presentation of all possible 
approaches would be beyond the scope (even the admissible length) of this thesis, 
repetitive (often using nuanced different methods to make much-the-same findings), and 
likely add more ‘noise than signal’ to the core analysis.  It would also likely test the 
patience of the most saintly supervisor and examiner. 
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corruption.  Hopefully, with time, this study will encourage greater cross-
disciplinary scholarship to broaden and deepen the nascent sub-discipline of 
leximetrics (‘quantitative law’) and to expand our knowledge of the 
characteristics and determinants of the effectiveness of laws. 
 
Critical Readers 
 
This thesis has benefitted substantially over its development from the 
constructive feedback from a number of critical readers – people from a 
diverse range of perspectives whose observations have challenged, and 
caused me to re-focus, my thinking on a number of the key themes and 
issues explored in this study. These critical readers have brought 
perspectives from the ‘reasonable person’ (does this make sense to the 
‘average reader’), from practitioners (who are interested in the causes of, 
and the effectiveness of alternate approaches to tackling, corruption) and 
from scholars from the law, economics, and law and economics (who are 
interested in deepening and expanding the boundaries of knowledge), 
amongst others; all have added value to this work. 
 
The nature of these commentaries has generally fallen into two main camps.  
The first of those commentaries reflected on the overall ‘balance of the 
thesis’, usefully pointing out, in earlier drafts, an imbalance between the 
narrative materials contained in Chapters 2 and 3 (dealing, respectively, 
with “The Corruption Problem”, “International Law and Corruption”) with 
Chapter 6 (“Modelling Corruption”).  A vigorous use of the ‘red pen’  
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pared back Chapters 2 and 3 leading to a much more tightly presented 
review of the literature and argument, while additional context and 
explanations of leximetric modelling in Chapter 6 should assist the non-
quantitative reader work his/her way through the data analytics.   
Suggestions to extend the reviews and the analyses contained in Chapters 4 
and 5 (“Theories of Law and Economics”, and “The Law and Economics of 
Crime”, respectively) for example considering how scholars from the 
different streams of law and economics might theorise corruption, were 
taken on board. 
 
Critical readers have also variously proposed a number of potentially 
interesting lines of leximetric modelling.   These include:  modelling the 
effectiveness of municipal implementation by States Parties of their 
international law obligations under the OECD Convention; developing 
multi-stage and/or systems equations leximetric models to examine more 
deeply the causes of corruption, and the linkages between them; and, 
examining whether municipal implementation of obligations in one State 
Party had spillover effects on other States Parties92. Other interesting ideas 
involved: investigating the underlying issue of the direction of causality, 
most notably whether corruption is simply the outcome of other causes, or 
is itself the driver of other indicators93; examining if corruption is a 
homogenous concept, or whether alternative metrics of corruption 
 
                                                 
92 For example, amongst the geographically contiguous, and closely economically and 
politically integrated, States Parties of the European Union. 
93 For example, does ‘excessive regulation’ cause corruption, or does corruption cause 
‘excessive regulation’? 
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(eg ‘petty’ vs ‘grand’) produce meaningful differences in modelling 
outcomes; and, whether another and/or larger data set, which would allow 
the introduction of additional variables, potentially causal of corruption, 
could be included in a revised leximetric model94.   All of these ideas would 
likely add-value to our understanding of the drivers of, and the effectiveness 
of instruments for dealing with, corruption, as well as sustaining a 
substantial program of post-doctoral research for a number of years. 
 
Analytical Purpose of the Thesis 
 
The development and the progress of this thesis has, understandably, been 
an intellectual journey; a marathon.  In its initial conceptualisation, this 
thesis was intended to sit within the corporate law domain, looking at the 
impact of corruption on the processes of corporate governance in 
multinational firms operating in markets/nations where corruption was 
particularly problematic.  The original thesis plan was to apply leximetric 
modelling techniques, using micro-economic (firm and industry level) data, 
to quantify the impact of corruption on firm-level decision making. 
 
A cathartic moment – resulting from my interest in the interaction of law 
and economics, my doctoral research/ readings, and consultations with my 
supervisors – resulted in a partial re-orientation of my thesis.  (Fortunately 
this occurred relatively early in the thesis process, and with the express 
encouragement of supervisors.)  The changes saw the thesis move: from the  
 
                                                 
94 Addressing what is sometimes called ‘the omitted variables’ problem 
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corporate law to the law and economics domain; from a concentration on 
municipal statute to international economic law; from an emphasis on the 
micro-economics of the firm and the industry, to the macro-economics of 
the Nation State; although my interest in corruption, in examining the 
effectiveness of laws (as a means of driving changes in behaviour) and in the 
application of econo-/lexi-metrics to legal problems remained.   
 
This thesis seeks to weave together an analysis/argument/narrative of the 
adverse economic, social and legal effects of corruption, rigorously 
evaluating using the toolkit of econo-/lexi-metrics the effectiveness of 
international law viewed through the prism of law and economics.  The 
thesis will be developed by examining the substantive elements of key 
international legal instrument(s), the analytical perspectives of law and 
economics, and empirical legal analysis to show situations of the 
(in)effectiveness of law. 
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis examines the nature, extent and impact of the 
corruption problem, and will review, inter alia, the different types, and 
some of the main causes and the consequences of corruption; Chapter 3 
reviews the footprint of international law on corruption, in particular the 
key features, both in the strengths and the weakenesses, of some of the main 
international legal instruments existant designed to tackle corruption; 
Chapter 4 reviews the main general theories of law and economics; Chapter  
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5 looks at the interface of law and economic theory, and crime, such as the 
Chicago, the Austrian, the Public Choice, the Rational Choice and the 
Behaviourialist approaches to law and economics; Chapter 6 sets out the 
econo-/lexi-metric modelling of the impact of international law on 
corruption, carefully examining the practical and the statistical significance 
of the impact of an important international legal instrument on corruption 
in member nations; and, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis and reports its 
main conclusions, most notably that the mere existence of a law does not 
mean it is necessarily effective. 
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Chapter 2:    The Corruption Problem 
 
“The problem of corruption in the public sphere 
is almost a natural consequence of 
the nature of government interventions.”95 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption, like death and taxes, is (almost) one of life’s certainties.  That 
corruption is a problem in business, in government, in politics, in public 
policy, and in society is more or less accepted with little real challenge.  
However, there are legitimate grounds for debating the causes, 
consequences and potential policy tools to address the problem. While 
corruption has been around for centuries, some may say even millennia, it is 
only comparatively recently – since the late 1970s – that substantial 
scholarly and public policy attention has been directed toward the 
corruption problem96.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95  Lederman et al (2001) at 6. 
96  The veritable eruption in analytical work since the early to mid 1980’s in particular, 
from a range of disciplinary perspectives - business administration, economics, 
econometrics, international relations, law, political science, public administration and 
public policy, to name just a few - has helped to build a broader and deeper picture of the 
corruption problem. 
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This chapter is an empirical review of the corruption problem: dealing with 
the definitions and categorisations of corruption; identifying a number of 
vulnerable sectors; studying several of the key causes of corruption; 
examining some of the main consequences of corruption; reviewing some of 
the ongoing debates in the corruption literature; looking at certain potential 
policy tools to address corruption; before reaching some general 
conclusions. 
 
This study shares the view that corruption is a measure of the nature and 
incidence of “government failure”97 given “bureaucratic corruption can be 
viewed as an indicator of government performance.” 98.  That is, corruption 
is a reliable metric of the failure of government to perform its proper 
economic, legal, political and social functions.  Recognising corruption is an 
inevitable consequence of government intervention in an economy99 and 
completely eliminating corruption - where it has taken root and its self-
perpetuating nature100 - is probably an unrealistic ideal101, a more pragmatic 
approach combining prevention and continuous remedial action against 
corruption is likely to prove more productive, holding out the potential for, 
at least, the minimisation of corruption102.    
                                                 
97  Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) at 194; Hellman et al (2000a) at 1 Bentzen (2012) at 167. 
98  Wei (2000a) at 17; see also Hellman and Kaufmann (2002) at 5 for similar view. 
99   Liu (1996) at 26; Johnson et al (1997) at 159; Tanzi (1998) at 3; Ehrlich and Lui (1999)  
at 272; Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) at 25; Wei (1999) at 16; Barreto (2000) at 35; 
Treisman (2000) at 436; Lederman et al (2001) at 6; Blackburn et al (2006) at 2464;  
Graycar and Villa (2011) at 420.. 
100  Andvig and Moene (1990) at 63. 
101   Inter alia, Alam (1989) at 446; Naim (1995) at 247; Liu (1996) at 28; Williams (2000) at 
xiv; Barreto (2000) at 47; Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 8; Sandholtz and Koetzle 
(2000) at 51; Blackburn et al (2006) at 2447; given, as Vinod (1999) at 592 observes: “A 
fight against corruption involves fighting human nature.”. 
102  Or, as one scholar (Di Vito (2007) at 15), argues, finding the right balance between 
government failure and market failure. 
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Categorisation of Corruption 
 
Numerous efforts have been made to define and/or categorise corruption, 
usually on some graduated scale based on impact or seriousness.  While 
there is general agreement about the broad definition of corruption, there 
are a broad range of categorisations of corruption, ranging across: 
petty/grand; demand-/supply-driven; centralised/decentralised; corruption 
with/without theft; market/parochial; corruption according to/against the 
rule; and, greasing/blocking corruption. 
 
The most widely accepted definition of corruption refers “… to the use of 
public office for private gains, where an official (the agent) entrusted with 
carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of 
malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the 
principal.” 103.  In short, corruption is the abuse of public office for private 
gain104.  Others have extended the scope of this definition to include those 
in positions of authority and leadership within private enterprise and the 
non-profit sector (for example, trade unions, or aid and development 
agencies)105.   The standard form definition has drawn criticism for a number 
of reasons, most notably for being unreasonably narrow, restricting 
corruption to the public sector alone, and not recognising comparable 
incidences of corruption in the private sector106. 
                                                 
103  Bardhan (1997) at 1321. 
104  Shliefer and Vihny (1993) at p 599; World Bank (1997) at 102; Tanzi (1998) at 8; Wei 
(1999) at 4. 
105  Ehlrich and Lui (2000) at 4. 
106  Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 689. Braguinsky (1996) at 14, for example, points out 
insider trading is a particularly insidious form of corruption practiced within the private 
sector which does not attract the same degree of moral opprobrium as corruption within 
the governmental sector.  
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One prominent categorisation of corruption is into ‘petty’ and ‘grand’ 
corruption. ‘Petty corruption’ has been defined as that “practiced by 
underpaid civil servants who come to depend on small ‘contributions’ from 
the public to meet basic needs or to help pay a perverse form of tithe to 
their superiors for the right to hold a public sector job and profit from the 
many opportunities for extortion that it offers.”107.  By comparison, ‘grand  
corruption’ is regarded as conduct “practised by high officials who, in the 
process of making decisions of significant economic value, routinely demand 
bribes, kickbacks, percentages or other ‘gifts’ from those seeking 
government tenders and sales.”108.  Regardless of the definition used, 
whether petty or grand, corruption has a number of common 
characteristics: the involvement of a public official; the capacity to exercise 
a discretionary power; misuse of that power; and, the provision of a benefit, 
usually money or in kind. 
 
An allied categorisation is ‘state capture’109, which occurs when (usually 
larger) enterprises make ‘grand corruption’ scale payments to politicians and 
public officials to effect the design and implementation of laws and 
regulations.  ‘State capture’ is intended to generate a self-reinforcing 
dynamic under which those holding ‘capture power’ use it to subvert 
political and economic institutions for their own benefit or that of their 
                                                 
107  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 8. 
108  Id.  See Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) for an extensive discussion of ‘grand corruption’ in 
public investment, especially infrastructure projects; Rose-Ackerman (2002) where it 
involves multinational enterprises. 
109  Hellman et al (2000b) at 2; Lambsdorff (2002b) at 104; for a good general discussion of 
the ‘state capture’ approach to corruption, see Kaufman and Vicente (2011). 
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allies (often known as “crony bias”110).  Such ‘state capture’ through ‘grand 
corruption’ contrasts with ‘state influence/petty corruption’ (generally 
practiced by smaller firms) which seeks to exert some influence over the 
administrative implementation of existing laws and regulations.  In essence, 
‘state capture’ corruption seeks to ‘buy’ the entitlement to design the rules 
of the game, while ‘state influence’ seeks to ‘rent’ the implementation of 
rules already made111.   
 
Another categorisation is ‘demand-/supply-driven’ corruption112.  Demand-
driven corruption reflects the demand by the public for corrupt acts 
involving, for example, reduction or elimination of tax liabilities, favourable 
spending decisions by government and/or access to publicly provided goods 
and services at lower-than-otherwise prices.  By comparison, supply-driven 
corruption reflects the willingness and capacity of public officials to initiate 
corrupt behaviour, which can be reflected in the nature and extent of 
institutional controls and punishment regime, the level of public sector 
wages and the conduct of higher political and bureaucratic leadership113.  
During the authoritarian Soeharto years in Indonesia, for example, “the  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110  Hellman and Kaufman (2002) at 1. 
111  An important consequence for impacted, smaller firms is those outside the ‘state 
capture’ group generally experience weaker property rights, and diminished commercial 
sales and investment performances: Hellman et al (2000b) at 4; Gaviria (2002) at 245.    
112  Tanzi (1998) at 3. 
113  Chand and Moene (1999) at 1130; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590 – 592.  
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entire regime was built upon maximising corruption.”114. In the kleptocratic 
State115, the strong, corrupt leader at the centre allows ‘bounded corruption’, 
under which corrupt behaviour (and pricing) is regulated to ensure greedy 
or unreliable lesser officials do not endanger the overall (corrupt) system116. 
 
An allied categorisation is centralised/decentralised corruption117. In the 
centralisation case, the participants engage in ‘lump-sum corruption’ (one 
large payment) at a given central point in the political machinery, thus 
mitigating the potential for inconsistent, discretionary decisions at the 
margin. By contrast, decentralisation involves numerous, smaller corrupt 
transactions at decision-making points well-removed from, or out at the 
periphery of, the central administration.  The Soeharto years in Indonesia 
are, again, a relevant case-in-point118. 
 
                                                 
114  MacIntyre (2003) at 11, and Robertson-Snape (1999) more generally for interesting 
discussions of the corrupt State during the Soeharto years in Indonesia. 
115  Coolidge and Rose-Ackerman (1997) at 6, and more generally for an expansive 
conceptual discussion of corruption in a ‘kleptocratic State’ and a review of relevant 
experiences in a number of African countries since the 1960s.  For an overview of peak 
level corruption in South Korea during the 1990s see Khan (1996) at 684 – 685; Charap 
and Harm (1999) for a general discussion of corruption in what they call ‘predatory 
hierarchies’ and in dictatorial States. 
116  Beyond Soeharto’s Indonesia, regulated corruption was practiced in South Korea 
during the Park Chung Hee years (1961 – 1979) per Moran (1999) at 571; Khan (1996) at 
683 reports former President Roh Tae Woo admitted in 1995 he had accumulated a 
personal fortune amounting to some $US 650 million during just five years in office! 
117  Bradhan (1997) at 1325. 
118  Ironically, Soeharto came to power promising to tackle the corruption of the Sukarno 
years: Robertson-Snape (1999) at 589. Indeed, the problem of decentralisation of 
corruption in Indonesia appears to have persisted beyond the Soeharto years:   Olken and 
Barron (2008) at 338.  As former President Mobutu, of Kenya, was reported (cited in Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) at 6) to have said: “If you want to steal, steal a little 
cleverly, in a nice way.  Only if you steal so much as to become rich overnight, you will 
be caught.” 
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Another categorisation is ‘corruption without theft’ and ‘corruption with 
theft’119.  In the ‘corruption without theft’ case, the corrupt official turns 
over the full price of the good or service to the government, so the 
government incurs no direct loss of income from the corrupt act (with the 
corrupt official charging a ‘price plus corrupt mark-up’, the latter of which 
he/she keeps for themself).  By comparison, in the ‘corruption with theft’ 
case the corrupt official charges a price of their own determination (often 
lower than that formally mandated) for the products or services, conceals 
the transaction and retains the entire amount as a benefit for him/herself120. 
 
Corruption can also take the form of ‘market’ versus ‘parochial’ 
corruption121.  Market corruption takes place in a competitive market 
environment and with a high degree of transparency.  For the parties to 
such corrupt engagements, the identity of the other party is largely 
irrelevant and driven primarily by short-termism and opportunity122.  By 
contrast, ‘parochial corruption’ occurs in situations with few potential 
corrupt parties and thus an environment of limited or restricted 
competition.  There is also limited entry and exit of players, and the 
confidentiality, identity and trust of the parties on both sides of the illicit 
transaction is a matter of importance.  
 
                                                 
119  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at 601–602. 
120 A common example of the latter in developing countries involves corrupt customs 
officials allowing goods to pass across border check-points without being recorded in 
return for corrupt payments (usually at a bribe price below the official tax payable).  
Given both parties (the bribe-payer and the corrupt official) benefit, the probability of 
disclosure or detection is small. 
121  Lambsdorff (2002a) at 222. 
122 ‘Petty corruption’ often falls in to this category. 
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Beyond size, corruption can be tested against its implications for the laws 
and regulations impacted.  ‘Grease payments’, which are made to expedite a 
procedure which should normally have been carried out by the relevant 
official, can be regarded as ‘corruption according to the rule’ (that is, the 
official being paid additionally to do what they are supposed to do).  By 
comparison, ‘bribes’ which are payments to obtain services which the 
official is generally prohibited from providing can be regarded as 
‘corruption against the rule’.  Broadening the framework slightly, extortion 
can be considered as something of an ‘harassment tax’ – a charge which the 
impacted firm or person must pay to avoid harassment by the relevant 
government official(s)123. 
 
Another categorisation distinguishes between ‘greasing’ and ‘blocking’ 
corruption124.  ‘Greasing corruption’ has characteristics of being predictable 
and acting like a transaction cost of doing business, while ‘blocking 
corruption’ tends to be unpredictable, causing large uncertainties for 
business, with the former being less damaging than the latter in economic 
terms125.  Research by the World Bank undertaken in the mid 1990s found 
the overwhelming majority of corruption in Asia, eastern Europe, and the 
Middle East and North Africa took the form of ‘grease corruption’, with the 
corrupt officials honouring their side of the illicit bargain and thus reducing 
uncertainty for the business party126. 
 
                                                 
123  World Bank (1997) at 103; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 12; see Marjit et al (2002) at 92 
and more generally on the powers of tax inspectors in developing countries to extort 
‘harassment tax’ payments from business and individual taxpayers to ensure ‘favourable’ 
tax assessments and/or obviate potential intrusive tax audits. 
124  Brunetti et al (1997a) at 31. 
125  World Bank (1997) at 103. 
126  Brunetti et al (1997a) at 31; see also Campos et al (1999) for comparable research. 
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The predictability of corruption can have important implications for the 
commercial, economic and social impacts of corruption, with more 
predictable corruption being less damaging than less predictable corruption 
in its impact on business investment and economic performance127.  In this 
framework: countries with high levels and low predictability of corruption 
tend to be most disadvantaged by corruption; those with high levels and 
greater predictability are less worse-off than the preceding group; while the 
least worse-off are those countries with low levels but high predictability of 
corruption128.  In some countries corruption is so predictable the implicit 
prices attached to certain corrupt activities are almost common 
knowledge129.   
 
 
 
                                                 
127  World Bank (1997) at 103; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 134; Tanzi and Davoodi 
(2000) at 11; Thede and Gustafsen (2012) at 662. Campos et al (1999) at 1061, define 
predictability to mean the degree to which the bribe-paying party is confident the 
recipient will honour their side of the illicit bargain, generally in the form of a petty 
corrupt act such as the granting of a licence or the like.  For those interested in the 
‘honour amongst thieves’ view of corruption, see Lambsdorff (2002a and 2008).   For 
example, Lambsdorff (2002a) at 223: “Preference for honesty can have a rather ambiguous 
effect on corruption.  It may restrict the inclination to become involved in corruption, but 
it can also help to enforce corrupt contracts.”   
128  Campos et al (1999) at 1061.  In so far as any policy lessons can be drawn, where a 
trade-off is necessary between the level and the predictability of corruption, the least-
worse scenario is to tolerate more predictable ahead of a greater incidence of corruption.   
129 For example, the bribe required in Zimbabwe to obtain a drivers licence was known to 
be around $US 12, as were the bribe price of the telephone repair in Beijing (Carrilla 
(2000) at 258–259), while the bribe-price for public sector positions with higher potential 
for extorting corrupt payments was well known in the former Soviet satellite States of 
Albania, Georgia, and Lativa (World Bank (1998) at 3; Alam (1989) at 444).  Other well-
known examples include bribe-prices for driving licences, marriage licences and birth 
certification in Indonesia  (Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590). 
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Indeed, corruption can become so institutionalised as to have its own 
functional culture and regulated framework130: in effect, the ‘laws and 
practices of corruption’.  According to one account131, grand corruption 
became so institutionalised in the former Soviet Union all bribes were 
channelled through the local office of the Communist Party, and any 
deviation from the agreed-upon-pattern and pricing of corruption would be 
penalised by the higher echelons of the Party bureaucracy. India, by 
contrast, reportedly practices ‘competitive corruption’ where behaviour and 
prices are set independently by the direct parties in a revenue-optimisation 
manner (revenue relative to risk), and where new players enter the 
corruption process from the government side by creating new laws and 
regulations that are in turn used for extortion-motivated harassment132. 
 
Table 2.1 provides a summary of the main typologies of corruption.  As 
discussed earlier, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, with 
particular instances of corruption potentially having features of several of 
the typologies.  For example, a small payment made by a local businessman 
to a regional official to get a licence issued with the official keeping the 
money would have elements of petty, demand-driven, decentralised and 
with-theft corruption.    
 
 
 
                                                 
130  Charap and Harm (1999) at 3. 
131  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at 605, who also have similar stories about The Philippines 
during the Marcos years, and parts of Italy under the domination of organised crime.  See 
also Charap and Harm (1999) for similar stories from Africa nations with strong dictators. 
132  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at 605; Wu (2005) at 154.  For a good discussion of the 
nature and incidence of corruption in India see Earle and Cava (2008/09) at 78–81. 
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Table 2.1:  Typologies of Corruption 
 
Petty Corruption:  small payments to 
low level civil servants for minor 
functions 
 
 
Grand Corruption:  large payments 
to high level civil servants for 
decisions of significant economic or 
political value 
 
 
Demand Driven Corruption:  the 
corrupt activity or opportunity is 
initiated by a member of the public 
 
 
Supply Driven Corruption:  the 
corrupt activity or opportunity is 
initiated by a public official 
 
Centralised Corruption:  corruption 
is organised or paid at a central point 
in the civil service or political 
machinery 
 
 
Decentralised Corruption:  
corruption takes place well-removed 
from, or at the periphery of, the 
central administration 
 
 
Corruption With Theft:  the 
government incurs a loss of revenue 
from the corrupt activity – the 
corrupt official retains some of the 
revenue for themselves’ 
 
 
Corruption Without Theft:  the 
government incurs no loss of 
revenue from the corrupt activity – 
the corrupt official retains a ‘mark-
up’ on the formal price 
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Market  Corruption:  there is a 
competitive and transparent market 
for corruption eg regarding the price 
for different corrupt activities 
 
 
 
Parochial Corruption:  there is a 
restricted market place for 
corruption, with limited entry and 
exit, and opacity regarding the 
identities and prices of the corrupt 
players 
 
 
Corruption According to the Rule:  
made to expedite an official 
performing their proper duties (eg 
issuing a licence) 
 
 
 
Corruption Against the Rule:  made 
to produce a different outcome from 
a decision-making process, which 
absent corruption, would not 
otherwise have occurred 
 
 
Greasing Corruption:  minor and 
predictable corruption, usually 
regarded as a cost of doing business  
(see also Petty Corruption, and 
Corruption According to the Rule) 
 
 
 
Blocking Corruption:  major and 
unpredictable corruption, often 
producing major uncertainties and 
enhanced political risk for business 
(see also Grand Corruption, and 
Corruption Against the Rule) 
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The concept of corruption is not uniformly accepted without qualification 
around the world.  What might be regarded as corruption in one national or 
regional culture may not be considered corruption elsewhere in the world, 
or across time133.  Different perceptions and practices of ‘corruption’ may be 
attributable to diversity in experiences and perceptions of how business and 
government relations are conducted, rather than detached observations of 
what may appear to be corrupt payments, for example efforts to ‘buy’ 
favourable treatment134.  It can also reflect cultural differences in attitudes to 
the independence of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, where 
those bodies more subject to political control are less likely to consider 
allegations of corruption either at all, objectively or vigorously135.   
 
Adopting a cross-cultural/-national, a survey conducted in Thailand in the 
early 1990s found what those surveyed (Thai nationals) considered 
permissible conduct by government officials may well have been regarded 
as corruption in the United States or Western Europe136.  Similar attitudes 
appear to be held in Indonesia in the context of Javanese (patrimonial)  
                                                 
133  Heywood (1997) at 423–425; Nelken and Levi (1996) at 6–10; Kim and Kim (1997) at 
561–571; George and Lacey (2000) at 591; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 33–34; 
Treisman (2000) at 402–403.    
134  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 10.  However, according to Wei (1997) at 18, such 
arguments are really little more than self-interest- and -justification on the part of corrupt 
officials. 
135  Nelken and Levi (1996) at 9–10; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 124. 
136  Wei (2001b) at 2. Wei (1997) at 18 quotes a German newspaper report: “The Thai 
Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mr Pairoj Lohsoonthorn, has publicly called on officials 
to accept bribes….”This is part of traditional Thai culture,” Mr Pairoj said.”. 
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cultural norms137 and in tropical Africa where successful members of a 
kinship or tribal group are expected to distribute largesse to others in their 
group. 
 
Such cultural filters can also emerge in developed, industrialised nations 
with foreign policy expediency framing what is/is not considered 
corruption, and when/where such practices are problematic and 
when/where they are not.  Several commentators138 have claimed western, 
industrialised nations, especially in the United States and Western Europe, 
were content, even quite willing, to ignore corruption amongst their 
political allies during the Cold War period which prevailed from the mid 
1940s until the late 1980s, where it gave them economic, political or 
strategic advantage over their (communist) adversaries. 
 
Areas of Vulnerability 
 
The public sector in most countries is, to varying degrees, vulnerable to 
corruption, depending on the role and functions of the agency, the nature 
and extent of supervision, and the ethical culture of the bureaucracy. As 
observed earlier, corruption as an almost inevitable consequence of  
                                                 
137  Robertson-Snape (1999) at 596–598, under which the Javanese ruler would dispense 
personal favours to his people.  See also Theobold (1999) for a general discussion of 
patrimonialism in least developing countries, and developing countries in Africa and Latin 
America. 
138  Williams (1999a) at 487 and (2000) at xiv; Tanzi (1998) at 4; Mauro (1998b) at 11; 
Quah (2001) at 454; Shams (2001) at 90. 
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government, with bribery/extortion a standard feature of engagement 
between officialdom on the one hand, and the citizenry and the private 
sector on the other139. 
 
Areas of the public sector regarded140 as particularly vulnerable to 
corruption include: public procurement and contracting141, especially where 
it is related to military acquisitions142; the utilities sectors, such as power, 
water and transport143; licencing, especially where import and export 
permits are required144; the administration of price controls145; revenue 
collection, in particular for taxation and customs146; government 
appointments and/or promotions147, most notably in areas related to the 
above activities; and, rezoning of land, especially to commercial and 
industrial purposes148.  The Asian Development Bank has estimated during 
the late 1990s corruption cost national governments in the region as much 
as fifty per cent of their tax revenues149. 
 
                                                 
139  Some scholars (Khalil et al, 2010, at 179) argue bribery and extortion should not 
considered as equivalents in terms of their design and their impact, with the latter being 
far more pernicious than the former, and initiatives which successfully work to reduce 
bribery are likely to be defeated when they are inevitably offset by increases in extortion . 
140  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 9. 
141  World Bank (1997) at 106; Tanzi (1998) at 12; Kaufman (1997) at 126; Hellman et al 
(2000a) at 40. 
142  Gupta et al (2001) at 749. 
143  Clarke and Xu (2002) at 23. 
144  Kaufman (1997) at 126. 
145  Id. 
146 Jong and Bogmans (2010) at 385; Chiumya (2011) at 539; Thede and Gustafsen (2012) at 
662. 
147  It has been observed (Murphy et al (1991) at 521): “People pay hundreds of thousands 
of dollars for positions with the power to allocate supposedly free water to farmers in 
India, since these jobs give them monopoly rights to charge for water.”   See also Kahana 
and Qijun (2010) at 82. 
148  Tanzi (1998) at 14. 
149  Reported in George et al (2000) at 493. 
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New firms, and especially smaller businesses, are particularly vulnerable to 
extortion by corrupt public officials150, for a number of reasons. These 
include newer private firms are often more in need of licences and permits 
to function151, and can be more profitable than other enterprises and hence 
have a greater capacity, ceteris paribus, to pay higher bribes (or be more 
likely to attract the attention of predatory officials)152.  At the same time, 
less efficient firms are more likely than their more efficient counterparts to 
engage in corruption, viewing such expenses as a mechanism to ‘rebalance’ 
the commercial playing field153. Furthermore, bribe taking/extortion may be 
more risky for the corrupt official at the early and more formative stages of 
the illicit relationship and with the less efficient firms154, and hence the 
corrupt official may demand higher payments in the form of a risk 
premium.  As the relationship matures, and both parties have a history of 
complicity (and mutual capture), the risk premium diminishes and the 
corrupt official becomes content with the steady stream of corrupt 
payments155.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
150  Murphy et al (1993) at 412; Hellman et al (2000a) at 46; Clarke and Xu (2002) at 8; 
Emerson (2002) at 63; Hellman and Kaufmann (2002) at 20. 
151  Hellman et al (2000b) at 13. 
152  Fisman and Svensson (2000) at 5; Hellman and Kaufman (2002) at 19; Safavian et al 
(2001) for the (negative) experience of micro-enterprises in post-Soviet Russia, and 
Bishara (2011) for similar impacts on like enterprises in the Middle East. 
153 Cheung et al (2011) at 1. 
154 They tend to be inferior in their abilities to conceal their illicit activities from the 
properly functioning (non-corrupt) authorities: Cheung et al (2011) at 4. 
155  Murphy et al (1993) at 413; Clarke and Xu (2002) at 8. 
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Countries with an abundance of natural resources, and businesses engaged 
in the extraction and exporting of natural resources are particularly 
susceptible to corruption156. This reflects the often substantial capital 
investments required to develop a natural resources site (for example, an 
iron ore or uranium mine, let alone one for precious metals such as gold or 
minerals such as diamonds or sapphires)157.  It also reflects the tendency for 
such projects to require numerous approvals and licences, the need for often 
substantial complementary public investment in infrastructure (such as 
roads and seaports) and the often very high profits from natural resources 
development, which in turn attracts the attention of rent-seekers amongst 
predatory bureaucracies and political players.  
 
Causes of Corruption 
 
There is no one, single cause of corruption.  Rather, corruption can build 
upon one or more of a broad range of factors which are present to varying 
degrees in almost all countries.  These include deficiencies in: economic 
governance; market institutions; political governance and institutions; the 
nature and extent of taxation and of government spending; the processes by  
                                                 
156  Leite and Widemann (1999), and Pendergast, Clarke and Van Kooten (2011) for broad 
discussions of the linkages between natural resources endowments their development and 
corruption in developing countries.  See also Treisman (2000) at 429; Clarke and Xu (2002) 
at 20; Paldam (2002) at 220; Sarr et al (2011) at 376. Both generally and specifically where 
they include diamonds, see Chang and Golden (2010) at 17. 
157  Although Leite and Widemann (1999) at 22 find the fuels and ores sub-sector of the 
natural resources sector tend to be less vulnerable than the agriculture and foods sub-
sector, leading one to conjecture the presence of foreign investors in the former has a 
disciplining effect on the ‘grabbing hand’ of government officials which local farmers 
cannot avoid. 
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which civil servants are appointed, rewarded and promoted; as well as the 
presence of activist industry and trade policies, and the mixed impact of 
globalisation158. 
 
Poor economic and political governance creates opportunities and 
incentives for corruption.  Key characteristics of poor economic governance 
include excessive government intervention in economic activity, 
deficiencies in government transparency159, accountability and economic 
management160, and the absence of a stable, rules-based competitive 
domestic market place161.  Excessive government intervention, often in the 
form of ‘over-regulation’, creates opportunities for rent-seeking162 by 
government officials, lack of transparency can conceal the conflict (or 
multiplicity) of interest(s) of government officials (especially where they 
have outside private commercial interests), while the absence of a stable, 
rules-based competitive market regime provides a fertile ground for 
arbitrary and discretionary official conduct. 
                                                 
158  Some analysts, using econometric modelling techniques, have found countries without 
Protestant (Christian) ethos and traditions are more susceptible to corruption: Sandholtz 
and Koetzle (2000) at 31; Paldam (2001) at 402; La Porta (1999) at 265; Gokeekus (2008) at 
59; Treisman (2000) at 427 - 429; Wu (2005) at 166; Travits (2007) at 225.  Serra (2006) at 
226, for example, argues this reflects the egalitarian and individualistic characteristic of 
that creed, in contrast to what the author considers to be the more hierarchical religions 
such as Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy.     
159 Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) at 278. 
160 For a good discussion of the relative effectiveness of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ 
monitoring to ensure accountability amongst public officials, see Serra (2011).  She finds, 
inter alia, combined forms of such monitoring are more effective than one or other on 
their own (Id at 3). 
161  Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 3; Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) at 196; Clausen, Kraay and 
Nyiri (2011) at 212. 
162  Defined as “the activities and expenditures of individuals who seek to change rights to 
earn the above normal profits described as rents.”: Khan (1996) at 687.  For a detailed 
discussion of the economic theory of ‘rent-seeking’ see Lambsdorff (2002b) at 99–108;  
also Murphy et al (1993) at 409, and Khan (1996) at 687–688. 
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Weak market institutions can facilitate corruption and foster the broader 
environment for corruption especially in developing nations and economies 
in transition163. Not surprisingly, well-established systems of market 
institutions – typified by clear and transparent rules, strong law 
enforcement mechanisms, and a robust competitive environment – reduce 
rent-seeking opportunities and thus the incentives for corruption164. 
Conversely, the weakness of market institutions, evident in the intensity of 
barriers to entry of new businesses, the (in)effectiveness of the legal system, 
and the competitiveness of services provided by infrastructure 
monopolies165, can encourage corruption 
 
Weak political governance and institutions can also facilitate corruption166, 
primarily through the channels of deficiencies in political accountability167, 
the structure of the provision of public goods168 and the absence of an 
effective rule of law169.  Inadequacies in political accountability can become 
evident in low probabilities of exposure and punishment for officials 
engaged in corruption, and inadequate transparency in the provision of  
 
 
                                                 
163  Boardman and Recanatini (2000) at 1; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 21; Goel and Nelson 
(2010) at 444. 
164  Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 39. 
165  Boardman and Recanatini (2000) at 15. 
166  Although the direction of causality can also flow the other way, with corruption 
undermining political governance and State institutions, weakening them / ensuring they 
remain weak: Hellman and Kaufmann (2002) at 6; Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) at 214. 
167 Especially where there is a lack of clarity of responsibility amongst/ within political 
institutions, which can be measured by indicators such as the majority status of 
government, cabinet duration, party system fragmentation, and influence of opposition 
parties on policy making: Travits (2007) at 227. 
168  Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 4; Lederman et al (2001) at 4. 
169  Hellman et al (2000a) at 1; Leite and Weidmann (1999) at 23; Brown and Shakman 
(2007) at 319. 
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governmental activities, while the absence of competition in the provision  
of public goods affords additional opportunities for rent-seeking (read: 
corruption) by officials170.  Shortcomings in these areas can have a profound 
effect on the incidence of corruption, with democracy171, decentralisation of 
government172, electoral competition and rules173, parliamentary systems, 
political stability174, independent and robust prosecutors175 and judiciaries176 
and freedom of the press177 all associated with a lower prevalence of 
corruption178.  
 
                                                 
170  Andvig and Moene (1990) at 319; Shleifer and Vishny (1993); Lederman et al (2001) at 
9; Di Vito (2007) at 26; Di Giacchino and Franzini (2008) at 291; Tonoyan et at (2010) at 
819; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
171  Naim (1995) at 251 – 253; Rose-Ackerman (1999) at 378; Clarke and Xu (2002) at 20; 
Wei (2000) at 15; Tresiman (2000) at 433; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 32; Krause and 
Mendez (2009) at 181; Brown and Shakman (2007) at 319; Bobonis and Camara Feuertes 
(2000) at 1; Goel and Nelson (2010) at 440. 
172  Fisman and Gatti (1999) at 3; Wei (2000a) at 15; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 32; 
Lederman et al (2001) at 10; Ali and Isse (2003) at 460; Bentzen (2012) at 182. However, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001) at 1 caution such regional decentralisation of 
government only changes the nature, not the incidence, of corruption, with local 
economic, political and social elites benefiting at the expense of non-elites in the 
provision of government services.  Treisman (2000) at 433 makes a similar point.    
173 Especially regarding term-limits, that is the number of times an elected represented can 
be (re-) elected: Bobonis and Camara Fuertes (2009) at 2: Ferraz and Finan (2010) at 1. 
174  Leite and Widemann (1999) at 23; Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) at 440; Olofsgaard 
and Zahran (2008) at 166; Hodge et al (2011) at 482.  Robinson and Sattar (2011/12) at 738 
argue corruption within democratically elected governments has been used to justify, and 
then sustain, military coups in a number of Asian nations, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and Thailand.  
175  Van Aaken, Feld and Voigt (2010) at 210. 
176  Naim (1995) at 247; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 124; Tonoyan et at (2010) at 819. 
177  Lederman et al (2001) at 2; Treisman (2000) at 404; Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 10; 
Naim (1995) at 247; Frelie et 1l (2007) at 838; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
178  For a contrary view see Warner (2003) who argues, following a study of the European 
Union, the spread of freer trade, deregulation and privatisation, political competition, and 
economic decentralisation can fuel corruption amongst poorer, less developed economies. 
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Taxation is often regarded as a primary cause of corruption, particularly in 
terms of the burden, structure and operation of taxation systems179.  
Corruption can be regarded as analogous to an (illegal) tax180, one that can 
impose substantial economic costs for developing countries in particular181.   
Taxation systems particularly vulnerable to corruption tend to be 
characterised by: laws that are complex and/or difficult to understand182, and 
subject to differing interpretations; the payment of taxes requiring frequent 
contact between taxpayers and tax administrators; and, administrative 
procedures which involve discretion by tax officials, and/or lack of 
transparency, for example in the selection of audits and litigation, or the 
determination and collection of liabilities183.  The provision of tax 
incentives, especially to preferred firms or industries, and where it involves 
discretionary decisions by government officials, also creates windows of 
                                                 
179 The impact of taxation on corruption can be both first order (the mere existence of a 
taxation system motivates people to engage in corrupt practices to avoid having to pay 
taxes per se) or second order (for example, people engage in corrupt practices to evade 
having to pay their assigned tax obligations.) 
180  Rivera-Baitz (2001) at 728; Shleifer and Vishny (1993) at 612; Abed and Davoodi 
(2000) at 14; Hellman et al (2000a) at 36; Friedman et al (2000) at 481; Olken and Pande 
(2011) at 4; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 12. 
181  By one estimate, each $US 1 of corruption imposes around $US 1.67 of burden to the 
impacted economy: Vinod (1999) at 601, using then prevailing exchange rates.  
Corruption can also be a regressive ‘tax’, with the bribe burden carried by smaller firms in 
economies-in-transition being around 60 per cent higher than for larger firms, when 
measured as a share of their own annual revenues: Hindriks et al (1999) at 395. According 
to Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 8, the figures were 5 per cent of annual revenues for small 
firms, compared to 3 per cent for large firms. Marjit et al (2000) at 92 point out richer 
individuals in a society also have greater capacity to engage in bribery of taxation officials 
to reduce their tax obligations, opportunities which are not usually available to the poor, 
thus shifting the relative tax burden away from the rich and more toward the poor and so 
reducing the progressivity/increasing the regressivity of the income tax system. 
182  Richardson (2006) at 323. 
183  Tanzi (1998) at 11; Chand and Moene (1999) at 1138; Hindriks et al (1999) at 396–397.  
See Robertson-Snape (1999) at 594–595 for an illustration of the corruption – taxation 
nexus in Indonesia during the Soeharto years. 
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opportunity for corruption184.  However, causality can also run the other 
way – corruption can adversely impact the taxation system, in the form of 
greater incidence of tax evasion, higher tax collection costs, and a narrowing 
of the tax base185 as business engage in ‘capital flight’ or relocate to the 
‘unofficial economy’186. 
 
Government spending can also be a driver of corruption, with ‘bigger 
governments’ (that is, those with larger aggregate spending as a proportion 
of national economies) being more vulnerable to corruption than ‘smaller’ 
governments187.  Corruption in government spending can be particularly 
problematic where it involves a substantial degree of discretion in decision-
making and/or lack of transparency188.  General public procurement and 
major public investment projects are particularly vulnerable to 
corruption189, while ‘extra-budgetary accounts’ which exist in some national 
public sector accounting processes are ripe for corrupt exploitation190.  
Activities subject to greater confidentiality and secrecy (such as military  
 
 
                                                 
184  Tanzi (1998) at 14; Kaufmann (1997) at 127. 
185  Which means an increased tax burden has to be imposed on a small number of persons 
to raise a given amount of tax revenue. 
186  Friedman et al (2000) at 461; Al-Marhubi (2000) at 199; Azpitarte (2011) at 13; Singh, 
Jain-Chandra and Mohommad (2012) at 1. 
187  Goel and Nelson (1998) at 111; Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 3; Ali and Isse (2003) at 460. 
188 Effective audits of government spending programs have been found to lead to 
significant reductions in corruption, especially where the results of these audits are 
publicised through media campaigns, at least in the short term:  Bobonis and Camara 
Fuertes (2009) at 1; Ferraz and Finan (2010) at 1 – 2; Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2011) at 4. 
189  Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 1; Tanzi (1998) at 12. 
190  Kaufmann (1997) at 128;  Tanzi (1998) at 13. 
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spending, which is often concealed under a cloak of ‘national security’191, 
and aspects and stages of privatisation processes192) and thus lesser legislative 
or wider public oversight or review are particularly vulnerable to 
corruption193. 
 
The processes by which civil servants are appointed, rewarded and 
promoted can also have an impact on the corruption problem194.  The 
incidence and burden of corruption tends to be higher in systems where 
civil service personnel practices are more exposed to nepotism and 
patronage195.     Low civil service salaries, both in absolute terms and relative 
to those available from comparable employment in the private sector, can 
stimulate corruption: the lower the relative civil service salary, the higher 
the incidence of corruption196, the wedge having been described as “the rate  
 
 
                                                 
191  Gupta et al (2001) at 752 – 753; Liu (1996) at 28. 
192  Kaufman and Seigelbaum (1997) at 9. 
193  Schleifer and Vishny (1993) at 599; Mauro (1998a) at 264.   The preservation of such 
secrecy often means the ‘victims’ of corruption, such as taxpayers, are unaware they have 
been victimised: Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 33. 
194  Although the World Bank (1997) at 105 cautions: “It is unwise to deal with the 
possibility of corruption by assuming that government officials are of higher moral 
standing than the rest of the population.”. 
195  This is especially the case when public sector employment, particularly where it 
involves greater potential for corrupt and extortive behaviour (with low probability of 
detection and punishment) or are allocated through an auction system (under which those 
paying the greatest bribe get the position): Wei (1999) at 18.  Research by the World Bank 
(Wamey (1999) at 1) reports the incidence of the sale of public positions in a number of 
eastern European countries, with the incidence of ‘position-selling’ being most prevalent 
for customs officers, tax inspectors, and public legal officials (judges, prosecutors and 
investigators). 
196  Besley and McLaren (1993) at 120; Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) at 4; Kaufman 
(1997) at 128; Goel and Nelson (1998) at 116; Montinola and Jackman (2002) at 147. But 
see Treisman (2000) at 436, who produces econometric evidence to challenge this view. 
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of temptation”197.  Public sympathy with ‘poorly paid’ civil servants can lead 
to social acceptance of corruption, and reluctance to report it by ordinary 
citizens (at least up to the point where they consider it ‘fair and 
reasonable)198.   
 
Activist industry policies can stimulate corruption199, especially where they 
are designed to promote one sector over another (usually manufacturing 
over agriculture and services), are stratified by size of firm (often larger over 
smaller businesses) or by degree of investment in productive capital and/or 
in research and development (generally, in the form of public funding for 
more research/higher technology oriented enterprises)200. Some observers 
have gone so far as to argue: “… corrupt politicians devise industrial policies 
to obtain bribes from the companies they pick as ‘national champions.’”201.  
In these situations, politicians and bureaucrats with control rights over 
policy formation and/or the distribution of largesse intervene to capture 
some of the economic rents (in the form of extortion payments) for  
 
 
 
                                                 
197  World Bank (1997) at 104. 
198  Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) at 23.  For a contrary view see Besley and McLaren 
(1993) at 137, who see more effective monitoring of civil servants conduct of their duties, 
rather than wage levels, as the better policy response. 
199  Ades and Di Tella (1997a) at 1023; Mauro (1998b) at 11; Khan (1996) at 685. 
200  Ades and Di Tella (1997a) at 1023–1024. 
201  Ibid at 1037.  See Moran (1999) at 575, for the example of the South Korean chaebols 
during the administration of Kim Young Sam in the 1990s. 
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themselves202.   Government procurement programs, which are often closely 
associated with activist industry policies, are also vulnerable to corruption 
for similar reasons203.   
 
Trade policy can play an important role in determining the incidence and 
impact of corruption.  A number of studies have found countries less open 
to international trade (evident in higher tariffs and regulatory/non-tariff 
barriers) tend to experience relatively greater incidences of corruption, 
reflecting the absence of the disciplinary effect of greater competition for 
local companies from foreign firms204. The extortion problem is particularly 
acute where tariffs are higher, and/or differ considerably across imported 
goods, providing customs officials with the opportunity to extract rents 
from importing firms, for example using any discretionary powers to 
reclassify goods into a lower tariff category in exchange for a corrupt 
payment205.  
 
 
                                                 
202 Politicians in particularly high-leverage positions, especially those with greater power 
over decision-making processes and outcomes, tend to charge much higher bribe-prices, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the overall ‘value in play’: Cheung et al 
(2011) at 5. 
203  World Bank (1997) at 106; Ades and Di Tella (1997a) at 1036.  That is, the bureaucrat 
seeking a bribe payment to allow the enterprise to even participate, let alone win, the 
government procurement contract. 
204  Ades and Di Tella (1997b) at 514, and (1999) at 988; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 
44; Harma (2000) at 33; Treisman (2000) at 435; Torrez (2002) at 387. 
205  Economists have found a strong association between the variance in tariffs (a measure 
of their dispersion) within individual countries and the incidence of corruption across 
nations, with much of the extorted payments constituting ‘corruption with theft’ – that is, 
most of the money going into the pockets of corrupt customs officials: Kaufman (1997) at 
122; Gatti (1999) at 2; Jong and Bogmans (2010) at 357; Chiumya (2011) at 539. See also 
Clarke and Xu (2002) at 20. 
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Globalisation can have a mixed impact on corruption, on the one hand 
combating it and on the other hand facilitating it. The corruption combating 
effects of globalisation include its positive impact on democratisation of 
political processes, decentralisation of decision-making, liberalisation of 
market forces (including deregulation of markets, and privatisation of 
nationalised assets), and expanded freedoms for the media206. By contrast, 
globalisation can be a force for facilitating corruption within, and 
encouraging its spread between, countries. The globalisation of electronic 
communications, evident in the rapid up-take in usage of the Internet and 
allied electronic mail systems, may have increased substantially the 
opportunities for corruption, not least of which through their facility for 
international money transfers and related money laundering207.  
 
Consequences of Corruption 
 
The specific consequences of corruption are usually contextual, being 
dependent on the institutional structures, and state of economic 
development and growth of a particular Nation-State.  In a developing 
country pursuing market-based economic development strategies, 
corruption may be regarded as a transitive and short-term cost which has to 
be borne to achieve faster, sustained economic growth in the longer term.  
By comparison, for nations with totalitarian systems corruption can 
seriously threaten, even lead to the breakdown of, the economic and 
political system208,209. 
                                                 
206  Naim (1995) at 247; Kaufman (2003) at 2; Hodge et al (2011) at 482; Lalountas (2011) at 
645; Badinger and Nindl (2012) at 16. 
207  Quah (2001) at 456. 
208  Braguinsky (1996) at 14,  
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Corruption can be a substantial disincentive to foreign direct investment 
(FDI)210, reducing the overall levels of such inflows and presaging capital 
outflows (even ‘capital flight’), especially after financial and foreign 
exchange liberalisations211.  In short, corruption deters often much needed 
FDI212, with investment decisions being distorted by the nature and 
incidence of corruption, usually encouraging greater investment in 
politically favoured and/or less efficient activities213 and/or industries/firms 
less likely to be subject to corrupt expropriations (for example, 
manufacturing, rather than the more vulnerable resource industries214).  
Corruption can also distort the way in which multi-national firms finance 
their FDI, working to discourage equity and encourage debt based 
financing215.   
 
The relative incidence of corruption in the FDI source and recipient 
countries can also be important, with multinational enterprises tending to 
skew their foreign investments towards places with similar corruption 
                                                                                                                                            
209  Ibid at 24. 
210  Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 31–32; Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 695; Smarzynska 
and Wei (2000) at 12; Wei and Wu (2001) at 19; Besancenot and Vranceanu (2002) at 231; 
Lambsdorf (2003) at 240; Vinod (2003) at 886; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 12.  Wei (1997) at 
11 estimates a unit increase in corruption can be associated with a 16 per cent fall in the 
inflow of foreign direct investment, for selected group of developing countries.   
211  Rivera-Baitz (2001) at 727. 
212  Wei (2001a) at 12; Habib and Zurawicki (2001) at 687. 
213  Brunetti et al (1997a) at 23. 
214  Brouthers, Gao and McNicol (2008) at 673. The resources sector being more vulnerable 
because of factors such as licensing and the higher sunk costs associated with developing 
facilities such as mines, and oil and gas systems. 
215  The latter of which can be regarded as a more conditional and qualified form of 
commitment and a better means for handling political risk, but usually entails lesser 
transfers of management and marketing expertise, and technology to the host country: 
Straub (2008) at 245; Pantzalis et al (2008) at 387. 
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profiles to their home countries216. Whilst this may see foreign investors 
from ‘clean’ countries orienting their investments toward similar host 
countries, it can also result in investors from more corrupt nations directing 
their capital towards host nations’ with similar levels and styles of corrupt 
behaviour217, especially given the capacity of multinationals from corrupt 
nations to capitalise the value of their operating experience in such 
environments218. 
 
Corruption can also have a profound impact on the composition of capital 
flows into an economy, shifting them away from direct investment toward 
loan or portfolio flows219 (in effect, from longer to shorter term 
investments), and toward greater reliance on foreign currency 
denomination of capital transfers220 thus shifting the currency risks onto the 
recipient country; a potentially quite sizeable cost of corruption.  
Corruption can also impact the composition of FDI by forcibly skewing such 
investment toward joint ventures rather than otherwise-preferred wholly- 
 
                                                 
216 Econometric modelling has found company directors who are less accountable to 
shareholders in their home jurisdictions tend to pay higher bribes in foreign markets: 
Cheung et al (2011) at 5. 
217  Wu (2006) at 852; Cuero-Cazurra (2006) at 807. 
218  In the form of of higher-than-otherwise asset valuations.  In effect, understanding how 
to operate in a corrupt environment becomes an intellectual asset to the enterprise:  
Pantzalis et al (2008) 387.  As such, corrupt nations may not necessarily lose from 
corruption if they target similarly corrupt, capital-rich nations as sources of foreign direct 
investment. 
219  Wei and Wu (2001) at 20 -21, in part reflecting the availability of formal and informal 
insurance and related protections from international agencies such as the International 
Monetary Fund; Caprio, Faccio and McConnell (2011) at 21. 
220 Ibid at 20. 
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owned subsidiaries221.  This can also involve more defensive approaches to 
intellectual property protection, such as lesser technology transfer (notably 
of less sophisticated and behind ‘state of the art’ technologies) than may 
otherwise have been the case222.   
 
Corruption can have a profound adverse impact on the stability of private 
sector financial institutions, in particular domestic banks and equity 
markets, by reducing the quality of the balance sheets of banks, other 
institutional lenders and firms223.  Economic research has found corruption 
contributes to banking distress, and can accelerate the transmission of 
financial instability across international equity and currency markets224.  It 
can also impair the development of private financial institutions and 
systems in developing countries, and their capacity to engage with the 
broader international financial system to the cost of economic growth and 
development in impacted developing countries225. 
 
Corruption appears to have a mixed effect on foreign aid, with economists 
finding more corrupt countries tend to receive more foreign aid than their 
less corrupt counterparts226. The line of reasoning is as follows: corruption 
undermines economic development and growth, and public revenue raising 
capacities, in poorer countries which are then seen by aid donors as more in 
                                                 
221  Smarzynska and Wei (2000) at 13; Hallward-Driemeier (2009) at 27. 
222  Smarzynska and Wei (2000) at 13. 
223  Wei and Wu (2001) at 21. 
224  Vinod (2003) at 873, citing, at 889, Thailand and the ‘Asian Financial Crisis’ of 1997 as 
a case-in-point.  
225  Broadman and Recanatini (2000) at 16; Vinod (2003) at 877. Most often evident in 
interests rates which are higher, and foreign direct investment inflows that are lower, 
than otherwise. 
226  Alesina and Weder (2002) at 1126. 
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need of foreign aid.  However, when foreign aid is forthcoming it tends to 
create new opportunities for corruption, especially in the aid-favoured 
activities227, while corruption tends to undermine aid-effectiveness, 
especially in lower income and transitional economies228.  This, in turn, 
deters private donors and agencies from providing supplementary aid, 
which, together, have a negative impact on capital investment, and social 
development and economic growth229. 
 
Corruption can have a profound adverse impact on economic and social 
development in developing countries by expanding income inequality and 
increasing poverty230.  This occurs because corruption impedes economic 
growth, reduces the progressivity of the taxation system, distorts and 
undermines the effectiveness of social welfare spending, and results in lower 
general funding of, and unequal access to, the education system and through 
this the formation of human capital231. It also reflects the tendency of 
wealthy elites to lobby for preferential exchange rate, and trade, taxation 
and government spending policies that advance their interests232.  Such 
distributional consequences are likely to become more severe the greater 
the persistence of corruption233.   
                                                 
227  Ali and Isse (2003) at 460. 
228  Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 8. 
229  For an extensive discussion of the linkages between foreign aid and corruption see 
Kolstad, Fritz and O’Neil (2008), who argue the causal linkages and the consequences are 
more complex than presented and analysed by many quantitative economic scholars, and 
more detailed and nuanced approaches are required. 
230  Gupta et al (1998) at 1; Li et al (2000) at 155. 
231  Mauro (1998a) at 263; Gupta et al (1998) at 29; Wei (1999) at 2; Olofsgaard and Zahran 
(2008) at 166; Hodge et al (2011) at 482. 
232  Gupta et al (1998) at 7; Pani (2011) at 164. 
233  Gupta et al (1998) at 6.  Econometric research has estimated if business perceptions of 
the incidence of corruption in Bangladesh had been reduced to that of Singapore (that is, 
if Bangladesh had been perceived as being as ‘clean’ as Singapore) then Bangladesh’s 
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Corruption can be clustered with regulation and taxation as distortions to 
the market economy emanating from the public sector, and imposed upon 
the private sector at a broader cost to business entrepreneurship234, 
investment235, employment236, productivity237 and economic growth and 
development238.  All three – regulation, taxation and corruption – can 
influence the relative importance of the official (within the law) and 
unofficial (outside the law) economies239.  Government officials can use 
regulation and taxation, and their administration, as instruments to leverage 
corrupt payments, while citizens and businesses can engage in corrupt 
transactions to avoid or mitigate the impact of regulation and taxation240. 
 
The failure of public officials to lead by good example can mean the 
ordinary citizenry have diminished respect for proper authority and 
                                                                                                                                            
average annual per capita economic growth rate could have been almost 2 per centage 
points higher in the 25 years to 1985: Wei (1999) at 10. 
234  Murphy et al (1991) at 522.  Fisman and Svensson (2000) at 3, estimate each one 
percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a 3 per centage point 
reduction in firm growth, which is about three times the estimated effect of taxation.  See 
also Gaviria (2002) at 261; Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002) at 397; Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) 
at 95. 
235  World Bank (1997) at 103; Ades and Di Tella (1997b) at 514; Gaviria (2002) at 246. 
236  Especially amongst smaller firms: Gaviria (2002) at 261. 
237  Both in terms of the levels and rates of growth of total factor productivity: Salinas-
Jiminez et al (2007) at 913; and of public sector productivity:  Del Monte and Papagni 
(2001) at 14; Lambsdorff (2003b) at 457. 
238  Mauro (1995) at 681; Liu (1996) at 28; Johnson et al (1997) at 160; Barreto (2000) at 48; 
Paldam (2002) at 220; Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) at 432; Blackburn et al (2006) at 2464 
239 Johnson et al (1997) at 160; Friedman et al (2000) at 460; Eilat and Zinnes (2002) at 
1233; Azpitarte (2011) at 13; Singh, Jain-Chandra and Mohommad (2012) at 1. 
240  Economists have found a direct correlation between taxation and regulation on the 
one side, and corruption on the other: the higher the level of regulation and taxation, the 
greater the corrupt payments politicians can extort from entrepreneurs: Johnson et al 
(1997) at 170; Svensson (2003) at 220; Hopkins and Rodriguez-Pose (2007) at 200.   Khalil 
et al (2010) at 192–193 argue where law enforcement is required to pursue bribery or 
extortion (that is, a ‘one or the other’ situation) priority should be given to, and the 
greater dividends will come from action against, extortion. 
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through it lesser respect for government, whether at bureaucratic or elected 
levels, and if politicians and civil service leaders are regarded as being 
corrupt, there can be lesser motivation for ordinary people to refrain from 
engaging in similar conduct. As such, a ‘contagion effect’ spreads 
throughout the public sector241.   
 
Corruption can also cause biases within national taxation systems242, in 
particular encouraging tax evasion, poor tax administration, and exemptions 
(both legal and illicit) that disproportionately favour politically well-
connected and financially affluent population groups.  Such practices can 
cause a narrowing in the tax base and reduce the progressivity of the tax 
system.  In broad terms, the greater the incidence of corruption in the 
taxation system, the greater the tax-impost required to raise any given level 
of revenue243.  Economists have found corruption is associated with 
substantial revenue losses244, which reflect a pattern of businesses under-
reporting their taxable affairs in collusion, and individuals negotiating their  
tax liabilities, with corrupt tax inspectors. It can also reflect the 
pervasiveness of tax-evasion and the more regressive the tax system (that is, 
the relative burden of taxation is shifted from higher to lower 
                                                 
241  Chand and Moene (1999) at 1130; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 130.  As the World 
Bank observed, “Unchecked, the creeping accumulation of seemingly minor infractions 
can slowly erode political legitimacy to the point where even non-corrupt officials and 
members of the public see little point in playing by the rules.” : World Bank (1997) at 102. 
242  Gupta et al (1998) at 7. See Hindricks et al (1999) for a general discussion of the 
interaction between corruption, and taxation administration and policy. 
243  Freisdman et al (2000) at 461. 
244  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 18 report a unit increase in corruption, measured as a 
one-step rise in a given corruption index, is associated with a 1.5 per centage point decline 
in a nation’s total-revenue-to-GDP ratio, a 2.7 per centage point decline in its tax-to-GDP 
ratio, and a 0.6 per centage point fall in income-tax-revenue-to-GDP ratios. 
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income/wealth persons)245.  Direct (earnings-based) taxes appear more 
vulnerable than indirect (consumption or expenditure-based) taxes to 
corruption, with any given increase in the incidence of corruption coming 
at a greater cost to direct tax than indirect tax revenues246. 
 
Elsewhere within the public account, corruption distorts the pattern of 
public sector spending.  Not surprisingly, corrupt politicians and officials 
tend to spend a greater amount of public resources on activities which are 
more susceptible to bribery and extortion (such as unproductive 
infrastructure, and military acquisitions) and lesser amounts on those areas 
less vulnerable to such malfeasance (such as education and health)247. And, 
where such capital works/infrastructure spending takes place, they tend to 
be more of the so-called ‘white elephant’ variety248 - unproductive 
infrastructure with little or no commercial, economic or social value. 
Corruption also has causal linkages to higher-than-otherwise costs for any 
given project, lower quality of public sector infrastructure, and lower 
expenditures on operations and maintenance of existing infrastructure 
facilities249.   
                                                 
245  Hindricks et al (1999) at 395; Marjit et al (2000) at 92–93.  For a contrary view see 
Hunt and Laszlo (2005) who find corruption is not regressive, in that higher income 
households are more likely to make greater use of more senior and corrupt types of 
officials than are lower income households. 
246  Recognition of which has acted as an incentive for some governments to reorient 
taxation systems toward indirect (consumption/value-added tax) style systems: Tanzi and 
Davoodi (2000) at 20 - 21.   
247  Mauro (1998a) at 263; Gupta et al (2001) at 767; Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 3. 
248  Mauro (1998a) at 275. 
249  Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 7; Wei (1999) at 11.  These problems tend to be 
particularly acute in areas such as utility services (power, water and sewerage), roads, 
bridges and highways, and telecommunications: Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 18; Clarke 
and Xu (2002) at 1. Case studies have found corruption can increase the cost and lower the 
quality of public works projects by between 30 and 50 per cent: Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
at 5. 
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Corruption has an adverse impact on economic efficiency given its capacity 
to distort resource allocation within the public sector (where, as noted, 
infrastructure spending is skewed toward activities more vulnerable to 
corruption, ahead of economic or social merit) and the private sector where 
corporate effort is skewed toward rent-seeking activities rather than 
entrepreneurial endeavour250 (even to the extent of firms engaging in 
‘competitive corruption’251)252.    For many businesses, corruption can also 
push them to hold a greater share of their assets in liquid form (such as cash 
and deposits) which are less vulnerable than fixed assets (such as plant and 
structures) to corruption253 or, as noted earlier, forcing a sizeable proportion 
of them into ‘the unofficial economy’ to escape “the grabbing hand”254 of 
corrupt officials. 
 
Corruption also impacts adversely upon income distribution and inequality, 
with income distribution generally being less equal in more corrupt 
economies255.  This outcome reflects the tendency for social redistribution  
                                                 
250  Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 120. 
251  Hellman and Kaufman (2002) at 20–21, where larger and longer established firms in 
the private sector engage in rolling ‘bidding wars’ with each other and with smaller and 
newer firms through corrupt arrangements to secure and/or retain unequal influence with 
key government decision-makers. 
252  Economists have estimated such inefficiency costs can reduce annual economic growth 
rates by as much as one-fifth: Barreto (2000) at 47.  It has been reported businesses 
operating in China spend between 3 to 5 per cent of their operating costs on ‘gifts’ for 
government officials (Naim (1995) at 254), and a striking 90 per cent of Russian and 
Ukrainian business managers say it is normal for bribes to be paid to government officials 
(Johnson et al (2000) at 497). 
253  Caprio, Faccio and McConnell (2011) at 1. 
254  Friedman et al (2000) at 459. Ibid at 477 estimate a unit increase in an international 
corruption index is correlated with an almost 10 per cent rise in the share of the 
‘unofficial economy’ within the broader national economy for a sample of 42 developed 
and developing economies. 
255  Li et al (2000) at 155. 
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policies to create opportunities for exploitation by corrupt politicians and 
officials256, and for the poor to receive lower levels of social and other 
governmental services, have infrastructure decisions skewed against them257 
and income-earning options (especially by engaging in small business) 
reduced258.  Corruption also plays an important role in explaining 
differences in income inequality across nations259, with the impact being 
particularly powerful in Asia and in Latin America260.   
 
Not surprisingly, corruption can also fuel what is sometimes called the 
‘black’ or the ‘parallel’261 economy: illegal activity separate from 
conventional, legal commerce and industry.  This can reflect the illegal 
nature of the corrupt activity, the desire of businesses vulnerable to 
extortion to avoid the reach of corrupt officials262, and/or a rational 
commercial response to corruption-distorted policy settings or behaviour by 
government officials263.  As a result, a smaller share of commercial activity 
takes place in the ‘official economy’, and that which remains is usually less 
                                                 
256  Alesina and Angeletos (2005) at 1241. 
257  Being biased against projects that benefit the poor: Wei (1999) at 13. 
258  Wei (1999) at 13; Bishara (2011) at 228. 
259  Li et al (2000) at 157; Hunt (2006a) at 2. 
260  Interestingly, this inequality effect is configured in something of an ‘inverted U-shape’ 
– that is, visually akin to a ‘flat hump’ - indicating high or low levels of corruption tend to 
be associated with low income inequality, while intermediate levels of corruption tend to 
be associated with higher income inequality.  This would suggest middle income earners 
are more vulnerable to the adverse consequences of corruption (at least in the way it 
impacts on national income distributions) than are low income earners (who have lesser 
income with which to pay bribes) and higher income earners (who may be better 
positioned to insulate themselves, or exploit opportunities arising, from corruption):  Li et 
al (2000) at 177. 
261  Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002) at 397; Braguinsky (1996) at 24. 
262  Friedman et al (2000) at 459; Emerson (2002) at 64; Johnson et al (2000); Eilat and 
Zinnes (2002); Fadahunsi and Rosa (2002) all provide good general discussions of the 
linkages between corruption and the ‘black economy’. 
263  Marcouiller and Young (1995) at 630; Emerson (2002) at 63. 
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efficient than that which migrates to the ‘black economy’, thus producing a 
downward bias in official statistics on commercial and economic 
development and growth264. By one estimate265, corruption can induce as 
much as one-eighth of total national wealth to be redistributed from the 
formal to the informal economy.   
 
Beyond these ‘business-location’ decisions at the industry and firm level, 
corruption reduces the efficiency of firms as corrupt behaviour, in particular 
the payment of bribes, tends to be used by less efficient firms to weaken 
competition from more efficient enterprises, and thus undermine the 
ongoing commercial viability of the more efficient firm (where it does not 
respond in kind to the other firm’s corrupt activity)266.  It also acts to 
discourage entrepreneurship, organisational change and innovation267, given 
corrupt players tend to benefit from preservation of the ‘existing rules of the 
game’268.  The adverse effect of corruption on private sector innovation can 
be particularly powerful, especially amongst smaller, start-up enterprises269.  
Unlike their more established counterparts, innovative smaller businesses  
                                                 
264  Braguinsky (1996) at 24; Eilat and Zinnes (2002) at 1233. 
265  Barreto (2000) at 48.  See also Alam (1989) at 450. 
266  Clark and Riis (2000) at 110 – 111; Alam (1989) at 450.  The United States Government 
has reportedly claimed bribes determined the outcomes of some 239 international 
business contracts valued at $US 108 billion in the four year period to May 1998:  George 
et al (2000) at 493. 
267  With management effort diverted into engaging in corruption, rather than leading the 
company: Murphy et al (1991) at 520 and (1993) at 412; Rivera-Baitz (2001) at 728; Dal Bo 
and Rossi (2007) at 958 – 959. 
268  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at 615. 
269  Murphy et al (1993) at 413; Safavian et al (2001) at 1215.  Fisman and Svensson (2000) 
at 3 estimate each one percentage point increase in the bribery rate reduces firm growth 
by three percentage points. 
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are often constrained in their cash flow and access to credit facilities, and 
meeting demands for corrupt payments can require diversion of scarce 
capital away from productive activities.   
 
Macro-econometric modelling270 has also identified positive and negative 
implications of corruption for nations.  Corruption has been found to add to 
inflation (both in terms of its level, and its variability)271 and reduce 
economic growth rates272, potentially quite substantially273.  However, high 
and variable inflation can also facilitate corruption - that is, the causality 
runs from inflation to corruption274 - by making such practices easier to 
conceal. For example, spurious invoicing or price-loadings associated with 
corruption tend to be easier to mask during periods of higher inflation, as 
distinct from lower inflation when they may be more obvious275.  
Widespread corruption can also reduce national savings276, which is 
important for funding government spending and business investment, by as 
much as one-seventh277. 
 
                                                 
270  That is, at the national and international levels. 
271  Braun and Di Tella (2001); Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 22; Al-Marhubi (2002) at 202; 
Paldam (2002) at 215. 
272  Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), Kaufman and Wei (1999), Gupta et al, 1998) 
at 26; Ehlrich and Lui (1999) Braun and Di Tella (2001) ; Paldam (2002) at 215; Aidt, 
Dutta and Sena (2008) at 196. 
273  This higher variability in inflation reduces business investment (where a one standard 
deviation – a mesure of variability - increase in inflation variability reduces investment by 
just over 1 per cent of national output and reduces economic growth by around 0.33 per 
cent annually):  Braun and Di Tella (2001) at 16 – 17. 
274  Paldam (2002) at 222. 
275  Braun and Di Tella (2001) at 1.  Econometric estimates also indicate a one-standard 
deviation increase in corruption leads to a decline in average investment rates of some 8.5 
per cent of national output (Mauro (1995) at 681), and a fall in economic growth rate of 
1.4 per centage points annually (Leite and Weidmann (1999) at 25). 
276  Vinod (1999) at 594. 
277  Barreto (2000) at 47. 
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Corruption has also been found to be pro-cyclical, that is moving in tandem 
with the business and economic cycles278: corruption being higher during 
periods of business and economic growth, and lower during business and 
economic downturns.  Analysts have found rapid economic growth can lead 
to more corruption, reflecting the greater opportunities for public officials 
to demand corrupt payments and capacity to pay by business279 and 
households280. However, other researchers have made contrary findings, 
with the incidence of corruption rising during economic downturns as a 
greater number of people seek preferential treatment as a means of 
ameliorating commercial pain during difficult economic times281. 
 
Table 2.2 provides a summary of some of the main causes and consequences 
of corruption, grouped into four main themes: political; economic; 
institutional; and, policy settings.  The listing is non-exhaustive.  Similarly, 
the causal linkages do not necessarily run only from causes-to-
consequences, but as the earlier discussion has indicated can run in multiple 
directions:  what is a consequence in one situation may well be a cause in 
another.  For example, a weak or compromised system of law enforcement 
can in turn lead to weak or non-existent civil society which in turn can lead 
to patronage based civil service appointments and promotions  
 
 
 
                                                 
278  Braun and Di Tella (2001) at 4; Fisman and Svensson (2003) at 212.  Or at least the 
public’s willingness to tolerate corruption: Heywood (1997) at 419. 
279  Leite and Weidmann (1999) at 23. 
280  Hunt and Laszlo (2005) at 26. 
281  Goel and Nelson (1998) at 113. 
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and through this a misallocation of infrastructrure spending, inefficient 
regulatory and taxation sytems which results in lower economic growth, 
higher inflation and greater vulnerability to external shocks (for example, 
exchange rate crises)282. 
 
Table 2.2:  Causes and Consequences of Corruption 
 
Causes Consequences 
 
Political: 
 Absence of effective rule of 
law 
 Weaknesses in political 
accountability 
 Lack of competition in the 
provision of public goods 
 Distorted political 
competition/electoral rules 
 Lack of freedom of the press 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political 
 Diminished electoral and 
political accountability 
 Weaker civil society 
 Impedes transitions-to-
democracy 
 Lack of effective freedom of 
the press 
                                                 
282 The analogy of a neural network would not be in appropriate 
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Causes Consequences 
 
Economic: 
 Excessive government 
intervention in economic 
activity 
 Low levels of governmental 
transparency 
 Poor quality of economic 
management 
 Absence of rules-based, 
competitive markets 
 
 
Economic: 
 Distorted and/or weaker 
economic growth 
 Deterrent to foreign 
investment 
 Higher inflation 
 Distorted income/ wealth 
distributions 
 Greater vulnerability to 
external shocks  
 Weakens entrepreneurship 
 
 
Institutions 
 Absence of clear and 
transparent rules 
 Weak or compromised law 
enforcement (at policing, 
prosecuting and judicial 
levels) 
 Unwarranted barriers to entry 
by new market players 
 
 
Institutions: 
 Weaker legal/judicial systems 
 Compromised electoral 
authorities 
 Weak or non-existent civil 
society  
 Distorted and weaker 
financial systems 
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Causes Consequences 
 
Policy Settings: 
 Inefficient and/or excessive 
taxation systems 
 Non-transparent public 
expenditure regimes 
 Patronage based civil service 
appointments and promotion 
systems 
 Activist industry and trade 
policies 
 
 
Policy Settings: 
 Compromised market signals 
 Distorted foreign aid flows 
 Mis-allocation of 
infrastructure spending 
 Inefficient regulatory and 
taxation systems 
 Lower quality civil services 
 
Ongoing Debates 
 
While there appears to be a high degree of consensus in the academic and 
policy communities on the causes and consequences of corruption, there is 
discord on whether corruption has any redeeming characteristics (that is, 
benefits).   A rolling controversy within scholarly and broader policy circles 
concerns what has become known as ‘the beneficial grease debate’283.  In 
essence, is petty corruption, such as small payments to accelerate civil 
service decision-making or action, always injurious or can it have beneficial 
effects?284   
                                                 
283  Sometimes referred to as the ‘virtuous bribery’ story: Wei (1999) at 14.  For a good 
general review of the ‘grease the wheels’ debate see Meon and Sekkat (2005). 
284  Although no credible commentator or scholar has yet come forward to defend ‘grand 
corruption’. 
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Scholarly work has argued corruption can be efficiency-enhancing in 
economies burdened by government failure285, excessive or inefficient 
regulatory systems286, artificial impediments to competition287 and/or where 
there is a high level of certainty within an industry or nation regarding the 
bribery process and its location within governmental decision-making288. 
Corruption can also be beneficial: in accelerating the demise (even collapse) 
of totalitarian States289; where significant market distortions exist or market 
mechanisms are weak290; where corrupt activities act as de facto forms of 
‘deregulation’ (albeit arbitrarily so)291; for guaranteeing property rights 
which would otherwise be absent292; where it encourages the 
corporatisation or privatisation of government activities293; where it works  
                                                 
285  Leys (1965) at 220; Khan (1996) at 683. Colombatto (2003) at 375; Mendex and 
Sepulveda (2006) at 96. 
286  Leff (1964) at 11; Leys (1965) at 223; Huntington (1968) at 386; Barreto (2000) at 37; 
Dutt and Traca (2010) at 857;  Jong and Bogmans (2010) at 385.  Tullock (1996) at 6 argues 
underpaying tax officials and allowing them to retain some proportion of the taxation 
revenue they extract from ordinary and/or recalcitrant taxpayers, albeit a form of 
corruption, can improve the efficiency and receipts of the taxation, presenting a case 
study of China. 
287  Leys (1965) at 220; Celentani and Ganuza (2002) at 1273. 
288 Fisman and Gatt (2006) at 128, although the efficiency benefits of this lower 
uncertainty are not absolute, but relative to the inefficiency costs of greater uncertainty. 
289  Braguinsky (1996) at 14; Cheung (1996) at 1. 
290  Leys (1965) at 223; Lui (1996) at 26; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 21. 
291  Nye (1967) at 420; Levy (2007) at 423; Jong and Bogmans (2010) at 392.  But only up to 
some limited point, after which corruption becomes counter-productive: Braguinsky 
(1996) at 15. 
292  Colombatto 2003) at 374; MacIntyre (2003) at 12.  Perversely, ‘rights to corrupt’ can 
become so entrenched they themselves become a form of ‘property rights’ which are 
actually saleable or transferable, as has been the case in India: Cheung (1996) at 4. 
293  Shleifer and Vishny (1994) at 1015; Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 14.  Presumably only 
when and where corruption is present in the privatisation process.   The net benefits, 
from an anti-corruption standpoint, of converting a corrupt government instrumentality 
into a corrupt private sector entity are likely to be questionable. 
 79 
  
to overcome discrimination against minority groups (which can be 
especially problematic in developing countries)294; creating social 
redistribution policies and systems, which absent some degree of tolerated 
corruption, may not have existed295; and, can even be preferable when used 
to avoid more disastrous military conflicts296.  In these situations, corruption 
may be the least-worst alternative to such distortions, inefficiencies or 
practices297.   
 
However, critics298 of the ‘beneficial grease’ view challenge the underlying 
direction of causation - that inefficiency induces corruption – pointing out 
corruption causes those inefficiencies subject to complaint and corrupt 
response299.  In effect, a corrupt official has a strong incentive to create 
                                                 
294  Nye (1967) at 420. 
295  Alesina and Angeletos (2005) at 1241, who consider some nominal level of corruption 
may be the price to be paid for social welfare improving policies for the poor, which 
would not have been created absent the opportunities for corrupt exploitation by 
malfeasant politicians and public officials. 
296  Parchomovosky and Sigelman (2009) consider bribery to be a credible and less costly 
alternative than the direct and consequential costs of military conflict, whether between 
or within nations.  In these situations, it may be cheaper for one party to bribe the other 
not to initiate or engage in warfare. 
297  Lui (1985) at 778 and (1996) at 27 points to the example of corruption which 
introduces price signals into an economy, where they would not otherwise exist. Bayley 
(1966) at 726–730 hypothesises, but does not argue for, a range of potential ‘benefits’ of 
corruption, leaving to then-further research to test these ideas empirically.  As one analyst 
boldly observed: “… an economy sufficiently plagued by bureaucratic red-tape can be 
made better-off by corruption and is also capable of higher sustained growth rates because 
of that corruption.” : Barreto (2000) at 51. 
298  Mauro (1995) at 695; Kaufman (1997) at 116–118; Gaviria (2002) at 246; Alam (1989) at 
446-452.  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 3 regard the ‘beneficial grease’ perspective as a “… 
romantic view of corruption…”  For a balance sheet approach, outlining the costs and 
benefits of corruption, see Nye (1967). 
299  Bradhan (1997) at 1323; Mauro (1996) at 685; Alam (1989) at 449; Habib and 
Zurawicki (2001) at 690; Gaviria (2002) at 267.  That is, “… it is usually presumed that a 
given set of distortions are mitigated or circumvented by the effects of corruption; but 
quite often these distortions and corruption are caused or at least preserved or aggravated 
by the same common factors.” :  Bradhan (1997) at 1323. 
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inefficiencies (what economists call ‘endogenous harassment’300), for 
example in administrative processes or additional regulation, for which 
he/she can seek corrupt payments to assist the business person work their 
way around301. 
 
Regardless of which causally precedes which, corruption or inefficiency, 
once the circular motion commences it generates a downward spiral302, with 
less efficient firms engaging in corrupt transactions, the dividends of public 
spending being artificially skewed towards such firms, which in turn acts as 
an incentive for inefficient firms to remain or be sustained in business 
(rather than being made redundant by market forces), and other similar 
firms to join them in such conduct.  In the lexicon of economics, firms 
replace entrepreneurial endeavour with rent-seeking activity303, with the 
consequently lower entrepreneurship, investment and innovation leading to 
lower economic growth304.  Such distortions are greater for smaller firms305, 
especially those at the start-up phase of business activity in areas where 
there are relatively greater regulatory barriers to market entry, who are 
                                                 
300  Clarke and Xu (2002) at 24; see also Safavian (2001) at 1218. 
301  What one commentator has called “tailored harassment”: Wei (1999) at 14. 
302  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at p 601; Naim (1995) at 249; Cheung (1996) at 1; World 
Bank (1997) at 103; Bradhan (1997) at 1328; Lambsdorff (2002a) at 238; Tanzi (1998) at 25; 
Barreto (2000) at 48; Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 7; Gaviria (2002) at 267; Habib and 
Zurawicki (2001) at 690; Ehlrich and Lui (1999) at 290 for some econometric evidence of 
the relationship.   Customs officials are seen to be particularly inclined to create rent-
generating barriers to international trade: Treisman (2000) at 435. 
303  Tanzi (1998) at 25; Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 3. 
304  Mauro (1995) at 695; Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 7; Barreto (2000) at 47–48. Fisman 
and Svensson (2000) at 3 estimate each one percentage point increase in the bribery rate is 
associated with a 3 per centage point reduction in firm growth, which is about three times 
the effect of taxation. 
305  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 7; Safavian et al (2001) at 1216; Gaviria (2002) at 259. 
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more susceptible to demands from civil servants for corrupt payments306.  
Similarly, firms with large sunk costs (for example, capital investments 
made before start of operation) are also more vulnerable to corruption, both 
in terms of incidence and level (that is, being more likely to be targeted by 
corrupt officials, and for proportionally larger payments)307.    
 
Policy Tools to Address Corruption 
 
Any number of approaches has been proposed over time for tackling 
corruption, whether to manage, limit or reduce the practice.  Its longevity, 
measured in centuries, even millennia, suggest corruption has a strong 
capacity to survive even the best directed, intended and intensive assaults 
upon it308.  Indeed, it has been remarked “A fight against corruption involves 
fighting human nature.”309; or only slightly less fatalistic “… corruption is a 
‘dynamic’ phenomenon that tends to adapt quickly to changes in 
circumstances.”310. 
 
More encouragingly for those in the anti-corruption camp, some 
commentators311 regard corruption as inherently unstable, and ultimately 
self-predatory and –destructive. This situation arises because of the 
tendency for those involved in corrupt exchanges to over-reach themselves 
                                                 
306  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 9; Clarke and Xu (2002) at 1; Hellman and Kuafman 
(2002) at 20; but see Svensson (2003) at 220 for a contrary view.  However, the same is not 
the case with smaller firms with some degree of government ownership, suggesting 
corrupt officials are reticent to prey upon their own: Gaviria (2002) at 259. 
307  Svensson (2003) at 223; Wei and Wu (2001) at 6. 
308  Ehlrich and Lui (1999) at 272; Barreto (2000) at 35; Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 15 
309  Vinod (1999) at 592. 
310  Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 15. 
311  Nelken and Levi (1996) at 4–5. 
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and thus bring about the collapse of such arrangements.  It can also reflect 
ever increasing competition amongst ‘suppliers of corruption’ seeking new 
clients, the inevitable fight-back by those excluded from the corrupt system 
(and its spoils), and the propensity of less-disciplined participants to break 
ranks (and the necessary mutual silence) when rigorous anti-corruption 
campaigns come into effect.  From this perspective, better anti-corruption 
strategies may revolve around methods that destabilise corrupt 
relationships312, for example creating distrust amongst the parties, raising 
transparency and/or increasing the search costs/risks of identifying potential 
corrupt partners. 
 
An essential action, almost precondition, for tackling corruption is the 
presence and commitment of the necessary political will – in effect, decisive 
action and demonstration effect from the political leadership. Just as with 
corruption in national and other key leadership positions, corruption in the 
political, administrative and corporate classes can also have contagion 
effects and foster a culture of corruption, so meaningful commitment from 
elites is necessary preventing or eliminating corruption313.   
 
The contagion effect of corruption – where an individual, whether in 
government, in business or even an ordinary consumer sees someone else 
engaged, profitably, in the practice – should not be under-estimated314.  The 
contagion effect can operate on both the demand side (from government 
                                                 
312  Lambsdorff (2002a) at 221; Naim (1995) at 251. 
313  Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 9; Chand and Moene (1999) at 1138; Goudie and 
Stasavage (1998) at 133; Kingston (2008) at 90. 
314  Econometric studies have found physical proximity to corruption can have a 
(practically and statistically) significant impact on corruption both within the same and 
between adjacent jurisdictions: Andvig and Moene (1990) at 63; Goel and Nelson (2007) at 
840; Becker, Egger and Seidel (2009) at 300. 
 83 
  
officials, as bribe takers) and on the supply side (from business and/or 
citizens, as bribe payers).  On the demand side, the prospectively corrupt 
official operates in an environment of substantial opportunities and rewards 
for bribery, with lax enforcement and lesser penalties. There may even be a 
culture of ‘learning by watching’ or just ‘occupational osmosis’315, thus 
underpinning a potentially self-sustaining culture of corruption316.  
 
Contagion can also promote anti-corruption effort and initiatives, both in a 
preventative (for a ‘clean’ country to deter the slide into corruption) and a 
remedial (assist an impacted country to effectively deal with the problem) 
manner317.  Positive contagion can result from nations belonging to 
international organisations which are either explicitly (through their 
membership requirements or rules of operation) or implicitly (transmitted 
through the behaviour, norms or values of other nation-members) imparted.  
Such an effect can also work as a rational response to overt economic 
incentives: access to financial and technical assistance programs may be 
predicated on achieving membership of the organisation, a condition of 
which is meeting certain (anti-) corruption performance requirements318,  
 
Anti-corruption programs are ultimately political phenomena, given the 
decision to undertake or initiate them is usually made in the highest 
political echelons, as are decisions about their scope, priorities and targets.  
Catalysts for these politically-driven events can include: changes in the 
                                                 
315  Goel and Nelson (2007) at 840; Sah (2007) at 2573. 
316  Herzfeld and Weiss (2003) at 629.  Failure to engage in corruption when it is pervasive 
in a country, sector or institution can lead to a form of ‘social exclusion’ from that domain, 
whether for individuals or for corporate entities: Guerrero and Rodrigeuz-Oriegga (2008) 
at 370; Wu (2006) at 839. 
317  Becker, Egger and Seidel (2009) at 309. 
318  Sandholtz and Gray (2003) at 767.   
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person or the values of the head of government or state; challenges from 
counter-elites (for example, opposition parties, and influential voices in the 
media and in non-governmental organisations); efforts to undermine the 
credibility of the previous regime (or political alternatives); and/or, as an 
initiative to set the current and prospective political agenda - in short, to 
fortify the political position of the head of government319.  
 
Where political will is not present, or sufficiently demonstrated, from those 
in leadership positions, identifying and invigorating pockets of support 
amongst reform-minded decision-makers and opinion leaders can be 
valuable320.  This concept has been extended along geographic lines to the  
idea of special governance zones, especially in developing and/or 
transitional economies, which governments guarantee as being (and 
remaining) free of corruption321 which have positive demonstration effects 
for other parts of the nation, and interested governments322.  
 
More effective legal penalties and processes can be useful weapons to 
combat corruption.  Options put forward include: more substantial penalties 
for corrupt behaviour (especially by government officials)323; substantive 
investigative mechanisms, such as independent anti-corruption 
                                                 
319  Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991) at 82, although they remain agnostic on the broader 
question of the effectiveness of such campaigns in reducing the incidence and impact of 
corruption. 
320  Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 9. 
321  Wei (2002) at 2. 
322  Such strategies have been practiced, with results ranging from promising to successful, 
in locations such as Campo Elias (a small city in Venezuela) to Obninsk (near Moscow, in 
Russia): see Wei (2001b) at 6 for additional details on these experiences. 
323  Mokherjee and Png (1995) at 158; Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 1; Goel and Nelson (1998) 
at 116, who suggest such penalties need to be disproportionately heavy (namely, a hefty 
multiple of the perceived benefits) to be effective in tackling corruption.  See also Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) at 5 for similar views. 
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commissions324, ombudsman and/or internal investigations units325; and, 
whistleblower laws which protect, and even reward, public officials who 
report on corruption or malfeasance by other officials or contractors326.  
Pecuniary penalties, to be effective, need to be substantial and reinforced by 
the prospect of custodial penalties for more significant corrupt practices327.  
Prosecutions of prominent corrupt figures can also have a substantial 
demonstration effect328 on both bribe-givers and -takers.   
 
Despite support for independent anti-corruption agencies from 
governmental and other public policy organizations pressing the anti-
corruption agenda, such mechanisms have had mixed impact329.  Their 
success is often limited by a number of factors including: it can be difficult 
to establish such agencies, recognising the substantial countervailing 
interests of influential people engaged in corruption; if established, they can 
have limited effectiveness, especially where they are subject to control by 
their political masters who may themselves be corrupt or associates of 
corrupt business and other political players; and, they may suffer from 
deficiencies in legislated authority, such as the power to prosecute, 
independence in decision-making330, and from funding and staff constraints.  
 
                                                 
324  Such as those operating in Hong Kong and Singapore: World Bank (1997) at 107; but 
see Pope and Vogel (2000) and Quah (2001) for discussions on the effectiveness of this 
mechanism generally and in a number of Asian countries, respectively. 
325  As exist in South Africa and the United States, respectively: World Bank (1997) at 107. 
326  As exist in the United States: World Bank (1997) at 107; Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 2. 
327  Quah (2001) at 458, who examined the relative effectiveness of financial and custodial 
penalties in a number of Asian countries. 
328  Gray and Kaufmann (1998) at 10. 
329  Pope and Vogel (2000) at 8; Kaufman (2003) at 3. 
330  Van Aaken, Feld and Voigt (2010) at 205–206. 
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Amongst the various non-legal approaches put forward for tackling 
corruption are what have been called ‘social marketing strategies’331.  These 
strategies are based on the organisations of civil society – such as business, 
consumers, labour unions – working to create an atmosphere in public life 
that discourages corruption.  Key elements of these strategies include raising 
public awareness of the economic and social costs of corruption, increasing 
the understanding of the causes of corruption amongst the public, and 
making a public virtue of anti-corruption behaviour amongst politicians and 
civil servants332.   
 
The effectiveness of the fight against corruption is intimately linked to 
reform of the State333.  Key elements of the ‘State reform’ model include: 
honest and visible commitment by the political leadership to the anti-
corruption cause334; policy changes which reduce the demand for corruption 
in areas such as deregulation and tax simplification; reducing the supply of 
corruption, by curtailing bureaucratic discretion335 and instituting effective 
controls and penalties on vulnerable public officials336, emphasising 
prevention ahead of remediation337; and, resolving difficult issues 
surrounding the funding of political parties338. 
                                                 
331  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) for an extended discussion of the various options and 
strategies available and used.  See also George and Lacey (2000) at 578 – 587. 
332  So-called ‘one-shot’ campaigns are unlikely to have any sustained impact, with some 
analysts (Bardhan (1997) at 1334) pointing out it generally takes only a short time after 
such initiatives are concluded for corruption to return.   The situation, however, is likely 
to be different where such campaigns are sustained. 
333  Tanzi (1998) at 34; World Bank (1997); Wei (1999) at 24; Hellman et al (2000a) at 1; 
Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 4; Olofsgaard and Zahran (2008) at 169. 
334  Quah (2001) at 464. 
335  World Bank (1997) at 103; Wei (1999) at 16; Tonoyan et al (2010) at 819. 
336  Di Giachinno and Franzini (2008) at 294. 
337  Goel and Nelson (2007) at 846; the former head of the State Food and Drug Agency, 
within the People’s Republic of China, Zheng Xiaoyu, was sentenced to death in May 
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Reform of domestic political institutions is another key element of any 
strategy to tackle corruption339.  The continuation of corruption until it 
becomes endemic and the absence of necessary political reform can lead to 
regime collapse340 and even State failure341.  Key elements of this reform 
package include: limiting the size and reach of government, more so in the 
areas of regulation and taxation ahead of spending342; decentralisation of 
government functions from central to provincial or local levels343; reducing 
bureaucratic discretion in decision-making344; promoting competition and 
contestability345 in the delivery of government-provided goods and 
services346; the introduction or consolidation of democratic electoral  
                                                                                                                                            
2007 for accepting bribes.  The sentenced was carried out several weeks later, in July 
2007: Earle and Cava (2008/09) at 59. 
338  Tanzi (1998) at 15; Clausen, Kraay and Byiri (2011) at 213. 
339  Lederman et al (2001) at 29 – 32; Wei (1999) at 24; Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 17. 
340  Which some scholars regard as a positive dividend of corruption: Braguinsky (1996) at 
14; Cheung (1996) at 1. 
341  Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 3. 
342  Wei (1999) at 16; Goel and Nelson (1998) at 117. 
343  Wei (2000a) at 16. However, others (Goel and Nelson (1998) at 115) provide findings 
to the contrary, or (Ahlin (2002); Montinola and Jackman (2002); Fan et al (2009)) mixed 
results, depending on the nature of the decentralisation program, the latter pointing out 
that more complex systems of vertical public administration can create additional 
opportunities for corruption. 
344  World Bank (1997) at 105. 
345  Potential competition, which the corrupt official would see as a form of risk.  Such a 
risk may place downward pressure on the incidence of corruption, not least of which the 
‘bribe price’ charged to bribe-payers: Di Vito (2007) at 26; Ade and Di Tella (1997a) at 
515.  However, Di Giachinno and Franzini (2008) at 292–293 caution poorly designed 
bureaucratic competition may see substitution between the forms of corruption, with 
lower extortion being replaced by higher bribery. 
346  Lederman et al (2001) at 6; Clarke and Xu (2002) at 5, who emphasise its importance in 
the supply of utility services; Ahlin (2002) at 30 and Bose (2004) at 319, where such 
competition could take place between or within governmental agencies; Ahlin and Bose 
(2007) at 465, who see competition between corrupt and honest public officials as a means 
of reducing corruption, on the basis the honest counterparty would prefer to deal with an 
honest official, at no additional cost, than dealing at a cost (the bribe price) with a 
dishonest one. 
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processes347, especially in the form of effective oppositions348, plurality/single 
member electorates349 and parliamentary systems350; freedom of information 
legislation351; and, introduction or enhancement of freedom of the press352, 
and avoidance of restrictive defamation laws which can be used to shield 
corrupt public officials353.  Direct and focused action to weaken corrupt 
institutions should also be utilised, including encouraging defections of key 
players from corrupt systems, building coalitions of those adversely affected 
by corruption and inserting disinformation into corrupt systems to promote 
distrust, risk and uncertainty354.   
 
Political competition can be an effective tool to reduce corruption by 
opening government to greater public scrutiny, introducing contestability in 
the design and performance of the electoral process355 and into the provision 
of government-supplied goods and services, and the decentralisation of 
decision-making which challenges the creation of bureaucratic fiefdoms356.  
In this framework, the capacity of citizens (as taxpayers and voters) and 
business (as taxpayers and employers) to set limits on governmental activity  
 
                                                 
347  Naim (1995) at 251–253; Treisman (2000) at 401; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 38; 
Montinola and Jackman (2002) at 147; Bobonis and Camara Fuertes (2009) at 1; 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
348  Rose-Ackerman (1999) at 378. 
349  Persson et al (2003) at 958, thus encouraging greater accountability by individual 
members of the legislature, in contrast to multi-member or party-list systems which are 
more opaque, with specific members less exposed to electoral retribution for misconduct. 
350  But, see Clarke and Xu (2002) at 22 for a contrary view. 
351  World Bank (1997) at 108; Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) at 278. 
352  Eskeland and Theile (1999) at 2; Treisman (2000) at 404; Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 
10; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
353  Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 2.  
354  Klitgaard (2000) at 5. 
355  Montinola and Jackman (2002) at 147. 
356  Shleifer and Vihny (1993) at 616. 
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can act as a constraint on the nature and extent of corruption357.  However, 
decentralisation, if not properly designed and administered, can merely 
result in a redirection of the corruption, with government provided services 
being over-supplied to local and regional elites at the expense of the 
ordinary citizenry358.  
 
Curtailing the powers of individual bureaucrats would include dealing with 
their monopoly over the issuance of licenses and permits359, the supply of 
utility services360 and insider information361.  Under this model, public 
officials would be given competing jurisdictions so a client or consumer who 
is not well served by, or subject to extortion demands from, one official can 
approach another official or supplier362.  At the same time, this ‘competition-
between-officials’ should have a signalling effect for corrupt practices, and 
thus act as a ‘check-and-balance’ (absent, of course, collusion between the 
relevant officials).  However, insofar as this approach merely adds further 
layers of governmental intervention or duplication of services, and/or points 
of interaction for the business-person seeking to operate their enterprise, it 
may be counterproductive by adding more leverage points at which 
extortion can be exercised363. 
 
                                                 
357  Barreto (2000) at 36. 
358  Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001) at 5. 
359  Bardhan (1997) at 1337; Kaufmann (1997) at 126; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 129; 
Lederman et al (2001) at 9; Ahlin (2002) at 30. 
360  Clarke and Xu (2002) at 19. 
361  Lambert-Mogiliansky (2002) at 58. 
362  Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 3; Ahlin (2002) at 30. 
363  Ahlin (2002) at 4. 
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An allied approach involves curtailing discretionary powers exercised by 
government officials364. Key elements of such a strategy include: 
streamlining laws and regulations with which business must comply; 
contracting out to the private sector (with suitable reporting requirement 
public sector activities subject to endemic corruption365; the introduction of 
market-based mechanisms for allocating access rights to scarce resources, 
such as water or land; and, introduction of transparency into public 
procurement practices366.  Staff rotations, especially in positions vulnerable 
to corruption, can play a useful role367. 
 
Rebalancing the role of the public and private sectors can also be a useful 
anti-corruption strategy368. Insofar as bureaucratic allocation of scarce 
resources and regulatory interventions in the operation of markets exists, or 
is pervasive, there is a proportionate risk of corruption. Activist industry 
                                                 
364  World Bank (1997) at 105–106; and supported by empirical analyses, such as Vinod 
(1999) at 601. 
365  As happened in Indonesia when it contracted out aspects of its customs service, such as 
pre-inspection and valuation, to a private Swiss firm: see World Bank (1997) at 106 for a 
summary report. 
366  World Bank (1997) at 106.   One approach suggested by several scholars involves 
mandatory debarment of persons, natural and legal, found guilty of corruption, in 
whatever form, from participating in sub-national, national and multinational public 
procurement processes (especially as suppliers) for a nominated period of time, say 5 to 10 
years: Wu (2005) at 153; Hatchard (2007/08) at 23–28. 
367  However, risks include the potential to spread corruption by rotating corrupt officials 
into previously ‘clean’ positions, and the capacity of corrupt supervisors to rotate non-
corrupt subordinates who are not prepared to participate in corrupt activity: Rose-
Ackerman (1996) at 2. 
368  Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 13–15 offer an expansive list of potential policy actions for 
such a re-balancing, ranging across downsizing government, consolidation of public sector 
financial statements, strengthening the independence of central banks, restructuring of 
public sector enterprises, and liberalisation of international trade and commerce. 
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policies, especially where public officials are given broad discretion on 
which industries and firms to support369 and/or provide tax incentives370 are  
particularly vulnerable to corruption.  While absolute laissez faire is 
unrealistic, one approach to reducing corruption is bold and comprehensive 
deregulation of areas of bureaucratic intervention per se and/or particularly 
vulnerable to corruption, and legalisation of certain otherwise illegal 
activities371.  One particularly bold option is quite simply to abolish 
programs riddled with corruption372.   
 
As observed earlier, the nature and extent of competition within markets 
tends to impact on the incidence and levels of corruption.  Lesser 
competition in a market373 and a greater incidence of non-market based 
pricing374 can lead to greater corruption, as firms subject to reduced 
competition generally enjoy higher rents.  This gives public officials with 
control rights over such firms’ greater incentives to engage in extortive 
behaviour, in the form of extracting some of that rent for themselves.  
Conversely, greater competition in markets tends to reduce the rents  
 
 
                                                 
369  Wei (1999) at 17. 
370  Tanzi (1998) at 14. 
371  Eskeland and Thiele (1999) at 3; Bardhan (1997) at 1335; Stephan (2010) at 350. 
372  Rose-Ackerman (1996) at 3, for example, if corruption is endemic in a subsidy 
program, then if the program is abolished then the associated corruption will disappear.  
However, this option may not be appropriate for programs with strong commercial, 
economic or public policy rationales.   Such approaches have been effective in Hong Kong 
(within the police force, with the legalisation of off-track betting for horse races) and 
Singapore (within the customs service when the Government allowed more imports to 
arrive duty-free): Klitgaard (1988). 
373  Ades and Di Tella (1999) at 982; but see Svensson (2000) at 17 for a contrary view. 
374  Abed and Davoodi (2000) at 39. 
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available to firms, and can thus reduce corruption375.  As such, effective 
national competition laws and policies targeted at anti-competitive laws, 
regulations and practices, and trade liberalisation policies exposing domestic 
industry to effective competition from foreign trade and investment, can be 
useful instruments in the anti-corruption armoury of governments376.    
 
An alternative view contends increased competition can lead to greater 
corruption377. The line of argument is as follows: greater competition in 
markets encourages higher levels of efficiency and thus profitability 
amongst participating entrepreneurs, from which corrupt officials can 
extract greater illicit payments.  While some less efficient firms may exit the 
market under pressure of competition, the corrupt payments obtainable 
from the remaining efficient firms can more than offset this loss of corrupt 
opportunity378.   
 
Transparency is another potential weapon in the battle against corruption.  
At the most basic level, the absence of information on regulations, 
ambiguous or poorly drafted rules and/or changes to regulations or rules 
without proper public announcement are fertile grounds for corruption379.  
                                                 
375  Cheung (1996) at 3. 
376  Ades and Di Tella 1997 at 1003, and (1999) at 990, and 992; World Bank (1997) at 105–
106; Leite and Weidmann (1999) at 23; Treisman (2000) at 435; Wei (2000) at 2; Torrez 
(2002) at 387; Vinod (2003) at 886; Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) at 434. 
377  Bliss and Di Tella (1997) at 1001. 
378  Economic research tends to support this view, finding the burden of corruption 
imposed on a firm by corrupt officials depends upon the capacity of the firm to pay: a 
‘rent-extraction’ model, under which the more the firm can pay, the more it has to pay:  
Svensson (2000) at 1.   Hallward-Driemeier (2009) at 3 finds exit rates tend to be higher 
amongst more efficient firms, who are likely to be more targeted by corrupt politicians 
and public officials given their (the efficient firm’s) higher profitability; the less efficient 
firm has lesser profits with which to meet the demand for bribes. 
379  Tanzi (1998) at 20. 
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At another level, the greater the degree of transparency in decision-making 
and in disclosure of interests380, the higher the probability corrupt behaviour 
will be detected381.  The ‘scandal’ often associated with corruption is 
generally considered to make for good news stories, especially in the hands 
of the tabloid media382.  However, transparency can be a ‘double-edged 
sword’: it can also improve information available to outsiders on the 
identities of key decision-makers, and thus enhance the potential for 
‘connections’ which act as conduits for bribery383.  In effect, transparency in 
decision-making can act as a de facto form of advertising as to whom should 
be targeted for corruption384.   
 
Privatisation can also play a constructive role in tackling corruption, with 
the burden of corruption being lower in countries which have privatised 
more than comparable nations385, and in industries (especially utilities 
sectors) where privatisation has occurred relative to those where state-
ownership prevails386. The main drivers for this effect include greater  
                                                 
380 Senior public officials in Mongolia are required to make formal declarations of their 
incomes and assets, and those of their families, upon appointment and annually thereafter, 
under penalty of displacement or dismissal: Quah (2001) at 457. An initiative endorsed by 
the World Bank: Kaufman (2003) at 2. 
381  Bac (2001) at 107. 
382  Heywood (1997) at 420.  ‘Name and shame’ initiatives – where corrupt officials or 
agencies are publicly identified in the media – have had some success, for example in 
Bangalore (in India) where local community groups have highlighted corrupt practices in 
local government agencies leading to sackings of corrupt officials:  Gray and Kaufman 
(1998) at 10); see also Klitgaard (2000) for a number of cases, rendered anonymous by the 
author, of the effective use of public exposure to subvert corrupt government agencies and 
programs. 
383  Bac (2001) at 87. 
384  Transparency was problematic, for example, in the Turkish higher education sector 
during the 1990s when parents and students identified and sought to bribe previously 
anonymous examiners for entry into selective universities and courses: Ibid at 94. 
385  Clarke and Xu (2002) at 22; Tanzi (1998) at 7. 
386  Naim (1995) at 253. 
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managerial disciplines on employees within, and greater market place 
competition for, the privatised entity387.  But, predatory politicians can 
favour privatisation for its capacity to increase the efficiency of the firm(s) 
concerned, and thus prospective opportunities and capacities to meet their 
extortion demands388.    
 
Privatisation processes, where poorly designed or inadequately 
implemented, can be vulnerable to corruption389, especially where bidders 
are pressed to pay ‘commissions’ or ‘facilitation payments’ to those with 
inside information390 or administrative or decision-making powers in the 
privatisations391.  Corruption can also result in deliberate underpricing of the 
assets to be sold, with the difference shared between buyers and corrupt 
officials392.  Privatisations that merely result in the transformation of a 
public monopoly into a private monopoly are likely to have little, if any, 
impact on corruption393; it may just involve a sectoral relocation of the 
problem.  The Soeharto family and its business and political cronies in  
 
                                                 
387  Clarke and Xu (2002) at 23. 
388  Shleifer and Vishny (1994) at 998. 
389  Kaufman (1997) at 122; Kaufman and Siegelbuam (1997) at 9; Tanzi (1998) at 7; 
Warner (2003) at 3.   Kaufman and Seigelbaum (1997) provide a good treatment of the 
issues and linkages between corruption and privatisation for the specialist reader. 
390  Rose-Ackerman (2001) at 1893-1894. 
391  Tanzi (1998) at 7; Rose-Ackerman (2001) at 1893-1894.  The balance sheet for the 
privatisation of the Argentine national airline Aerolinas Argentinas in the late 1980s 
reportedly included an expenses entry of $US 80 million for ‘costs associated with the 
sale’: Naim (1995) at 253. 
392  Rose-Ackerman (2002) at 1894. 
393  Id; Kaufmann (1997) at 122; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 127. 
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Indonesia, for example, are alleged394 to have used the domestic 
liberalisation programs of the 1980s for self-enrichment by grabbing for 
themselves corporatised and deregulated government entities395.   
 
Trade liberalisation policies can play a constructive role in tackling 
corruption, especially where they lead to substantial opening of previously 
protected home markets to international competition396.  The enhanced 
competitiveness of domestic firms unencumbered by debilitating corruption 
can be reflected in greater foreign trade opportunities397.  However, the full 
benefit of trade liberalisation initiatives, especially where they take the 
form of reductions in quotas and/or tariffs, can be compromised if the 
administrative discretion given to customs officials (for example, on 
classifying goods for quota or tariff purposes) is not curtailed398.  Other 
external drivers can also act as catalysts for domestic economic reforms, as 
happened in the Philippines during the 1980s and 1990s under policy-
pressure from Japan and the United States as important capital lenders399, 
and in South Korea with the ‘Asian Economic Crisis’ of the late 1990s400.    
 
 
 
                                                 
394  Robertson-Snape (1999) at 595. 
395  Such practices were so widespread in Russia after its move to a market economy 
privatizatsia (privatisation) was nicknamed prikhvatisatsia (grabitization):  Naim (1995) at 
253. 
396  Ades and Di Tella (1997a) at 1033; Leite and Widemann (1999) at 23; Sandholtz and 
Koetzle (2000) at 44; Habib and Zurawicki (2001)  at 687; Torrez (2002) at 387; Vinod 
(2003) at 886. 
397  Gaviria (2002) at 245; Vinod (2003) at 886. 
398  Kaufmann (1997) at 122; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 128. 
399  Moran (1999) at 576. 
400  Ibid at 570. 
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Another proactive approach involves greater use by multilateral public 
financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, of conditionality in their lending practices401. Under this 
model, IMF and World Bank lending and refinancing is made conditional 
upon improvements in domestic economic governance, which can include 
specific actions to address identified corruption problems, for example the 
establishment of effective and independent anti-corruption agencies402.  
Such conditionality has already been applied by the IMF in its lending to a 
number of Baltic nations and Newly Independent States (of the former 
Soviet Union)403,404.  A variation of this approach involves disbarring 
companies which have criminal convictions for engaging in corrupt 
practices from tendering for work with the various multilateral 
development banks 
 
                                                 
401  World Bank (1997) at 101; Wei (1999) at 22; Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 4; Thornburgh 
(2003) at 139.  Some observers (Kaufman (1997) at 129) have called for the international 
community to withdraw financial support from the most egregiously corrupt nations. 
402  Pope and Vogel (2000) at 3. 
403  See Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 4–5 for a discussion of these experiences, and their 
effectiveness in tackling a broad spectrum of corrupt practices, ranging from the sale of 
preferential trading rights, across the sale of public utilities at very low prices to politically 
well-connected persons, and to allocation of government debt guarantees to dubious 
borrowers. 
404 The IMF’s governing Board in 1997 issued a set of Guidelines on “The Role of the IMF 
in Governance Issues” which set down a framework for the IMF’s role in client nations in 
developing institutions and administrative systems designed to eliminate the opportunity 
for corruption in the management of public resources (see Ibid at 8–9 for a discussion of 
the Guidelines).  However, it has been argued (Wei (2002) at 23) that a rigorous approach 
to such conditionality by public international financial agencies could mean the World 
Bank curtailing its development-assistance lending by as much as one-half - no doubt, 
indicative of the pervasiveness of the corruption problem in potential recipient countries. 
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Exposure of corrupt nations to rigorous analysis by international private 
sector rating agencies, especially for ‘country risk’ assessments405, can be 
used to tackle corruption externally when domestic capacities or 
commitments are limited (or complicitous in the corruption)406.  Such 
international credit ratings and the accompanying narrative country reports 
are widely used by international business and financial institutions in 
making foreign investment location decisions. They can also constructively 
act as countervailing power to the propaganda of (corrupt) domestic 
administrations for who local legal, market or political disciplines may be 
absent. 
 
Targeted foreign aid programs can be useful features in the armoury of anti-
corruption strategists.  Beyond ensuring ‘corruption-conditionality’ in the 
aid and lending programs of international public financial institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank407, foreign aid can fund capacity building for 
domestic law development and enforcement agencies in aid-recipient 
countries408, and the education of policy makers and the broader public 
about the consequences of corruption409.  Such an approach requires greater 
continuing engagement by the donor, beyond the ‘just write a cheque’ 
model, and is well-suited to the work of non-governmental aid bodies.  
However, such ‘aid-conditionality’ has been criticised for its  
 
                                                 
405  Essentially an economic and financial evaluation of a nation for its international 
creditworthiness and/or as a destination for foreign investment. 
406  Vinod (2003) at 878. 
407  Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 8; Tavares (2003) at 104. 
408  Vinod (1999) at 601. 
409  Vinod (2003) at 888. 
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potential to create ‘corruption traps’ for those countries most in need of 
external assistance in tackling corruption.  In this line of thinking, foreign 
aid is generally conditioned on developing countries implementing 
Western-defined measures to tackle corruption, but those countries with 
the least resources to do so are often most at risk of suffering the denial of 
the very resources they need to achieve those objectives410.   
 
Domestic laws with extraterritorial reach, such as the United States Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), can be useful mechanisms for combating 
corruption411.  Such laws are expected to make affected (in this case, 
American) firms more corruption-averse than firms from countries without 
such legislation. However, questions have been raised about the 
effectiveness of stand-alone laws such as the FCPA in combating 
corruption412.  The FCPA has reportedly had little, if any, impact on the 
demand by corrupt officials in developing countries for illicit payments413, 
while the foreign investment behaviour of United States’ firms is not 
significantly different from other-national firms414.   
 
                                                 
410  Andersson and Heywood (2009) at 760–761. 
411  Wei (1999) at 2. 
412  George and Lacey (2000) at 591; Breidenbach (2009) at 175; Salbu (2000) describes the 
FCPA as “doomed to failure” (at 659) and “ineffectual” (at 679) because it focuses on 
trying to order behaviour rather than dealing with the systemic problems that drive such 
conduct.   However, he goes on to say (at 681) the FCPA has useful symbolic value for its 
role in at least raising awareness of corruption. 
413  Wei (1999) at 23. 
414  The FPCA appears to have had little impact on the export performances of US firms 
trading with bribery-prone Latin American countries, net of their overall commercial 
competitiveness: Beck et al (1991) at 301; Wei (1997) at 23; Smarzynska and Wei (2000) at 
13.  As one analyst has observed: “… when bribery becomes a necessary part of the 
business deal, the American firms are just as clever as other investors in finding covert 
means to pay it in spite of the FCPA.” : Wei (1997) at 22–23. 
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International dispute resolution mechanisms could usefully be developed to 
resolve complaints of corruption in cross-border business, dealing in 
particular with allegations a ‘clean’ enterprise lost a contract or other 
commercial opportunity as a result of the behaviour of a corrupt 
competitor415.  Such models already exist, in the form of the arbitration 
processes of the International Chamber of Commerce, and of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes maintained 
by the World Bank416.  A variation of this approach would be to allow 
impacted enterprises to report the incidence, nature, severity and effect of 
corruption in developing and transitional economies to public international 
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, who, while not 
necessarily investigating individual complaints, could use any patterns of 
complaints to inform their assistance programs417. 
 
Some commentators see remedial action laying within the principles and 
practices of multinational enterprises418. While these businesses can 
positively commit to appropriate international codes of conduct419, such as 
those issued by business and trade associations, and the enterprises 
themselves, more concrete actions may be necessary.  These actions include  
 
                                                 
415  Rose-Ackerman (2001) at 1912. 
416 According to scholarly legal opinion, there does not appear to be any substantive legal 
barrier, either doctrinal or procedural, which would necessarily preclude allegations of 
corruption being taken into account in international commmerical arbitration generally:  
Fox (2009) at 487, especially where the contract concerned had specific provisions 
prohibiting the use of bribery (Ibid at 502). 
417  Rose-Ackerman (2001) at 1914. 
418  Ibid at 1911. 
419 For a general discussion of the role and effectiveness of corporate social responsibility 
statements by corporations in tackling corruption, see Carr and Outhwaite (2009), and 
Hess (2012). 
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clear statement by corporate leadership of their opposition to the 
engagement in corrupt activity by officers, employees and representatives of 
the organisation, and the introduction of systems of rewards for those who 
resist and penalties (including referral to appropriate criminal enforcement 
authorities) for those who engage in such (mis-)conduct. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
There can be little doubt, corruption is a problem.  The only real debates 
revolve around its magnitude, and the causes, consequences and (potential) 
policy tools to address corruption.  Optimists champion the eradication of 
corruption; pessimists accept its seeming inevitability, and point to its extra-
ordinary longevity and resilience; pragmatists, sitting somewhere between 
the two, either to try to avoid it or, failing that, hope corruption can be 
minimised, both generally and in its impact on them in particular. 
 
The causes of corruption are numerous.  To some observers, the mere 
existence of government, and its intervention in markets, commerce and 
industry, provides sufficient fertile ground for corruption to take root and 
thrive. Particular causes identified in the scholarly and public policy 
literature range across poor economic and political governance and 
institutions, problems inherent within taxation and government spending 
arrangements, poor bureaucratic processes, and inappropriate policy settings 
in areas like industry, international trade, and government procurement. 
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The literature has identified a broad range of commercial, economic, legal, 
political, and social consequences of corruption: lower and distorted foreign 
investment in impacted countries; instability in domestic financial 
institutions; lesser foreign aid, especially for developing countries; greater 
income inequality and increased poverty, again especially in developing 
countries; serious distortions to a nation’s economic foundations, most 
notably in terms of private sector innovation, employment, investment, and 
in broader economic growth and development; biases within taxation 
systems and in the allocation of government spending, especially between 
social programs and infrastructure; and, stimulation of the ‘black’ or illegal 
economy.  Nevertheless, these costs have not prevented some observers 
from claiming corruption has certain redeeming qualities (in some 
situations), but they tend to be rather isolated voices. 
 
Just as the causes and consequences of corruption are diverse, so are the 
various options which have been put forward from different quarters for 
dealing with corruption.  These potential options range across: simple 
patience and time, given the tendency of corruption to be self-destructive; 
the need for strong and committed political leadership; more effective legal 
penalties and processes, including independent anti-corruption agencies and 
campaigns; reform of the powers, responsibilities and institutions of the 
State; rebalancing the role of the public and private sectors; expanding 
competition within markets, including privatisation of government assets  
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and more liberal trade policies; enhancing transparency in government 
decision-making; greater use of conditionality in lending by international 
public financial institutions; increasing use of extra-territorial application of 
domestic anti-corruption laws and policies; and, wider take-up of codes of 
conduct by businesses vulnerable to extortion or operating in corrupt 
environments. 
 
Undertaking economic, legal and other reforms aimed at substantially 
reducing, if not eliminating, corruption, is a laudable objective.   
However, those so committed should not under-estimate the nature and 
extent of likely opposition:  “… corrupt relationships are an important 
source of resistance to economic liberalisation: participants in corruption 
benefit precisely because they have rigged the system in their favour.”420.  
To expect them to meekly surrender such advantages and privileges may 
prove to be an overly generous assessment of one’s fellow mankind given “A 
fight against corruption involves fighting human nature.”421. 
 
Although corruption is present, to varying degrees, in almost all, and 
problematic in many, countries of the world, international law has 
traditionally taken little interest in the topic focusing instead on the more 
procedural elements of inter-governmental relations such as the sources and  
the subjects of international law.  However, this situation began to change  
 
 
 
                                                 
420  Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 48. See also Kaufman (1997) at 122 – 123, and World 
Bank (1998) at 1; Charap and Harm (1999) at 1. 
421  Vinod (1999) at 592. 
 103 
  
in the middle of the twentieth century with nation-states shifting toward a 
more positivist approach to international law, evident in a widening of the 
subjects of international law to include the natural environment, 
intellectual property and more recently corruption, as well as the 
globalisation of international trade and commerce.  Indeed, the last decade 
of the twentieth century saw the negotiation and entry into force of a 
number of multilateral and plurilateral/regional anti-corruption agreements.  
The scope and depth of these international legal instruments is the focus of 
Chapter Three, following.  
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Chapter 3:   International Law and Corruption 
 
“Each culture has different perceptions and practices 
with respect to corruption – 
acceptance of what is reasonable and appropriate 
differs widely.”422 
Introduction 
 
Corruption is undoubtedly a serious problem for national governments in 
their conduct of economic and social policy, for commerce and industry in 
their domestic and international business transactions, and for all concerned 
– government, business and society – evident, for example, in lower 
economic growth, slower economic development, distorted business and 
social infrastructure decision-making, and greater income inequality and 
poverty; and, importantly, through its capacity to undermine respect for the 
rule of law.  The scholarly and the popular literature have proposed a great 
many strategies for tackling corruption423, any reasonable treatment of 
which would add several chapters to – and divert the focus of – this study.  
Rather, this study will focus on the modalities available under international 
law, in particular multilateral and regional treaties for tackling corruption.  
While there is no single ‘magic bullet’ (one action which solves all problems 
in all cases) for dealing with corruption, rigorous approaches under 
international law are likely to be a key element of any concerted program of 
action with a realistic probability of success. 
                                                 
422  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) at 10. 
423  As reviewed in Chapter 2 
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In recent years, States have embraced positivist legal approaches at the 
international level to tackling corruption – creating and adopting rules, 
rights and obligations which they, exercising their will, voluntarily accept, 
evidenced in the form of binding obligations under international law.  
These commitments have manifested themselves in law-making treaties, 
instruments which set down rules of general or universal application in a 
specific area of international relations: in the current case, corruption.  Such 
instruments are also normative and intended to create formal legal 
obligations for the ambitious, future conduct of the participating States, on 
the terms and conditions of the treaties concerned.   
 
The main subjects of these instruments are primarily States, that is a 
sovereign entity which has a recognised right to exercise jurisdiction over 
its own territory and its permanent population. By contrast, non-State 
persons, such as private companies, and in particular multinational 
enterprises operating in numerous States, are not Parties to these law-
making treaties and generally do not have direct legal rights or duties under 
them.  The international community of nations has used international law 
to build a series of instruments, with various nomenclatures, to tackle 
corruption.  These efforts, which have been particularly active during the 
1990s and early 2000s, involved multilateral bodies such as the United 
Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), as well as regional organisations covering Europe, 
Latin America and Africa424. 
                                                 
424  The activities of other organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce, 
the International Monetary Fund, Transparency International, the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organisation and individual countries (such as the United States of America) 
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The International Law 
 
International law has traditionally been regarded as the system of rights and 
obligations of States inter se425 through which they avoid or contain 
disputes426, a definition which served adequately for many centuries.  
However, more recently, and particularly since the early twentieth century, 
the scope of international law has expanded to include rules relating to: the 
functioning of international organisations, their relationships with each 
other, and with States and individuals; and, individuals and non-State 
entities, to the extent the latter are of concern to the international 
community. 
 
In the case of international organisations, this reflects the establishment, 
especially during the mid-twentieth century, of a sizeable number of 
permanent international organisations, such as the United Nations, the 
World Health Organisation, and the World Trade Organisation, which have 
been given international legal personality and have entered into legal 
relationships with each other and with States427.  In the case of individuals, 
it reflects the movement by the United Nations and the European Union, 
for example, to create obligations upon themselves and Member States to 
protect human rights and the freedom of individuals428. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
will not be examined in any depth, as to do so would substantially broaden the scope and 
dilute the core focus of this work. 
425  Shearer (1994) at 4; Dixon and McCorquodale (2003) at 1. 
426  Blay (2003) at 2. 
427  See Shaw (2003) at 46-47 for an interesting discussion of the legal personality of 
international institutions under modern international law. 
428  See Shearer (1994) at 328-338 for a discussion; and, Bantekas (2006) for a wider 
discussion of corruption as a ‘crime against humanity’ under international law. 
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The past century or so has also seen the topics of international law expand 
considerably from the peace, security and comity between nations issues 
which prevailed in conventional international law (at least, up to the late 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century), into areas such as the natural 
environment, space exploration, banking and finance, economic and social 
development, intellectual property rights and, as this study will show, 
corruption.  There has also been a stratification of international law with 
the growing distinction between general and regional rules of international 
law. That is, between laws and rules of universal application to all States, 
and those developed and applied only in a particular geographic region 
where the specific States concerned are located429.   
 
There is also a need to distinguish between private and public international 
law.  Public international law is primarily concerned with relationships 
between States relating to their governmental functions, while private 
international law (sometimes called ‘conflict of laws’430) addresses the 
activities of legal and natural persons in their private dealings across 
national borders.  Private and public international law are not mutually 
exclusive, with many elements of the former arising from the latter, for 
example the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) under the World Trade Organisation, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Sale of Goods, both of which create platforms for private 
trans-national trade and commerce. 
                                                 
429  These include so-called ‘Latin American international law’ - discussed by the 
International Court of Justice in the Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case: ICJ 1950, 266 - as 
well as that arising from the formation of entities such as what is now known as the 
European Union, and the South Pacific Commission. 
430  Although ‘choices of law’ would be a better description – which State’s domestic law is 
applicable to the resolution of a private dispute between individuals where the issues 
involved are trans-national. 
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While international law has enjoyed a long and varied path in its evolution 
from ancient to modern times431, reflecting the prevailing notions and 
practices of international relations and of law of the various ages432, legal 
scholars have generally seen its theoretical foundations resting on two 
pillars433: natural law; and positivism. 
. Natural Law  
 
The natural law approach to international law builds on what ancient 
through to medieval scholars regarded as ‘the law of nature’.  Its 
antecedence in the Greek and Roman philosophical traditions stressed the 
nature of man as a reasonable being, with laws being those which nature 
dictated to human reason; the influence of the (Roman Catholic) Christian 
churches infused a semi-theological element. 
 
Under natural law theory, which dominated scholarship in international 
law throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, States submitted 
to international law because their relations were framed by a higher law – 
that of ‘nature’.  The ‘law of nature’ approach built on the inherent dignity 
of humankind, and its aspirations for a peaceful and well-ordered 
                                                 
431  The current conceptualization of international law builds upon a very long history in 
the dynamic development of international law, which can be traced back, at least in 
western historical tradition, to the Greek City States and the Roman Empire.   For 
overviews of evolving history and philosophy of international law (which, while 
interesting and informative, are not integral to this thesis) see Shearer (1994) at 7-14. 
432  Although the adage “Law cannot be divorced from politics or power…”  (Shaw, 2003: 
75) would appear to hold considerable resonance across time and space. 
433  Or, as Shaw (2003) at 48 says “… a complex relationship between idealism and 
realism”, for natural law and positivism, respectively. 
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community life, and related to God434 the creator – in essence, what is 
inherently good about human nature – and, law common to all humankind 
(jus gentium)435.  The natural law approach to international law has 
attracted a range of criticisms, largely reflecting its philosophic, and 
sometimes theological, basis: it is imprecise; it is subjective; and, it tends to 
be detached from the hard practical realities of international relations. 
Nevertheless, natural law remains the basic foundation of modern 
international law.  
 
. Positivism 
 
The positivist approach436 basically holds international laws to be much the 
same in character as municipal law – that is, both emanate from the positive 
consent and the will of the State to their creation, and willingness to comply 
with them.  In the Westphalian tradition, the State has complete 
sovereignty and authority.  In essence, positivists regard international law as 
being those rules, rights and obligations which various States, exercising 
their wills, have voluntarily accepted, evidenced in the form of treaties, 
diplomatic notes or public documents (for example, speeches by those 
holding State power). 
 
                                                 
434  Usually taken from the Christian perspective, given the theological orientation of the 
natural law philosophers such as St Thomas Aquinas. 
435  Themes of natural law have carried over into the twentieth century and can be seen in 
the existence and content of international instruments dealing with human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and war crimes (for example, in the Nuremburg and Tokyo 
Tribunals formed after the Second World War, and those for Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 
the 1990s, to deal with allegations of ‘crimes against humanity’): Shaw (2003) at 45. 
436  Sometimes also referred to as “consent theory”:  Blay (2003) at 14. 
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A fundamental principle of the positivist school is pacta sunt servanda 
which declares agreements made between governments must be carried out 
in good faith. The positivist approach, including pacta sunt servanda, has 
not been exempt from scholarly criticism437, in particular for its difficulty in 
dealing with customary international law (that is, international law which 
has emerged through consistent practice, rather than the express and 
consensual exercise of the will of the State).    
 
The response from positivists is that, absent express statements to the 
contrary by individual States, their consent to international law is tacit or 
implied by their membership of the international community of nations.  
This issue has resonance for the creation of new States438 who are expected 
by existing States to comply with the body of international law existent at 
their time of formation. 
Sources of International Law 
 
The material sources of international law can be regarded as the actual 
substance from which international jurists and lawyers determine the rule, 
or law, applicable to a given situation.  However, unlike their counterparts 
dealing with municipal law, the international lawyer does not have ready 
access to statutes, codes and even jurisprudence, and their work can be 
confounded by the need to identify and assess the standing of what may be 
presented as a ‘customary rule of international law’. 
 
                                                 
437  See Blay (2003) at 14-16 for a general discussion of some of these scholarly criticisms. 
438  Such as those which emerged during the decolonization of the post Second World War 
period, and from the break-up of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 
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Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice comes 
closest to providing the foundation sources of international law439, 
identifying: international treaties440; international custom (as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as being law)441; “(t)he general principles of law as 
recognised by civilised nations”442; and, as a subsidiary means, judicial 
decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified legal academics443.  
To this listing, some scholars have also added the decisions or 
determinations of international institutions444. 
 
An important allied issue is the order of precedence to be attached to these 
sources of law.  As general rules: treaties, customs and general principles of 
law prevail over judicial decisions and juristic works445, provided the treaty 
is not in conflict with jus cogens; the latter in time will prevail over the 
earlier in time; and, the special rule will prevail over the general rule446.  
The rule of jus cogens is based on an acceptance of fundamental and 
superior values of international law and relations, and means a treaty or a 
customary law from a peremptory norm of general international law 
permits no derogations447.  Treaties conflicting with jus cogens shall be 
void448, while reservations that offended the rule would be unlawful449. 
                                                 
439  Brownlie (2001) at 3 describes Article 38 as “… a complete statement of the sources of 
international law”. 
440  Article 38(1)(a). 
441  Article 38(1)(b). 
442  Article 38(1)(c). 
443  Article 38(1)(d). 
444  Shearer (1994) at 28. 
445  Brownlie (2001) at 3 – 4. 
446  lex specialis deerogat legi generali. 
447  There are clear echoes of Natural Law. 
448  Article 53, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Agreements, (1969) 8 ILM 
679. 
449  North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ (1969) 3. 
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. International Treaties 
 
Treaties are commonly considered to be the foundation of modern 
international law and are sometimes (naively) viewed as a form of 
‘international legislation’ that can create international law more effectively 
and efficiently than the generally slower moving customary approaches.  
From a legal perspective, the effect of any individual treaty in leading to the 
creation of rules of international law is dependent on the nature of the 
treaty concerned, in particular whether it is: a law-making treaty, which 
sets down rules of general or universal application in a specific area of 
interstate relations; or, a treaty contract, between a small number of states 
and dealing with a matter particular to them450.   
 
Law-making treaties create formal legal obligations for the future conduct of 
the participating States Parties on the terms and conditions of the treaty 
concerned.  Where there are a large number of States Parties to a law-
making treaty, the declaratory nature of the provisions of the instrument 
can be sufficient to support a customary rule451.  Even an unratified law-
making treaty can be taken as evidence of a generally accepted rule(s), at 
least in the short term452.  Such treaties by their mere existence do not 
automatically over-ride customary international law in a given area.  The 
latter will not simply dissolve or be absorbed into the former, but rather will 
maintain its separate legal existence453.  However, such situations can lead to  
                                                 
450   The former are a source of international law; the latter are not. 
451  Brownlie (2001) at 12. 
452  Nottebohm Case, (Second Phase) ICJ 1955, 23; North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ 
1969, 3. 
453  Nicaragua Case, ICJ 1986, 14. 
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difficulties in international law, given the two rules – one derived from a 
law making treaty and another from customary international law - may be 
subject to different principles in regard to their interpretation and 
application454. 
 
Treaty-contracts, by contrast, are not a direct, general source of 
international law although they may constitute particular law between the 
States Parties to the agreement.  Having said that, treaty-contracts can lead 
to the formation of international law through the principles underpinning 
customary law, most notably where non-parties come to accept the 
provisions of a particular treaty as generating customary international law455 
and/or there is a recurrence of treaty-contracts laying down similar rules 
that evolve into a principle of international law456. 
 
Multilateral treaties, while having a large number of States Parties, should 
not necessarily be regarded as international law of general application such 
that the provisions of those treaties bind non-parties. Rather, non-parties 
must evidence, by their conduct, their intention to accept the provisions of 
those multilateral treaties as general rules of international law before they 
can be regarded as being bound by them.  Bilateral treaties, where they are 
habitually framed in the same way, can be used (with caution457) as guidance 
to prevailing international practice and hence informative of international 
law (for example, in the area of extradition458). 
                                                 
454  Shaw (2003) at 91. 
455  North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ 1969, 3. 
456  Shearer (1994) at 40. 
457  Brownlie (2001) at 14. 
458  Re Muzza Aceitiuno, ILR 18 (1951), No 98. 
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. International Custom 
 
Customary approaches have been the dominant source of international law 
for much of its history, and customary rules have evolved from extensive 
historical and traditional processes, which in turn facilitated their 
acceptance by the international community.  These rules have emerged 
from practices and usages from three main circumstances: diplomatic 
relations between States; the practice of international institutions; and, 
municipal sources of law. 
 
Diplomatic relations between States, evident in official statements by 
governments (whether written or verbal; for example, by Foreign Ministers 
or Ambassadors) constitute evidence of usage (both acceptance or rejection 
of customs) followed by States; the practice of international institutions, 
whether in the form of conduct or statements, can promote the 
development of customary international law concerning their status, powers 
and responsibilities459; while municipal sources, such as State laws or judicial 
decisions, can be evidence of adoption of such or similar laws which can be 
taken as general recognition of a broad principle of law460. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
459  Held by the Permanent Court of International Justice, in an Advisory Opinion on the 
regulatory powers of the International Labour Organisation (ILO):  (1922) PCIJ, Series B, 
No 2 at pp 40 – 41. 
460  For example, in The Scotia the United States Supreme Court found the United States 
Government had by legislation and practice accepted certain maritime practice and safety 
laws for ships at sea enacted originally in the United Kingdom: (1871) 14 Wallace 170. 
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However, two tests must generally be satisfied before a practice or usage can 
be considered as customary international law.  These tests deal with two 
aspects of the formation of international law: the material, being the actual 
behaviour of States; and, the psychological, being the belief such behaviour 
is law461.  The material aspect requires a recurrence or repetition of the acts 
that stimulate the customary rule.  A single act generally is not sufficient: 
the conduct must be regular and repeated, with constancy and uniformity of 
practice, especially by those States whose interests are most likely to be 
affected by the rule in question462.   
 
The psychological aspects, also known as opinio juris sive neccessitatis463, 
requires an expectation to emerge that, in similar circumstances in the 
future, the same conduct will be repeated.  Where that expectation evolves 
into a general recognition by States the conduct concerned is an obligation 
or a right then the behaviour concerned has changed from practice or usage 
into customary international law464.  The determination of opinion juris 
must be inferred from all of the circumstances, not merely the specific 
actions presented as constituting the material element of the supposed  
 
 
 
                                                 
461  For an expansive discussion of the material and psychological tests in customary 
international law, see Shaw (2003) at 70-88. 
462  Asylum Case, ICJ 1950, at 276-277. No particular duration is required to establish a 
customary rule, although the passage of time will provide evidence of generality and 
consistency of adoption and application (Right of Passage Case, ICJ (1960) 6), while serial 
departures from the practice may negate claims of a customary rule, although minor 
deviations would not necessarily do so (Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ 1951, at 
138). 
463  ‘(A) general practice accepted as law’:  Brownlie (2001) at 7. 
464  Shearer (1994) at 34. 
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customary international law465 and generally and widely recognised by the 
international community of nations466. Such general and wide recognition 
ould not apply when the particular practice was only recognised as law by a 
small number of States467. 
 
A State may seek to exclude itself from customary international law through 
processes of objection: as a persistent objector during the process of 
formation of the custom, with the objector being required to provide clear 
evidence in rebuttal of the assumption of acceptance468; and/or, as a 
subsequent objector, where the State objecting has to demonstrate a 
consistent and unequivocal manifestation of a refusal to accept the 
customary law469. 
. Decisions of Juristic Bodies 
 
Decisions of juristic bodies470 can play a authoritative role in the formation 
of international law471.  However, unlike Courts in common law 
jurisdictions, they cannot create law through precedent: they are a 
subsidiary source for determining rules of law472.   Against this background, 
the Court cannot regard its previous decisions as binding per se, and as 
                                                 
465  Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ, Series A, No 10. 
466  See: West Rand Central Gold Mining Co vs R, (1905) 2 KB 391 at 407; and, Article 53 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Agreements (1969) 8 ILM 679. 
467  Right of Passage Over Indian Territory Case, ICJ 1960, 6. 
468  Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, ICJ 1951. 
469  Id. 
470   Such as the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor, the 
International Court of Justice. 
471  Article 38(1)(d), Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
472   Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states, inter alia, the 
Court’s decisions have “no binding force except between the parties and in respect to that 
particular case.”. 
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precedents473. However, the Court can, and has, used past decisions as a 
source of guidance to encourage a substantial degree of judicial consistency, 
including the reasoning behind those decisions, and the principles of 
international law474, although even here scholars urge prudence475.  
 
The judicial decisions of municipal courts can also have evidential value by 
providing indications of the State practice, and have become important 
sources for material on the recognition of governments and States, State 
succession, diplomatic and sovereign immunity, extradition, war crimes, the 
concept of the ‘state of war’, and law of prize476.  Again, scholars warn 
caution should be exercised in relying on such decisions477. 
. Juristic Works 
 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice directs 
the Court to apply the teachings of leading jurists and legal publicists as a 
subsidiary means for determining the rules of international law.  They are 
not, however, an independent ‘source of international law’.  Rather, juristic 
writings and analyses have evidentiary value, especially for deducing 
customary rules from the cumulation of practices or usages.  Such works 
                                                 
473  South West Africa Case, 2nd Phase ICJ 1966, 5, 36–37. 
474  The PCIJ in several cases practiced de facto precedent: Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Populations Case, ICJ (1925) Ser. B. No 10, 21; Reparations Case, PCIJ (1926), Ser. B., No 
10, 18; and, more recently the ICJ in, inter alia: Cameroon Case, ICJ (1962)  27; South 
West Africa Case, 2nd Phase ICJ 1966 5; North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ 1969, 3. 
475  “…it is incautious to extract general propositions from opinions and judgements 
devoted to a specific problem or settlement of disputes entangled with the special 
relations of two states.”: Brownlie (2001) at 20. 
476  The Scotia (1871) 14 Wallace 170; The Pappuette Habana (1900) 175 US 677; The 
Zamora (1916) 2 AC 77; Lauritisen vs Government of Chile ILR 23 (1956) 708. 
477  Given the potential for such sources to present a narrow national interest/outlook: 
Brownlie (2001) at 23. 
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can, however, have particular value where there are no clearly established 
customary or treaty rules, or other reliable forms of guidance478, on a 
particular matter, whereupon juristic works can be considered as an 
independent ‘source of law’.  Scholarly opinion, however, appears divided 
on the role and the standing of academic and juristic writers on 
international law479.    
. Decisions of International Institutions 
 
While not expressly mentioned in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, the decisions or determinations of 
international institutions can influence the formation of international law.  
This contribution can come through a number of channels: they may 
represent an intermediate or near-to-final step in the evolution of 
customary law, particularly concerning the operations and powers of the 
institution (with the degree of influence being measured by the extent of 
practical adherence to the decision by States Parties)480; where  
 
 
                                                 
478  Or there is a need for ‘intellectual support’ in a dissenting or separate opinion:  
Brownlie (2001) at 25. 
479  On the one hand, such works: ”… are important as a way of arranging and putting into 
focus the structure and the form of international law and elucidating the nature, history 
and practice of the rules of law…(and can) inject an element of coherence and order into 
the subject as well as to question the direction and purposes of the rules.”  (Shaw (2003) at 
106).  By contrast: “It is, however, obvious that subjective factors enter into any 
assessment of juristic opinion, that individual writers reflect national and other prejudices, 
and, further, some publicists see themselves to be propagating new and better views 
rather than providing a passive appraisal of the law.” Brownlie (2001) at 24. 
480  For example, the status to be conferred upon an abstention by a State when called 
upon to vote at the United Nations (it should not be regarded as non-concurrence):  
Shearer (1994) at 46. 
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those international institutions are empowered to provide binding 
determinations on the interpretation of instruments under their authority481; 
and, where international institutions have the power to give general 
directions or decisions which are binding on all Members482. 
 
. Other Sources  
 
There are a number of other sources of international law beyond those 
enumerated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (and 
discussed earlier).  These include general principles of international law and 
equity, both of which are particularly useful when a court is considering a 
matter where there is no law per se or clear law on exactly the point under 
deliberation.  Judicial reliance on the ‘general principles of law’ tends to be 
greater in international law than in municipal law given the relatively lesser 
availability of decided cases and legislation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
481  For example, by the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, pursuant 
to Article XVIII of the Articles of Agreement establishing the Fund (22 July 1944).  
482  For example, Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome, of 25 March 1957, which established 
what is now known as the European Union.   Resolutions of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, for example, are not binding per se on member States, although where 
they deal with general norms of international law and are accepted by a majority vote 
they constitute evidence of the opinions of governments and an accelerated means for the 
evolution of customary law on the matter at hand: Nicaragua vs United States of America 
(Merits) Case, ICJ 1986, 98. 
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Some of the principles of international law that have emerged over the past 
century include: every violation of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparations corresponding to the damage483; private rights acquired 
under existing law do not cease on a change in sovereignty484; a judgement 
having the authority of res judicata is binding on the parties to the 
dispute485; a party that has acquiesced to a particular situation cannot later 
proceed to challenge it486; and, States must act in good faith in meeting their 
obligations487. 
 
Equity – a set of principles constituting the values of the legal system488 - has 
also found its way into international law through references in a number of 
important decisions by international legal authorities489.  In one of the 
clearest statements on the matter, the International Court of Justice noted: 
“…it is bound to apply equitable principles as part of international law, and 
to balance up the various considerations which it regards as relevant in 
order to produce an equitable result.”490.  However, scholars491 have  
                                                 
483  Chorzow Case, PCIJ (1928) Ser. A, No 17, 4. 
484  Also known as ‘respect for acquired rights’: German Settlers in Poland Case, PCIJ, Ser. 
B, No 6, 36. 
485  Argentina-Chile Case, 113 ILR 1. 
486  Temple Case, 24 ILR 840.  See also estoppel in common law or preclusion in civil law, 
which have been considered in international law:  A State which has by its conduct 
encouraged another State to believe in the existence of a certain factual or legal situation, 
and to rely upon that belief, may be estopped (or precluded) from asserting the true 
situation in its relations with the other State - North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ 
(1969) 3; Temple of Preah Vihear Case, ICJ (1962) 6. 
487  Fisheries Case, 55 ILR 238; Lac Lannoux Case, 24 ILR 119; Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, ICJ (1996) 102. 
488  Shaw (2003) at 99. 
489 Inter alia:  Diversion of Water From the Meuse Case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No 70, 73; Rann of 
Kutch Case, 50 ILR 2; North Sea Continental Shelf Case, ICJ (1969) 3. 
490  Tunisia – Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ (1982) 18, 60. 
491  Shaw (2003) at 102. 
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criticised the use of equity within international law on a number of 
grounds, most notably concerning the lack of clarity as to how a dispute is 
likely to be resolved and the principles likely to be used in reaching a 
decision, both of which introduced an element of unpredictability. 
 
Subjects of International Law 
 
In broad legal terms, the subjects of law are ‘legal persons’ who possess the 
capacity to hold and maintain certain rights, and are subject to perform 
certain duties492.  Determining legal personality involves an assessment of 
key concepts within the law, such as status, capacity, competence, and 
rights and duties.  In international law, personality requires a determination 
of the relationship between rights and duties under such laws, and the 
capacity to enforce claims493. 
 
. States  
 
The foundation stone of international law is the State494.  There is little 
dissent to the status, capacity or competence of States to accept rights and 
make commitments to obligations, and they enjoy a number of fundamental 
rights within the international legal order: independence; equality; and, 
peaceful co-existence.  The main characteristic of a State is its 
independence, or sovereignty, which has been defined as the capacity to  
 
                                                 
492  Reparations for Injuries Case, ICJ, (1949) 179. 
493  Shaw (2003) at 176. 
494  For further discussion, see the sub-section, above, on positivism. 
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provide for its own well-being and development, free from the domination 
of other States, provided that in doing so it does not impair or violate the 
rights of other States495.   
 
On the issue of rights and obligations of States, international law starts from 
the point of permitting freedom of action for States unless there is a rule 
(either treaty or customary in origin) which constrains such sovereignty.  
However, such freedom as exists within, not outside, the international legal 
system and as such the international law determines the scope and content  
of the independence of States, not the States themselves acting 
individually496.  Prominent amongst the rights and duties of States are: the 
right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and its permanent population; 
the right to self-defence (in certain circumstances); and, the duty not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign State497.  
 
Another important characteristic of States is their legal equality – in terms, 
of their rights and duties.  States, regardless of their economic, political or 
military power or size, have the same juridical capacities and functions498,499.  
The right to peaceful co-existence has largely emerged from several  
 
                                                 
495  Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1949 at 286. 
496  Shaw (2003) at 190. 
497  Corfu Channel Case, ICJ (1949) 4. 
498  See, for example, the United Nations: Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (1970) 9 ILM 1292. 
499  Which has been manifest in the ‘one vote, one value’ system which operates within 
the United Nations General Assembly.  However, this should be viewed against the veto 
powers of the United Nations Security Council, and the privileged status of its permanent 
members – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States of America. 
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resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly500 covering concepts 
such as sovereign equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
States, respect for the territorial integrity of States, and condemnation of 
subversive activities by one State against another. 
 
Associations of States can have legal personality under international law 
separate to those of the participating States depending on the circumstances 
and the constitutional nature of the arrangement, and upon international 
acceptance.  Confederations that involve several countries acting closely 
together under some form of international agreement and central 
institutions with agreed functions are likely to find international legal 
personality501. Looser associations of sovereign States, such as the (British) 
Commonwealth of Nations, which do not intend to form binding legal 
relations between participating sovereign States and which operate as 
discussion fora, are unlikely to secure such personality502. 
 
International organisations, such as the United Nations and the 
International Labour Organisation, can (and do) have international legal 
personality where their enabling treaties contain constitutional provisions 
setting out their duties and obligations. The International Court of Justice 
has expressly held, in terms applicable to other international organisations, 
the United Nations is a subject of international law with the attendant rights 
                                                 
500  Resolutions 1236 (XII) and 1301 (XIII). 
501   For example: Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht), (1992) 31 ILM 227; Charter 
Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 1995, 34 ILM 1298; Preliminary 
Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation Between the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia, 1994, 33 ILM 605. 
502  Shaw (2003) at 215, 
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and duties503.  This status can also extend to regional international 
organisations, again through the terms of their constituent instruments, as is 
the case with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)504 and the 
European Union (EU)505. 
. Non-State Persons 
 
Business entities, such as international public companies and multinational 
corporations, can obtain international legal personality in certain (limited) 
circumstances.  In the case of international public companies, international 
legal personality would depend on its constitutional nature, powers and 
competencies, and distance from municipal law.  International public 
companies, such as the Bank of International Settlements (created by virtue 
of a treaty between five States in 1930) and Intelsat (created as an 
intergovernmental structure in 1973) have the requisite legal personality.   
 
Multinational corporations, by contrast, are privately owned business 
entities operating across multiple States.  They can have economic resources 
beyond those available to smaller States, and often enter into agreements 
and contracts with foreign States (for example, in the terms and conditions 
of foreign direct investment).  However, such corporations, generally  
 
 
                                                 
503  See Shearer (1996) at 58 for a discussion of this point. 
504  Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National 
Representatives and International Staff (1951). 
505  Inter alia: Treaty of Rome (1957), Maastricht Treaty on European Union and Economic 
and Monetary Union (1993), 31 ILM 227. 
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created by municipal law, do not have international legal personality and 
the law of treaties does not govern their contractual obligations with 
States506.   Despite a number of international efforts to regulate their global 
conduct507, the international legal status of multinational corporations and 
the legal effect of such regulations remain unresolved508. 
 
Individuals traditionally have not been considered subjects of international 
law509, with the chain-linkage (generally) being from the international law 
to the State to nationality to the individual.  This situation was manifest 
where an individual making a claim against a foreign State would have the 
matter subsumed (and advanced or otherwise) under that of his/her national 
State510.  
 
International law does not create general direct rights for individuals511, 
although States can confer particular rights on individuals which can 
become enforceable under international law512.   International law can (and 
                                                 
506  Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case, ICJ (1952) 93. 
507  See for example: United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations Draft 
Code of Conduct, (1984) 23 ILM 602; World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign 
Direct Investment, (1993) 31 ILM 1366. 
508  Shearer (1996) at 61 suggests: “One tenable solution is to characterize these entities as 
subjects of transnational law, that is to say, a legal order of the nature of a tertium guid 
intermediate between international law, on the one hand, and domestic national law on 
the other.”   In effect, proposing a third plane, between international law and municipal 
law. 
509  Although adherents to Natural Law would say the essential feature of international 
law, and indeed law itself, is concern for the human being. 
510  Panevezys – Saldutiskis Case, PCIJ Series A/B, No 76; Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions Case, PCIJ (1924) Series A, No 2.  An international agency, such as the United 
Nations, can espouse a claim against a State on behalf of one of its officials:  Reparations 
for Injuries Case, ICJ (1949) 182. 
511  Danzig Railways Officials Case, PCIJ (1928) Series B, No 15. 
512  For example, Article 304 (b) ofthe Treaty of Versailles, in 1919, allowed nationals of 
the allied powers to bring actions against Germany in their own names for compensation; 
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does), however, impose obligations upon individuals, most notably through 
international individual criminal responsibility for what are considered to 
be crimes against war, peace and humanity513, as well as specific issues such 
as: the conduct of apartheid (a form of racial discrimination)514; the  
distribution of obscene publications515; the supply and usage of illegal 
narcotics516; engaging in torture517; hostage taking518; and/or, piracy at sea519.  
Thus, delinquents, such as international drug traffickers, hostage-takers, or 
pirates, can be subjects of international criminal law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
while the EURATOM Treaty of 1957 grants individuals and corporations certain rights of 
direct appeal to the European Court of Justice against decisions of organs of the European 
Union (Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 1957).   More 
recently, a number of international treaties, mainly in the human rights area, have 
conferred direct rights on individuals and have enabled them to have direct access to 
international courts and tribunals: See for example: The European Convention on Human 
Rights, 1950; The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, (1967) 6 ILM 368; and, The International Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, (1966) 5 ILM 350. 
513  For example, Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles, (1919), and Article 6 of the 
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals, (1945) 39 AJIL, 
Supp, 259, both of which dealt with the prosecution before military tribunals of persons 
alleged to have committed war crimes.  See also the International Law Commission’s Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1991) 30 ILM 1584. 
514  The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid (1974) 13 ILM 50. 
515  The Agreement for the Suppression of the Circulation of Obscene Publications (1910); 
The International Convention for the Suppression and Circulation of and Traffic in 
Obscene Publications (1924).  
516  The Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking (1931); The 
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Trafficking in Dangerous Drugs (1936). 
517  The Draft Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1984) 23 ILM 1027. 
518  The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979) 18 ILM 1456. 
519  The International Maritime Organisation Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) 27 ILM 668. 
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International and Municipal Law 
 
An important issue within international (and municipal) law is the extent, if 
any, to which domestic courts are obligated to give effect within their 
domestic jurisdiction to the rules of international law, both where these 
rules are in harmony or in conflict with municipal law.  To what extent 
should municipal courts take into account international law, and how 
should they deal with conflicts between international and municipal law? 
 
There are two main theories of the relationship between international and 
municipal law – monism and dualism (the latter sometimes also called 
pluralism). Monism holds international and municipal law are essentially 
connected parts of a single legal system; by contrast, dualism holds 
international and municipal law represent two discretely different legal 
systems. Some scholars520 have suggested monism sits comfortably within 
the Natural Law (and the idea that the individual is a subject of 
international law), while dualism sits with positivism (and its view 
international law regulates relations between States, while municipal law 
regulates the conduct of citizens between themselves, and with the State). A 
third view – harmonisation – has emerged that sits between monism and 
dualism, which holds international and municipal law each have their 
respective fields of competence and coverage, and instances where they 
collide or conflict are the exception.  In this context, international law is 
superior in dealing with the relations between States, while municipal law is 
supreme in the domestic domain.   
                                                 
520  Shearer (1996) at 64; Blakin (2003) at 119–120. 
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Tackling Corruption under International Law 
 
The active engagement of the international diplomatic and legal 
communities in corruption issues has tended to lag behind those of the 
business and academic communities.  While commerce and industry has 
been exposed, in varying manners, to the practice of corruption for many 
years, and the academic community (especially those in the economics and 
development studies disciplines) have been actively studying relevant 
imensions of corruption over the past thirty or so years, international legal 
activity has lagged behind both in time and in endeavour521.  Indeed, it has 
really only been since the 1990s that Nation States and their advisors have 
become actively engaged in international efforts to combat corruption in its 
various forms. 
 
The motivations for these efforts are varied and range across: the changed 
economic and political dynamics of international relations since the end of 
the Cold War522; the liberalisation of the world economy, especially the 
globalisation of business523; shifts in practitioner and scholarly thinking on 
development policies and strategies524; and, concerted efforts by the United  
States to multilateralise525 its own domestic anti-corruption initiative526. 
                                                 
521  For a short history of co-ordinated international legal efforts to combat corruption 
over the past century see Anechiarica (1999) at 380–387. 
522  “(T)he removal of the compelling need to support corrupt regimes for national security 
reasons.”:  Webb (2005) at 193.  
523  Nesbit (1998). 
524  Shams (2001) at 92.  
525  Randall (1997); Gantz (1998) at 466; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 17; Corr and 
Lawler (1999) at 1253; Salbu (1999a) at 54; Unzicker (1999/2000) at 665; Salbu (2000) at 
684; Abbott (2001) at 276; Shams (2001) at 96; George et al (2000) at 486.  According to 
one scholar (Metcalfe, 2000, at 133):  “America’s economic competitors where pleased as 
punch that the US had handicapped its own firms in the competitive environment of 
international trade.”.   For a sweeping rhetorical critique of this multilateralisation see 
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This study will consider six major international instruments created during 
the past two decades to tackle corruption, namely the: United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (2003; UNCAC)527; OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997; OECD - FPO)528;   Commentaries on the Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997; OECD – FPO - Commentaries)529;  Criminal Law 
Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe (1999; (CLCC-CE)530: 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (1996; IACAC)531; and, the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003; 
AUCPCC)532.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Salbu (1999b), in particular what he sees (at 226-227) as the moral and political peril of 
such action: “The moral peril consists of the dangers of intrusiveness, paternalism, 
imperialism and disrespect that arise whenever one state imposes its discretionary values 
upon another state.  The political peril entails the ill will, as well as the potential conflict, 
that can result from the imposition of alien values.”  For a solid critique of the Salbu view 
on corruption, see Nichols (1999) at 291-297. 
526  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Public Law No 95-218, 91 Stat. 1494 (1998). 
527  43 ILM 37 (2004).  For a history of the UNs anti corruption work see: Pierros and 
Hudson (1998) at 87-88; Landmeier (2002) at 590-591, and for a critique of the 
effectiveness of the UNCAC see Igbinedion (2009). 
528  36 ILM 1016 (1997).   For general histories of this instrument see Pierros and Hudson 
(1998) at 92; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 66-75; George et al (2000); and Posadas 
(1999/2000) at 376-382, in particular for its foundations in the US FCPA. 
529  George et al (2000). 
530  38 ILM 505 (1999); ETS 173.  For concise histories of the EU’s internal work on 
corruption see: Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 89-91; Posadas (1999/2000) at 395-399; 
Landmeier (2002) at 592-593; Anonymous (2002b). 
531  35 ILM 724 (1996). For concise histories of this instrument see Sutton (1996/97) at 
1442-1450; Jimeses (1998) at 157; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 54-62; Shams (2001) at 103-
108; Posadas (1999/2000) at 382-394; Henning (2001) at 806-809; Landmeier (2002) at 
591-592; Altamarion (2006/07) at 499–523; and, Morrissey at 169–181. 
532  43 ILM 1 (2003). 
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These instruments are not exhaustive of all of the multilateral or regional 
treaties dealing substantively with bribery issues or in some way touching to 
varying degrees on the corruption issue whether in the private or public 
sector, or within the broader framework of international law agreements533. 
However, they constitute a representative sample of the main international 
instruments currently in force534.  Other instruments535 which touch upon 
corruption issues to some degree but not examined in this study include the: 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime536; 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol against 
Corruption537; Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific538; 
Council of Europe’s Twenty Guiding Principles For The Fight Against 
Corruption539; Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption540; 
Fight Against Corruption Involving European Community Officials541; and, 
European Union’s Joint-Action To Fight Corruption In The Private 
Sector542. 
 
                                                 
533  Carr (2007) at 131–142 argues the multiplicity of such conventions is indicative of 
weakness, not strength, in the international fight against corruption, pointing to a range 
of what she regards as inconsistencies in key concepts, definitions and approaches, which 
are likely to undermine their individual and their collective effectiveness by, for example, 
allowing for selective compliance by States Parties. 
534  For a list of their antecedents, which can provide some context and history to their 
development, see Figure 3.1. 
535  Several of which have been superseded by those in the group being studied. 
536   40 ILM 353; UN GA Res 55/25; for a concise history of the UN’s work on anti-
corruption see Gantz (1998) at 470-472. 
537  Adopted by the SADC Heads of State and Government at their August 2001 Summit 
held in Malawi. 
538  Agreed at the 3rd Annual ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia Pacific, 
held in Tokyo in December 2000. 
539  Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 November 1997, Resolution (97) 24. 
540  ETS 174. 
541  Adopted by Council Act 97/C 195/01 of 26 May 1997 (C 195 of 25 June 1997). 
542  Adopted by the Council on 22 December 1998 (OJ L 358, 31.12.1998). 
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This study will not look at: the role of international financial institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank and 
their lending policies and practices543; the work of multilateral business 
organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)544; 
proposals to include corruption within the jurisdiction of the International  
Criminal Court545 or the World Trade Organisation (WTO)546; or of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
543  However, those interested in good discussions on the actual and potential role of the 
World Bank in anti-corruption activity could usefully see:  Shams (2001) at 95-99; Zagaris 
and Ohri (1999) at 78-81; Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 372-374.   For similar reviews of the 
actual and potential role of the IMF see: Harms (2000) at 204-207; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) 
at 81-83. See also Posadas (1999/2000) at 399-401. 
544  The ICC issued two sets of its own (non-binding) guidelines: “Recommendations to 
Combat Extortion and Bribery in Business Transactions” (17 ILM 417: 1978); and, 
“Revisions to ICC Rules on Extortion and Bribery in International Business” (35 ILM 
1301: 1996).  For general reviews of the work of the ICC in anti-corruption field see:  
Boswell (1997) at 1173-1175; Gantz (1998) at 473-476; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 86-88; 
Harms (2000) at 174; Vincke (1997) at 198; Loren (2001) at 337; Salbu (2001) at 456–458; 
Delaney (2006/07) at 450-451  The work of private business bodies like the ICC should 
not be undervalued according to Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 22: “Corporate self-
regulation will multiply the effectiveness of government antibribery law enforcement.”. 
545  For an interesting discussion of such a proposal see Harms (2000) at 197-204. 
546  Nichols (1995/96), Harms (2000); Abbott (2001); Posadas (1999/2000) at 410-412; Alai 
(2008/09); Schefer (2009).  Nichols (1995/96) at 713 is particularly critical of proposals for 
the WTO to take on a major and leadership role in tackling corruption:“The World Trade 
Organisation is not empowered to solve all of the world’s woes, nor should it try.”. 
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individual countries, such as the United States and its Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA)547; or of individual multinational enterprises548; as to 
do so would substantially broaden the scope and dilute the focus of this 
work.  
 
. Definitions  
 
The six anti-corruption instruments under review have both commonalities 
and differences in the range of covered definitions.  For example, while 
several provide definitions for “public official”, “foreign public official”, 
“confiscation” and “proceeds of crime”, only one or two (variably) provide 
definitions of “illicit enrichment”, “legal persons”, and “private sector”.    
 
While the UNCAC has the largest number and broadest range of definitions, 
it still has a number of notable gaps in the suite of definitions, for example 
“foreign country”, “legal person”, “private sector”, and “public 
agency/enterprise”.  As such, while it could arguably be considered the 
primary benchmark for international anti-corruption agreements, being the  
 
                                                 
547  For discussions of the origins, development and application of the United States 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1), and its seminal role in the creation of 
a number of the multilateral instruments examined in this study see:  Martin (1997/98) at 
420-428; Corr and Lawler (1999) at 1255-1296; Posadas (1999/2000) at 348-365; Taylor 
(2000/01); Poon (1995/96); Randall (1997); Gantz (1998) at 459-465; Zedalis (1998); Salbu 
(2001) at 445–453; Landmeier (2002) at 594-605; Krever (2007/08) at 87-96.  The 
legislative shortcomings of the FCPA were remedied in The Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law No 100 – 418, Stat 1107 (1998).  For a discussion 
of the shortcomings and the remedial action taken see Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 360-362, 
and then at 361-362 for how US companies worked around the requirements of the FPCA.  
548  For an interesting perspective on the role of individual multinational enterprises, and 
their capacity to use domestic civil litigation to progress an anti-corruption agenda, see 
Burger and Holland (2006/07) at 62–69. 
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most comprehensive, it is not exhaustive of all of the relevant issues.  Only 
one of the instruments provided a formal definition of “legal person”: 
“…any entity having such status under the applicable national law …”549. 
 
The definition of “public official” is, understandably, a fulcrum one for anti-
corruption instruments.  Conceptually, they can be: “(i) any person holding 
a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a State Party, 
whether appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether 
paid or unpaid, irrespective of that person’s seniority;  (ii) any other person 
who performs a public function, including for a public agency or public 
enterprise, or provides a public service, as defined in the domestic law of the 
State Party and as applied in the pertinent area of law of that State Party; 
(iii) any other person defined as a “public official” in the domestic law of a  
State Party.”550.  By contrast, the CLCC-CE adopts a more descriptive 
approach: “… public officer”, “mayor”, “minister” or “judge” in the national 
law of the State in which the person in question performs that function and 
as applied in its criminal law.” 551. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
549  CLCC-CE, Art 1 (d). 
550  UNCAC, Article 2 (a); similar definitions can be found in IACAC, Article 1 and 
AUCPCC, Article 1. 
551  CLCC-CE, Art 1 (a). 
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An “official of a public enterprise” is defined in one instrument only, being a 
public official who “shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the 
enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in the relevant 
market…”552.  “Public authority”, by comparison, may be held by persons 
(e.g. political party officials in single party states) not otherwise formally 
designated as public officials553.   
 
In this context, a “public enterprise” is an enterprise over which 
government(s) directly or indirectly exercise a dominant influence – for 
example, when the government(s) hold the majority of the enterprise’s 
subscribed capital, control the majority of voting shares or appoint a 
majority of the members of its administrative or managerial body or 
board554.  The allied concept of “public agency” is an “… entity constituted 
under public law to carry out specific tasks in the public interest.”555. 
 
Only two of the instruments provided definitions of “foreign public official”.  
Such an approach was to be expected for the UNCAC given its 
comprehensive nature, and the OECD-FPO given such persons are the 
primary focus of that instrument. The UNCAC defines a “foreign public 
official” in both ex officio and functional terms as: “…any person holding a 
legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a foreign country,  
 
 
 
                                                 
552  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 15. 
553  Ibid, Para 16 
554  Ibid, Para 14. 
555  Ibid, Para 13. 
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whether appointed or elected; and any person exercising a public function 
for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise.” 556. 
The OECD – FPO is virtually identical, although it adds “ … and any official 
or agent of a public international organisation.” 557. 
 
Beyond these two instruments, the inclusion of specific definitions for key 
concepts related to anti-corruption practices and processes can only be 
regarded as patchy in the instruments under review.  For example, often 
only one (or at most two) of the instruments provide a definition of a 
particular concept, and no instrument provides a broad range of definitions 
across most, let alone all, concepts, although the UNCAC has the largest 
number of definitions, per se. 
“Foreign country”, a critical concept in international anti-corruption 
endeavour, is defined in only two of the instruments, as ”… not limited to 
states, but includes any organised foreign area or entity, such as an 
autonomous territory or a separate customs territory”558 and as “all levels 
and subdivisions of government, from national to local”559.    
                                                 
556  UNCAC Art 2 (b). 
557  OECD – FPO, Art 1 (4) (a). 
558  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 18. 
559  OECD – FPO, Art 1 (4) (b). 
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Similarly, “public international organisation”, and “official of an 
international organisation” are each defined in one instrument only:  the 
former as “any international organisation formed by states, governments, or  
other public international organisations …560, and can include a regional or 
multilateral organisation (for example, the European Commission or the 
Secretariat of the World Trade Organisation); and, the latter as “…any 
person who is authorized by such an organization to act on behalf of that 
organization.”561. 
 
“Public function” is given broad ‘definition’ (almost to the extent of 
subjectivity) in one instrument as “… any activity in the public interest 
…”562 delegated to an official by a government, while another is more 
specific, defining it to mean “any temporary or permanent, paid or honorary 
activity, performed by a natural person in the name of the State or in the  
service of the State or its institutions, at any level of its hierarchy.”563.  
However, another provides a definition of the allied concept of “official 
duties” as:  “… any use of the public official’s position, whether or not 
within the official’s authorised competence.”564. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
560  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 17. 
561  UNCAC, Article 2 (c ) . 
562  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 12. 
563  IACAC, Article 1. 
564  OECD – FPO, Art 1 (4) (c ).  
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Surprisingly, corruption and bribery are formally defined in only two of the 
instruments.  “Corruption” has been defined as: “…the acts and practices 
including related offences proscribed in this Convention …”565 (pointing in 
particular to illicit enrichment), while bribery is distinguished between 
““active bribery”, meaning the offence committed by the person who 
promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with “passive bribery”, the offence 
committed by the official who receives the bribe…..”566. 
 
Allied concepts include: “illicit enrichment”, which is defined to mean: “the 
significant increase in the assets of a public official or any other person 
which he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or her 
income.”567; and, “improper advantage”: “… something to which the 
company concerned was not clearly entitled …”568. 
. Jurisdiction 
 
All of the instruments address in some way the critical issue of jurisdiction, 
whether determined by territory or nationality, or both (extra-
territoriality).  Several make clear statements regarding the application of 
territorial jurisdiction using a conventional geographic test – that is, where 
the offence is committed in its territory569.  However, a number of the  
 
 
                                                 
565  AUCPCC, Art 1. 
566  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 1 
567  AUCPCC, Art 1. 
568  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 5. 
569  IACAC, Article V, first para; and AUCPCC, Article 13 (1) (a) for similar. 
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instruments define nationality as a basis for jurisdiction.  For example:  
“Nationality jurisdiction is to be established according to the general 
principles and conditions in the legal system of each Party.”570. 
 
Some instruments state territorial jurisdiction should not be too constrictive 
or rigidly applied: “The territorial basis for jurisdiction should be 
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery 
act is not required.”571.  Others adopt a mixed approach: the offence is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory; the offender is one of its 
nationals, one of its public officials or a member of one of its domestic 
public assemblies; and, the offence involves one of its public officials or 
members of its domestic public assemblies or any person who is at the same 
time one of its nationals572.   
 
Some instruments deal with extra-territoriality, albeit in different ways:  
“Nothing in this Convention shall entitle a State Party to undertake in the 
territory of another State the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of 
functions that are reserved exclusively for the authorities of that other State 
by its domestic law.”573.  But, by contrast:  “This Convention does not 
preclude the application of any other rule of criminal jurisdiction 
established by a State Party under its domestic law.”574. 
 
                                                 
570  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 26; OECD – FPO, Article 4 (2); AUCPCC, Article 
13 (1) (b) for similar. 
571  OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 25. 
572  CLCC-CE, Article 17 (1). 
573  UNCAC, Article 4 (2). 
574  IACAC, Article V, fourth para; AUCPCC, Article 13 (2) for similar. 
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However, efforts have been made to provide indicative thresholds for the 
use of extra-territorial jurisdiction upon own-nationals: “… when the 
offence, although committed outside its jurisdiction, affects, in the view of 
the State concerned, its vital interests or the deleterious or harmful 
consequences or effects of such offences impact on the State Party.”575.  To 
avoid multiple legal jeopardy, regardless of jurisdiction, a person shall not be 
tried twice for the same offence576. 
 
Given the numerous bases for jurisdiction, one of the instruments provides a 
(diplomatic) approach to deal with competing jurisdictions.  When more 
than one State Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence, they are 
encouraged to consult with each other with a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution577. How such consultations are 
handled, and the outcome realized is, in effect, determined on a case-by-
case basis. 
. The Public Sector  
 
The instruments under review deal with a number of aspects of public 
sector administration or functioning relevant to corruption, both actual and 
potential.  These range across: employment; election to public office; 
conflict of interest; codes of conduct; whistle-blowing; public financial 
accounting; public procurement; and, transparency.  The UNCAC, again,  
provides the most expansive coverage of these issues (dealing with each of  
them), followed by the IACAC and the AUCPCC, both of which largely 
echo the main United Nations’ instrument. 
                                                 
575  AUCPCC, Article 13 (1) (d). 
576  Ibid, Article 13 (3). 
577  OECD – FPO, Article 4 (3). 
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The employment provisions emphasise prevention of corruption through, 
inter alia, objective, rigorous and transparent public sector employment 
practices, with adequate levels of remuneration (taking into account levels 
of development in the nation concerned).  States Parties are required to 
maintain robust systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion 
and retirement of government officials, which are to be based on principles 
of efficiency, transparency and objective criteria such as merit, equity and 
aptitude578. 
 
The UNCAC is the only instrument which deals, albeit weakly, with 
preventative measures in the election of persons to public office, calling 
upon States Parties to establish criteria for persons seeking election to public 
office, transparency of funding for such candidates (including, where 
appropriate, public funding) and transparency to obviate potential conflicts 
of interest 579. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
578  UNCAC, Article 7.1. 
579  Although States Parties are only required to “consider” adopting such measures: see for 
example, UNCAC, Article 7.2 and 7.3. 
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The UNCAC gives further guidance on the question of conflict of interest, 
addressing both disclosure of benefits which may give rise to potential 
conflicts of interest and the imposition of penalties for those in breach of 
codes of conduct or standards.  States Parties are expected to require public 
officials to declare their outside activities, employment, investments or 
assets from which a potential conflict of interest may arise580 with penalties 
for violations of such measures581. 
 
The IACAC goes further providing a reinforcing measure to assist in the 
detection of any dividends from conflict of interest, requiring States Parties 
to consider the application and establishment within their jurisdictions of 
“(s)ystems for registering the income, assets and liabilities of persons who 
perform public functions in certain posts as specified by law and, where 
appropriate, for making such registrations public.” 582. 
 
Several instruments encourage States Parties to introduce ‘whistle-blowing’ 
laws to encourage and/or protect those who come forward to disclose 
potential instances of corruption; allowing them to do so without legal or 
other prejudice.  For example, States Parties shall: “…facilitate the reporting  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
580  Ibid, Article 8.5. 
581  Ibid, Article 8.6. 
582  IACAC, Article III. 
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by public officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when  
such acts come to their notice in the performance of their functions”583; and, 
create “(s)ystems for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in 
good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of their 
identities..” 584. 
. The Private Sector  
 
Of the instruments under review, only the UNCAC provides any 
substantive treatment of the private sector, although the AUCPCC touches 
on several issues in a general, and oblique, manner.  Surprisingly, the private 
sector is defined in only one of the instruments, as being: “…the sector of a 
national economy under private ownership in which the allocation of 
productive resources is controlled by market forces, rather than public 
authorities and other sectors of the economy not under the public sector or 
government.”585. 
 
Prevention of corruption in the private sector is addressed, in any 
meaningful way, in only one instrument (the UNCAC).  These preventative 
measures range across the promotion of: co-operation between law 
enforcement agencies and private sector entities; integrity within the 
private sector, including through codes of conduct and encouraging good 
commercial practices; and, of transparency, especially in the identity of legal  
 
 
                                                 
583  UNCAC, Article 8(4). 
584  IACAC, Article III. 
585  AUCPCC, Article 1. 
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and natural persons.  They also include the prevention of the misuse of 
procedures for the regulation of private entities and conflict of interest, in 
particular where a former government official subsequently obtains related 
employment in the private sector. 
 
A number of the instruments give particular attention to rigour and 
transparency in accounting and financial reporting matters.  States Parties 
are required to take measures regarding the maintenance of books and 
records, financial statement disclosures and accounting and auditing 
standards, to prohibit: the establishment of off-the-books accounts; the 
making of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions; the 
recording of non-existent expenditure; the entry of liabilities with incorrect 
identification of their objects; the use of false documents; and, the 
intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier than foreseen by 
the law.586  Additionally, States Parties are required to ensure private sector 
entities “… have sufficient internal auditing controls to assist in preventing 
and detecting acts of corruption and that the accounts and required 
financial statements of such private enterprises are subject to appropriate 
auditing and certification procedures.”587. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
586  UNCAC, Article 12(3); and similarly OECD – FPO, Article 8 (1). 
587  UNCAC, Article 12 (2) (f). 
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Only one of the instruments588 makes an express statement on the 
prohibition of the tax deductibility by the private sector of bribe payments: 
“Each State Party shall disallow the tax deductibility of expenses that 
constitute bribes … (and) other expenses incurred in furtherance of corrupt 
conduct.”589.  However, other instruments take a more moderate approach, 
only requiring States Parties to “consider” such treatment590.   
 
. Criminal Offences  
 
The instruments under review seek to establish criminal liability for legal 
and natural persons for a range of offences.  These offences in the public 
sector include:  bribery of a public official; solicitation by a public official; 
bribery of a foreign public official, or officials of public international 
organisations; bribery of elected officials/representatives; diversion of 
property by a public official (for example, embezzlement or 
misappropriation); trading in influence; abuse of function; and, illicit 
enrichment.  In the private sector, they range across: bribery; solicitation; 
embezzlement; handling the proceeds of crime, both laundering and 
concealment; attempt and participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
588  However, the OECD’s “Recommendation of the Council on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Public Officials”, (OECD Doc: DAFFE/IME/BR (97)20) adopted by the 
Council on 11 April 1996, deals solely and specifically with this issue. 
589  UNCAC, Article 12 (4). 
590  IACAC, Article III. 
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Several establish the liability of legal persons:  “… the liability of legal 
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.  Such liability shall be 
without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who have 
committed the offences.”591.  The CLCC-CE requires juridical persons to be 
liable for the actions of a natural legal person “…who has a leading position 
within the legal person…”592. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, only two of the instruments (the UNCAC and the 
CLCC-CE) contain particular provisions requiring States Parties to make 
bribery of domestic public officials by a legal person in the private sector a 
criminal offence:  “… when committed intentionally: (t)he promise, offering 
or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, 
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that 
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official 
duties…”593. 
 
A greater number, however, make solicitation by a public official a criminal 
offence, where such payments “... directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties.”594.  The IACAC and the AUCPCC both go one step further  
 
 
 
                                                 
591  UNCAC, Article 26 (1)-(3); see also OECD – FPO, Article 2; CLCC-CE, Article 2. 
592  CLCC-CE, Article 18(1). 
593  UNCAC, Article 15(a); CLCC-CE, Article 2 has the same intention and thrust, and is 
almost identical in its wording. 
594  UNCAC, Article 15(b); and, also CLCC-CE, Article 3. 
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by defining “undue advantage” to include “… any goods of monetary value, 
or other benefit, such as a gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself or 
herself or for another person or entity, in exchange for any act or omission 
in the performance of his or her public functions.”595. 
 
Interestingly, only one of the instruments deals expressly with the 
contentious issue of what are sometimes called ‘facilitation payments’ – 
small amounts paid to expedite the progress of a matter, rather than the 
outcome per se of the matter.  “Small “facilitation” payments do not 
constitute payments made “to obtain or retain business or other improper 
advantage" ….  are also not an offence.” 596.  Such payments shall not be 
grounds for the application of extra-territorial jurisdiction, where it is 
allowed/practiced597.  Interestingly, the generally broad UNCAC did not 
address this issue. 
 
Several, however, require States Parties to make an offence of the diversion 
of property, in particular embezzlement or misappropriation, by a public 
official, giving broad reach to the concept of ‘property’, being “… public or 
private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the 
public official by virtue of his or her position.”598.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
595  AUPCC, Article 4 (1)(a), which is closely mirrored in IACAC Article VI (I). 
596  OECD – FPO, Para 9. 
597  Ibid. 
598  UNCAC, Article 17; see also IACAC, Article XI (2)-(4) inclusive; and, AUCPCC, 
Article 4(1)(d). 
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Participation, attempt and related actions and measures are made offences 
under all of the instruments. The UNCAC, for example, requires States 
Parties to establish as an offence “… participation in any capacity such as an  
accomplice, assistant or instigator …”599 in corrupt conduct, or where there 
an attempt600 or preparation601 to engage in such conduct.  The OECD – FPO 
extends this reach to embrace “ … complicity in, including incitement, 
aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an act …”602  and “…attempt and  
conspiracy to bribe …”603,  while the IACAC applies a cover-all approach of: 
“… participation as a principal, coprincipal, instigator, accomplice or 
accessory after the fact, or in any other manner, in the commission or 
attempted commission of, or in any collaboration or conspiracy to commit 
…”604. 
 
One area where there is a strong commitment to action, at least measured 
by the number of instruments containing statements on the matter, is 
making an offence of the laundering of the proceeds of crime, and in 
particular acts relating to bribery, solicitation and other forms of corruption.  
Such ‘laundering’ includes: the conversion or transfer of property; the 
concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition,  
 
 
                                                 
599  UNCAC, Article 27 (1). 
600  Ibid, Article 27 (2). 
601  UNCAC, Article 27 (3). 
602  OECD – FPO, Article 1 (2); see also CLCC-CE, Article 15, dealing with aiding and 
abetting. 
603  OECD – FPO, Article 1 (2). 
604  IACAC, Article VI (5); and, the almost identically worded AUCPCC, Article 4(1)(i). 
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movement or ownership or rights with respect to property; and, the 
acquisition, possession or use of property; where the legal person knows 
such property is the proceeds of crime605. 
 
Similarly, concealment of the proceeds of crime is to be made an offence 
under several of the instruments: For example: “(t)he concealment or 
disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or 
ownership of or rights with respect to property which is the proceeds of 
corruption or related offences.”606.  This legal liability extends to include 
where the legal person did not participate in the primary offence, although 
they know the property is the result of corrupt conduct607. 
 
. Enforcement and Sanctions  
 
The elements of an offence shall include “(k)nowledge, intent or purpose  … 
(which) may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.”608.  For 
public officials subject to domestic law, any immunity granted to public 
officials will not be an obstacle to the investigation of allegations against, 
and the prosecution of, such officials609. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
605  UNCAC, Article 23; AUCPCC, Article 6 (a) and (c ); OECD FPO, Article 7; and, CLCC-
CE, Article 13. 
606  AUCPCC, Article 6 (b). 
607  UNCAC, Article 24; see also IACAC, Article VI (4); AUCPCC, Article 4 (1)(h).  
608  UNCAC, Article 28; see also OECD – FPO, Para. 3. 
609  AUCPCC, Article 7 (5); see also UNCAC, Article 30 (2). 
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Prosecution and adjudication powers implemented by States Parties shall be 
“…exercised to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in 
respect of those offences and with due regard to the need to deter the 
commission of such offences.”610.  Where investigation and prosecution 
involves a foreign public official, States Parties will not be influenced by 
considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon 
bilateral relations with another country, or the identity of the natural or 
legal persons involved611. 
 
In general terms, penalties will be “…effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions”612 and 
can extend in the case of natural persons to “…include deprivation of liberty 
sufficient to enable effective mutual legal assistance and extradition.”613.  
The civil or administrative sanctions that could be imposed upon legal 
persons for an act of bribery of a foreign public official under the OECD-
FPO include: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; 
disqualification from participation in public procurement; placing under 
judicial supervision; and/or judicial winding-up614. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
610  UNCAC, Article 30 (3). 
611  OECD – FPO, Article 5. 
612  UNCAC, Article 26 (4); OECD – FPO, Article 8 (2); CLCC-CE, Article 19 (1) - (2). 
613  OECD – FPO, Article 8 (1). 
614  OECD – FPO, Commentaries, at Para 24. 
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Specific sanctions in other instruments include: custodial penalties615; 
suspension or removal from office for a public official616; disqualification 
from holding public office (as an elected representative), or holding office in 
a wholly-owned government enterprise617; seizure and forfeiture618; 
monetary sanctions619; annulment of contracts620; withdrawal of a 
concession621; and, entitlement to seek compensation for damages622. 
                                                                                                                      
Scholarly Commentary 
 
There is little dissent within the scholarly community that while robust 
domestic action to tackle bribery and corruption is necessary, it is not of 
itself sufficient623. To be effective, domestic action needs to be augmented by 
complementary international initiatives.    
                                                 
615  OECD – FPO, Article 3 (1). 
616  UNCAC, Article 30 (6). 
617  Ibid, Article 30 (7). 
618  UNCAC, Article 31: OECD – FPO, Article 3 (3); IACAC, Article XV; AUCPCC, Article 
16 (1). 
619  OECD – FPO, Article 3 (2); AUCPCC, Article 16 (1). 
620  UNCAC, Article 34. 
621  Ibid. 
622  Ibid, Article 35. 
623  Nichols (1999) at 279. 
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The instruments examined in this study can play a useful reinforcing role.  
Indeed, a sizeable body scholarship regards the mere existence of these 
multi-national instruments as amongst their most valuable contribution to 
the anti-corruption challenge624.  Each of the instruments has been subject 
to varying degrees of scholarly analysis, for their strengths and weaknesses, 
and failings and opportunities for improvement. 
 
The UNCAC has its strengths including broad treatment of the major 
aspects of the anti-corruption effort, namely prevention, criminalisation and 
international co-operation625. However, scholars have identified several 
weaknesses in the UNCAC, most notably:  the failure to incorporate robust 
monitoring mechanisms626; the requirement for States Parties to only 
‘consider’ preserving property for confiscation627; over-reliance on bilateral 
relations for asset recovery628; and, the lack of meaningful obligations on 
States Parties to effectively incorporate the provisions of the Convention 
into municipal law629. 
 
                                                 
624  Sutton (1996/97) at 1470, Gantz (1998) at 481, Perrios and Hudson (1998) at 86, and 
Low (1998) at 154 for the IACAC; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 76, George et al (2000), 
Unzicker (1999/2000) at 655, and Wehrle (2000) at 31 for the OECD FPO; Webb (2005) at 
210 for the UNCAC; Udonbana (2003) at 447 for the AUCPCC. 
625  Ibid at 206. 
626  Ibid at 228. 
627  Ibid at 209. 
628  Ibid at 210. 
629 “It follows the formula of the weakest regional conventions by giving states parties a 
large degree of leeway to decide if and how far to incorporate the Convention into 
national law.”: Webb (2005) at 221. 
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The OECD – FPO has attracted considerable scholarly praise630 for its fight631 
against corruption, largely due to its developed country membership632 and 
its focus on supply-driven corruption emanating from multinational 
corporations.    
 
Other strengths of the OECD-FPO are seen to include: the clear and 
unequivocal nature of the commitments of the States Parties633; its peer-
based monitoring program and mutual legal assistance measures, which can 
assist in ensuring uniformity of implementation634; the capacity for non-
OECD members to accede to the instrument as full States Parties635; the 
inclusion of provisions dealing with accounting, record-keeping and 
disclosure requirements636; the inclusion of provisions stating that the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion shall not be subject to economic or 
foreign policy considerations, or of the identity of the legal or natural 
persons involved637; and, any statutes of limitation maintained by States 
Parties cannot be used to defeat enforcement of implementing legislation638. 
 
                                                 
630  Shams (2001) at 100; Gantz (1998) at 483; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 75, and Tronnes 
(2000) at 130, use similar laudatory statements.  Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19 are 
more moderate in describing at as “a solid framework for an international system” for 
tackling corruption. 
631  The OECD’s commitment to the fight against corruption led one commentator 
(Anonymous, 2002a, at 82) to say “… the OECD appears to have become a sect of true 
believers in opposing foreign corrupt practices.”. 
632  For a good discussion of Australia’s early implementation of the OECD Convention see 
Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 369-372. 
633  Gantz (1998) at 491. 
634  Tronnes (2000) at 121; Gantz (1998) at 489; see Wehrle (2000) for a good overview of 
the peer review processes of the OECD-FPO. 
635  Gantz (1998) at 490; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 75. 
636  Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 98. 
637  Corr and Lawler (1999) at 1309. 
638  Ibid. 
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However, the OECD-FPO has also attracted criticism for: its failure to 
address the role of the bribe-taker, especially where the corruption incident 
was demand-driven639; the failure to cover domestic public officials640, 
candidates for public office, political parties and/or party officials641, 
corruption of which can readily defeat the ‘public official’ test which 
underpins the instrument; the failure to cover family members of any of 
these persons/groups642; the failure to expressly prohibit the tax deductibility  
of bribes643; the inadequate coverage of bribery by foreign subsidiaries644; the  
inadequate treatment of government procurement, in particular for foreign 
aid programs645; the absence of a ‘trading in influence’ provision646; while, 
the wide grant of discretion647 to States Parties in designing, and the 
resulting differences in, the implementing legislation648 has diminished the 
effectiveness of the Convention. 
 
                                                 
639  George et al (2000) at 518; Miller (2000) at 160; Loren (2001) at 328; Harms (2000) at 
161; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 99; Nesbit (1998) at 1305. 
640  Gantz (1998) at 486; Nesbit (1998) at 1305; Webb (2005) at 196. 
641  Shams (2001) at 100; George et al (2000) at 516; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 97; Corr 
and Lawler (1999) at 1305; Posadas (1999/2000) at 381; Webb (2005) at 196; Nesbit (1998) 
at 1305; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19; “… a huge loophole for foreign countries 
which could then channel illicit payments to party officials rather than government 
officials.”: Gantz (1998) at 486. 
642  Posadas (1999/2000) at 381. 
643  Corr and Lawler (1999) at 1309. However, this was pursued in the subsequent 
“Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to 
Foreign Officials” : 35 ILM 1311 (1996). 
644  George et al (2000) at 516; Loren (2001) at 326; and similarly Zedalis (1998) at 178 on 
the use of intermediaries. 
645  George et al (2000) at 520-521 for a discussion of the nature of the problem and 
potential remedial action. 
646  Gantz (1998) at 487. 
647  Tronnes (2000) at 119. 
648  George et al (2000) at 517; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19; Miller (2000) at 140; 
Harma (2000) at 49. 
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The IACAC has also attracted laudatory commentary from the scholarly 
community649 reflecting its achievement of having as States Parties both 
capital exporting countries (such as the United States of America; ‘the 
supply side’ of corruption) and capital-importing nations (for example, 
Brazil; the ‘demand side’ of corruption)650.  Other positive aspects of the 
IACAC are seen to include: its capacity to defend/strengthen democratic 
institutions and processes in participating developing countries651 and in its 
region652; it encourages member States to deal with domestic corruption653; 
its focus on the conduct of individuals, ahead of entities such as 
corporations654; and, its illicit enrichment provision which only requires an 
unexplained increase in personal assets rather than clear proof of acceptance 
of a bribe655. 
 
Even so, the IACAC has drawn criticisms including: the absence of an over-
arching paradigm to determine what forms of official misconduct should be 
considered criminal656; the potential propensity for States Parties to exercise 
the opt-out provisions of the Convention657; the tentative nature of 
implementation of elements of the IACAC by States Parties within their  
 
                                                 
649  Shams (2001) at 107; Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 367. 
650  Id; Webb (2005) at 193. 
651  Webb (2005) at 193. 
652  Sutton (1996/97) at 1472. 
653  Webb (2005) at 193. 
654  Sutton (1996/97) at 1476. 
655  Which, in effect, means a shift in the onus of proof and a lower burden of proof: 
Boswell (1997) at 1171. 
656  Henning (2001) at 796. 
657  Low (1998) at 154. 
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domestic jurisdictions658; and, the absence of any formal dispute settlement 
mechanism, especially for dealing with claims by one State Party that 
another is failing to effectively perform its obligations under the 
Agreement659. 
 
Substantive criticisms include: its failure to incorporate provisions dealing 
with attempted corruption660 and to enable institutionalised follow-up to 
further develop the instrument, and for the vague nature of the monitoring 
mechanism of the compliance and performances of State Parties661; the 
potential for greater-than-facilitation payments to avoid coverage662; and, 
the imbalance of punitive- over incentive-based approaches to dealing with 
corruption, the latter of which are likely to be more effective in regional 
cultures663. 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The world community of nations during the early 1990s and into the early 
2000s expanded greatly the use of law-making treaties under international 
law to reinforce the battle against corruption.  Such instruments were 
largely normative and intended to create formal legal obligations on the 
participating States Parties, primarily through the enactment and 
enforcement of consequential municipal criminal laws. 
 
                                                 
658  Boswell (1999) at 142; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 
54; Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 367. 
659  Gantz (1998) at 489. 
660  Henning (2001) at 811. 
661  Shams (2001) at 107; Webb (2005) at 197-198. 
662  Henning (2001) at 809. 
663  Husted (2002) at 413. 
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These instruments have, to varying degrees of breadth and depth, dealt 
with: definitions of key features of corruption; issues of jurisdiction; 
coverage of the public and the private sectors; the nature of offences; and 
enforcement and sanctions. However, they still have important 
shortcomings, including inadequate attention to demand-driven corruption  
(looking at the causal role of the bribe-taker), the scope of the concept of 
‘public official’, and the tolerance and subjective nature of ‘facilitation  
payments’.  While no individual instrument necessarily deals with all 
possible issues, they collectively, and in a number of cases individually, 
constitute substantial progress on the state of international legal (and 
diplomatic and public policy) affairs prevailing in the early 1990s.   
 
The real importance of these instruments will rest on two key pillars: firstly, 
in the medium to longer term, the extent to which they are broadened and 
deepened in their content and their reach, potentially taking into account 
the plethora of issues raised in numerous scholarly commentaries discussed 
in this chapter; and, secondly, and more immediately, the extent to which 
the treaties are infused into the municipal criminal laws of the various 
States Parties and through this change the behaviour of those at whom they 
are targeted. 
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The essential foundation of these international anti-corruption agreements 
is the interface of law and economics:  economics because corruption results 
in potentially serious distortions to the allocation of economic resources and 
broader economic decision-making; and, law because corruption is usually a 
criminal act in most mature legal systems.  Economic analyses in law and  
economics generally centre on the place of economic efficiency and the role  
of the price mechanism as a signal of past and future decision-making by 
individual economic actors (persons, households or firms).  By comparison,  
legal analyses in law and economics focus on the roles of explicit and 
implicit prices for legal actors.  The interface of such price signals, their 
impact of decision-making by economic and legal actors, and on wider 
efficiency is the foundation of law and economics.  The broader interface 
between, and the main theories of, law and economics are examined in 
Chapter Four, following. 
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Table 3.1   Current Instruments and their Antecedents 
 
Instrument Antecedents664 
 
United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (2003)665 
 
 
“General Assembly Resolution on 
Measures Against Corrupt Practices of 
International and Other Corporations, 
Their Intermediaries and Others 
Involved”  (1979)666 
“Draft UN Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations”  (1984)667 
“UNCITRAL Model Law on the 
Procurement of Goods, Construction 
and Services” (1994)668 
“Declaration Against Corruption and 
Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions” (1996)669  
“International Code of Conduct for 
Public Officials” (1996)670  
 
                                                 
664  From within the same organisation. 
665  43 ILM 37 (2004). 
666  18 ILM 180 (1979). 
667  23 ILM 602 (1984). 
668  33 ILM 445 (1994). 
669  36 ILM 1043 (1997); G A Res 51/191. 
670  36 ILM 1039 (1996); G A Res 51/69. 
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OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business 
Transactions (1997)671 
 
 
“Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises” (1976)672 
“OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises (1976)673 
“Recommendation on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions” 
(1994)674 
“Recommendation of the Council of 
the OECD on the Tax Deductibility of 
Bribes to Foreign Officials” (1996)675 
“Revised Recommendation of the 
Council on Combating Bribery in 
International Business Transactions” 
(1997)676 
                                                 
671  37 ILM 4 (1998). 
672  15 ILM 967 (1976). 
673  Ibid. 
674  33 ILM 1389 (1994). 
675  35 ILM 1311 (1996).  For a general discussion of the Recommendation, see Shams 
(2001) at 98. 
676  36 ILM 1016 (1997).    
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Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption of the Council of 
Europe (1999)677 
 
 
“Convention on the Protection of the 
European Communities’ Financial 
Interests” (1995)678 
“First Protocol to the Convention on 
the Protection of the European 
Communities’ Financial Interests”  
(1996)679 
“Convention on the Fight Against 
Corruption Involving Officials of the 
European Communities or Officials of 
Member States” (1997)680 
 
 
Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption (1996)681 
 
 
                                                 
677  38 ILM 505 (1999). 
678   OJ C 316 (1997) 49. 
679   OJ C 313 (1996) 2. 
680  37 ILM 12 (1997); Council Act No 97/C 195/01, 1997 OJ 195, 2-11.  For a general 
discussion of this instrument see Webb (2005) at 201-202. 
681  35 ILM 724 (1996). 
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African Union Convention on 
Preventing and  Combating 
Corruption (2003)682 
 
 
“Transparency Code for the 
Management of Public Finances” 
(2000)683 
“Accra Declaration on Collaborating 
Against Corruption” (2001)684 
 
 
                                                 
682  43 ILM 5 (2004). 
683  Cited by Udonbana (2003) at 455. 
684  Ibid. 
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Chapter 4:    Theories of Law and Economics  
 
“For the rational study of the law, 
the black-letter man may be the man of the present, 
but the man of the future is 
the man of statistics and the master of economics.”685 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption, regardless of the form it takes – bribery or extortion; occasional 
or systemic – is essentially an economic and a legal phenomenon:  economic 
because it involves inefficient transfer of resources, usually from better to 
lesser advantageous uses; legal because almost without exception, corruption 
is illegal in mature legal systems, whether international and municipal.  The 
broadening and deepening position of corruption within the international 
economic law parallels similar growing-closer interaction between law and 
economics – how economic misconduct can, and does, undermine the rule 
of law; and, the effectiveness or otherwise of the law in preventing, or 
failing that remediating, this situation. 
 
This chapter will examine the linkages between economics and the law.  
While causality no doubt flows both ways – economics impacts on the law, 
and the law impacts on economics686 – this study will embrace the former 
approach given its placement within the broader scholarly literature on 
corruption, economics and the law, and the econometric modelling to  
 
                                                 
685  Holmes (1897) at 469. 
686 Also known as regulation.  For a good overview of this dimension of the law and 
economics interface, which is outside the scope of this study, see Gordon (2000). 
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follow.  In this examination of the linkages between law and economics, we 
will focus on the main theoretical streams:  the jurisprudential niche of law; 
the Chicago school; Public Choice theory; Institutional law and economics; 
Neo-Institutional law and economics; Rational Choice theory; and, 
Behavioural law and economics.  We will not adopt the thematic approach 
that looks at the law and economic dimensions of, for example, contract, 
competition, corporate, evidence and procedure, family, labour relations, 
property (intellectual and physical), public finance and taxation, and tort 
law687.  We will, however, look at ‘criminal law and economics’. 
 
The economics of the law and economics discourse has largely revolved 
around microeconomics (the economics of the individual, the household 
and/or the firm), in contrast to macroeconomics (of the nation as a whole).  
Without undertaking a lengthy report of the many dimensions of 
microeconomics688, it is worth identifying a few key underpinnings which 
frame discussion of law and economics issues689. In essence, microeconomics 
is the study of how consumers and producers allocate scarce resources 
amongst competing uses.  Microeconomic theory tells us consumers seek to  
 
 
 
                                                 
687  Those interested in the law and economics approaches in these areas could usefully 
start with several ‘readers’ of the main papers in each of these sub-areas, and progress 
thereafter based on their own interests.  Prominent amongst these anthologies are, in 
alphabetical order: Coleman and Lange (1992 a and b); Parisi (2000); Parisi (2001a); Posner 
(2001); Posner and Parisi (1997a and b, and 2002). 
688  Such material being available to the interested reader from a broad range of under-
graduate, and post-graduate by coursework textbooks, accessible from any university 
library or better bookshop. 
689  For a good general discussion, reasonably accessible to the non-economist, see Ulen 
(1992). 
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allocate their scarce incomes and time amongst the broadest range of goods 
and services available to them so as to maximise their satisfaction, whilst 
producers seek to allocate the land, labour and capital (including 
entrepreneurial and intellectual property) available to them to create the 
best product and/or service at the lowest price, and thus maximise their 
profitability. 
 
The key mechanism within microeconomics for making such allocative 
decisions is the price mechanism.  Price signals in a competitive and well-
functioning market condense an enormous amount of information into a 
tractable measure to assist consumers and producers come to the best 
possible decision for them.  Such prices can be absolute (for the consumer, 
the ticket price of good or service he/she is looking to purchase) or relative 
(for the producer, comparing the prices charged by several suppliers of 
essential inputs, such as electricity).  These explicit prices can be contrasted 
with implicit prices.  The latter emerge where there initially appears to be 
no explicit price yet there are real economic resource allocative costs 
involved in making a choice between multiple options.   
 
Legal rules can contain explicit and/or implicit prices: the former, for 
example, a pecuniary penalty for breach of the law (say, a speeding fine); 
the latter, taking the form of the economic consequences of a decision or 
rule on those impacted by it (say, producer and consumer responses to a 
new law or regulation).  The implicit prices of legal rules can influence the 
conduct of those subject to those rules, taking the form of the costs of: being  
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informed of the rules; taking precautionary measures and/or of conforming 
with them (especially for producers who may have to vary their production 
methods and processes); and, administering and enforcing them (both for 
public agencies, and private actors where the rules create new private rights, 
such as intellectual property rights)690.  The interface of these costs and 
prices, and legal rules is at the heart of law and economics. 
 
In this study, the concept of law and economics is based on causality 
running from economics to the law, and involves the application of 
economic theory to the study of the creation, structures and processes of the 
law and its institutions. This study takes the view economics can challenge 
lawyers to think more broadly about the law691, ahead of a concentration on 
strict doctrinal approaches, drawing on the ability of economics to 
formulate testable hypotheses that can be evaluated through the application 
of rigorous statistical tools to quantifiable evidence692.  However, in taking 
this position, we accept economic analysis can be just one perspective on 
complex legal pictures. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
690  For an interesting study of the interaction of these issues, in the area of tort, see Ulen 
(1992) at 114–118. 
691  Posner (2004) at 67. Breyer (1983) at 295, and Becker (1983) at 306-308 usefully 
remind us lawyers will still be making legal arguments, even if they are using economics 
as part of their evidence or their argument. 
692 Which led one social scientist (a sociologist: Friedman, 2010/11 at 488) to state: “Many 
economists will prune away, quite ruthlessly, anything that interferes with the process of 
making their field formally rigorous.” 
 166  
The Law in Law and Economics 
 
Any general reading of the expansive law and economics literature could 
well leave the reader with the impression the subject is mostly about the 
application of economics to the law693 and not much about the law itself.  
Such a perception would be mistaken:  there is much law in law and 
economics, whether it be in the common or the statute law694. 
 
The basic nature of the common law is the progressive development 
through jurisprudence of principles of law, which act as the foundation 
stone for judicial decision-making.  In effect, the development of the 
common law is the progressive search for such foundations, and the 
authority and legitimacy of such laws.  Historically, such foundations have 
ranged from theology in the Middle Ages (when the law was strongly 
influenced by religious institutions such as the Churches and clerics in the 
Christian world), the secular natural law movement from the Renaissance to 
the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries695, and the positive scientific 
attitudes which sought to apply the rigorous methods of the natural sciences 
to the law696.  The law and economics movement is a successor to these 
                                                 
693  For a readable history of the development of law and economics see Grembi (2007). 
694  On the substantial, gap-filling, role for law and economics in statutory interpretation, 
see Rizzo and Arnold (1987), reflecting the fact “the legislative process functions with 
limited time, information, foresight and deliberative powers…” (Id at 169). 
695  For a discussion of the influence of key thinkers from this period, such as David Hume, 
Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, see Rowley (2005) at 1-9. 
696  The United States Supreme Court, in Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc, 
509 US 579 (1993) has set out a four step requirement for determining whether evidence 
presented to American courts should be accepted as ‘science’.  They are:  the theoretical 
foundations of the methods must yield testable propositions which could be falsified; 
these methods should preferably be published in peer-reviewed scholarly journals; there 
should be known rate of error which can be used to assess the inferences; and, the 
methods used should be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.  
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perspectives697.  The capacity of the common law to embrace the law and 
economics perspective in many ways highlights its core strengths – its 
dynamic characteristics of flexibility and adaptability to the continuing 
change and evolution in the societies it serves698. However, this flexibility 
and adaptability is not found in all corners of the law.  To some, such as 
those holding doctrinal views of the law, the arrival of the law and 
economics movement would be akin to seeing the barbarians at the gates to 
the city699.    
 
To legal doctrinalists, whose influence was strongest at the end of the 
nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries, the law is separate and 
apart from external influences, whether they be religious, natural science, 
social or economic.  In this view700, the law is a logical form of inquiry into 
the inter-relationships between legal propositions in a given legal order – 
almost a pure and independent science.  The law is a set of principles to be 
                                                                                                                                            
According to Crespi (1992) at 233, the law cannot be considered a ‘science’ as one cannot 
readily subject its underlying assumptions to rigorous testing for falsifiability.  For an 
expansive discussion of the application of scientific methods to the law see Ulen (2002). 
697  Readers interested in the history of the law and economics movement see:  
Hovenkamp (1990b), for an expansive discussion of its origins in the period between 1870 
and 1930; and, Mackaay (2000b), Harris (2003), Hylton (2004) for more general historical 
reviews. 
698  The common law system also plays a more powerful (and positive) role in promoting 
economic growth and development than does the civil law system, in the countries where 
they are practiced:  Mahoney (2001) at 503. 
699  Although it has been paid the ‘flattering’ compliment of being “arguably the most 
successful of economics’ various imperialistic movements.”:  Medema (2003) at 1 and 
(2006) at 14. A sentiment endorsed by others such as Epstein (1997) at 1168; Goodhart 
(1997) at 2; Campbell and Piciotto (1998) at 253; Grembi (2007) at 3.   Supporters of law 
and economics see it as “the (premier) interdisciplinary field of legal studies”:  Posner 
(2004) at 66; the “dominant paradigm for legal research”: Salzberger (2007) at 3; while 
“law and economics has always been an elite activity, like playing polo.”: Cooter (2011) at 
1479.  Such hubris likely provides additional motivation for critics of law and economics. 
700  Often associated with influential American legal academic, C C Langdell, who 
championed the doctrinalist approach during his time as Dean of Havard Law School. 
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found within case law, through the consistent study of judicial decisions 
across time, with legal questions answered with sole reference to legal 
materials such as precedents, statutes, legislative debates and records, and 
the better scholarly works.  Within this framework, judicial opinion has  
pre-eminent standing in the formation of the law, with legal reasoning 
focusing on identifying doctrine701. 
 
The pure legal science of doctrinalism has drawn criticism for its self-
referential nature as well as for its insularity, most notably from the broader 
ethics, social conditions, and political currents of the wider community in 
which the law was placed (and meant to serve)702.  Such critics come from a 
range of perspectives, such as what could be called ‘sociological 
jurisprudence’, which argues the law cannot be viewed in isolation of the 
wider social conditions and social sciences in which it operates.  In this 
view, Judges need to take into account the surrounding economic and social 
contexts which in turn impact judicial decision-making and through it the 
development of the law.  
 
If ‘sociological jurisprudence’ was a critique of doctrinalism, then the Legal 
Realist movement that emerged in the 1930s was a full-on assault.  The 
Legal Realists rejected the core tenet of doctrinalism – the existence of an 
objectively determined set of legal rights and obligations based on rigid legal 
rules.  Rather, the Legal Realists emphasised the flaws and the limitations of  
                                                 
701  As a result, the doctrinal approach “… revolved around a few fundamental axioms, 
derived primarily from empirical observation of how courts had in the past responded to 
particular sorts of problems.  From these axioms, one could and should deduce – through 
non-controversial, rationally compelling legal processes – a large number of specific rules 
or corollaries.”: Fischer et al (1993) at vii. 
702  Mercuro and Medema (1997) at 8. 
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the law703, and the (imperfect) human factor underlying judicial reasoning:  
a Judge’s decision to follow or distinguish a precedent was essentially 
determined by subjective value judgements (moral, social or political) rather 
than by unbending logic704. Such value judgements were influenced by the 
economic, social, political and other currents of the time.  And, by 
extension, a better comprehension of the law and its implications came from 
an understanding of its inter-relationships with other social sciences, such 
as anthropology, economics, political science and sociology. 
 
The Legal Realists saw a special relationship between law and economics, 
given legal change was often linked to developments in economic ideas and 
conditions, In contrast to the law and economics movement which was to 
follow in the second half of the twentieth century (who saw causality 
flowing from economics to the law), the Legal Realists saw causality going 
from the law to economics.  In this view705, the law provides an important 
foundation for the operation of economies by framing the outcomes of 
competitive markets and its forces through, for example, economic-laws 
such as competition, contract, corporations, environmental706, finance, 
intellectual and physical property, labour and taxation.  To the Legal 
Realists, by such interactions, the law could be used to improve the social 
condition of mankind707. 
 
 
                                                 
703 Tamanaha (2008/09) at 732. 
704  Mensch (1990) at 22. 
705  Llewellyn (1925) at 678–681. 
706  For example, tradable emissions rights, which apply economic principles to the 
environment. 
707 Tamanaha (2008/09) at 737. 
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The Economics of Law and Economics 
 
If the law of law and economics was largely concerned with the role of the 
law in guiding economic processes, the economics within law and 
economics is about the role of economic criteria, in particular efficiency, in 
the design and operation of the law. However, and not surprisingly, there 
has been substantial debate between the various schools of thought within 
law and economics on the absolute and/or relative importance of efficiency, 
and of other considerations (for example, equity708 and utility709) and indeed 
between the disciplines of law and of economics710. 
 
Economic theory attaches great weight and significance to the concept of 
purely competitive, perfectly functioning markets characterised by711: a 
great many consumers, motivated by self-interest and a desire to maximise 
utility712; a great many producers, also motivated by self-interest and a 
desire to maximise their profits in diffuse industries and/or contestable 
markets; neither consumers nor producers being able to control prices in 
                                                 
708  For a flavour of the debate on the limitations of economics in the law which flared 
during the 1970s and into the early 1980s see: Posner (1974/75); Leff (1974); Kennedy 
(1976); Posner (1979a); Bloustein (1978); Michelman (1979); Coleman (1982), and more 
recently Dorff and Fezan (2009); and for limitations of the law in economics, see inter alia 
Buchanan (1974). 
709  See for example, Coleman (1980). 
710  The latter of which is attributable, to some degree, to cultural differences - lawyers 
being inherently normative, while economists are predominately positivist, in outlook:  
Posner (1979a) at 285. 
711  Mercuro and Medema (1997) at 14. 
712  According to Ogus (2004b) at 365, utility maximization for someone looking to engage 
in a criminal act can be estimated by using the equation U < qE + pD, where U = the 
utility the individual derives from non-compliance with the law, qE is the probability and 
allied costs of the offense being detected by law enforcement agencies, and pD is the 
probability of a formal conviction and its associated costs (fines or loss of income from a 
custodial penalty) and other informal costs (such as social opprobrium for breaching 
community norms). 
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their markets, and thus being price-takers for the goods/services they buy or 
sell; prices which act as indicators for consumers and producers, as signals of 
shortages or surpluses; products which are homogeneous and hence 
substitutable; no barriers for either consumers or producers to enter or exit a 
market; all consumers and producers being fully informed of the prices and 
other conditions of all market transactions; all resources being held as 
private property, with clearly defined and well known property rights; and, 
extant property rights fully enforced through the law713. 
 
Economic theory also attaches substantial weight and significance to 
allocative efficiency, that is the extent to which: the allocation of inputs in a 
given production process delivers the mix of outputs which best meets the 
needs of consumers; and, the allocation of those outputs across consumers 
delivers the maximum possible consumer benefit.  In this situation, if all 
factors of production (land, labour and capital), and goods and services (both 
as inputs and outputs) are transacted in perfectly competitive markets, then 
the outcomes of these processes are efficient.  Optimal efficiency is achieved 
when the marginal benefit of any activity equals its marginal cost, either 
side of which efficiency can be improved by doing more (when marginal 
benefit is greater than marginal cost) or less (vice versa) of it.  
 
 
 
                                                 
713  The nature, causes and extent to which these theoretical ideals breakdown is the 
‘bread and butter’ of applied economics, for example:  less than fully contestable markets; 
some producers can be price-makers in shallow markets; not all products are 
homogeneous or seen as such (by virtue of advertising); and, all players, whether 
consumers or producers, are fully informed.   Perhaps they are principles more honoured 
in the breach than the observance. 
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In the law and economics setting, such efficiency can take several forms: 
Pareto efficiency, both in exchange and in production; and, Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency714. The most important of these concepts is Pareto optimality, 
which means resources (land, labour, capital) cannot be reallocated so as to 
make one individual better off without making someone else worse off.  In a 
broader social economics/law framework, when the marginal social benefit 
of an activity equals its marginal social cost the activity has achieved the 
Pareto optimal allocation of resources; individual consumers and/or 
producers cannot be made better off by any other allocative mix.  When all 
activities within an economy are at Pareto optimal, then the economy is 
Pareto optimal. 
 
However, the law impacts the initial conditions for determining Pareto 
optimality, with each Pareto optimal/efficient outcome dependent upon the 
original allocation of property rights in the resources concerned, within 
which each stage of the market-based transaction (that is, re-allocation) of 
resources takes place715.  As such, rather than a single Pareto efficiency for 
the whole economy, there may well be an almost infinite number of Pareto-
efficient situations, each of which is determined by the initial allocation of 
resources and of property rights thereto.  Indeed, Pareto optimality may 
never be achieved in markets whose structural characteristics fall short of 
the very high standard of pure competition or where there are deficiencies 
                                                 
714  For a good discussion of Pareto and of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, written in a style 
reasonably accessible to the non-economist and with minimal algebra and complex 
graphics, see Coleman (1980) at 512-520. 
715  Cooter (1987) at 152–153.   Some scholars have rejected Paretian approach, arguing 
instead for a ‘maximin model’ which would provide the least advantaged members of 
society to have a veto over any change: Rawls (1971) and (1974). 
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in the allocation or protection of property rights716.  Similarly, because 
litigation has distributional consequences (a particular judicial decision 
makes someone ‘better off’, and another ‘worse off’), Pareto optimality is 
likely to be unachievable in practice717.  Pareto optimality may never be 
achieved where any degree of importance is attached to the concept of 
equity or fairness, given they imply actors may wish to adopt a legal rule 
that expressly reduces the well-being of one or more members of the 
community718. 
 
In reality, it would be a rare and exceptional circumstance in which Pareto 
optimality could be achieved.  In this situation, the better objective is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, also known as the compensation principle719.  This 
principle holds a change from one economic or legal state to another (for 
example, a change in economic policy, or in judicial precedent) which 
favours some persons or group(s) at the expense of others can deliver an 
unequivocal improvement in social welfare720 if the gainers compensate the 
losers so the latter accept the change, and the gainers remain better off after  
                                                 
716  This situation is sometimes called ‘market failure’, and often generates calls for 
government intervention to address such shortcomings.   The better question is whether 
the net costs of perceived market failure are greater, equal to, or less than those associated 
with government failure.  Such a debate is for another place.  
717  Coleman (1980) at 511; Cooter (1987) at 151. 
718  Kaplow and Shavell (1999) at 64.  Nevertheless, the Pareto rule still has significance for 
its implications in determining what criteria to employ when making policy choices, and 
how they are made: Ibid at 72.    
719  It is also part of the theoretical framework of cost-benefit analysis within economics. 
720  The overall welfare of society rather than the public funding of social support 
payments to those in need. 
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paying the compensation. Or, in simpler terms, a change is a Kaldor-Hicks 
improvement if the gains to the winners exceed the losses to the losers 
(essentially an aggregated society-wide cost-benefit analysis)721. 
 
. The Chicago School  
 
The core thread of the Chicago school of law and economics722 is: the 
maximal role for markets and competition, and the minimal role for 
government and regulation; and, the maximal role for efficiency, with 
distributional issues being second-order matters723, more properly left to 
government and legislatures through the fiscal account (expenditure and 
taxation)724.  
 
                                                 
721  The actual payment of compensation is unlikely to happen in a real world situation. It 
would require each and every winner/loser to be identified, the quantum of their 
individual gain/loss to be calculated, and then some costless mechanism found to execute 
the transfer of compensation without error. The more practical realisation of Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency/the compensation principle is the change involves net gains to be 
distributed, and these amount to an increase in overall economic welfare.  For a broader 
critique of the application of Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks to the law see: Coleman (1982); 
Ellerman (2009). 
722  The Chicago school has produced, over time, some of the leading thinkers in law and 
economics, including Ronald Coase (a Nobel Laureate), Gary Becker (also a Nobel 
Laureate) and Richard Posner.  Such has been the influence of Coase, one prominent 
scholar (Stigler (1992) at 456, himself a Nobel Laureate) differentiates law and economics 
into two periods:  BC and AC, or Before Coase, and After Coase. 
723  Which has led one critic (Michelman (1978) at 311) to argue the Chicago approach to 
law and economics (and the Posnerian approach in particular) “…is oblivious to questions 
of distributive justice, and in general disregards all human valuations or motivations that 
are not responsive to considerations of price, or cost, in a sensse approximately measurable 
by methods available to economic science.”  
724  “… when redistribution is possible, it tends to be limited to those few who become 
parties to law suits.  And even then, redistribution may be haphazard.”: Kaplow and 
Shavell (1994) at 675. 
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The early Chicago approach, which emerged during the 1920s and 1930s, 
built upon the classical foundations of the economics of Adam Smith725 and 
the libertarian political philosophies of Jeremy Bentham726.  In essence, 
within the liberal democratic tradition, economic actors engage in the 
rational pursuit of self-interest, competition is an essential and virtuous 
feature of economic life, and market-generated outcomes are preferable and 
superior to those flowing from government interventions with market 
mechanisms727.  However, such thinking came under pressure from the rise 
of Keynesian economic policy thinking, which saw a greater role for 
government intervention, and to the New Deal/Great Society-style policies 
introduced in reaction to the Depression of the 1930s. 
 
The later Chicago approach, which emerged in the 1950s728, sought to show 
in econometric/quantitative modelling terms the strong links between 
competitive markets and efficient outcomes.  This work led to their 
advocacy of competitive markets, a limited role for government interference 
in markets, a lesser role for income- and wealth-redistributing government 
policies, greater emphasis on market forces and voluntary exchange, and 
                                                 
725  For an expansive discussion of the contribution of Adam Smith to law and economics, 
see Malloy (1988). 
726  For an insight into the influence of Bentham on key Chicagoans, such as Richard 
Posner, see Posner (2005).  And, for a championing of the (claimed) under-recognised 
contribution of British economist Henry Sidgwick, see Medema (2007). 
727  Which included scholars such as Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Gary Becker, 
Armen Alchian, Harold Demsetz, and Richard Posner. For an intellectually entertaining 
discussion of the inconsistencies of scholarly advocacy of greater government intervention 
in markets, see Coase (1974a). 
728  Friedman, Stigler and Becker all subsequently became Nobel Laureates in Economics, 
although only Becker’s award (and to a lesser degree Stigler) could be attributable to work 
in the domain of law and economics. 
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with them a superior place for the common law in mediating disputes729.  In 
this view, the best situation in law and economics is one of common law 
and free markets, with efficiency being the critical parameter for 
determining the application of economics to the law and rules of law 
operating to impose pseudo-prices on non-market activities730. 
 
The sequential Chicago schools of thought on law and economics contain 
several common threads, founded on the application of the economics of 
price theory to the law: individuals rationally731 pursue the maximisation of 
their satisfaction; individuals respond to price incentives in their market and 
non-market behaviours, with changes in the law impacting human 
behaviour by altering the relative prices of different forms of activity732; and, 
the law, both in its content and its outcomes, should be assessed on the basis 
of efficiency733.  For individuals (as consumers), maximising satisfaction 
involves processing all information available, from which they rank all of 
the possible alternatives open to them according to their desirability, and 
then compose and choose the mix of goods and services which maximises 
their satisfaction (also known as utility734).  For businesses (as producers), 
the comparable objective is profit maximisation, which is the mix or level of 
                                                 
729  Sometimes called the ‘Bethamite approach to law and economics’: Posner (1979a) at 
282; after Jeremy Bentham, a nineteenth century British economic and moral philosopher. 
730  Posner (1985a) at 92; Posner (1987b) at 5.  For a critique of this view see Michelman 
(1978) at 308-309; Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 56-58. 
731  As Hylton (2004) at 10 usefully reminds us: “some minimal degree of rationality must 
be accepted, even by critics of the rationality assumption.   For if men are completely or 
always irrational, laws are pointless.”.  For an extensive, and detailed, discussion of the 
place of rationality, in economics, law, psychology and sociology, and in the interactions 
between them, see Schroeder (2000). 
732  In particular, between legal and illegal:  Parisi (2004) at 5. 
733  Landes and Posner (1987); Posner (1992). 
734  To some, such as Cooter (2005) at 226, utility maximization should be the central 
objective of the law, with economics providing guidance on its realisation. 
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output, prices charged, composition of inputs (land, labour and capital) and 
the prices thereof, and contracting practices (for the purchase of inputs/sale 
of outputs).  For both consumers and producers, rational maximisation 
involves engaging in additional activity until the marginal cost equals the 
marginal benefit, of doing so. 
 
Compliance with the law by consumers and producers can be seen in a 
similar light – as a matter of rational choice735.  Compliance is a matter of 
weighing the marginal benefits of breaching the law736  against the marginal 
costs of doing so.  It follows those who engage in activities which breach the 
law can be expected to have different marginal benefit/cost profiles for 
illegal/legal conduct to other members of the community (in effect, 
different attitudes to risk and reward).  Such persons may well be acting 
rationally for the maximisation of their own satisfaction, but quite 
differently from the ‘reasonable man/woman’ of traditional legal theory737, 
who is socialised into, and behaves according to, the norms and conventions 
of a community: homo economicus vs homo justus738. 
                                                 
735  Posner (1979a) at 284.    
736 Dishonouring a contract; engaging in tortious conduct; committing a criminal offence, 
such as making or demanding a corrupt payment. 
737  Posner (1974/75) at 763. 
738  For a discussion on the relative roles of the law and of norms in framing human 
conduct see:  Ellickson (1998); Posner (1998a); Cooter (2000a and b); Ogus (2004a); 
Shavell (2005); Tunick (2009). 
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Economics establishes the value of such marginal benefits and costs through 
the price mechanism; the law does so through the sanctions profile (the 
nature of the penalty - pecuniary vs custodial; and the level of thereof – a 
small fine or a long prison sentence).  To the Chicagoans, the interface of 
law and economics becomes a question of convergence to the point where 
the price of illegal behaviour increases (through pecuniary or custodial 
penalties) to a level dissuasive of that misconduct; the marginal cost equals 
the marginal benefit of illegal behaviour to the individual739. 
 
The Chicagoans, not surprisingly given their emphasis on market forces, 
place great emphasis on the use of economic efficiency considerations in the 
evaluation of legal decision-making and rules.  Key concepts include Pareto 
efficiency and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency740.  As such, a key element of 
scholarship in the Chicagoan tradition has involved evaluating the extent to 
which the common law aligns to economic efficiency (sometimes known as 
positive law and economics), and in developing efficiency-based legal rules 
to guide legal decision-making (normative law and economics).  In short, 
the common law as a whole has an underlying economic logic741. 
                                                 
739  Posner (1983) at 75. 
740  Both of these concepts have been discussed at length above. 
741  Coase (1960) at 19.  According to Posner (1987b) at 5: “… the common law is best 
understood not merely as a pricing mechanism, but as a pricing mechanism designed to 
bring about an efficient allocation of resources in the Kaldor-Hicks sense.” 
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In this context, the development and application of the common law 
operates as if its primary objective is to maximise allocative efficiency; the 
most efficient allocation of an economy’s resources.  Thus, the main 
institutions of the common law (the judiciary and precedent) should be used 
to promote efficiency by facilitating market transactions through contracts 
and related law, and judicial decisions within the common law that result in 
the same allocation of resources which would have emerged from a free 
market742.  The latter proposition is, in turn, founded on two premises:  
inefficient legal rules are more likely to be subject to more frequent and/or 
intensive challenge in the courts than are efficient ones743; and, the 
judiciary, either explicitly or implicitly, work to identify and implement 
legal rules which generate efficient outcomes744. 
 
The normative stream of the Chicago school is concerned with determining 
efficient legal rules where the common law departs from the pursuit of 
economic efficiency.  A simple example illustrates the point: if A causes 
harm to B (say by causing air pollution), B may successfully litigate to have 
A cease his polluting activity.  However, the cost of pollution abatement 
may cause economic damage to A.  In this situation, to avoid harm to B, we 
must also harm A.  The solution, to the normative Chicagoans, is to identify 
                                                 
742  Director (1964); Coase (1974a).  For a critique of this view see Michelman (1978) at 
310, most notably: “A litigated case presents a judge with a sharply restricted set of 
choices of liability awards and rule formulations.  Probably no choice within the available 
set will significantly alter the price system or wealth distribution then observable in the 
economy.”. 
743  Given the expectation by the challenger the benefits from the elimination of 
inefficient laws will exceed the costs involved of such litigation: Rubin (1977) at 55; Priest 
(1977) at 65. 
744  Posner (1983) at 4–5; Posner (1990) at 359; Posner (1992) at 356. 
 180  
and then avoid the greatest harm745, and through this maximise society’s 
welfare.  More formally, this approach has become known as the Coase 
Theorem, which sets down in essence that if rights are fully specified and 
transaction costs are zero, then the parties to a dispute will engage in 
negotiations that ultimately deliver an efficient outcome regardless of the 
initial assignment of rights746.  Resolving such relative harm, at the least 
social cost, is a matter for negotiation between the directly impacted parties 
who, acting as rational utility maximising individuals747, will converge on 
the optimal, mutually beneficial outcome; the most efficient outcome will 
be achieved without the need for judicial intervention.  The axiom of this 
approach is judicial efforts to engage in deterministic (inefficient) allocation 
of rights748 will ultimately prove ineffective, given such rights will always 
move to their highest-value use.  Importantly, there is minimal role for 
third party interveners, such as governments, who have the capacity, if not 
the tendency, to produce an inferior – that is, less efficient – outcome as a 
result of their intervention749.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
745  Coase’s ‘social cost’: Coase (1960). 
746  For expansive discussions of the Coase Theorem see: Samuels (1974); Buchanan (1973). 
747  Sometimes called ‘wealth maximisation’ by Chicagoans like Richard Posner: see for 
example, Posner 1979a and 1985.  In this view, ‘wealth’ is a synonym for expected utility: 
Id at 87. 
748  The transaction may have physically involved the exchange of goods or services, but to 
Coase (2005) at 205, the transaction was really about the buying and selling of legal rights. 
749  According to Goodhart (1997) at 17: “Government and politics are clearly … the 
source of some absurdly inefficient outcomes.”. 
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To some, the true essence of Coase’s landmark work on social cost is that the 
cost of government failure generally exceeds that of market failure750.  That 
is, the presence of a social cost is insufficient to justify governmental 
intervention751.  Coase himself has observed, what could not unreasonably 
be called ‘Coase’s Second Theorem’: “The kind of situation which 
economists are prone to consider as requiring corrective Government action 
is, in fact, often the result of Government action.  But, there is a real danger 
that extensive Government intervention in the economic system may lead 
to the protection of those responsible for harmful effects being carried too 
far.”752. Economics places the reactive tendency for government 
intervention within the ‘theory of second best’, where an intervention that 
discourages one undesirable outcome may be encouraging an even worse 
result, which in turn is overall welfare reducing753. 
 
                                                 
750  Buchanan (1973) at 579; Horwitz (1980) at 906; Rowley (1981) at 402; Barretto et al 
(1984) at 256; and, your humble author. 
751  For an entertaining illustration of Coase’s thinking, using the case study of the 
provision of services by British lighthouses, see Coase (1974b). 
752  Coase (1960) at 28; Coase elaborated on this point: “… the existence of ‘externalities’ 
does not imply that there is a prima facie case for governmental intervention, if by this 
statement is meant that, when we find ‘externalities’ there is a presumption that 
governmental action (taxation or regulation) is called for rather than the other courses of 
action which could be taken (including inaction, the abandonment of earlier government 
action, or the facilitating of market transactions).” (Coase (2005) at 215).  According to 
Veljanovski (1980) at 170: “…Coase’s real contribution (is that) he stressed that legal and 
government intervention were themselves costly, and that realistic policy analysis 
required imperfect markets to be compared to imperfect governments and legal systems.”. 
753  A commonly cited example are laws which penalize the use of marijuana may be 
socially disadvantageous if they encourage the consumption of alcohol.  The answer to 
this question is an empirical one engaging a number of disciplines.  Donohue (1998) at 6, 
for example, posits whether criminal activity should be (inefficiently) supplied by a 
monopoly (and hence lesser output; greater probability of detection) than more efficiently 
in an open, contestable market. 
 182  
The initial either/or situation underpinning the Coase Theorem (either A 
suffered harm, or B suffered harm) was tempered by subsequent thinkers754 
who recognised transactions costs were not zero and could, depending on 
their level, potentially preclude bargaining.  In this case, the parties would 
negotiate toward an optimal result within the boundaries of efficiency and 
liability: the party causing the harm would only continue to do so while the 
benefits thereof (say, revenue or profit) exceeded the costs of doing so (say, 
compensatory damages), the convergence point (where marginal benefit 
equally marginal cost) being the optimal outcome.  Thus, the role for the 
judiciary is to infer who should accept liability for the harm, and where this 
is correctly allocated to the party who can remedy the matter at least cost 
then an efficient decision will emerge (that is, imposing ex post liability on 
the party who can remedy the harm at the least cost)755.  
 
The broader Chicago School approach to law and economics, and in 
particular its emphasis on efficiency, has attracted a substantial volume of 
criticism for both normative and positivists reasons756.  On the normative 
side, these criticisms have included: whether efficiency/wealth 
maximisation is a legitimate and/or proper objective for the law757; efficiency 
cannot be traded-off for justice758, and directly lead to social improvement 
other than through enhancing utility759 or equity760; the failure of the 
                                                 
754  See, for example, Calabresi and Melamed (1972) at 1089. 
755  Calabressi (1970) at 24-31; Calabressi and Hirschoff (1972) at 19; and Calabressi and 
Klevorick (1985) at 585. 
756  For extensive discussions of the normative vs positive debate see Bruce (I989). Detailed 
consideration of these debates is outside the core thrust of this study. 
757  Veljanovksi (1981) at 5–10; Hovenkamp (1990a) at 826; Baker (1975) at 4; Rose-
Ackerman (1990) at 62. 
758  Stigler (1992) at 462. 
759  Parisi and Klick (2004) at 445. 
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proponents of utilitarianism to distinguish between act and rule utility, and 
their preference for the former over the latter761; the failure to take into 
account the distributional consequences of legal decision-making762, 
whether common law or statutory763; individuals may well see utility or 
benefit maximisation in a broader social, rather than personal-specific, 
context, giving greater weight to inter-personal or social benefit than 
narrow self-interest764; and, individual liberty realised through the legal 
system is more important than economic efficiency (which should be 
pursued through other channels, such as the legislature)765. 
 
On the positivist side, these criticisms have ranged across: whether 
positivism is really just a form of instrumentalism (that is, a means to an 
ends), which in turn reverts to its normative foundation; utility 
maximisation is different to wealth maximisation766, with individuals often 
making decisions which deliver lesser pecuniary rewards, but greater 
                                                                                                                                            
760  Calabressi (1970) at 26–28, and 39-54; Calabressi (1980) at 555; Rawls (1973).  Muth 
(2010) at 132–133 argues considerations of equity need to be viewed more widely than 
just the primary counterparties in a matter, but take into account the interests, in 
particularly any harms caused to, third parties, an approach he labels (at 132) as 
“heterodox law and economics”.  However, this raises the challenge of defining the 
breadth and depth of ‘third parties’ – in essence, how wide is ‘the circle of stakeholders’? 
761  Tunick (2009) at 80, defining ‘act utility’ as reflecting situations where an act can be 
justified when there is greater utility from doing than not doing the act, while ‘rule 
utility’ pertains when an act can be justified when there is greater utility from adhering to 
a rule which justifies the act than not adhering to that rule. 
762  Also known as equity in economics.  
763  Horwitz (1980) at 906; Calabressi (2005) at 170; Heckman (1997) at 328; Hovenkamp 
(1990a) at 837; Cotter (1996) at 2072; Baker (1975) at 4; Cirace (1991) at 1140–1142; 
Goodhart (1997) at 16. 
764  Stigler (1992) at 457; Parisi (2004) at 15 - 18; Farber (2003) at 1797; Tunick (2009) at 
82. 
765  Cooter (1987) at 142. 
766  For a good discussion of the utility maximization approach, see Cooter (2005). 
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intangible satisfactions767; whether individuals are fully informed768; the 
failure to take into account co-ordination games and network 
externalities769; the considerable practical difficulties of reliably measuring 
the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks approaches to efficiency770; whether the 
absolute and marginal utilities which underpin efficiency analysis are the 
same across individuals, space and time771; and, ultimately, can the judiciary 
actually undertake the necessary analyses in a practical, robust and 
transparent manner consistent with the administration/design of laws772, 
without attracting the ire of the legislature773. 
 
 . The Austrians  
 
The Austrian school of law and economics, like the Chicagoans, emphasises 
the central role of the individual, loading on the concept of ‘praxeology’ – 
that is, the actions of the individual are at the centre of the law and of 
economics.  In more scholarly terms, praxeology is a process of inquiry 
which focuses on the efforts of humans to determine and satisfy their wants, 
                                                 
767  Persons in positions of corporate and/or political leadership take actions motivated by 
personal status, envy or other reasons of malice, ahead of any financial gain: Hovenkamp 
(1990a) at 829.  As we shall see in the later chapters on the application of law and 
economics to criminal behaviour and to corruption (the focus of this study). 
768  A key assumption of neo-classical economic foundations of Chicagoan law and 
economics, which is doubtful according to Stigler (1992) at 457. 
769 Co-ordination games are situations where individuals develop, pursue and implement 
their strategies in a co-ordinated manner with others (Ahdeih (2011) at 62–65) while 
network externalities involve individuals taking into account the impact of their actions 
on other people, even at an expense to themselves (Ibid at 61–62). 
770  Hovenkamp (1990a) at 833–835; Parisi (2004) at 13-15; Farber (2003) at 1795; 
Calabressi (2005) at 171–181, and at 175 for an interesting insight into the use of game 
theoretic conduct which can frustrate Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
771  Hovenkamp (1990a) at 849; Baker (1975) at 28; Crespi (1992) at 236; Farber (2003) at 
1793; Muth (2010) at 112 
772  Parisi (2004) at 12. 
773  Kaplow and Shavell (1994) at 675. 
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and from this deducing the implications for further individual action774.  In 
this framework, the impact of the alternatives considered, and the choices 
and decisions made, extend beyond the person concerned, but depend on 
the external economic, legal, social and political environment in which the 
person functions.  In contrast to the Chicagoans, in Austrian law and 
economics the person does not passively respond to the world around 
him/her, but rather is a pro-active player, following a path of human action 
toward their preferred ends; they are not standardised homo economicus 
who reacts to events around them but heterogeneous agents (homoagens775, 
776) who make things happen777. 
 
The Austrians’ recognise a central role for efficiency in the praxeological 
framework778, but of a different kind to that espoused by the Chicagoans779. 
To the Austrians, efficiency is viewed through the subjective eyes of the 
individual, focusing on how they make their choices over what objectives to 
pursue, what means they will employ to achieve these goals, and their (the 
person’s) assessments of the costs and benefits involved in the different  
 
                                                 
774 Sechrest (2004) at 33; Mercuro (2009) at 105; Leeson (2012) at 5. 
775 Schwartzstein (2002) at 1134–1135; Sechrest (2004) at 33, although neither of them 
specifically use the term. 
776 Veepil (2011) at 202; thus rendering econo-/lexi-metric modelling of human behaviour 
especially challenging, if not problematic: Litschka and Grechenig (2010) at 66.   
However, Sechrest (2004) at 30 implicitly rejects this view, arguing causality-based 
methods (such as regression) are the appropriate quantitative tools for empirical Austrian 
law and economics. Crespi (1997/98) at 379 says “Austrian models resemble flashlights 
whose translucent lenses dimly illuminate a large area of ground rather than sending forth 
a bright but narrow beam of light.”.  
777 Sechrest (2004) at 19. 
778 Individual goal-seeking. 
779 ‘Utility maximisation’. 
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options780.  The Austrian emphasis on the actions, the plans and the rights of 
the individual extends to the repudiation of the concept of the collective, 
such as ‘society’.  To the extent any such collectives may exist, the Austrians 
see them as merely the interactions of individuals which do not, in any 
economic or legal way (in the current context) constitute an entity in its 
own right781.   
 
The formation of objectives and the making of choices and decisions by the 
individual takes place within a broader environment of imperfect 
information and pervasive uncertainty, constrained by the inevitable limits 
of human knowledge and decision-making capability.  The complexities of 
this situation are further compounded by the location of the person in a 
dynamic setting, which can see events, and new experiences and/or 
knowledge, induce a change in objectives and/or preferred means for 
achieving them.  Constant change, rather than stability, is the norm782.  As 
such, time plays an important part in Austrian law and economic analysis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
780 Crespi (1997/98) at 330–331; Veepil (2011) at 204; Litschka and Grechenig (2010) at 62. 
781 Crespi (1997/98) at 334.  As one Austrian-minded scholar stated (Sechrest (2004) at 34), 
in no uncertain terms: “There are, to put it bluntly, no such things as “public goods”, “the 
public interest”, “the public good”, “the national interest” or “collective security”.  These 
are just empty phrases used by particular persons to manipulate others to bring about 
specific ends.”  
782 Krizner (1997) at 61–62; Schwartzstein (2002) at 1131; Litschka and Grechenig (2010) 
at 61. 
 187  
In the Austrian framework, ‘time’ is the period which can elapse between 
when the individual accumulates the necessary information and knowledge 
and then makes a decision to act, and between when this decision is taken 
and when the objective being pursued is achieved.  Importantly, to the 
Austrians, this time period creates the possibility, even the likelihood, the 
individual will change his/her preferences, experience an increase (or a 
decrease) in his/her economic resources and/or obtain new information or 
knowledge, leading to a revision or change in objective and/or the means of 
pursuit of an unchanged objective783.  In this context, time can be as short as 
that involved in making a particular retail purchase or as long as the life-
cycle. 
 
This operating environment of perpetual change generates opportunities for 
entrepreneurs, actors who identify and seek to take advantage of change and 
the non-steady state nature of the objectives and the preferences of 
individuals by creating new experiences, knowledge, products and 
technologies to meet those evolving objectives and preferences.  To the 
Austrians, asymmetries in information and knowledge are not evidence of 
market failure, but an integral element of the effective functioning of 
markets784.  Movements in market prices and property rights act both as 
revealed signals to entrepreneurs of the changing objectives and preferences 
of individuals, and to individuals of the responses of entrepreneurs; this  
 
 
                                                 
783 Crespi (1997/98) at 325. 
784 Krizner (1997) at 62; Veepil (2011) 201; Schwartzstein (2002) at 1128 - 1129. 
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iterative, dynamic and never-ending process driving commercial activity 
and economic growth and development785.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
Austrians reject the concept (central to neo-classical economics, and which 
underpins the Chicagoan view) of stable equilibrium, holding instead that 
the perpetual process of market adjustment might see movements toward 
equilibrium786 but never its sustained realisation787. Entrepreneurs also play a 
critical role in dealing with transaction costs in the exchange of property 
rights, and through this the creation and distribution of wealth788.  While 
the Coasean framework sees transaction costs as being externalities in the 
exchange of property rights, the Austrians regard such costs as being 
internalised by the entrepreneur when they organise and undertake the 
exchange of relevant property rights; they are included in the price of the 
exchange of property rights789. 
 
The Austrian’s envisage a limited role for both governmental and legal 
institutions; one of minimal interventionism.  The appropriate role of 
government is to put in place institutions which are best able to promote 
and deliver decentralised decision-making, with control being achieved by 
reliance on market forces790.  In this context, the law should not 
                                                 
785 Crespi (1997/98) at 328; Schwartzstein (2002) at 1128 – 1129; Litschka and Grechenig 
(2010) at 64. 
786 Which could create opportunities for leximetric modellers interested in analysing the 
impact of legal and regulatory interventions using the dynamics of error-correction 
techniques, in particular the path and the pace of movement of actor(s) undertake in 
moving to a new steady state. 
787 Known by various terms, including “equilibriation”, Krizner (1997) at 62; 
‘equilibriating processes”, (Ibid) at 65. 
788 Sechrest (2004) at 32). 
789 Entrepreneurs engage in transactions with a view to reducing negative, and increasing 
positive, externalities, the difference between which is the value-added which they can 
capture as their reward: Veepil (2011) at 207-209. 
790 Krizner (1997) at 81. 
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unnecessarily limit entrepreneurial activity, whether in the form of 
constraining their capacity to identify opportunities, to obtain feedback 
from individuals (especially consumers) or act to distort behaviours and 
incentives791.  As such, the legal system, and its institutions, should integrate 
economic and social habits, customs and norms, along with legal rules, in 
facilitating the functioning of market processes792.  In this situation, the law 
should emerge from the customs and practices of the commercial, economic  
and social market place (rather than the determinism of legislatures or 
bureaucracies), with the proper role of the judiciary and the legislature 
being limited to ‘filling in the gaps’ in existing rules793.  Taken together, the 
role of governmental and legal institutions is to define (through statute) 
and/or enforce (through judicial processes) private property rights to 
encourage entrepreneurs to perform their roles efficiently794.   
 
Clearly, the Austrians do not have a static, or even a slow-moving, view of 
law (and economics).  Rather, law and economics are engaged in a perpetual 
process of continual change, with the law (informed by the economics of 
the marketplace) growing through a process of continuous change and 
discovery795.  Ultimately, the law and economics are simply just parts of a 
creative, dynamic process of interaction and discovery by homoagens. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
791 Crespi (1997/98) at 375. 
792 Mercuro (2009) at 107. 
793 Litschka and Grechenig (2010) at 74–75. 
794 Cordato (1989) at 239; Sechrest (2004) at 35. 
795 Krizner (1997) at 73; Crespi (1997/98) at 329. 
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The Austrians, to date, do not appear to have expressly examined the place 
and the treatment of corruption within their theoretical framework.  
However, an arms-length observer could see the Austrian’s regarding 
corruption as merely another feature of the market place the entrepreneur 
may have to confront. An Austrian approach to the remediation of 
corruption would likely depend on whether it was driven by government 
failure (for example, inefficient bureaucracy and/or regulations) or by 
market shortcomings (for example, by some entrepreneurs looking to gain 
unfair market advantage).  However, the Austrians would most likely look 
first to market based solutions (such as norms of acceptable behaviour, and 
deregulation and transparency) ahead of broader and deeper legislative and 
regulatory interventions (and then likely only to the extent necessary, and 
no more, to effectively deal with the recognised problem). 
 
 .   The New Haven Perspective 
 
The New Haven perspective, in contrast to the Chicagoan and the Austrian 
commitment to competition and free market economics, recognises the 
place of market failure and the role of government intervention in 
remedying such defects.  In the New Haven view, law and economics 
should address alleged market failures, focusing on both the allocative 
efficiency and distributional implications thereof while also showing  
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concern for justice and fairness796.  Thus, the key interface in law and 
economics to the New Haveners is between efficiency and fairness, with the 
government/legislature, not the courts, being responsible for dealing with 
distributional and social issues797. 
 
On the economic side, the New Haveners favour individual choice and the 
use of market forces, where they function properly, with government policy 
interventions that rely on incentives798 to influence consumer and producer 
choice. On the legal side, they see a much greater role for statute and 
regulation (and by association with the latter, greater reliance on 
governmental institutions) than the Chicagoans799.  To the New Haveners, 
law and economics are but two sub-ordinate instruments of broader public 
policy framework800. 
 
To the New Haveners, the key tool for the application of law and economics 
in the judicial processes is cost-benefit analysis801.  In this framework, courts 
would require the parties802 to justify their actions, when challenged, by 
showing they have maxmised net benefits subject to statutory, budgetary  
 
 
                                                 
796  Rose-Ackerman (1992) at 6 - 9; Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 59. 
797  Ibid at 54; Cooter (2005) at 222; see also Kaplow and Shavell (1994) at 667. 
798  Both positive in the form of subsidies, and negative in the form of taxes or penalties. 
799  The Chicagoans do not regard statute law as having no efficiency-enhancing impact 
whatsoever, just that common law is superior in realizing this objective.  Rather, statute 
can be efficiency-enhancing where they place such considerations ahead of redistribution: 
Posner (1979) at 294. 
800  Rose-Ackerman (1992) at 3. 
801  For a good general review of the literature on the application of cost-benefit analyses 
to law and economics see Huang (2009). 
802 In particular, governmental agencies advocating an intervention to address a claimed 
market failure. 
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and informational constraints. The presumption in favour of net benefit 
maximisation would help to deliver interventions which produced 
outcomes more aligned with national, rather than vested, interests803.  In 
this situation, the role of the courts would move away from reviewing 
bureaucratic decision-making to ensuring compliance with administrative 
guidelines, toward reviewing the internal consistency of statutes, in 
particular their substance with the preamble and statements of purpose804. 
 
. The Public Choice (Virginia) School  
 
The Public Choice (Virginia) School805 focuses on the economic analysis of 
non-market decision-making, treating individual decision-makers as actors 
in complex activities that generate political outcomes.  Traditionally, Public 
Choice has centred its attention on the economic analysis of political 
decision-making by elected officials (such as heads and ministers of 
government), bureaucrats, lobbyists for vested interests, and voters806, 
working to identify the political failures in the formation of laws and from 
this stressing the importance of market-like mechanisms in the design and 
application of better legal rules807.  As such, Public Choice contributes to the 
understanding of the interaction of law and economics by providing an  
 
                                                 
803  Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 60. 
804  Ibid at 62. 
805  Named after the Thomas Jefferson Centre for Studies in Political Economy at the 
University of Virginia, where the original work on public choice was pioneered by, inter 
alia, James Buchanan.   It also has a Nobel Laureate (Buchanan). He was awarded the 
Nobel Prize for Economics in 1986 for his contribution to the contractual and 
constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making.    
806  For a good general discussion of these issues see McNutt (1996) at Chs 1, 4 and 5. 
807  Parisi (2004) at 10. 
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insight into the creation and implementation of statute law through the 
political process, and the pursuit of a broad range of policy objectives. In 
essence, the Public Choice model focuses upon the incentives which created 
the legal rule, rather than directly attempting to assess the costs and benefits 
of each individual rule808. 
 
The Public Choice/Virginian school builds on two core pillars: conventional 
public choice approaches to bureaucracies and legislatures; and catallaxy, 
which is an operational/exchange-based approach to public choice.  The 
conventional approach to public choice, which focuses on the analysis of 
bureaucracies, legislatures and the State809, has as its foundation the idea of 
homo economicus – that is, individuals, within both economic and political 
environments, behaving to maximise their own utility; in essence, an 
outcomes-oriented model.  By contrast, the catallaxy approach to public 
choice focuses on the development of voluntary agreements between actors 
in the economic and political domains; in essence, a process-oriented model. 
 
Within the Virginia School, both the conventional and catallaxy approaches 
to public choice have positive and normative elements.  The positive branch 
addresses the constitutional processes underpinning the broader rules of 
government, the political processes underlying the creation of statute by  
 
 
                                                 
808  Parisi and Klick (2004) at 437. 
809  Early writings in this field of public choice include: Stigler (1971 and 1976), and 
Peltzman (1976) on regulation; Shughart and Tollison (1986), Faith and Tollison (1983), 
Stigler (1976), and Peltzman (1980) on legislatures; and, Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967) 
on bureaucracies. 
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parliaments, and, the bureaucratic procedures behind the creation of rules 
and regulations.  The normative branch examines how each of these areas 
(constitutional, parliamentary and bureaucratic) function to deliver 
efficiency-enhancing outcomes810.  
 
In effect, the Public Choice approach is engaged in an analysis of closed 
systems.  Neo-classical economics, for example, views political actors and 
institutions, and their decisions, such as laws and regulations, as exogenous 
(that is, external) to economic activity.  By contrast, in the Public Choice 
model, political players, institutions and decisions are endogenous to (that 
is, internal to, or part of) economic behaviour.  Taken as a whole, to the 
Virginia School, rational utility-maximising individuals participate in both 
the economic market place (of production, consumption and exchange) and 
the political decision-making process (for example, as voters or political 
actors) to enhance their welfare, with society’s scarce resources allocated by 
the outcomes of the economic marketplace and the political process, 
separately and interactively811. 
 
As noted earlier, the conventional (homo economicus) stream of Public 
Choice links individual behaviour to collective action in an effort to explain 
how political processes work812.  Attention is also given to the creation and 
operation of ‘political rules’ – those under which political actors, such as  
 
 
                                                 
810  To be clear, and to distinguish, the main actors in the public choice approach are 
legislators, bureaucrats and voters; in the Chicagoan approach they are the judiciary. 
811  Buchanan (1972) at 12. 
812   From a law and economic perspective, the creation by parliaments of statutes and by 
bureaucrats of regulations. 
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legislators and bureaucrats, make political decisions, which in turn bound 
their capacity to make political choices (again, create legislation and 
regulations).  From a law and economics perspective, the question becomes: 
which rules maximise political engagement, ensure minimal government 
intervention in the market economy and through it deliver the laws and 
policies providing the most efficient allocation of society’s resources813?   
 
To the Virginians, the answer can be found by examining the interaction 
between the rational ignorance of voters and the self-interest of 
politicians/legislators.  In this situation, it is often rational for voters to be 
ignorant of the key issues and policy options for dealing with them given: 
the cost of acquiring information is disproportionate to the likelihood of 
their individual vote determining the election outcome; and, the tendency 
for politicians to place their own interests ahead of the public interest by 
creating government programs or laws which maximise their electoral 
appeal to vested interest groups or geographically key voter groups (for 
example, in marginal electorates).  In short, there is generally little 
incentive for the individual voter to obtain all relevant information in order 
to make a vote-decision, whilst there are strong incentives for politicians to 
embrace short-term strategies or policies that maximise the probability of 
re-election and political advancement (for example, ministerial 
appointment) – in the law and economics context, promising statutes which 
deliver outcomes sought by supportive vested interest groups. 
 
                                                 
813  Buchanan (1974) at 486–487. 
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The Virginians also see an active role for the bureaucracy814, which has a 
special resonance in the law and economics context.  Bureaucrats can play 
an important role by filling in the gaps which may exist in legislation815, and 
have the capacity to generate sub-ordinate legislation in the form of the 
design and adminisration of regulation.  Again, and similar to the case of the 
politician, the Public Choice school focuses on how, when and why the 
interests of the bureaucrat are different to those of the electorate/society, 
and how their (the bureaucrats’) decisions can be inefficient.  In part, this 
efficiency-gap reflects the utility maximisation of the bureaucracy and is not 
coterminous with that of society816. 
 
By contrast with the homo economicus approach to Public Choice models, 
the catallaxy perspective focuses on the dynamics and processes of co-
operation and exchange. The positive branch of catallaxy applies Public 
Choice models at the level of simple exchanges operating within well-
defined and known rules, examining how differences between people are 
resolved under prevailing political institutions.  In the law and economics 
context, its main application is in the design and content of constitutions817.  
The normative branch questions how differences should be resolved.  To the  
 
 
                                                 
814  See McLean (1987) at 81-102, and McNutt (1996) at 99-137 for wider discussion. 
815  For example, laws which set objectives but are not specific on implementation. 
816   The bureaucrat valuing metrics such as power, prestige and rank, size of budget under 
their control, and number of sub-ordinate staff. 
817 Where the basic rules of collective order and the structure of governmental institutions 
are determined, in particular, in facilitating the design and operation of institutions which 
promote the convergence of the self-interest of the governors with the general welfare of 
the governed; Buchanan (1975) at 228. 
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Virginians818, the preferred approach is to create a political process whose 
structures and operations reveal the motivations and values of political 
actors, with the exchanges moving toward consensus driven by the 
objective of maximising net social benefit (that is, the interests of the whole, 
ahead of those of the individual)819.  In this situation, political (and by 
association, legislative) institutions are structured and operate (like the 
market) through exchanges with outcomes based on the gains from trade for 
all participants.  Such outcomes are efficient where they find the consensus 
support of individuals in society820. 
 
. Institutional Law and Economics 
 
The institutional approach to law and economics, as it name suggests, places 
the institutions of law and of economics at the centre of analysis, where 
institutions are mechanisms of collective action used to control individual 
action, with collective action being able to restrain, liberate or expand 
individual action821. The three main original pillars of the Institutional 
approach emphasised: the need to collect and use empirical data rather than 
abstract ideas to ground theories of economics (and later its interaction with  
 
 
                                                 
818  Ibid at 227. 
819  For examples of the application of public choice models in non-zero sum games (ie 
there is a winner and a loser) see Mueller (1979) at 129-154.  
820  Two scholars, Jonathan Klick and Franscesco Parisi, have attempted to use the Virginia 
School as a springboard for what they have labelled the ‘functional school of law and 
economics’.  However, their writings have largely been limited to four extraordinarily 
similar papers (Parisi, 2004; Parisi and Klick, 2004; Klick and Parisi, 2005 and 2009), with 
insufficient interest from any other law and/or economics scholars to sustain the 
description of their perspective as a ‘school’.    
821  Commons (1934). 
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the law); choices between different institutions should be made 
pragmatically and dynamically (in the context of a continually changing real 
world), and in a unified manner between economic, legal and political 
institutions; and, the importance of understanding the influence of groups 
(especially vested interests) and their impact on the structure and operation 
of institutions.   
 
Within the Institutionalist framework, some scholars822 regard economic 
and legal processes as inseparable, and as coercive power structures and 
relationships that in turn require an understanding of their origins and 
implications for the distribution of economic power.  Legal institutions 
merely set the boundaries for the capacity of actors to engage in economic 
coercion823. In this situation, the interface of law and economics involves 
the courts assessing every statute for its economic implications, in particular 
its allocative and distributive consequences, and its potentially adverse 
effect on individual liberty or property.  However, and in contrast to the 
Chicagoans, the Institutionalists accept the presence of inefficiency, and 
recognise the challenge for the law (and for economics) of choosing 
between different inefficient configurations824. 
                                                 
822  For example, Hale (1952). 
823  Such coercion was not necessarily to be seen in a pejorative light, but rather as a 
simple reality of life. 
824  Barretto et al (1984) at 263. 
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Other Institutionalist scholars825 regard the law and economics as disciplines 
of obligations, duties, liberties and rights. In this (optimistic) view, legal and 
economic institutions are formed and adapted as needed to changing social 
conditions; such institutions are dynamic participants in various (inter alia, 
economic, legal, political and social) reform activities.  Market economies 
influence the law by placing pressure on the political (statute law) and legal 
(common law) systems for legal changes which promote a preferred 
direction for that evolution, and the law influences the economy by guiding 
the development of market economies in a particular direction (usually in 
the form of constraining what may be considered the less socially desirable 
features of market institutions). The challenge for legal decision-makers, in 
this framework, involves choices between alternative imperfect 
institutions826. 
 
Unlike a number of the other streams of law and economics (the Chicagoans 
and the Virginians), the Institutionalists did not distinguish between the 
various sources of law or intervention in markets, be they bureaucratic, 
jurisprudential, legislative or regulatory. Rather, the Institutionalists see 
them as different forms of the relationship between government and the 
economy, and/or legal and economic processes.  However, in contrast to the 
Chicagoans and the Virginians who saw causality flowing in a single 
direction (from changes in laws or legal structures, to changes in the  
 
 
                                                 
825  Commons (1934). 
826  Komesar (1981) at 1350. 
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conduct or structure of market economies and thus on to changes in 
economic performance) the Institutionalists see causality being bi-
directional827 (that is, changes in economic performance could also cause 
changes in market structures which in turn caused changes in the law828). 
 
The work of the early Institutionalist thinkers subsequently evolved into a 
series of foundational principles for the interaction of law and economics in 
an institutional setting: economic behaviour determines, and is determined 
by, the institutional environment in which it occurs; the interaction 
between individual behaviour and institutions is evolutionary; and, such 
behaviour tends to be constructive-conflict in nature, which needs to be 
channelled by appropriately structuring institutions (such as the law) 
capable of exerting social control over economic conduct829.  In essence, the 
Institutional school is about the interaction of institutions and the 
behaviour of different actors at various stages of decision: at the 
constitutional stage, being the broad social contract of a society; at the 
institutional stage, involving the structuring (and restructuring) of the 
economic-legal-political institutions in society; and, at the economic impact 
stage, examining the effects of the economic-legal relationships. 
 
 
 
                                                 
827  On the ‘structure<>performance’ linkage see Schmid (1989) and (1994); on the 
‘conduct<>performance’ linkage see Samuels (1975) and (1989). 
828  Competition law is a clear example:  inefficiencies arise in markets dominated by a lack 
of competition (due to, say, abuse of market power by oligopolies) which in turn is dealt 
with through stronger competition laws. 
829  Gordon (1964). 
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The Institutionalists also engage in comparative institutional analysis830, 
seeking to explain and compare the different outcomes likely to emerge 
from discrete, alternative institutional structures for their implications for 
costs, efficiency, prices, incomes, employment and other economic 
parameters of the quality of life of individuals and the productive capacity 
of enterprises. This approach to efficiency is a key point of differentiation 
between the Institutionalists and the Chicagoans: while efficiency is the 
primary consideration in law and economics to the Chicagoans, to the 
Institutionalists it is but one of a number of economic considerations (along 
with prices, costs, income, production, and risk) in the allocation of rights831.  
To the Institutionalists, there is no single, unique efficient result; each 
specific interaction between law and economics832 will give rise to a 
particular set of prices, costs etc.  As such, where the law seeks to protect 
different economic rights then various efficient outcomes will emerge. 
Insofar as the law whether through jurisprudence or statute, or changes 
therein, generates efficient outcomes, they should be examined from the 
point of view of the litigants, rather than society at large833. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
830  Mercuro (1989); Samuels (1981). 
831  Samuels (1989) at 1563; Schmid (1989) at 67. 
832  That is, the allocation of rights. 
833  Samuels (1981) at 154. 
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. Neo-Institutional Law and Economics 
 
Neo-Institutional law and economics, like its Institutionalist counterpart, is 
founded on the premise institutional arrangements are important 
determinants of economic structures834.  However, Neo-Institutional law 
and economics extends earlier Institutional thinking in two notable 
respects:  first, individuals rationally pursue their own self-interest subject 
to constraints, in the form of stricter definitions of property rights and 
transactions costs, and the capacity of persons to process information835; and, 
second, institutional structures are formed and evolve to enhance society’s 
wealth producing capacity – that is, having the objective of wealth 
maximisation. The Neo-Institutionalists also extend the concept of the 
institution, from the formal constitutional, statute and common law rules of 
the game of the Institutionalists, to include informal mechanisms such as 
customs, conventions and codes of conduct. 
 
The Neo-Institutionalists identify three key groups of formal rules which 
constitute a critical part of society’s institutional structure, namely political, 
economic and contract (legal) rules836.  Political rules define the hierarchal 
structure of the political system and its decision-making process, while 
economic rules define property rights over assets and the ability to exchange 
those assets.  Legal rules set down the provisions relating to an agreement to 
exchange rights in property. Taken as a whole, these three sets of rules 
                                                 
834  North (1990) at 3, another Nobel Laureate. 
835  Ostensibly, the economic concept of ‘bounded rationality’ – that is, the computational 
ability of the human mind to acquire, analyse and make a decision from a massive volume 
of information.   In effect, individuals make rational decisions, bounded (limited) by their 
capacity to process available information. 
836  For longer discussion, see North (1990).  
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facilitate economic and political exchange within either the existing or a 
changed institutional structure, which in turn leads to gains from exchange 
(trade) and increases in wealth.  And, given the interdependent and 
multidirectional nature of the relationships between these rules, changes in 
one rule can induce changes in the others837. 
 
Much of the applications work of the Neo-Institutionalists, and indeed their 
Institutional forebears, has revolved around the property rights approach to 
economic and legal analysis838.  Property rights are important to such 
analyses given they determine the ownership of resources, their allocation 
between individuals, the costs and benefits of the usage of those resources 
and, through all of these factors, establish the incentives which drive 
economic behaviour and performance. They also determine the distribution 
of power and wealth within the politico-economic system.  Differences in 
the allocation, and the costs and benefits, of ownership drive the incentives 
and the constraints on individuals to engage in economic behaviour, and in 
particular in exchange of those property rights. 
 
The willingness and the capacity of individuals to engage in exchange is a 
function of their ability to participate in transactions within a contractual 
(that is, legal) framework that minimises uncertainty surrounding contract 
performance839.  For an effective exchange to take place840, society needs 
institutional arrangements to facilitate, and if necessary enforce, such 
transactions.  Alternately, absent a strong institutional framework 
                                                 
837  North (1989). 
838  North (1990); Barzel (1989); Libecap (1989 a and b). 
839  North (1990) at 34. 
840  That is, one where the benefits exceed the costs to the parties. 
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supportive of property rights, high transaction costs before, and uncertainty 
over rights after, an exchange would have a chilling impact on such trade841.  
As such, to the Neo-Institutionalists, legal rules help to lower the 
transaction costs associated with exchange and so facilitate more numerous 
and complex contractual agreements.  Such legal rules can be found in the 
broader sources of law (in particular, statute or common law) or, preferably 
to the Neo-Institutionalists, within contracts842. 
 
An important challenge to the Institutionalist/Neo-Institutional approach 
has been a questioning of the effectiveness of laws, given a fundamental 
purpose of institutions is to create and enforce the law (Allott, 1980), and to 
facilitate compliance (Snyder, 1993).  In this perspective, the purpose of the 
law is to shape the behaviour of individuals (at the micro-legal level) and of 
society (at the macro-legal level), by prescribing what is, and what is not, 
permitted/required, framed by the establishment and conduct of institutions 
and the processes of the law.  As such, the effectiveness of laws is a proxy 
measure of the effectiveness of institutions (Synder, 1993; Iida, 2004). 
 
Institutional failure arises when the laws they create and administer are not 
effective, reflecting shortcomings in either design and/or compliance.  Flaws 
in the design of laws which can undermine their effectiveness include: the 
laws are out-of-step with fundamental norms and values of the individuals 
and the societies in which they operate, and such are not accepted by those 
they are intended to govern; are not widely known or understood by them 
(absent professional legal advice and interpretation); and/or, legislators are 
                                                 
841  Eggertsson (1990) at 317; North (1993) at 245. 
842  Galanter (1981) at 3. 
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not receptive to, and willing to act on, indicators of the ineffectiveness of 
laws such as poor compliance (Allott, 1980).  Shortcomings in enforcement 
and compliance (most notably in the form of changing behaviours or values, 
or delivering different-than-otherwise outcomes: Iida, 2004) can diminish 
the effectiveness of laws by reducing respect for the specific laws concerned, 
for the law more generally and for the institutions which create and 
implement them (Synder, 1993). 
 
 
Other Schools  
 
While the neo-classical (Chicagoan), the Austrian, the Public Choice 
(Virginian), the Institutionalist and Neo-Institutional schools have 
dominated much of the law and economics literature, a number of other 
players have also made footprints on the field. These other players come 
from the perspectives of Critical Legal Studies, Rational Choice, 
Behaviourial, Game Theory and Internationalism843. 
 
 . Critical Legal Studies 
 
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) has its origins in ideological, left-of-centre 
economics and politics: an economics which gives greater emphasis to 
distributional impacts than efficiency considerations844; and, a politics 
responding to the ascendency of liberalism within the dominant schools 
                                                 
843 Although they are not in all ways and at all times mutually exclusive from the other 
schools. 
844  Kelman (1979a) and (1979b); Kennedy (1981). 
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(especially those of the Chicago and Public Choice law and economics845). In 
the CLS perspective, placing efficiency considerations at the centre of law 
and economic scholarship only serves to act as a brake on political activism 
by diverting attention to a claimed trade-off between efficiency and 
equity846.   
 
Beyond efficiency, proponents of CLS also disapprove of other key pillars of 
the liberal approach to law and economics.  They criticise: the Coase 
Theorem on zero transactions costs for its empirical implausibility (on the 
basis the prices consumers would want to surrender an entitlement are 
likely to be much higher than the amount they would be prepared to pay 
for one they do not have)847; the primacy attached by libertarians to private 
property and to contracts, in particular in promoting the role and function 
of markets, and the assumption of uniform utilities across all actors848; and, 
the failure of the libertarians to take into account the concept and practice 
of discrimination, which introduces otherwise ignored biases into law and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
845  Schwartz (1984) at 422; Hutchinson and Monahan (1984) at 205; Eastman (2000) at 
754; Ostas (1998) at 207.   
846  Kennedy (1981). 
847  Kelman (1979b). 
848  Kennedy and Michelman (1980). 
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economic analyses849.  They are not averse to personalising their attacks on 
eading libertarians, in particular Richard Posner850 (although this criticism 
has been seen as a back-handed compliment)851. 
 
Other proponents of CLS see the law as a political or social, rather than an 
economic, institution giving particular attention to the role of the law 
within broader society, how the law fulfils those roles and the interaction of 
the law with other prevailing political and/or social (as distinct from 
economic) institutions852.  In this framework, the law is a subset of political 
and/or social theory853, in contrast to its development over time as part of, 
and as a vehicle for legitimising, the prevailing economic order854.    
                                                 
849  Kelman (1991). 
850  Minda (1978); Balkin (1987).  Leff (1974) at 452 describes the then current edition of 
Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law as “… four hundred pages of tunnel vision…”, while 
Campbell and Piciotto (1998) at 255 go even further: “Posner has built … an ideology of 
law and economics, and ignoring or disparaging objections with various degrees of 
disingenuousness.”  (reading ‘disingenuousness’ in its diplomatic meaning as ‘stupidity’). 
They point, in particular, (Id) to the controversial Landes and Posner (1978) paper on the 
‘market for babies’. 
851  “Volume of criticism is not the best measure of the persuasiveness of a theory, but it 
does suggest the importance that some part of the scholarly community places on the 
theory.”: Priest (2005) at 370.  Advocates of law and economics are not unwilling to fire 
back: “law and economics has always been an elite activity, like playing polo.”: Cooter 
(2011) at 1479. 
852  Kornhauser (1984) at 365; Trubeck (1984) at 589. 
853  Hutchinson and Monahan (1984) at 213. 
854  Ibid at 222; Kornhauser (1984) at 352. 
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By comparison, more radical advocates of CLS see it founded in neo-
Marxism855: scientific Marxism, which stresses the determination of 
economic, legal and political ideas by social relationships and the ownership 
of the means of production; and, critical Marxism, which argues for the 
radical indeterminacy of social circumstances, and hence the impossibility 
of developing sustainable laws856.  In the latter situation, there are no 
coherent principles that can guide the judiciary in the interpretation and 
application of the law, so they apply their own contemporary or doctrinal 
values857. The perceived critical challenge, for advocates of the CLS 
approach (and the ‘C’ within the term CLS), is to change the prevailing legal 
consciousness858 and to move legal discourse to the (political) left859. 
 
 . Rational Choice 
 
The Rational Choice approach to law and economics is founded on the 
processes of human decision-making, most notably cost-benefit/risk-reward 
analysis.  The decision-making process can be either substantively rational 
(being proportional to the achievement of a given objective, within the 
                                                 
855  See, for example, Fitzpatrick and Hunt (1987). 
856  Kennedy and Michelman (1980). 
857  Schwartz (1984) at 441. 
858  Trubeck (1984) at 590.  According to Schwartz (2012), the Critical Legal Studies 
movement had minimal impact on the progress of law and economics, given the former 
tended to focus their analytical efforts on distributive justice, gender and racial equality 
issues while the latter attended to business, commercial and economic law matters.  Any 
influence the Critical Legal Studies movement came to an end when it collapsed in the 
1980s: Medema (2006) at 1; Schwartz (2012) at 10.  The volume and pattern of scholarly 
writings on law and economics would seem to indicate the CLS community do not appear 
to have re-asserted themselves in the debate, but may well have  moved on to other fields 
of legal scholarship. 
859  Eastman (2000) at 764. 
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constraints of given or expected resources), or procedurally rational (the 
outcome of a process of deliberation)860.  Put simply, a person – whether 
natural or legal – will engage in an activity when the expected 
benefits/rewards exceed the expected costs/risks.  The decision taken – for 
example, in the context of law and economics, to commit a criminal act – is  
a matter of careful, thoughtful and rational deliberation; will the benefits 
exceed the costs? In contrast to some of the other approaches to law and 
economics, the cost-benefit foundations of Rational Choice are values-
neutral, merely seeking to set down decision procedures (that is, dealing 
with practical, rather than moral, questions)861.  
 
While there is no single, broadly accepted definition, Rational Choice builds 
on two core pillars862.  First, choice is rational when it is deliberative and 
consistent, meaning the decision-maker has considered carefully their 
proposed course of action, and can give a reasoned justification for making 
that choice from amongst the range of alternatives available.  The rational 
decision-maker will, over a run of time, make consistent and reasonably 
stable choices compatible with a set of personal objectives863.  Second, and  
 
 
 
                                                 
860  Jones (2001) at 1146. 
861  Hoffman and O’Shea (2002) at 342. 
862  Ulen (2000) at 791. 
863  Nozick (1993).  However, this conceptualization could also apply to an irrational 
decision-maker: the irrational decision-maker can, over a run of time, make consistent 
and reasonably stable choices compatible with a set of personal objectives. 
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probably more formally, individuals have transitive preferences, and they 
seek to maximise the utility they derive from those preferences, subject to 
various constraints such as time, money and cognitive abilities864. 
 
However, this is not to say all individuals are fully rational at all times; some 
people may make what appear to others to be less-than-rational, or even 
(what are subjectively considered) irrational decisions.  Rather, the ‘rational 
person’ in economics, and in law and economics, is a composite of the 
community of interest whose inconsistencies or biases are evened out in the 
aggregate.  As such, this approach allows those using a Rational Choice 
framework to analyse the behaviour of groups of individuals as if their 
members were rational, in particular in response to a legal change.  In 
reality, most rational people do not completely ignore, nor totally conform 
to, any given legal change but rather adapt, to the changed 
incentive/disincentives (benefits/costs) the new law produces865. 
 
Traditionally, the Rational Choice approach has favoured market (that is, 
economic) rather than non-market (that is, legal) choices for a number of 
reasons.  These include market choices are frequent and routine, and thus if 
people make mistakes when they make choices they have the opportunity  
 
 
                                                 
864  That the Rational Choice approach to decision-making is almost an article of faith 
within the economics profession reflects its desirable features for economic analysis:  it 
allows economists to make predictions of human behaviour, which tend to be borne out 
by empirical evidence; deviations from predictions are usually explicable by factors other 
than the potential irrationality of the decision-maker; and, the presence of an 
evolutionary fitness amongst economic actors (the rational will survive and prosper, the 
irrational will experience penury and demise): Ulen (2000) at 792–794. 
865  Veljanovski (1980) at 177. 
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to learn from experience through repeated transactions. The exercise of 
market choice is generally mediated through relative prices and the use of 
money, so the decision-maker can make a reliable estimate of the 
comparative price/worth of alternate courses of action866.  In addition, 
market choices usually have a single, optimal decision-outcome, in contrast 
to non-market choices where there are potentially a large number of 
suitable outcomes867.   
 
However, this does not necessarily mean Rational Choice models have 
application only in economics, and not in law and/or law and economics: 
many legal decisions have market-like characteristics.  Rational Choice 
within law and economics sees the law creating rules which impose implicit 
prices (in the form of potential penalties, monetary and custodial) on 
different forms of future behaviour, with actors making legal decisions on 
the basis of those relative prices (risk/reward) in much the same way they 
would in making decisions based on relative prices (costs/benefits) in a 
market situation.  In essence, legal decisions often have a market-choice-
like quality.  This approach has particular resonance to decisions to commit 
a crime868. 
 
                                                 
866  Including the opportunity cost of the decision taken. 
867  Ulen (1998). 
868  Such activity can be rational where the perpetrator evaluates the costs/benefits of legal 
and illegal (criminal) activity: the expected costs being the probability of being 
apprehended and convicted multiplied by the monetary value of the penalty (fines and/or 
lost income/wealth from a custodial sanction), allowing also for reputation loss at being 
branded a criminal; while the expected benefits can be calculated as the probability of the 
activity not being detected, or failing that a conviction achieved, multiplied by the 
monetary and non-monetary (reputation gain?) benefits of the particular crime.  Decisions 
to engage in corruption, one form of crime, may well be the result of a rational choice. See 
the pioneering work of Becker (1968). 
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The application of Rational Choice models of law and economics has 
particular resonance in criminal law, such as in the optimum use of prices 
and sanctions to deter or penalise wrong-doing.  In this domain, the price is 
the money extracted for doing what is permitted, whilst a sanction is a 
detriment imposed for doing what is prohibited869.  The challenge for 
Rational Choice analysts of law and economics is assessing the effective 
impact of prices and of sanctions upon behaviour, and placing the ‘dividing 
line’ at an appropriate position between the two instruments870,871.  While 
advocates of the prices/sanctions approaches to Rational Choice law and 
economics see it having flexible application to areas of the law such as 
contract, regulation and tort, they concede it has lesser latitude in the 
criminal law where socially accepted behaviour is generally one of low 
tolerance (the socially preferred situation is one of no crime at all)872. 
 
 
 
                                                 
869  Cooter (1984) at 1523. 
870  A problem compounded by the heterogeneity of individuals (natural and legal) in their 
attitudes to risk (some being risk averse, others risk takers) and in their income/wealth, 
the latter of which impacts upon their responsiveness to price-based penalties:  Polinsky 
and Shavell (1979) at 880.  All other things being equal, a wealthier person is likely to be 
less responsive than a poorer person to a given dollar amount of penalty, but more 
responsive to a custodial sanction (given the greater cost of loss of income, and damage to 
reputation. 
871  The relative role of prices and sanctions in framing human behaviour largely depends 
on the capacity of law makers to identify socially desirable behaviour and the costs of 
deviations from it.  Where lawmakers can clearly define such behaviour, but are prone to 
error in assessing the costs of deviation therefrom, the blunter instrument (sanctions) is 
preferred to the sharper (prices). Where the converse prevails (lawmakers can accurately 
measure the external costs of misconduct, but not define socially desirable behaviour) 
then prices are to be preferred to sanctions as the instrument for legal intervention: 
Cooter (1984) at 1524. 
872  Ibid at 1549. 
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The application of cost-benefit methodologies in law and economics has 
both strengths and weaknesses873.  Amongst its key strength is the capacity 
to resolve policy issues underpinning many statutes874 by questioning how 
much the parties to the matter may be willing to pay875.  This ‘willingness to 
pay’ is particularly useful in assisting the law to find a ‘market price’ for a 
non-market good or service which can be a problem when comparing legal 
rules876.  It also has the capacity to test Kaldor-Hicks efficiency by asking, in 
a measurable way, what price the ‘winners’ would have to pay to 
compensate the ‘losers’ from any legislative activity and whether the former 
would be willing to pay it per se877.  However, its weaknesses include the 
malleability and subjectivity of certain of the benefits, especially where they 
are intangible and/or some time away in the future, and its unsuitability to 
situations involving systemic risk in particular where the ‘costs of getting it 
wrong’ can be pervasive and substantial878.  Ultimately, the worth of cost-
benefit techniques in law and economics will come with the rigor and 
transparency with which they are used, and subject to contest and 
justification. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
873  Hoffman and O’Shea (2002) at 346. 
874  Although some scholars (Goodhart (1997) at 21) are not necessarily convinced of the 
effectiveness of such modalities: “Any statute that is enacted on a floodtide of popular 
emotion is liable to be unbalanced.”. 
875  How much cost are they willing to incur to obtain a given benefit; or what benefit can 
be expected to flow from a given cost. 
876  Hoffman and O’Shea (2002) at 357. 
877  Ibid at 358. 
878 Drissen (2012) at 4. 
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 . Behaviouralism   
 
A key challenge to the Rational Choice model comes from the Behavouralist 
camp879 who, ostensibly, argue individuals or even groups are not 
necessarily perfectly rational at all time and in all circumstances880.  Whilst 
not rejecting the idea of a linkage between law and economics, they 
challenge the underlying argument of the Rational Choice paradigm – that 
of perfect rationality – proposing instead an approach which takes account 
of the imperfect nature of human behaviour881.  If individuals are less than 
perfectly rational882, their responses to changes in the law may not 
necessarily be what is predicted or sought by legal policy-makers and 
legislators883.  Behaviouralists see their approach to law and economics as 
superior to the Rational Choice camp in two important respects:  they 
consider their assessment of human conduct to be more realistic; and, they 
propose testable hypotheses, rather than merely offering assumptions, of 
human behaviour884.  Similarly, they see their approach as providing a better  
 
                                                 
879  Behavioural law and economics may well be a misnomer.  The better appellation 
might well be ‘law and psychology’:  Sunstein (1999) at 111; Arlen (1998 at 1789); 
Prentice (2000) at 740; Mitchell (2003) at 17.   Or “the evolutionary (biology) analysis in 
law”: Jones (2001) at 1143. 
880  Somewhat maligned as the “equal incompetence assumption”: Mitchell (2002) at 67. 
881 Rachlinksi (2011) at 1676, who regards the term” behaviorial law and economics” as 
misleading, seeing the interface as ‘law and psyschology’ (at 1677 - 1678).  
882  This less than perfect rationality does not extend to mean individuals are irrational, or 
their behaviour is random or impossible to predict, just that they fall short of the rational 
homo economicus favoured by the Chicagoans and the Rational Choice camps:  Jolls et al 
(1998a) at 1475 -1476. 
883  “… the analysis of the incentive effects of legal rules based on such implausible 
behavioural assumptions (as are found in Rational Choice models) cannot possibly result 
in efficacious legal policy, at least not in all circumstances.”: Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 
1055 –1056. 
884  Jolls et al (1998a) at 1489; Jolls (2007) at 2. 
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understanding of the nature and the extent of the changes in the law needed 
to achieve any given legal or public policy objective885, in contrast to the 
‘one size fits all’ approach of the Rationalists.  However, the Behaviouralists 
do not hold out their approach as justifying State paternalism through the 
law, recognising legal policy makers, legislators and bureaucrats are just as 
vulnerable to the same cognitive and motivational distortions as everyone 
else886. 
 
In contrast to the individual of Rational Choice (characteristised by the 
Behaviouralists as having stable preferences, rational expectations of the 
future, optimal processing of information and utility maximising), the 
conduct of the real person is bounded – by bounded rationality, bounded 
willpower and bounded self-interest887.  Each of these bounds pushes the 
ordinary person further away from the idealised homo economicus888. 
 
Bounded rationality reflects the limited nature of human cognitive abilities; 
no-one has unlimited mental computational abilities, and a flawless and 
infinite memory889.  No individual, no matter how clever, has an unlimited 
memory or inexhaustible computational abilities to evaluate and 
differentiate between all possible situations, or completely specify every 
                                                 
885  Jones (2001) at 1145. 
886  Sunstein (1997) at 1178; Rachlinksi (2011) at 1680.    However, one leading 
behavioural law and economics thinker - Jolls (2007) at 34 – 36 advocates “debiasing 
through law”, where both procedural and substantive law is used to guide people away 
from making errors of judgment. 
887  Jolls et al (1998) at 1476. 
888  “Most people may never be able to optimize anything because there are so many ways 
to do a task wrong, and only one way to get it right.”: Epstein (2006) at 113. 
889  For an expansive discussion of the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ see Simon (1955).  
Also:  Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1075–1102; Jones (2001) at 1150–1156; Jolls (2007) at 
10–15. 
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potential outcome.  Indeed, such a ‘full-specification approach’, where the 
individual pursues to the point of exhaustion all possible information, 
options and implications is likely to be inefficient, with the better 
mechanism for the great majority of ordinary people  involving the use of 
mental shortcuts and broad rules of thumb to process information and make 
decisions890.  The use of such approaches results in departures from the basic 
Rational Choice model in two ways: judgemental and decision-making. In 
this framework, actual judgements show systematic departures from the 
models of unbiased forecasts suggested by the Rational Choice camp, whilst 
the actual decisions taken violate expected utility theory.   
 
Bounded rationality tends to be reflected in several forms of behaviour.  
One of the most powerful of these forms of conduct is the so-called 
availability heuristic891 – people tend to attach greater weight to more 
recent892 and more salient893 events.  One form of this availability heuristic is 
anchoring: people tend to make probability-based decisions based on an 
anchor, or some arbitary initial value, from which they tend to be reluctant 
to move894. Juries in particular are vulnerable to both anchoring and to 
hindsight bias895: the tendency of decision-makers to attach an excessively 
                                                 
890  Adler (2009) at 140-143. 
891  The use of heuristics themselves are subject to behavourialist analyses – as proxies for 
other decision-making inputs when the cost of information collection, analysis and 
decision-making is high or difficult:  Sunstein (1997) at 1187. 
892  For example, the probability of a motor vehicle accident may be considered by an 
individual to be greater if they have recently witnessed such an event, than if they have 
not. 
893  Jolls (2004) at 10. 
894  Sunstein (1997) at 1188. 
895  For a good discussion of hindsight bias in juries in negligence cases see Jolls et al 
(1998a) at 1523–1527.  In short, juries tend to find in favour of the plaintiff more 
frequently than rigorous cost-benefit analysis would regard as appropriate. 
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high probability to an event simply because it ended up happening896.  A 
countervailing tendency to hindsight bias in human behaviour is the 
tendency toward over-optimism897. In this situation, people tend to believe 
adverse events are far less likely to happen to them than to others898.  
 
Another form of bounded rationality is the use of understanding(s) by 
individuals when confronted by the need to make decisions.  
Understandings involve the tendency of an individual to work toward ends, 
as distinct from using the means, immediately before them in their decision 
frames and intellectual capacities899, especially in situations where the 
decision process is complex or the outcome may result in a degree of 
difficulty.  Understandings are likely to be called upon by individuals 
particularly in situations where they have attitudes and/or concepts which 
are already internalised, based on either education or experience, but will be 
less useful, even unavailable, to lesser analytically capable people, where 
they are confronted with a problem they have not dealt with before.  
Clearly, a weakness with the understandings approach is if people are 
recognised as being capable of interpreting a situation idiosyncratically, 
then all forms of behaviour can be brought under its umbrella and none 
considered inconsistent with it – making it little guide at all. 
 
                                                 
896  For an expansive discussion see Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1095 – 1100. 
897  Also known as over-confidence bias:  Ibid at 1091 – 1093. 
898  Implying politicians and bureaucrats should exhibit restraint in creating new 
regulatory interventions or regimes when an undesirable event occurs:  Ibid at 1100 – 
consistent with Coase’s so-called ‘Second Theorem: author. 
899  Ellis and Hayden (2005) at 47. 
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Other forms of bounded rationality include categorisation (the differing 
ways by which individuals categorise information, contexts or events)900,  
self-serving bias (the tendency of individuals to integrate information in a 
manner most consistent with their own interests)901, and obstinacy, where 
individuals refuse to even consider possible courses of action, which may be 
in their own interests, driven by motivations such as acrimony (for example, 
toward the other party in the potential settlement of litigation), or 
stubbornness902, even to the extent of forgoing potential financial gain903. 
 
Bounded willpower is seen to exist because individuals take actions they 
know are contrary to their longer term interests904.  A more prevalent form 
of bounded willpower is likely to be habitual behaviour, which causes 
individuals to (repeatedly) make sub-optimal decisions in certain 
circumstances905.  In this situation, the role of the law is to ‘steel’ the 
individual’s (deficient) willpower – that is, compel them to some minimum 
standard of behaviour beyond what they might normally do for 
themselves906.  Bounded willpower can have particular application in areas 
of law where decisions taken ‘today’ can have implications which are either 
                                                 
900  For a discussion of categorization as a form of bounded rationality see Hill (2000) at 
573 – 575. 
901  Isaacharoff (1998) at 1738. This tends to distort how individuals evaluate decisions 
relating to litigation (both as plaintiff and defendant): Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1093–
1094. 
902  Bavli (2007) at 22. 
903  Ibid at 39. 
904  The classic example being people who smoke or take illegal drugs, well aware they are 
at very least injurious to their health and potentially fatal. 
905  For example, habitually buying at the same retailers or service providers, rather than 
‘shopping around’. 
906  Mandated minimum retirement incomes policies, such as the Australian 
superannuation guarantee scheme, are a case in point – requiring those in the labour force 
to undertake a minimum provision of saving for their own retirement.   Mandated cooling 
off periods for certain forms of consumer purchases is another case in point. 
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distributed across time, or whose impact is a long time away907.  Behaviours 
subject to bounded willpower, whether by addiction or habit, raise 
challenges for legal policy makers and legislators given they are likely to be 
more difficult to manipulate or modify than the Rational Choice approach 
would otherwise predict908.  
 
Bounded self-interest is a qualification upon the utility maximisation of 
Rational Choice: people care about how they treat others, even strangers, in 
some circumstances.  As a member of a wider society, they wish to treat 
other people fairly and be similarly treated by them.  The classic example is 
the simple bargaining situation known as the Ultimatum Game, in effect, a 
game where the winner can take all, or almost all, of the dividends.  Studies 
have shown the winner in such games may be motivated by fairness toward 
the loser – being prepared to take a majority of the dividends, but still leave 
the loser with a substantial minority (up to a sizeable 40 per cent)909.  A 
corollary of this preference for fairness is what is known as ‘extremeness 
aversion’, where people seek a compromise between stated alternatives. In 
this sense, how options are presented can influence the decision made, 
while the introduction of even irrelevant options can alter the outcome910.  
Not surprisingly, extremeness aversion tends to generate compromise 
effects, most notably choosing a ‘second best/less preferred’ outcome911.   
                                                 
907   For example, criminal law, where the offence takes place immediately but any penalty 
may be imposed across time, in the form of a long custodial sentence. 
908  Korobkin and Ulen (2000) at 1115. 
909  For a description and discussion of the Utlimatum Game, see Jolls et al (1998a) at 1489 
– 1493; According to Arlen (1998) at 1786, “some groups of people do not care about 
fairness (and become economists)…”. 
910  Sunstein (1997) at 1181–1182, who argues an axiom of economics ‘the irrelevance of 
irrelevant alternatives’ may well be wrong. 
911  For example, the tendency of many people to choose the second or third most 
expensive item on a menu, when they may really have preferred the first most expensive 
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Behavioural law and economics has particular resonance for criminal 
conduct and the criminal law.  On the one hand, those actively engaged in 
criminal activity tend to suffer less from bounded rationality (an imprecise 
assessment of the probability of apprehension and punishment) than of 
bounded willpower (they tend to value the immediate benefits of their 
illegal activities more than the longer term costs, which can be spread out – 
in the form of a custodial sentence – over a much longer period of time).  In 
the lexicon of the economist, they have sharply declining discount rates912. 
 
Like other streams within the law and economics sub-discipline, 
Behaviourialism is not without its critics.  Amongst the criticisms913 levelled 
at Behavourialism  are: it is not really an alternative to the Rational Choice 
model at all, but at best a modest embellishment914 and at worst 
atheoretical915; many of the ‘findings’ upon which Behaviourialism are based 
are derived from laboratory research, as distinct from fieldwork, and hence 
its generalisability is debatable916; what Behaviouralists claim to be irrational 
behaviour is more realistically people processing incomplete information to 
the best of their abilities or what is reasonably available to them at the time 
                                                                                                                                            
(presumably for reasons of palate rather than explicit price alone):  Sunstein (1999) at 135- 
136. 
912  Jolls et al (1998a) at 1538–1539. 
913  For a rejoinder to some of the criticisms recorded below, discussion of which is outside 
the range of this study, see Rachlinski (2000).  
914  According to one legal scholar (Kelman (1998) at 1586), advocates of behavourialist 
law and economics “seem to confuse discordant observations for a countertheory…” .   See 
also Arlen (1998) at 1768; Farber (2001) at 281. 
915  Posner (1998b) at 1560: “(behaviourialism has) overlooked the distinction between a 
description and a theory because they confuse explanation and prediction… (it) seems 
perilously close to the abyss of non-falsifiability; perhaps it has fallen in.”. 
916  Isaacharoff (1998) at 1742:  Of the Behaviorialists “There is every reason to believe that 
modesty is the most prudent course for its proponents.” (Ibid at 1744).  See also: Rostain 
(2000) at 985; Mitchell (2002) at 72. 
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and place (that is, rationally in their circumstances)917; Behavourialists have 
overstated their case, reflecting the tendency of their research to go looking 
for exceptional conduct918, confusing counter-stories with competing 
theory919, and failing to take into account contextual or institutional 
settings920; many of the behaviours are not systematic, and hence it is not 
possible to predict with any degree of reliability how, when and where they 
will occur921; and, shortcomings in individual behaviour at one point in time 
can be overcome by ‘learning from one’s mistakes’ across place and time922. 
 
 . Game Theory 
 
The game theory approach to law and economics, whilst not necessarily 
holding out a discrete theoretical framework for dealing with the 
interactions between the two disciplines, does carry forward a number of 
the threads of other perspectives on law and economics.  Rather than a 
theory of the law923, game theory could better be regarded as a rigorous, 
quantitative method for analysis of the law (and law and economics) – in 
                                                 
917  Kelman (1998) at 1583; Isaacharoff (1998) at 1732; Jones (2001) at 1147. 
918  Mitchell (2003) at 1. 
919  Jones (2001) at 1157; Mitchell (2002) at 76. 
920  Isaacharoff (1998) at 1743; Mitchell (2002) at 73; Rostain (2000) at 986. 
921  “Behavourial economic analysis of law cannot serve as the basis for broad normative 
policy conclusions because it cannot provide a coherent alternative model of human 
behaviour capable of generating testable predictions and policy conclusions in a wide 
range of areas.”: Arlen (1998) at 1777.  See also: Mitchell (2003) at 21; Rostain (2000) at 
979-980. 
922  Known as Bayesian updating in economics:  Kelman (1998) at 1583–1584; See also 
Arlen (1998) at 1769. 
923  According to some scholars, the value of the application of game theory to the law has 
been its capacity to confirm insights which are already incorporated into the law: Kattan 
and Vigdor (1996) at 441–442. 
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essence, a modelling framework924.  Whilst detailed discussion of the 
theoretical constructs is outside the scope of this study, game theory has 
seen scholarly applications in areas of the law ranging across contract925, 
civil litigation (notably, the conduct of proceedings926), negligence927, 
criminal law (in enforcement928, plea bargaining929 and in corruption930), 
competition law931, taxation932 and environmental law933. 
 
Conceptually, game theory can be regarded as the use of equations, usually 
founded in the conditional probability branch of statistics and econometrics, 
to build models of the behaviour of decision-makers whose choices impact 
on each other.  In effect, game theory is a form of interactive and sequential 
decision-making requiring the players involved in the game to make an 
assessment of what information the other party possesses, and how they can 
be expected to use that information934 to produce efficient outcomes935.  For 
                                                 
924   “In general, all actors (players in game theory) are assumed to be bloodless, 
personalityless, passionless maximizing machines.   In short, the perfect Posnerite 
economic man.”:  Shubrik (1991) at 291. 
925  Katz (1990b). 
926  See, for example, Katz (1990a); Chen et al (1996).  Also Rosensberg and Shavell (1985) 
for litigation initiated for its strategic, nuisance value; and Bebchuk (1996) for the curious 
situation of bringing civil proceedings with a negative expected value (that is, the costs of 
litigation are expected to exceed the damages awarded). 
927  Chung (1993), 
928  Reingganum (1993); and, Khalil et al (2010) for its application to bribery and extortion. 
929  See, for example, Grossman and Katz (1983), Reinganum (1988); Kobayashi and Lott 
(1996); Baker and Mezzetti (2001). 
930  Wu (2005) at 156–157; Carbonara et al (2008) at 785–791. 
931  Ayres (1987); Wiley (1987); Kattan and Vigdor (1996); Carlton et al (1996).  
932  Graetz et al (1996) at 4. 
933  For an expansive reading list of some of the key papers in these areas see:  Ayres (1989) 
at 1292; Huang (1995) at 109–114. 
934  A critical assumption of game theory in general, and in its application to the law in 
particular, is what is known as the Nash equilibrium, where the solution to a game 
requires each player’s strategy to be their best response only to the other player’s similarly 
best response.   That is, all players pursue strategies which optimize their own self-
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all players, the result sought is the same: to optimise the expected net 
utility/value from the game936. The interaction of game theory and the law 
occurs when a (usually small) number of players who have private 
information adopt strategies designed to advance their own interests, taking 
into account the interests and the strategies of other players937.  In these 
situations, the substantive and procedural law existent can constitute a 
detailed set of ‘rules of the game’938, which can (and do) impact the final 
outcomes (known in game theory as equilibria), and the sensitivity of the 
players in their conduct/participation in the game939. 
 
Designing a game, and its application to a legal situation, requires the 
analyst-modeller to define several key elements:  the players, being the 
individuals who make the decisions940; the order of play and the actions 
which are available to each player at each point of the game; the 
information possessed by the players at the time they make their decisions; 
and, the outcomes and the payoffs for the players that result from different 
combinations of decisions and resulting actions.  The rational game player 
                                                                                                                                            
interest, informed by the strategies of the other players:  Ayres (1989) at 1297.  See also 
Katz (1990b) at 233-238. 
935  For a review of the scholarly debate over whether, or not, game theory allows analysts 
to identify, and players to negotiate toward, efficient results in the Chicagoan outcome see 
Ayres (1990) at 1315 – 1317. 
936  Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) at 4;  Cooter et al (1982) at 226.  For a contrary view, see 
Ahdeih (2011) at 62–65, who considers co-ordination games, where players co-ordinate 
their strategies and choices to benefit all players, rather than just individual’s pursuing 
their singular interests. 
937  That is, the law operates as means of bounding strategic behaviour by the parties, 
especially in non-co-operative situations, and thus act to facilitate the movement toward 
equilibrium (or a solution):  Katz (1990b) at 229. 
938  Ayres (1989) at 1294; Posner (1998) at 765. 
939  Graetz et al (1996) at 4; Posner (1998) at 765, 
940 In the context of law and games, the plaintiff and the defendant, but can also be 
extended to their legal advisers and judicial officers. 
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may also draft a scheme, or sequence of plays941 and thus develop a 
contingency plan before the game commences, revising as it progresses; a 
tangible form of rational expectations942. Not surprisingly, what at first 
glance may appear a simple game can generate a broad range of possible 
outcomes (or no outcomes at all) even when graphically represented as a 
tractable decision-tree943 rather than the potentially overwhelming matrix-
algebra format944. 
 
Games can be co-operative or unco-operative.  As the nomenclature 
suggests, in co-operative games the players recognise their interdependence 
and seek to co-ordinate their actions and move in a co-operative manner 
toward a mutually beneficial equilibrium outcome, akin to the Coase 
Theorem and the Pareto optimality favoured by the Chicagoans945.  Players 
in co-operative games tend to be motivated by the realisation they can gain 
more by joint action with others than by acting alone946 and have an 
expectation of further interactions in the future.  By contrast, and as the 
terminology indicates, a unco-operative game is the observe of a co-
operative one, and tends to be typified by adversarial moves, hostile 
strategies and even threats, with early moves being along non-equilibrium 
                                                 
941  Actions by his/her opponents, and his/her possible reactions, and so on. 
942  Cooter et al (1982) at 230-231. 
943  Also known as extensive form. 
944  For illustrations of the extensive form processes see P’ng (1983) at 541; Rosenberg and 
Shavell (1985) at 4; Ayres (1989) at 1299–303; Shubrik (1991) at 286. For those interested 
in an algebraic representation see: for the criminal law, Grossman and Katz (1983), 
Reinganum (1988 and 1993), Baker and Mezzetti (2001); civil litigation, Katz (1990a) at 9- 
12, and then 16-21; in torts, Chung (1993); in bargaining and negotiation in general, 
Milgrom and Stokey (1982); in antitrust/ competition law, Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
945  Milgrom and Stokey (1982) at 18. 
946  Also known as positive sum games. 
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paths947. Players in these games tend to be motivated by a rivalrous mindset, 
and a gain for the other player is considered as coming at a cost to oneself 
(ostensibly, a zero sum game attitude), and often see their interactions as 
one-off and unlikely to occur again in the foreseeable future. 
 
Amongst the most challenging of games, yet most applicable to the law, are 
those involving asymmetric or incomplete information.  Such games involve 
at least one player in the game being unsure about any one, or even all, of 
the constitutive parts of the game, but most notably the identity of the other 
players, the information available to them, their strategies and their 
expected payoffs. The converse of such information is common knowledge, 
that is one of complete and perfect information which is known by all 
players to a game, and each player knows this information is known to all 
other players, and so on.948 
 
In games with asymmetric or incomplete information the lesser informed 
player will often attempt to deduce the information available to their better 
informed rival(s), and his/her/their strategies, from their behaviour - for 
example, their early moves, how they respond to your moves, and in a legal 
context any offers of settlement they make or accept/reject those made by 
                                                 
947  Being courses of action which are unlikely, of themselves, to produce an outcome. 
Non-co-operative games are seen to be particularly applicable to situations of adversarial 
or aggressive bargaining/negoiation, for example in the processes of litigation, in the early 
stages of contracting or in the corporate marketplace (such as an unwelcome merger or 
acquisition): Ayres (1991) at 422. 
948  The board game of chess is a good example of a game involving perfect information, in 
that each player has full knowledge of all of the moves that have taken place up to a 
particular point in the game being played: Shubrik (1991) at 287.  For a good discussion of 
games involving common knowledge, see Milgrom and Stokey (1982), Milgrom and 
Robert (1982), and Geanakopolos (1992), 
 226  
the first player, all of which can convey information949.  Alternately, the 
information-advantaged player may sequentially and incrementally release 
small amounts of the information he/she holds to their rival within a 
strategy950 of using this progressive disclosure for negotiating advantage951.  
The former approach is known in game theory as a separating equilibrium952 
and the latter known as persuasion953 or signalling954 games955. Such games 
are relatively common place in legal processes involving bargaining or 
negotiations, for example in contracting956, litigation or when private 
players deal with regulators957. Similarly, the information disadvantaged 
player can draw on the reputation of his better informed rival player, using 
information on past behaviour to draw usable inferences about future 
conduct958.  Reputation issues tend to have greater weight in games where 
the players expect to have ongoing relationships or repeated interactions in  
 
 
 
                                                 
949  For example of this form of ‘information gaming’ in the criminal law, in particular 
relating to plea bargaining in the United States legal system, see Baker and Mezzetti 
(2001). 
950  In the lexicon of game theory, strategy is the interaction of information and 
action/moves, and contingency plans, by the players: Shubrik (1991) at 288. 
951  Chen et al (1996) at 241. 
952  In contrast to a pooling equilibrium, where the players discreetly pursue similar 
strategies. 
953  Chen (1996) at 241. 
954  Posner (1998) at 766. 
955  Although signalling can be illegal under competition law where it is used amongst 
players with an implicit collusive motivation, such as sending messages about pricing 
strategies:  Carlton et al (1996) at 431. 
956  For an expansive discussion of the application of game theory to contract negotiations 
see Katz (1990b). 
957  Bebchuk (1984) at 414; Greatz et al (1996) at 4; Lewis and Poitevin (1997) at 50. 
958  Known as backward induction in game theory.  For an application, see Katz (1990b) at 
238 – 239. 
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the future, especially where there is potential for retaliation based on past 
behaviour959.  Such approaches are analogous to Bayesian leximetrics in 
which a player updates their prior beliefs based on how others behave960.   
 
The presence of asymmetric or incomplete information can impact on the 
law, and vice versa:  most notably, the law can evolve to deal with 
imbalances in information961, and by setting the framework for bargaining962 
or when the law itself becomes part of the rules of the game963.  Changing 
the (legal) rules of the game, known in game theory as discontinuous 
change964, even slightly can have a substantial impact on the outcome of any 
legal-economic game, especially where it involves bargaining between 
players. 
 
The application of game theory to the law is not without its critics, who 
challenge it on a number of grounds.  Prominent amongst the claimed 
shortcomings are: the robustness of the assumptions of common knowledge 
and of full information (all parties to the game have full and shared 
information; there are no information asymmetries)965; the parties to the 
game/legal matter have the same conjectures about the outcome (such as 
                                                 
959  Mahoney and Sanchirico (2002) at 6. 
960  Cooter et al (1982) at 230-235. 
961   For example, competition and consumer protection law. 
962  For example, in contract, in divorce/family law as well as civil and criminal litigation. 
963  Also sometimes known as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’: Mnookin and 
Kornhauser (1979) at 950; Cooter et al (1982) at 225. 
964  For a discussion of this concept see Ayres (1990) at 1314. 
965  Huang (1995) at 106–107.  Although supporters of the application of game theory to 
the law, and to law and economics, point out it does at least make transparent the 
imperfect distribution of information amongst players, and the potential costs of such 
allocations and its remediation:  Ayres (1990) at 1310. 
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attitudes to risk and uncertainty966), and thus can converge on a single 
equilibrium (absent which there will be multiple, or no, solutions to the 
game967); the outcomes of particular games are very sensitive to the way 
problems are defined, and the assumptions made in designing the game968; 
most games are single-shot (one play each) which, while keeping them 
tractable, are unrealistic969;  even in multiple step games, the players 
maintain a single strategy fixed at the start of the game970; the 
generalisability of results, in particular the tendency for cases to show an 
outcome might happen as distinct from it being is likely to occur971; and, 
potentially most important, the players and other interested parties are 
‘homo economicus’972,973. The practical application of game theory to the law 
has been impeded by what amount to the very high (analytical) barriers to 
entry974: even legal academics with a sound understanding of law and 
economics can find conditional probability demanding, let alone a practising 
lawyer without a higher degree in economics or mathematics. 
 
 
                                                 
966  Cooter and Rubinfield (1989) at 1077. 
967   Supporters of game theory and the law (and economics) rejoinder the potential for 
multiple or no equilibria may well reflect poor specification of the game/problem, or an 
inability to keep it tractable:  Ayres (1990) at 1310. 
968  Kobayashi (1996) at 412; Graetz et al (1996) at 4. 
969  Kattan and Vigdor (1996) at 446. 
970  Ibid. 
971  Kobayashi (1996) at 418. 
972  Huang (1995) at 107. 
973  Efforts to improve the reality of games has seen the development of ‘super-games’, 
typified by multiple players, an infinite number of periods and opportunities for players to 
change strategies along the way. However, such analytically useful innovations have come 
at the cost of tractability, and producing stable and consistent equilibria. “In other words, 
the supergame predicts that anything can happen”: Kattan and Vigdor (1996) at 447.  
Readers interested in the play-out of a super-game should see Farrell and Maskin (1989) 
although a high level of proficiency in probability modelling will be presumed. 
974  Ayres (1989) at 1292. 
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 . Empirical Legal Studies 
 
Like game theory, empirical legal studies (ELS) is not per se a theory of law 
and economics.  Rather, ELS champions the application of the 
methodologies of statistical analysis to legal situations.  ELS-based studies 
have used methods such as agent based simulations975, content analysis976, 
regression (whether cross-sectional, panel, longitudinal or dynamic/time 
series), forecasting (including of judicial decisions977), multivariate 
methods978, decision-path analysis979 and even experimental (laboratory-
based) methods980.    
 
ELS aims to overcome what its supporters see as some of the shortcomings 
of non-empirical legal studies981, in particular testing alternate legal policy 
options, seemingly anomalous examples or instances982 and/or developing 
counter-factuals983.  In this frame, narrative, normative and/or theoretical 
                                                 
975 Picker (2002). 
976 The analysis of words, phrases, sentences et al in narrative texts, such as judicial 
decisions or legislative debates.  Useful software includes Nvivo or Statistica Word Miner.  
For a good discussion of the application of content analysis in empirical legal studies see 
Heise (1998/99) at 825–826. 
977 Rutger et al (2004) at 1171–1179. 
978 Eisenberg (2000) at 668; Harcourt (2002) at 998. 
979 Rutger et al (2004) at 1195-1205. 
980 Croson (2002) and (2009). 
981 Heise (1998/99) at 808 argues:  “Assertions unconnected to an empirical basis fill law 
review articles (and judicial opinions).  Anecdotal evidence is comparatively simple and 
transparent, requiring little expertise to generate the expected reaction.  Regrettably, 
however, scholars possess few, if any, mechanisms to assess anecdotal evidence for 
truthfulness, typicality or frequency.   Lacking such mechanisms, anecdotal evidence 
supplies a risky foundation upon which to form generalisations applicable to a larger 
population.” 
982 Croson (2002) at 930 – 936. 
983 That is, ‘what might/would have happened had things (as defined) been different:  
Croson (2009) at 43.  Such studies are commonplace in econometric modelling both for 
economic management and for policy formulation. 
 230  
legal scholars still have their place (as generators of hypotheses) whose work 
is then used as inputs by empirical legal scholars (in testing the validity, or 
otherwise, of those hypotheses)984. 
 
However, a number of important barriers exist to the widening and the 
deepening of ELS within the legal academy, most notably the seeming lack 
of interest in, or preparedness to embrace, quantitative methods amongst 
senior legal scholars985. Other barriers to the expansion of ELS include its 
potential to threaten favoured theories (or at least make them more 
vulnerable to rigorous challenge)986, its contest to the normative nature of 
the law987, the paucity of data sets relevant to/suitable for empirical legal 
analysis988 and the status of empirical studies as ‘second class scholarship’989.   
 
The empiricists have, however, made useful advances in areas such as the 
effectiveness of laws, focusing most notably on whether new (largely 
statute) laws have changed citizen behaviour (both at the aggregate and the 
individual levels), and/or delivered outcomes distinctly different from that 
which may well have otherwise prevailed990.  Empirical studies on the 
effectiveness of laws (where the impacts of legal change were the focus of 
scholarly analysis) have come from non-legal disciplines as well as from 
legal scholarship. 
                                                 
984 Heise (1998/99) at 815, who argues, pointedly, (at 818) “…numbers provide less shelter 
than words.”  and again (at 824) “nullius in verba”  (‘trust not words’); Croson (2002) at 
927 – 928. 
985 Heise (1998/99) at 810 and (2002) at 828; Eisenberg (2011) at 1738. 
986 Heise (1998/99) at 813. 
987 Ibid at 814. 
988 Heise (2002) at 829 and (2011) at 1748. 
989 Heise (1998/99) at 819 – 820; Heise (2011) at 1748. 
990 A core theme of this thesis which will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6, with 
application to corruption, using modern leximetric modelling techniques. 
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Non-legal studies which have examined issues relating to the effectiveness 
of laws991 have focused on blood alcohol concentration laws for motor 
vehicle drivers (Zwerling and Jones, 1999; Voas et al, 2003) and mandatory 
seat belt usage in motor vehicles (Zara et al, 2001; Shults et al, 2004; Adams 
et al 2013992), generally finding them to be useful in achieving their policy 
objectives, although the overall effectiveness is strongly influenced by 
enforcement as distinct from the law per se (McArthur and Kraus, 1999; 
Rivara et al, 1999).    
 
Legal studies which have used leximetric methods to examine the 
effectiveness of laws have ranged across property law (Welsh, Carpentier 
and Hubell, 2001), road safety law (again, both drink-driving and seat belt 
use; Muller, 1982; Jonah and Lawson, 1984; Asch et al 1991), divorce law 
(Gonzalez-Val and Marcen, 2012), and health (anti-smoking) laws (Del 
Bono et al, 2013).  The methods used ranged across simple comparisons of 
coefficients of modelling different conditions (Jonah and Lawson, 1984; 
Welsh, Carpentier and Hubbell, 2001), tests of equality of outcomes before 
and after a legislative change (Muller, 1982; Asch et al, 1991), difference-in-
difference techniques (Del Bono et al, 2013) and more rigorous breakpoint 
(also known as event/intervention) modelling methods (Garbacz, 1992; 
Gonzalez-Val and Marcen, 2012; Vujic et al 2012).  With a small number of 
exceptions (Garbacz, 1992; Gonzalez-Val and Marcen, 2012; Vujic et al 
2012), the various legal studies were ostensibly tentative explorations of the 
effectiveness of laws using simple to modest quantitative methods. 
                                                 
991  Coming mainly from medicine and public policy. 
992   An interesting study which looks at how potential offenders try to ‘game the law’, by 
using one law (seat belts) to defeat another law (drink driving).  
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International Law and Economics 
 
Law and economics has traditionally had, at best, only a modest footprint in 
international law993.  However, the law and economics movement has over 
the past decade or so entered this domain, exploring the application of 
primarily Rational Choice (in several forms) and Institutional models to 
international law. 
 
The Rational Choice approach to international law and economics has 
focused on theories such as: self-interest (where, as the nomenclature 
suggests, States Parties develop and honour international obligations out of 
distinct self-interest994); and, reputation risk, that is a concern about their 
reputation as a co-operative and reliable counterparty.995  In the self-interest 
model, States Parties develop, commit to and comply with international law 
for several distinct reasons.  These include: the simple coincidence of self-
interest, as common forms of behaviour are often in the self-interests of 
States Parties regardless of the conduct of others; attitudes to coercion, 
especially amongst smaller and/or less powerful States who, concerned at 
being the subject of sanctions or other penalties by their more powerful 
counterparts, engage in conduct which is more in the interests of the larger 
State than their own; the desire to be treated by other nations in the same 
way our State treats them; and, as a means of overcoming co-ordination 
                                                 
993  For an overview of these debates see:  Goldsmith and Posner (1999) at 1113–1116; 
Guzman (2002) at 1830–1840, and (2004) at 123–128.  
994  Goldsmith and Posner (1999) at 1114–1115.  They conceptualise national interest as 
being the sum of the interests of individuals and institutions:  Goldsmith and Posner 
(2000) at 654. 
995  Guzman (2002) at 1825; Parisi and Ghei (2002) at 94 use a game-theoretic framework 
examine the issue of reputation as a form of multiple-stage game between repeat players. 
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problems, which can be particularly problematic when using customary 
international law in a multilateral world of many complex relationships996 
and significant externalities997.  To some advocates of the self-interest model, 
opinion juris is largely a fiction, with customary international law merely a 
descriptive account of regularities in the behaviour of States998. 
 
To advocates of the application of the Rational Choice approach to 
international law, dealing with externalities can best be achieved through 
explicit treaties.  This modality allows the implications of the international 
agreement to be made clear to the direct parties and potentially transparent 
to other States who can then consider its consequences for themselves and 
others.  Such information will also allow potentially interested States Parties 
to determine whether the international instrument moves them closer to 
Pareto optimal situation or a Kaldor-Hicks approach is needed999. At the 
same time, an appreciation of the externalities will inform interested States. 
Parties (often beyond the original, direct Parties) in moving toward a 
Coasean outcome: continuing negotiations to the point where participants  
exhaust the potential gains from dealing with those externalities, to the 
xtent transactions costs1000 have been accounted for in determining the 
costs/benefits of the negotiation process1001. 
                                                 
996  Where explicit treaties may well be the better option: Goldsmith and Posner (2000) at 
659. 
997  In effect, the consequences for States Parties not directly involved in the agreement. 
Analogous to spill-over benefits or costs.   
998  Goldsmith and Posner (1999) at 1115. 
999  Sykes (2004) at 18.  
1000  These transactions costs are likely to extend beyond the mere financial costs of 
participation in negotiations (staff time, travel costs etc), and extend to those (often 
intangible) costs of State Parties engaging with domestic political players, and incurring 
the burden of ‘issue linkage’ (where dealing with the primary issue at hand involves 
addressing related, or otherwise attached, issues: Sykes (2004) at 21). 
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In the Rational Choice-Reputational model, the effectiveness of 
international law is the outcome of an interaction of the concern of a State 
Party with its reputation for reliability and trustworthiness (present and 
future), and the attitude(s) of other States Parties to the offending State in 
failing to fully honour or act in outright breaches of those laws1002.  
Concerns with reputation-risk arise whether the international law and 
obligations result from customary, treaty or ‘soft’ international law1003.  An 
important element of the Rational Choice-Reputational model of 
international law and economics is the presumption of repeated interactions 
amongst State players: where the relationship is a ‘one-off game’ the issue of 
reputation does not necessarily arise as engagement is not expected to be 
repeated.  However, such ‘one-off’ games are rare in reality, with most 
practical international relations being open-ended repeated games.  In its 
simplest form – a two stage game1004 – at the first stage, the States Parties 
negotiate over the content of the international law (for example, a bilateral  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1001   Ibid at 19.   Such pressures, according to Sykes (2004) at 21, underpin the efficiency 
of, and growing preference for, multilateral over bilateral negotiations, especially on 
economic and related issues. 
1002  Downs and Jones (2002) at S96; Guzman (2005) at 122.  Where the adversely impacted 
State Party is prepared to accept the violation of the international law, for whatever 
rational reason of its own, then said breach may regarded as technical in nature only.  For 
example, Country B may ‘accept’ Country A’s breach of a commitment if it (B) expects a 
greater gain in the longer term for a continuing relationship. 
1003  International law, such ‘soft law’ can take the form of joint communiqués, ministerial 
accords or memoranda of understanding which contain signals of commitment: Guzman 
(2002) at 1835; Kirchner (2007) at 5.  See also Abbott and Snidal (2000) for a wider 
discussion. 
1004  For a game theoretic exposition, see Guzman (2002) at 1841–1844, and Guzman (2005) 
at 135 – 137. 
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undertaking) and their level(s) of commitment thereto.  At the second stage, 
the participating States Parties then consider the extent of their compliance 
with those commitments, weighing the benefits of some measured level of 
under-performance (or even default) against the costs to their reputation1005.  
 
The Rational Choice approach to international law and economics has been 
qualified in the form of Strategic Choice1006, especially in the decisions of 
Nation States.  In this framework, when making decisions of an 
international nature, Nation States: anticipate the likely choices and 
reactions of other players; are concerned about the consequences of their 
actions; apply fairly consistent and stable preferences across time and issues; 
prioritise and select means which will deliver superior outcomes, consistent 
with those preferences; and, use the best available information.  The 
difference between the Strategic and the Rational Choice models of 
international law and economics reflects the capacity and the costs of 
acquiring full information, with the former ostensibly being the ‘best 
possible decision’ in the prevailing (limited) information situation1007. 
                                                 
1005   For factors such as honourable behavior and reliability.  Reputation costs can also be 
reflected in higher costs for the negotiation and implementation of future agreements, 
with wary counterparties demanding the reputation-poorer State deliver on its 
commitments first, or make a weighted-share contribution to monitoring and verification 
of performance, or even posting some form of ‘international bond of performance’.  For a 
general critique of the application of game-theory to international law and economics, see 
Chinen (2003). 
1006  Keohane (2002) at S308. 
1007  Ibid at S309; Sykes (2004) at 7. 
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The Institutionalist footprint in international law and economics has 
generally been more modest than that of Rational Choice. But, like their 
domestic companions, Institutionalists in international law and economics 
argue ‘institutions matter’1008.  International institutions and the laws they 
administer and/or create, like their domestic counterparts, exist to make or 
constrain decisions outside of the conventional price mechanism.  Such 
international institutions are formed, and maintained, to facilitate co-
operation and transactions between States who trade, not in goods and 
services, but in the core assets of nations – the components of power1009.  In 
this context, the currency is jurisdiction, ranging across the power to 
prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce, and the outcome of the trade is the 
States’ maximisation of its own basket of preferences within the wider 
context of their broader international relations objectives (such as 
enhancing their national interest, prestige and status, and legal and 
regulatory jurisdiction). This trade can also extend to the creation of 
multilateral mechanisms to deal with externalities, and/or platforms for 
direct negotiations over such matters1010.  Elsewhere in this framework, 
private sector players, such as international businesses, look to identify, and 
then arbitrage or otherwise take advantage of, the various imperfections and 
opportunities presented by the international legal system to maximise their 
own commercial and economic advantages1011.  
 
                                                 
1008  Dunoff and Trachtman (1997) at 7.  
1009  Ibid at 13. 
1010  Sykes (2004) at 16–19.  The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is seen as a means for 
addressing such externalities, or spillovers, in international trade and commerce.  For 
example, where policy actions in one area are linked to those in another area – such as 
cross-sectoral retaliation during trade disputes: Dunoff and Trachtman (1997) at 16–17. 
1011 Danielsen (2011) at 32. 
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Theories of Law, Economics and Corruption 
 
While rich veins of scholarly thinking and debate have emerged from a 
number of schools and perspectives across a range of theories of law and 
economics, sadly this work has not extended to theorising over the place 
and treatment of corruption within their respective frameworks1012.  
However, such potential theorising is likely to approach the law and 
economics of corruption from a range of angles, with differing perspectives 
on the causes and better approaches to remedying the corruption 
problem1013. 
 
The core thrust of Chicagoan theorising on the law and economics of 
corruption would likely build on extending Coase’s Second Theorem, 
arguing corruption was the result of government per se and its expansive 
intervention in the functioning of markets1014. In this context of government 
failure, the appropriate strategy would be to reduce the footprint of 
government through a program of minimal-regulation and maximal-
competition related reforms, both of which would enhance economic 
efficiency1015.  In addition, greater transparency in governmental activities  
 
 
                                                 
1012  Unfortunately, to the best of the author’s knowledge and researches, none of the 
scholars within any of the schools et al have expressly discussed these linkages.   Until 
advocates and critics of each of the schools et al do so, we can only speculate. 
1013  The following narrative is the author’s conjectures of what each of the schools/ 
movements/ perspectives might argue on the interface of their respective theories’ of law 
and economics with corruption.   
1014  By creating opportunities for corrupt politicians and bureaucrats to extract economic 
rents from market actors. 
1015 The fundamental objective of Chicagoan law and economics. 
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would also re-weight the marginal-cost/-benefit equation of corrupt 
activity, although it is an empirical question whether this would likely 
result in ‘higher priced corruption’1016 or reduced corruption, the answer 
reflecting the attitude to, and value placed upon, reputation by corrupt 
players. 
 
The Austrian’s would regard corruption as merely another feature of the 
market place the entrepreneur may have to confront.  An Austrian approach 
to the remediation of corruption would likely depend on whether it was 
driven by government failure1017  or by market shortcomings1018.  However, 
the Austrians would most likely look first to market based solutions such as 
norms of acceptable behaviour, and deregulation and transparency, ahead of 
broader and deeper legislative and regulatory interventions and then likely 
only to the extent necessary, and no more, to effectively deal with the 
recognised problem. 
 
To the New Haveners, corruption would likely reflect market failure, 
resulting in less efficient markets and diminished fairness. The appropriate 
law and economics response would be two-pronged:  more effective statutes 
and regulation, and associated enforcement thereof; and, more energetic 
courts championing the national interest through more punitive, even 
potentially exemplary, sentencing for those convicted of corrupt activity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1016 To compensate for the increased risk in a more transparent environment 
1017 For example, inefficient bureaucracy and/or regulations. 
1018 For example, by some entrepreneurs looking to gain unfair market advantage. 
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The Public Choice (Virginia) school would theorise corruption as reflecting 
the prevalence of the self-interest of politicans and bureaucrats, and their 
capacity to exploit the rational ignorance of voters1019 about corruption.  In 
this context, politicians and bureaucrats would be motivated to keep 
corruption ‘below the media/political radar’, and to de-emphasise incidences 
of corruption if they otherwise arise in public policy discourse.  Building on 
their ‘conventional approach’ to Public Choice, for the Virginians the 
starting point for tackling corruption would likely begin with stronger (both 
in breadth and depth) anti-corruption legislation and more effective 
enforcement. Key elements of such legislation would likely include 
enhanced penalties1020 and heightened enforcement1021 .  
 
The Institutionalists would likely regard corruption as a metric of 
institutional failure, and the ascendency of vested interests (corrupt players) 
over the broader interest. They would also likely regard corruption as 
distortive of the underlying system for the trading in property rights and 
corrosive of the broader institutional structure (both governmental and 
market).   The challenge for the Institutionalists (both old and new schools) 
would centre around the development and implementation of political, 
economic and legal rules both individually and collectively, and the creation 
of appropriate institutional structures which impacted the behaviour and 
the decision-making of actors, whether already or potentially corrupt. 
 
                                                 
1019 Whom are largely unaware, and thus similarly unconcerned. 
1020  For example, exclusion from political or bureaucratic office for those convicted of 
corruption, thus defeating their capacity to engage in the practice. 
1021  For example, the creation of well-resourced, ‘clean-hands’ agencies specifically 
targeting corruption. 
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Stronger form Critical Legal Studies exponents, particularly those holding 
toward the neo-Marxist view, would treat corruption as reflecting the 
inherent failure of the freer market, libertarian approach to law, economics, 
politics and society.  In this framework, while they would be concerned 
with the adverse impacts of corruption on the economically disadvantaged 
and politically disempowered sections of society, they would view 
corruption as useful in underming the veracity of the market system, and 
contributing to their ambition of fundamental economic, legal, political and 
social change.  
 
Rational Choice thinkers would consider corruption as the rational outcome 
of a conscious and deliberate cost-benefit/risk-reward assessment by 
particpants, with the outcomes being sufficiently superior to the available 
alternatives which would have been considered by actors.  In this context, 
the appropriate legal-economic response is unremarkable: rebalance the 
cost-benefit/risk-reward equation, by raising the costs/risks1022  or reduce the 
benefits/rewards1023, or some superior combination thereof.   However, and 
rationally, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats will have powerful incentives 
(bounded in self-interest) to resist such rebalancing. 
 
Behaviourialists are likely to theorise corruption as the outcome of a 
reasoned consideration by corrupt players of the potential costs-benefits/ 
risks-rewards of such conduct.   However, and in contrast to the Rational 
Choice approach which uses similar prisms, the Behaviourialists would 
consider the decisions-making and processes of engagement in corruption as 
reflecting the limited rationality, willpower and/or self-interest of the 
                                                 
1022  For example, more effective enforcement; greater penalties. 
1023  For example, disproportionate asset confiscation laws. 
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corrupt players.   In this framework, the Behavourialists would focus their 
attention on initiatives which influenced this limited rationality and 
willpower1024, and limited self-interest1025. In essence, Behavourialists would 
be looking to leverage the psychology and the behaviours of actors to move 
them away from corrupt inclinations or conduct. 
 
Strict game theorists and modellers are likely to be normatively indifferent 
to corruption, viewing it as just another form of sequential interactions 
(game) between players.  Their foci would likely be on modelling the 
different forms of corrupt behaviour, its implications and the effectiveness 
of alternative countervailing interventions or responses to stimuli.   
Nevertheless, the largely positivist approach of Game Theorists, focusing on 
which types of games best explain behaviours and decision-making of 
players in the corruption game (both enforcement and offenders), and how 
they can best be explained in leximetric terms, are likely to provide valuable 
insights into the better/best/optimal strategies for tackling corruption. 
 
The Legal Empiricists, like their cousins the Game Theorists, can also be 
expected to be normatively indifferent to corruption, their interest being 
largely concerned with ‘can we model it’ – that is, subject corruption to 
rigorous leximetric data analyses and modelling.  However, the Legal 
Empirists are likely to consider corruption from a different perspective to 
Game Theorists.   While Game Theorists are tend to focus on the processes  
 
                                                 
1024 Such as ensuring corrupt actors understood the wider implications and longer term of 
their behaviour. 
1025 In particular how their own interests are likely to be disadvantaged by corruption, for 
example where a corrupt competitor ‘out corrupts’ them in say a government tender. 
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of corrupt behaviour (in particular, the dynamics of the interactions 
between players), the Legal Empiricists would be expected give greater 
attention to leximetric modelling the causes and consequences of 
corruption, and the effectiveness of laws addressing corruption (as will be 
seen in Chapter 6 of this thesis).  
 
International law and economics would likely theorise corruption in 
positivist terms, as a threat to the effectiveness and the integrity of 
international law, and system of international relations. From this 
standpoint, they would focus on how best to use the instruments and 
processes of international law, and the toolkit of international law and 
economics to deal with corruption.   Advocates of international law and 
economics would likely see explicit international instruments (mainly 
formal treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral) as the primary vehicles for 
progressing an anti-corruption agenda, harnassing the concern of States 
Parties with self-interest1026 and reputation1027.      
                                                 
1026   The tangible economic et al benefits of being corruption-free. 
1027   As a principled and trustworthy actor in international affairs. 
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Criticisms of Law and Economics 
 
While the interaction of law and economics has built something of a 
following in the academic and practitioner communities, it would be unwise 
to overstate the extent of its embrace. Most likely, law and economics has a 
loyal band of adherents, and a few zealous advocates; but it also has its 
critics who champion their views with equal, if not greater, commitment.1028 
 
One of the earliest and most energetic1029 criticisms of the law and 
economics movement (especially the Chicago branch) concerned the status 
to be afforded to objectives such as efficiency and wealth maximisation.  
Numerous critics of Chicago law and economics have decried the primacy 
its champions attached to efficiency/wealth maximisation as the 
fundamental purpose of the law1030. The nature of these criticisms include: 
realising efficient outcomes requires perfectly competitive markets, 
assumptions/conditions which are rarely found in the real world1031; the 
                                                 
1028  One of the more sarcastic being Leff (1974) at 459: “If we find a way to slip in our 
normatives in the form of descriptives, within a discipline offering narrow and apparently 
usable epistemological categories, we would all be pathetically grateful for such a new and 
more respectable formalism in legal analysis.”   For expansive and serial criticisms of the 
law and economics movement see Cirace (1991).  Bernstein (2005) at 102 goes so far as to 
call law and economics a “sickness” and its product as “classic cases of GIGO (garbage in, 
garbage out).” (Ibid at 101). 
1029  In terms of the exchange of scholarly articles. 
1030  Malloy (1988) at 259; Stigler (1989) at 631; Mason (1992) at 179; Campbell and 
Piciotto (1998) at 257; Ellickson (1998) at 538. 
1031  Humes (2003) at 968–969.  The conditions include: the products in the market must 
be homogenous; each market participant must be a ‘price taker’, that is they must not 
have sufficient power to set prices in a market; all market participants must be fully and 
perfectly informed; and, all markets must be fully contestable and competitive, meaning 
anyone can enter or leave a market (that is, there are no barriers, market or regulatory, to 
entry or exit.  See also: Campbell and Piciotto (1998) at 258; Veljanovski (1980) at 165– 
167; Berstein (2005) at 109–112. 
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human community is a more complicated social arrangement, with some 
people willing to place greater emphasis on the group/society than on the 
individual1032; government is no less legitimate than the market, both being 
the creation of human choice1033; and, the debatable proposition implicit in 
much of the law and economics advocacy that economics speaks with one, 
agreed voice on most issues1034.   
 
One particularly incisive criticism has focused on the pre-eminence given to 
microeconomics (the economics of the individual or the firm) ahead, and 
almost to the exclusion, of macroeconomics (whole economies)1035. From the 
macroeconomic perspective, the proper role of law and economics is to 
develop an infrastructure of law, whether common or statute, which 
promotes longer-term economic growth.  Indeed, the macroeconomic 
approach is likely to be more realistic than its microeconomic counterpart, 
given the proclivity of legislatures to enact laws with macroeconomic 
goals1036. 
 
 
                                                 
1032  Leff (1974) at 468; White (1987) at 169; Ellickson (1998) at 340. 
1033  Leff (1974) at 468. 
1034  Williamson (1983) at 211; Wald (1987) at 227–228. 
1035  Hume (2003) at 959.   A point conceded by one of the ‘founding fathers’ of modern 
law and economics, who has acknowledged a better understanding of law and (macro) 
economics would improve our understanding of movements in the business cycle and 
financial crises: Posner (2010) at 268, and at 271. Few would cavil with the view that ‘law 
and macro-economics’ is under-developed compared to its ‘law and micro-economics’ 
sibling; a challenge for future scholarship.   The modelling undertaken in this thesis (as 
outlined and reported in Chapter 6, “Modelling Corruption”) could be seen to go some 
way to fill the gap in this scholarship, albeit as a ‘spillover’ from the main research 
question/ objective of this study. 
1036  Such as economic growth, employment creation, trade facilitation, and/or price 
stability: Hume (2003) at 971. 
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Another prominent stream of criticism of the Chicago approach to law and 
economics has focused on the latter’s treatment of distributional issues, and 
in particular the relationship between efficiency on the one hand and the 
distribution of income and wealth on the other.  Critics of the Chicago view 
have argued1037 if a perfectly competitive market (an essential feature of the 
Chicago model) is to operate, there must also be some clearly defined initial  
distribution of income and wealth as this is the foundation for the 
economically and/or socially efficient market outcome: for each initial 
different distribution of income/wealth, there is a different efficient 
outcome.  Furthermore, the Chicagoans ‘efficiency theory of rights’1038 is 
seen as flawed1039 because the valuation of such rights is contingent upon 
those the individual already possesses (the initial allocation), and thus their 
wealth and capacity to acquire more economic rights.  Closing this 
theoretical gap requires making value judgements about the distribution of 
such rights. 
                                                 
1037  Veljanovski (1980) at 173. 
1038  Economic rights should be assigned to those who value them most highly. 
1039  Ibid at 174. 
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Some scholars have gone so far as to express concern that the incursion of 
law and economics into the law is threatening the very soul of the law 
itself1040, with the law being reduced to little more than a branch of 
economics1041.  In this view1042: the positivist nature of economics is seen to 
be inconsistent with the fundamentally normative nature of the law; the 
rationalist underpinnings of economics do not sit comfortably with the 
often irrational and unpredictable behaviour which regularly confront 
practitioners of the law; economics idolises the individual, and denies the  
concept of ‘society’, whilst the law recognises both the individual and 
society; and, economics regards the law as a series of priced and 
commoditised services provided by lawyers and the courts in a contestable 
marketplace, demeaning the legal and judicial processes as providers of 
justice. 
                                                 
1040 Some scholars (Waller (2009/10) have gone so far as to describe law and economics, 
and the Chicago perspective in particular, as a “virus ... (which) has spread by penetrating 
a new area of the law, replicating itself, and transmitting itself to new host bodies of law 
or legal jurisprudence.”  (at 369) and calling for legal scholars to work to find “an effective 
antibody (capable of) immunizing the host from the successful introduction of a new 
ideology.” (Ibid at 370). 
1041  Frankel (2006) at 24. 
1042  These points are made, and argued, by Id, and by Bernstein (2005) 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
Without doubt, it would be churlish to deny there are not cultural 
differences between those trained, versed and practicing in the professions 
of economics and of law1043. They have different lexicons, methods of 
analysis1044 and discourse, epistemologies and presentation styles in setting 
out their world-views, the most important of which is the economist’s 
commitment to positivism and the lawyer’s leaning toward normativism1045.  
Lawyers tend to be inductive rather than deductive in their analytical style,  
 
seeking out universal truths from singular statements embedded in the 
judgements of courts; such an approach is anathema to economists1046. 
Lawyers prefer to move from the observation of facts to the derivation of a 
theory; economists generally use evidence to assess a pre-determined 
theory1047.  Lawyers focus on the detailed facts of a particular case, and 
                                                 
1043  For a good discussion of some of the practical difficulties for front line judicial officers 
in applying economics to the law, some of which relate to differences of professional 
culture and modus operandi see Mason (1982), Breyer (1983) and Wald (1987).  For views 
on the cultural differences from academe (albeit from the legal perspective alone) see: 
Summers (1983) at 339–340: Schwartz (1983) at 332–333; White (1987); Stigler (1992). 
1044   Malloy (1991) at 37 reduces the ‘legal approach to problem solving’ to what he 
considers a simple equation:  facts + issues + rules and proper form + precedent + rationale 
= correct answer +/- human error.  The companion ‘economic approach to problem 
solving’ is defined (Ibid at 41) as economic facts + economic issues + economic principles + 
prior economic distributions + efficiency rationale = correct answer +/- human error.   In 
this schema, according to Malloy (Id) law and economics, therefore, becomes:  legal facts + 
legal issues + legal rules and forms + legal rationale = economic facts + economic issues + 
economic principles + prior economic distributions + efficiency rationale, which in turn 
equals correct answer +/- human error. 
1045  Katz (1996) at 2230, which he describes as “... things as they are and things as they 
should be, between fact as value, between is and ought.” 
1046  Cooter (1982b) at 1265. 
1047  White (1987) at 167; Wald (1987) at 236. 
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precise formal arguments; economists appear to prefer seemingly general 
models and the inferences they produce1048.  And, lawyers strive to exercise 
a broader judgement in which all aspects of the matter at hand are 
evaluated; economists tend to deal with partial relationships on a ceteris 
paribus basis, with key interactions being much simplified1049, although this 
is not a unanimous view1050.  Rather, and lest one think the professional 
deprecation flows only one way1051, lawyers can suffer from a lack of 
sufficient facility in statistical techniques to enable them to engage in 
rigorous quantitative analysis1052, 1053, have a horizon which tends to focus  
 
(narrowly) on the workings of the courts and the judiciary, find comfort in 
doctrinalism1054 and jurisprudence1055, and regard other disciplinary 
perspectives on the law as heresy and its proponents akin to heretics1056.  
They may also have a proclivity to embrace, in an uncritical manner, strong 
                                                 
1048  Veljanovski (1980) at 175; Wald (1987) at 236. 
1049  Breyer (1983) at 303; Rowley (1981) at 394 – 395.   
1050  “… legal scholars and lawyers have always been skeptical of theory, reluctant to reach 
too far in justifying a conclusion and, instead, going only far enough to encompass the 
facts before them.”: Ulen (2004a) at 415. 
1051  “Legal scholarship in its present state has many of the characteristics of descriptive 
botany.”: Kitch (1983) at 194. 
1052  “ Like the rabbits in Australia, economists have discovered an unoccupied niche in the 
ecology, namely the absence of quantitative reasoning in the law, and are moving quickly 
to fill it.”: Cooter (1982b) at 1261.  As an Australian economist, I must thank Cooter. 
1053 Although the increasing emphasis on ever more complex and technical econometric 
and statistical methods in law and economics scholarship – usually requiring a technical 
efficiency of a PhD in Economics - may become self-defeating for the spread of law and 
economics within the legal academy, and the judicial and legal practitioner communities: 
Schwartz (2012) at 3 and 20. 
1054   “…for whom empirical work is foreign territory inhabited by dragons.” : Ulen 
(2004a) at 420. 
1055  Which economists tend to regard as insubstantial theories: Cooter (1982b) at 1266. 
1056  Ulen (2004a) at 418.   
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and universalist assumptions which lack substantive foundation1057.  
Economists also have a superior capacity to see the connections between 
ends and means, and have the capacity to trace (and estimate) both the 
inter-relationships and the trade-offs between various objectives1058. 
 
This study stands with those who position themselves between the polar 
extremes of the law and economics debate:  it is too much to claim law and 
economics is, or should be, the totality of legal analysis; and, it is too little to 
claim there is no role at all for law and economics in legal analysis.  Rather, 
the better view sees economics as a constructive tool for improving legal 
analysis in appropriate circumstances; but it is not an end in itself.  Like 
others1059, we regard law and economics as a practical and useful tool for 
bringing order to a chaotic world, and adding analytical rigour in the 
commercial and economic branches of the law1060.  As such, this study sees 
the utility in economics being derived from its capacity to help with 
formulating testable hypotheses that can be evaluated through rigorous  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1057  Hansmann (1983) at 227: “It is not unusual ... to see … legal scholars apply that same 
theory, decade after decade, without making further inquiry into the truth or falsity off 
the theory, to evaluate changes in the law.” 
1058  Veljanovksi (1980) at 175. 
1059  Rowley (1981) at 391; Barretto et al (1984) at 258; Donohue (1988) at 912; what Cotter 
(1996) at 2073 calls ‘pragmatic law and economics’. 
1060  “Economics provides a scientific theory to predict the effects of legal sanctions on 
behaviour.  To economists, sanctions look like prices, and presumably, people respond to 
these sanctions much as they respond to prices ….Economics has mathematically precise 
theories (price theory and game theory) and empirically sound methods (statistics and 
econometrics) of analyzing the effects of prices on behaviour.”:  Cooter (2005) at 223.  A 
similar sentiment is expressed by Veljanovksi (1980) at 176. 
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methods against experience and quantifiable evidence.  In designing and 
applying such models, the challenge remains to ensure they are realistic and 
tractable, and not so elaborate and complex as to be unmanageable or 
unintelligible to the better informed reader, whilst also giving structure and 
direction for empirical work1061. 
 
While scholars have proposed a broad range of theories of law and 
economics, their application to crime and criminal behaviour, such as 
corruption, has been made more challenging by the seeming absence of a 
single, homogeneous form of ‘the criminal’ or motivation for engaging in 
‘criminal behaviour’.  Nevertheless, Rational Choice Theory has tended to 
dominate scholarly thinking on the law and economics approach to 
analysing crime and criminal behaviour at the level of the individual, who 
will make their ‘criminal activity decision’ based on the costs/benefits, or 
risks/rewards, involved.  In making these risk/reward assessments, the 
individual (prospective criminal, or in the context of the current study, 
potential bribe-payer/-taker), will take into account, inter alia, the 
likelihood of apprehension, prosecution and conviction, and the expected 
form of penalty; in short, crime is a decision framed by law and economics.  
However, the role of Game Theory should not be under-valued with 
decisions to engage in (or desist from) criminal activity likely to  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1061  Hansmann (1983) at 228; Barretto et al (1984) at 259.   Which, according to Ulen 
(2002) at 900, “…is an absolutely vital part of the development of a mature legal science.”. 
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be informed by the expected actions of other players such as counter-parties 
(for example, corrupt officials willing to seek out alternate bribe-payers) 
and/or competitors (for example, other bribe-payers willing to take their 
place in the corrupt relationship), while Empirical Legal Studies has the 
capacity to examine, metric and thus enable rigorous comparisons of the 
drivers and the impacts of crime, including corruption. Theoretical issues in 
the law and economics of crime and criminal behaviour are considered in 
Chapter Five, following.  
 
Chapter Five will examine the law and economics of crime which, as we 
will see, is a particularly challenging undertaking given there is no single, 
homogeneous form of ‘the criminal’.  Rather, those who participate in 
crimes, such as corruption, have differing degrees of engagement in criminal 
activity, attitudes to risk, access to information on the law, degree of 
concern about potential apprehension, and responsiveness to sanctions. 
These issues will be considered through the prisms of the law and 
economics of criminal behaviour, enforcement, punishment and deterrence, 
and the nature of ‘markets for criminal activity’.   While there is ‘no one size 
fits all’ definition of the criminal in all situations, it would appear the 
Rational Choice approach to law and economics – involving an evaluation 
of the risks and rewards of criminal activity – is likely offering the better 
explanation of criminal activity. 
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Chapter 5:    The Law and Economics of Crime 
 
“The profit of the crime is the force which urges a man to delinquency: 
the pain of the punishment is the force employed to restrain him from it; 
If the first of these forces be the greater, the crime will be committed; 
if the second, the crime will not be committed.”1062 
 
Introduction 
 
Analyses of the law and economics of crime1063 are greatly challenged by the 
absence of a single homogenous individual form of ‘the criminal’.  Beyond 
the usual socio-demographic characteristics of age, income, gender, social 
status, ‘the criminal’ in the law and economics context is rendered 
heterogenous by their: engagement in criminal activity (career and 
professional vs occasional and opportunistic, moving back and forward 
between legitimate and illegitimate, not actively seeking, but exploiting, 
easy options which may present themselves); attitudes to risk (risk 
preferrers, risk-neutral, risk averse); degree of information on the law, and 
related capacity to conceal their crime (high, medium, low); concern at 
potential apprehension (just an occupational risk, or to be mitigated even at  
 
 
 
                                                 
1062  Jeremy Bentham (1843), cited in Cook (1977) at 174. 
1063  The law and economics of crime movement has common foundations with the 
Chicago school of law and economics – both emanated from the University of Chicago, 
both in terms of their early journalistic outlets (Journal of Political Economy, and, Journal 
of Legal Studies, respectively), and of the authors such as Gary Becker (for a while), Isaac 
Ehrlich, Richard Posner and George Stigler. 
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substantial cost); responsiveness to sanctions (low, medium, high disutility 
for custodial penalties); and, the nature of the punishment regime they are 
likely to confront (financial vs custodial, as well as any stigma effects); all of 
which serve to create an almost individualised marginal cost/benefit profile 
for each and every criminal, actual or potential.  Whilst it may be possible 
to profile the ‘average’ criminal, analysts should not overlook the potentially 
substantial variance amongst those who engage in criminal activity1064. 
 
While the scholarly literature on the law and economics of crime is rich in 
algebraic formulae to carry, and even ‘prove’, the various arguments, this 
chapter will lean toward the narrative for ease of exposition and reflecting 
the home discipline of the thesis being law (rather than fully-fledged 
calculus).  Those looking for mathematical proofs of the various arguments 
and propositions will find much elsewhere in which to immerse 
themselves1065.  However, there have also been several substantive empirical  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1064  Henderson and Palmer (2002) at 147. 
1065  For example, Becker (1968); Landes (1971); Posner (1973), in particular the expansive 
appendix; Block and Lind (1975a); Ehrlich (1977); Polinksy and Shavell (1979); Kaplow 
(1990b); Malik (1990); Polinsky and Shavell (1991); Shavell (1991) and (1992); Stanley 
(1995); Rasmusen (1996); Baik and Kim (2001); Henderson and Palmer (2002); D’Antoni 
and Galiati (2005); Lee and McCrary (2005). 
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studies which have used cutting edge (for their respective times) 
leximetric1066 techniques, such as forecasting models1067, panel data1068, path 
analyses1069, probability modelling-based decision-tree analyses1070 and, 
simultaneous equation modelling1071.  
 
An interesting application of the law and economics of crime is the nexus 
between regulation and corruption.  While regulations can be created to 
serve public interest1072 or private interests1073 purposes, they are also 
vulnerable to being drawn into the vortex of corruption.  This has led to a 
line of scholarly inquiry within law and economics into the relationship 
between regulation and corruption, in particular the challenging question of 
‘which causes which’: does regulation cause corruption, or does corruption 
cause regulation?     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1066  Leximetrics means the application of econometric techniques to the law.  For 
interesting application in the criminal law see, for example, Ehrlich (1977) at 749–760; 
Blumstein and Nagin (1977), at the appendix; Cook and Zarkin (1985) at 120–125; Grogger 
(1991) at 300–307; van Tulder and van der Torre (1999) at 479–482.   
1067  Cohen et al (1980); van Tulder and van der Torre (1999), for forecasting models of 
minor criminal offences, such as burglary and robbery. 
1068  Witte (1980) at 62; Viscusi (1986) at 323; Philipson and Posner (1996) at 422; Lynch et 
al (2000) at 231; Katz et al (2003) at 334; Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 6; Lee and 
McCrary (2005) at 13. 
1069  Thornberry and Christenson (1984) at 407. 
1070  Viscusi (1986) at 329; Shavell (1990) at 439. 
1071  See, for example:  Ehrlich (1973) at 549; Carr-Hill and Stern (1973) at 291; Orsagh 
(1973) at 357; Ehrlich and Brower (1987) at 100; Cameron (1988) at 308; Trumbull (1989) 
at 427. 
1072 Such as the regulation of markets to redress economic and social costs associated with, 
inter alia, imperfect competition in markets and/or undesirable market outcomes. 
1073  Where regulations are created and enforced for the benefit of the regulator or those 
being regulated. 
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Criminal Behaviour 
 
The criminal law has generally regarded criminal behaviour as deviant 
social misconduct1074. Whilst not necessarily disputing this fundamentally 
sociological perspective, the law and economics movement regards criminal 
behaviour as a rational decision, one where the individual weighs the costs 
and benefits of their criminal behaviour. In the lexicon of economics, an 
individual will engage in criminal activity if the expected utility to him/her 
from doing so exceeds that from alternate uses of his/her time1075, and/or the 
rewards exceed the risks of criminal conduct, and in particular where the 
expected marginal benefit is greater than the expected marginal cost1076.  For 
society, enforcement of the criminal law will proceed to the point where 
the marginal gain in curtailment of crime approximates the marginal costs 
involved1077.  The costs and benefits of the criminal law (and enforcement) 
chain are merely the price signals of crime1078.  Where utility is measured in  
a monetary sense, as personal income and wealth increase such individuals 
are less likely to engage in criminal behaviour, or seek criminal activities  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1074  Ehrlich (1973) at 521. 
1075  Becker (1968) at 176; Ehrlich (1972) at 262; also known as ‘the occupational choice 
approach to crime’: Ehrlich (1973) at 522. 
1076  Stigler (1970) at 529; Ehrlich (1972) at 262; Ehrlich (1973) at 522; Bar-Ilan and 
Sacerdote (2004) at 15. 
1077  Easterbrook (1983) at 292.   
1078  Ibid at 289; Posner (1985b) at 1214; Lee and McCrary (2005) at 1. 
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which have proportionally higher rewards1079.  However, where utility is 
measured in an intangible manner, or using a psychological metric (‘the 
challenge of getting away with it’1080), economic factors play a lesser role. 
From the risk/reward perspective, the decision to engage in criminal activity 
reflects the interaction of factors such as the probability of conviction for 
each offence, the punishment per offence and a portmanteau of other 
considerations (for example, reputation costs of even a failed prosecution, or 
of conviction)1081,1082. 
 
Attitudes to risk are important determinants of the propensity to engage in 
criminal behaviour.  Some citizens are wholly law abiding, and may well 
never participate in criminal conduct; others are risk-avoiders, and are 
unlikely to  ever engage in criminal activity, or if they were to do so it 
would require a substantial margin of reward over risk; some are risk-
neutral, and may well evaluate any decision to perform a criminal act as a 
                                                 
1079  The capacity for an individual to engage in legal and illegal activities should not be 
regarded as mutually exclusive; a person can have a presence in both camps:  a young male 
may be a truck-driver during the day, and a drug dealer at night.   Similarly, it is plausible 
for an individual to work in the legal market for an extensive period, before dipping 
temporarily into criminal conduct:  Ehrlich (1973) at 523–524. 
1080  Empirical research for the United States suggests some 40 per cent of criminals engage 
in wrong doing for hedonistic reasons, such as what they perceive as the ‘glamour’, 
‘excitement’ or ‘enjoying the fast life’: Anderson (2002) at 307. 
1081  Becker (1968) at 177; Rose-Ackerman (2010) at 234, in the specific case of choosing 
whether or not to engage in and/ or report, corrupt behaviours.  According to Stigler 
(1970) at 530, apprehension and conviction are merely part of the occupational choice 
decision-making of the criminal, much like physical injuries to athletes – something 
which just needs to be taken into account. 
1082  Empirical research indicates the decision to engage in crime does not involve 
evaluating the risk of each of apprehension, conviction and sanction, but the conditional 
probability (that is, interaction) of all three risk elements:  Viscusi (1986) at 330.  In 
statistical terms, these probabilities are multiplicative, rather than additive, meaning the 
cost of errors in estimating what are ostensibly subjective probabilities are likely to be 
compounding (that is, errors in earlier elements of the apprehension – conviction – 
penalty chain are likely to come at a higher price than those later in the chain). 
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straight-forward risk/reward proposition; and, others are risk-takers, who 
may well have a preference for crime as a means of deriving utility (whether 
monetary or otherwise) and a tendency to discount risk/inflate reward1083. 
Whilst the criminal law cannot be stratified ex ante to deal with different 
attitudes to risk by each and every individual, any given deterrent is likely 
to be more effective for the risk-averse than risk-neutral or risk-
preferrers1084, all other things being equal.  
 
The law and economics of crime approach sees crime as potentially self-
perpetuating, for rational economic reasons – that is, individuals with a 
record of criminal convictions are channelled increasingly into illegal 
activities through the foreclosure of opportunities in the legal market place.  
Looked at another way, for many convicted criminals the employment 
market place narrows with the increase in incidence, nature or seriousness 
of their offence, pressing them to relocate to the illegitimate marketplace to 
earn income1085.  An accountant convicted of fraud is unlikely to be able to 
practice in the legitimate market, and may well find him/herself selling 
their professional skills to those operating in the illegitimate sector.  The 
punishment regime can also play a role in the self-perpetuation of crime, in 
particular where imprisonment for younger or marginal offenders results in 
vocational education and training for subsequently career criminals; prisons 
as ‘colleges of crime’1086.   
                                                 
1083  Ehrlich (1973) at 528, and (1977) at 742.  For an expansive discussion of the likely 
responses of risk-neutral, - averse, and –preferring individuals to different potential 
criminal situations, see Polinksy and Shavell (1979) and (2000). 
1084  Tauchen et al (1993) at 12. 
1085  Ehrlich (1973) at 529.  For general discussions of the labour market choice approach 
to criminal activity, see Block and Heineke (1975), and Freeman (1996). 
1086  Ehrlich (1973) at 535 and (1981) at 315; Cook (1977) at 166–167; Shepherd and Rubin 
(2013) at 3 – 4. 
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Enforcement 
 
An important challenge for the law and economics of crime sub-movement 
has been addressing the relative allocation of scarce public resources to 
different parts of the criminal law chain, in particular between enforcement 
and punishment. Early theoretical work1087 on the issue proposed the better 
strategy for controlling criminal activity was to focus on lifting the 
probability of conviction ahead of strengthening the subsequent penalty 
regime, which has subsequently been borne out by empirical studies1088.  
The underlying thinking behind this approach was potential risk-neutral 
criminals were more concerned at being apprehended than being punished.  
For law enforcement strategists this meant better resourcing the police and 
the courts, although it also meant stratification1089. 
 
An important challenge for law enforcement agencies is whether to pursue 
maximal or optimal enforcement – that is, pursue all law enforcement 
options to the point of exhaustion (maximisation), or to the point of greatest 
efficiency (optimisation).  The harsh reality of public finance, that taxpayers 
dollars are not limitless and are subject to other competing calls, means law 
enforcement is most unlikely to ever be maximal1090.  Law enforcement will 
                                                 
1087  Becker (1968) at 181. 
1088  Ehrlich (1973) at 553; Witte (1980) at 79; Trumbull (1989) at 429; ; van Tulder and 
van der Torre (1999) at 476.  In short, if the probability of conviction for a crime could be 
raised to a very high level (even close to one hundred per cent), then penalties could be 
tailored simply to the social cost of the crime committed. 
1089  The cost of such resources is likely to be higher, and their effectiveness lower, the 
more serious the criminal activity given the more demanding evidentiary requirements 
and likely greater recourse to concealment and legal defensive measures by the alleged 
criminal: Ehrlich (1973) at 540–541. 
1090 Enforcement agencies will never be able to pursue exhaustively the investigation, 
apprehension and prosecution of each and every allegation of criminal conduct. 
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also be bounded by the opportunity cost to the taxpayer of crime control – 
what else those scarce public resources devoted to policing, prosecutions 
and imprisonment could have been spent upon (for example, education, 
health, infrastructure)1091.  Rather, law enforcement agencies and policy 
makers will pursue optimal enforcement, taking into account the marginal 
cost and the marginal benefit of doing so1092, both in the aggregate and in 
the particular1093.  The marginal cost of enforcement, however, will 
generally be informed by the marginal benefit of deterring such criminal 
activity in the future, which in turn is often framed by social values – more 
law enforcement resources are, understandably, devoted to actioning a 
murder than a shop-lifting incident, for example. 
 
Optimal enforcement has both supply-of-offences by the criminal, and 
supply-of-enforcement by law agencies, dimensions.  For the career 
criminal, the propensity to engage in crime (both in its type and level of 
activity) is framed by the rules of occupational choice1094:  what is the net 
present value of the expected benefits/costs of criminal activity compared to 
those from legitimate behaviour1095, and what is the impact of the frequency 
                                                 
1091  Freeman (1996) at 37. 
1092  Stigler (1970) at 527; Easterbrook (1983) at 295; Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) at 49. 
1093 For example, the front line police detective-manager, and public prosecutor in the 
choice of criminal acts to investigate and prosecute, respectively. 
1094  Viscusi (1986) at 317 likens the decision to engage in criminal activity to one to take 
on hazardous employment.  For the person employed in a hazardous job the key issue is 
one of workplace safety, which can be crystallized into the probability of injury 
multiplied by a measure of its severity.  For the criminal the factors are the probability of 
apprehension and conviction, multiplied by a measure of the severity (of the sanction). 
1095  According to one empirical study (Ibid at 336), the crime risk premium ranges 
between 54 and 64 per cent.  That is, as a generalization, the net return from an 
illegitimate activity has to be around 54 to 64 per cent higher than from a credible 
legitimate activity to make the illegal act worthwhile to the criminal. 
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of committing crime on the probability of apprehension and conviction?1096  
Decision-making by the criminal on the frequency at which they commit a 
crime will be informed by the tendency for the probability of detection to 
rise with the incidence of criminal conduct, given the potential for law 
enforcement agencies to learn about the criminal’s patterns of behaviour.   
 
The law enforcement agency in the nature and extent of its activity pursues 
a strategy based on minimising the sum of social damage from crime and 
enforcement costs.  The first part of this calculation involves enforcement to 
the point where marginal return equals marginal cost, whilst the second 
part inclines those tasked with enforcement (police and prosecutors) to 
pursue the frequent violator and those whom cause the most damage1097.  
The prosecutor will be informed by the opportunity cost of going to trial, 
taking into account whether the publicly financed resources could be better 
used elsewhere/in pursuing another enforcement action.  In essence, 
prosecutorial decision-making involves optimising returns (successful 
prosecutions) within a given financial constraint (a taxpayer-funded 
budget)1098.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1096  Ehrlich (1972) at 274. 
1097  Stigler (1970) at 533. 
1098  Easterbrook (1983) at 297. 
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Punishment 
 
An important challenge for the criminal law is to impose appropriate and 
effective punishment.  The law and economics approach to crime goes one 
step further, proposing optimal punishment1099.  In this regard, analyses of 
the law and economics of crime have looked at two particular themes: first, 
the absolute and relative use of financial and custodial penalties; and, 
second, if maximal penalties, whether financial or custodial, are most 
effective. 
 
Early work on the law and economics of crime held fines were to be 
preferred, wherever feasible, as a form of punishment as they were more 
likely to improve social welfare1100.  This thinking reflected the social 
costs1101 of imprisonment and probation for convicted criminals exceeded 
those of imposing a financial penalty (which had lower administrative costs 
for enforcement agencies, and even brought in revenue to the public 
account).  It also built on the foundation financial penalties would be more 
effective and could be more finely tuned and implemented than 
imprisonment in imposing marginal increases in punishment1102.  Fines also 
have advantages of: being seen by society as compensation for the cost of 
                                                 
1099  That is, minimising the net social loss resulting from crime, measured as the damage 
caused by the crime, and the costs of apprehension, conviction and punishment: Becker 
(1968) at 207; Ehrlich (1982) at 5. 
1100  Becker (1968) at 193.  See also: Viscusi (1986) at 328; Easterbrook (1983) at 293; 
Shavell (1985) at 1232 and (1991) at 1091; Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) at 51.   For a 
contrary view, arguing against the simple substitutability of financial and custodial 
penalties, Block and Lind (1975) at 246. 
1101 Measurable as the public financial expenses. 
1102 In the lexicon of economics, fines are sharper, and imprisonment is blunter, policy 
instruments. 
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crime (or even a tax on crime1103); not imposing onerous multiple costs on 
society, being both the cost of the crime itself and the additional cost of 
funding custodial penalties; economists being generally better able to 
estimate the elasticities (responsiveness) of individuals to fines than to 
imprisonment, so allowing better targeted and tailored use of criminal 
penalties to the crime and the individual; and, setting a transparent, 
measurable and comparable pricing regime for crime(s), both in their 
absolute and relative levels1104.   
 
However, analysts of the law and economics of crime are not absolute in 
this preference for fines over imprisonment, recognising society regards 
some crimes (like murder or serious sexual assault) as so heinous nothing 
less than a substantial custodial penalty is acceptable1105.  Similarly, they 
recognise there are social costs involved in implementing custodial penalties 
atop of the social costs of the crime already committed, such as the cost to 
taxpayers of operating a prison system1106, and the potential for such 
institutions to raise the probability of repeat offences either by recidivism or 
acting as ‘colleges of crime’1107. 
 
                                                 
1103  Cook (1977) at 174; Posner (1980) at 410; Waldfogel (1993) at 139; Friedman (1999) at 
259. 
1104  Becker (1968) at 195. 
1105  Ibid at 198; Shavell (1985) at 1236. Posner (1985b) at 1209 points out, given the cost of 
murder to the victim is close to infinity, it is difficult to estimate a sufficiently heavy fine 
as to deliver effective deterrence to murder.    
1106  Posner (1980) at 410; Ehrlich (1981) at 317. 
1107  Ehrlich (1981) at 315; Shepherd and Rubin (2013) at 6-7. Myers (1983) at 165 cautions 
against using data on repeat offenders as reliable measures of recidivism, pointing out it 
could also be interpreted as a measure of the individual’s failure as a criminal rather than 
their commitment of resources to illegitimate activities. 
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The issue of maximal penalties has been subject to considerable scholarly 
debate, with the weight of argument, and evidence, appearing to favour the 
view that imposition of maximal penalties is not appropriate as a consistent 
and uniform practice in punishment.  Whilst maximal penalties can be 
politically and socially attractive1108, the consistent use, or high probability, 
of maximal penalties can act as a motivation for increased or even maximal 
concealment of criminal conduct1109.  Rather, punishment should be 
proportionate to the crime1110, tailored to the attitudes to risk of the 
criminal1111, with maximal penalties being used sparingly as they have the 
potential to defeat marginal deterrence if used excessively1112. 
 
The optimal penalty is likely to be proportional to the harm caused by the 
crime1113: modest penalties for the least harmful actions, moving up a 
‘punishment curve’1114 toward a peak of the most onerous penalties (capital 
punishment, or ‘never to be released’1115) for the most harmful acts, taking 
into account the economic and the social costs of imposing the penalty1116.  
                                                 
1108  The ‘tough on crime’ mantra often heard during election campaigns. 
1109  Malik (1990) at 341. 
1110  Ehrlich (1982) at 6. 
1111  Malik (1990) at 352; Kessler and Levitt (1999) at 359. 
1112  If the criminal expects to incur the maximal penalty for a given crime, they have little 
incentive to moderate their conduct/have an incentive to move to the frontier of 
misconduct for a given penalty: Polinsky and Shavell (2000) at 63. 
1113  For an expansive discussion of the challenges involved in quantifying ‘harm’ in the 
applications of economics to the criminal law, see Lynch et al (2000). 
1114 For an interesting effort to empirically estimate the shape of a punishment curve, 
albeit at one point in time, see Waldfogel (1993) at 146. 
1115  Even this penalty can be sub-optimal, as it provides no disincentive for a criminal 
imprisoned for murder not to murder again whilst in prison.  In effect, any repeated 
murders whilst in jail become ‘free-goods’:  Posner (1985) at 1211. See Ehrlich (1975) for 
an expansive discussion of the effectiveness of capital punishment.    
1116  Kaplow (1990a) at 245.  A proposition made more complicated in the reality when 
society wishes to introduce the (non-economic) concept of fairness into the determination 
of optimal penalties:  Polinksy and Shavell (2000a) at 224–229. 
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In broad and practical terms, this approach means ‘lesser offences’ may be 
better punished by financial penalties, whilst ‘more serious’ crimes should 
attract custodial penalties.  However, an important determinant of whether 
a penalty is optimal may well be framed by the attitude to risk of the 
individual concerned1117.  For the risk-averse individual, any probability of 
detection and potential criminal charge alone may be optimal, meaning 
effective deterrence obviates the need to really consider punishment at all; 
for the risk-neutral individual, the maximum feasible fine is likely optimal 
(other than for more egregious offences); whilst for risk-takers, it is likely to 
be onerous, and custodial ahead of financial (all other things being equal). 
The optimal custodial penalty (that is, the interaction of the duration and 
severity of imprisonment) is a function of the net expected harm of the 
alleged criminal conduct, ranging from zero up to a point where the 
expected net harm of the wrongdoing equals the cost of imprisonment 
(where a fine is the more efficient penalty), after which expected net 
expected harm exceeds the cost of incarceration (that is, imprisonment is  
the better penalty)1118.    
 
An important challenge for the enforcement agencies, and the judicial 
processes (in particular, the prosecutors and the judiciary) is the demanding 
information requirements to enable them to determine, and then impose, 
optimal penalties. At the highest level, this threshold can be perfect 
information: the courts are able to obtain full and complete information 
about the defendant, their actions, their motivations, their expected and 
realised private benefits from the wrongful act, and their responsiveness to 
                                                 
1117  Kaplow (1992) at 6. 
1118  Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) at 69. 
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different penalties for committing a harmful or undesirable action for any 
given probability of apprehension1119, a problem made more difficult when 
the alleged criminal themself used imperfect information in their criminal 
decision-making1120. While theoretically engaging, perfect information is 
rarely available in the real world in which law enforcement agencies and 
the courts are required to operate, especially with events or responses with 
very low probabilities which are generally quite difficult to estimate 
reliably1121.   
 
The ‘punishment curve’ is critical information for those looking to engage in 
criminal conduct1122.  In premeditated crimes and/or those based on an ex 
ante rational decision-making process1123 (in contrast to ‘fits of passion’ 
crimes which are generally not amenable to mainstream economic 
analysis1124), the marginal punishment may well impact on the decision to 
commit a crime, and what crime to commit.  If the margin of punishment is 
narrow, this can act as an incentive for a criminal to engage in relatively 
                                                 
1119  Shavell (1985) at 1241–1242. 
1120  Bebchuk and Kaplow (1992) at 369; Lee and McCrary (2005) at 3; and D’Antoni and 
Galiati (2005) at 3, pointing to the criminal’s likely imperfect information and/or 
knowledge of variables such as the probabilities of apprehension, convention and 
distribution of penalties. 
1121  Posner (1985b) at 1208. 
1122 The rate at which the burden of penalties for more serious crimes increases.  Viscusi 
(1986) at 321 prefers the term ‘frontier’ to ‘curve’, on the basis  the latter can be regarded 
as the outer limit of criminal behaviour, while the potential criminal may be inclined to 
engage in something less than maximal criminal activity, depending on how they utilize 
the various factors which constitute ‘the criminal decision’. 
1123  Analyses of the law and economics of crime assume the individual committing the 
crime is sufficiently rational to be deterrable: Posner (1985b) at1205.   Studies applying 
this method of analysis to non-rational, or irrational, individuals are seemingly rare. 
1124  Although for empirical studies see: Ehrlich (1973) at 549, who concluded the 
conventional law and economics of crime approach was less reliable in analyzing crimes 
of passion than those of premeditation. 
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more serious crimes1125 – the classic example being kidnapping a victim, and 
then whether or not to murder them1126.  Looked at another way, reducing 
the penalty of the lesser crime may well diminish the incidence of the 
greater crime1127.  Similar issues arise with the treatment of first-time and 
repeat offenders, with literature emphasising relatively more severe 
penalties for any given offence committed by repeat offenders1128. 
 
The determination of the penalty can also impact the incidence of crime and 
the cost of enforcement.  Where the penalty regime fails to impose 
sufficient penalty for concealment of a crime, over and above the 
committing of the crime itself, an implicit signal is sent to the criminal to 
devote more resources to concealment1129.  The appropriate response would 
see the penalty loading for concealment (being in addition to the 
punishment for the harm caused by the offence itself) rising at least in 
proportion to the degree of concealment involved in the offence; where it is 
more than proportionate, this would act as a disincentive to concealment.  
Such a penalty loading would also need to take into account the higher cost 
to taxpayers of funding law enforcement of more intensively concealed 
crimes1130.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1125  Ehrlich (1977) at 751. 
1126  Ehrlich (1975) at 401, and more broadly for a wider discussion of the marginal effects 
of capital punishment at the highest point of the punishment curve.  Also, Polinsky and 
Shavell (2000a) at 63. 
1127  Posner (1985b) at 1207. 
1128  Chu et al (2000) at 135; Emons (2004) at 41. 
1129  Stanley (1995) at 1. 
1130  Becker and Stigler (1974) at 2. 
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Deterrence 
 
In the law and economics of crime, the underlying objective of deterrence is 
clear-cut: it aims to modify the ‘price of crime’ for offenders, actual and 
prospective, by intervening in the determination of the marginal 
cost/benefit (or risk/reward) equation1131. The subsequent challenge becomes 
identifying ‘the best form of deterrence’: whether it is punishment or 
prevention; if punishment, fines or imprisonment; if punishment, maximal 
or optimal; if prevention, private or public; and, what permutations and 
combinations of these factors. The ongoing scholarly debate on each of 
these points, individually and interactively with each other, suggests the 
best which can be said is ‘there is no one size that fits all’, and the best 
approach may be contextual. 
 
The use of financial penalties (fines) is seen1132 as the first-best form of 
punishment, wherever they are feasible and appropriate for the crime.  The 
effectiveness of fines tends, however, to be determined by their 
proportionality to the wealth of the convicted criminal1133 – a fine of any 
given money amount will likely have a greater impact on a low than a high 
income/wealth individual1134.  The appropriate response to this seemingly 
regressive aspect would be to stratify the financial penalty regime to the 
capacity to pay of the criminal1135, set in the context of an equivalent 
                                                 
1131  Ehrlich (1981) at 312. 
1132  Ehrlich (1981) at 317 and (1982) at 6; Posner (1980) at 409; for a more qualified view, 
in relation to organized crime, see Coffee (1980) at 419. 
1133  Polinsky and Shavell (1991) at 618. 
1134  A potentially heavy burden for the former, and a trifle for the latter. 
1135  Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 2. 
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disutility the convict would have experienced through imprisonment1136.  In 
this situation, the well-targeted fine becomes analogous to a system of 
progressive taxation, with a transfer payment from the individual to 
society1137.  However, given the low income/wealth levels of many career 
criminals, even fines of a modest amount are likely to be a substantial share 
of their financial assets, thus potentially rendering the convict unable to pay 
and imprisonment as the only credible penalty1138. 
 
The effectiveness of imprisonment as a punishment tends to be conditional 
on the income, wealth and social status of the criminal: those at the upper 
end of these ranges tend to have a strong aversion to imprisonment, and 
hence it has a greater deterrent effect on their conduct, than those at the 
lower deciles; they have more to forego or lose in income, wealth and social 
status1139; the ‘stigma effect’ of imprisonment1140.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1136  Posner (1980) at 410, although this may only apply to affluent offenders and/or 
perpetrators of white collar crimes, as some offences are regarded by society as so 
egregious that no money amount would be acceptable: Ibid at 411. 
1137  Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 16. 
1138  Shavell (1985) at 1238.  Consider the case of the drug-addicted criminal, who 
undertakes criminal activity to fund their addiction; they are unlikely to have any real 
wealth or much in the way of non-committed legitimate income. 
1139  Block and Lind (1975b) at 488. 
1140  Witte (1980) at 80; Posner (1980) at 414.  Although stigma effects can also apply for 
certain forms of crime punished by financial penalties, see Blumstein and Nagan (1977) at 
269. 
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The stigma effect of a custodial penalty is generally regarded as 
sociological1141 although it can also be economic1142.  As such, the economic 
effect of stigma becomes one of a longer term discount on future labour 
income for the individual(s) concerned.  At the same time, stigma may not 
be linear, rising in proportion with the amount of time spent in prison, but 
rather have an absolute rather than a relative impact – that is, there is a 
disutility of having been imprisoned per se, largely regardless of the length 
of time spent in custody1143.  As a consequence, stigma has diminishing 
effectiveness in addressing recidivism – having ‘lost one’s reputation’ the 
marginal stigma cost of future criminal penalties converge on the negligible.  
Indeed, stigma may promote criminality through recidivism as a rational 
response to the adverse economic effects of limited legitimate employment 
opportunities1144.  
 
The certainty attached by law enforcement agencies and by criminals to the 
likely penalty for a criminal act also influences its effectiveness, with 
uncertainty over the penalty (and hence creating doubt or imprecision in 
the risk/reward equation) generally enhancing effectiveness1145.  Individuals, 
even experienced criminals, are likely to have imperfect information, let 
alone reasonable knowledge, of the probability and/or the magnitude of  
                                                 
1141 Mainstream citizens avoid social interaction with criminals, regarding them as 
‘undesirable’. 
1142 Persons with criminal records being limited to lower wage, less attached and low/non-
career employment, or even extended unemployment (Rasmusen (1996) at 520), and/or 
become less appealing prospects for marriage/life-partnering (Shepherd and Rubin (2013) 
at 6). 
1143  Polinsky and Shavell (2000) at 47. 
1144  Ehrlich (1972) at 264; Cook (1977) at 168; Myers (1983) at 163; Thornberry and 
Christenson (1984) at 398;Rasmusen (1996) at 539.   
1145  Block and Lind (1975b) at 484; Harel and Segal (1999) at 277.   However, this 
uncertainty has been criticized as creating something of a lottery in the enforcement 
process:  Ehrlich (1982) at 4. 
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apprehension, conviction and sanction.  Rather, their information set is 
likely to range somewhere within the spectrum of little or only vague 
information, to subjective or at most objective probability distributions1146.  
Law enforcement agencies may see a tactical advantage in keeping precise 
information confidential, or uncertain, although it would appear most 
members of society, and criminals in particular, have good general senses of 
the likelihood their acts, as a class, are harmful1147.   
 
The effectiveness of imprisonment on the incidence of criminal behaviour is 
also influenced by the elasticity of supply of potential offenders.  Quite 
simply, if convicted criminals who are incarcerated for their offences are 
readily replaced by either new entrants to that criminal marketplace, or 
stepped up activity by existing players, the market supply of criminal 
behaviour is likely to remain fairly much unchanged1148.  This situation is 
more likely to occur for crimes against property1149 or so-called ‘victimless 
                                                 
1146  With little likelihood of having made a robust estimate of conditional probability – 
that is, the cumulation of the probabilities of apprehension, conviction and penalty: 
Polinsky and Shavell (2000a) at 68.  For an empirical study bearing out “the self-perceived 
invincibility amongst criminals” see Anderson (2002).   He estimates some 76 per cent of 
potential criminals are ill-informed about one or more elements of the probabilities of the 
apprehension – conviction – punishment chain, with 83 per cent believing they would 
not be caught for their wrong doing: Ibid at 304. 
1147  Kaplow (1990b) at 94. 
1148  Cook (1977) at 169; Ehrlich (1981) at 316; Posner (1985b) at 1216; Cameron (1988) at 
305; Freeman (1996) at 36.  For example, if the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of a 
given number of drug dealers induce new dealers to enter the market for the supply of 
drugs, or existing suppliers to fill the gaps created by their now-imprisoned competitors, 
the incidence of criminal activity does not diminish, assuming the original conviction had 
no impact on consumer demand. 
1149  Particularly where there is a strong secondary market for the criminally obtained 
property – for example, stolen alcohol, tobacco, household electrical appliances or motor 
vehicles (whole or parts):  Ehrlich (1981) at 309. 
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crimes1150’, than for those against persons1151.   Such effects have also been 
found in empirical work on the elasticity of different forms of crime, with 
high levels of substitutability between various types of property crime 
(although not between property and crimes against the person)1152, 
suggesting an ‘underlying rate of crime’ where the law enforcement chain 
impacts the composition more than the level of aggregate criminal activity.  
The additional challenge for law enforcement agencies therefore becomes 
how to impact the substitutability between crimes, and the nature and 
extent of competition and contestability in the marketplace of crime1153. 
 
One aspect of the deterrence stream of the law and economics approach to 
crime which appears to have attracted relatively little attention has been the 
role of law enforcement agencies in preventing crime – more specifically, 
intervention occurring at the earliest stage, before the criminal act takes 
place or failing that causes an offence of lesser social harm.  Identifying the 
optimal point of intervention (prevention vs punishment) will be informed 
by the marginal deterrence of the ‘punishment curve’.  If the marginal 
deterrence for an offence is regarded as ‘too low’ by criminals1154, the  
 
 
 
                                                 
1150  For example, voluntary participation in criminal acts such illegal gambling, 
prostitution, and use of illegal narcotics:  Becker and Stigler (1974) at 4. 
1151  Ehrlich (1996) at 54. 
1152  Levitt (1998) at 361. 
1153   A ‘crack-down’ on any one form of crime by law enforcement agencies driven down 
the net dividend for criminal activity in that area but, certeris paribus, raise the net 
dividends on another area:  Viscusi (1986) at 322. 
1154  The expected marginal benefit of a crime to them exceeds the potential marginal cost 
to them. 
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prevailing sanctions regime is unlikely to be an effective deterrent, and law 
enforcement agencies will have to place greater reliance on prevention1155.  
An inherent problem in the prevention-based model is the substantial 
information demands imposed upon law enforcement agencies: they need to 
have accurate information about potential criminal acts before they occur, 
which is likely to be problematic for higher level crimes and/or those where 
the criminal invests substantially in concealment.   
 
A Market for Criminal Activity 
 
The great bulk of the scholarly work on the law and economics of crime has 
come from what can be considered a partial perspective1156 – that is, a 
detailed and intensive examination of a particular dimension of the broader 
issue, such as enforcement, deterrence or punishment.  Somewhat rarer are 
generalised perspectives – those which seek to adopt a more wholistic, 
overview standpoint1157.  Such integrated frameworks have been referred to  
as ‘a market model of crime’1158 and build on several key pillars: participants 
in the criminal market place, whether criminals, victims, and/or the various 
law enforcement players behave in an optimising manner; they form 
expectations of the relative availability of legitimate and illegitimate  
 
 
                                                 
1155  Shavell (1993) at 261. 
1156  This comment should not be regarded as a criticism of such approaches, which have 
been the backbone by volume and value, in the development of the law and economics of 
crime.   Rather, is a means of distinguishing different approaches. 
1157  Which necessarily build upon the foundations put in place by the partial analyses. 
1158  Ehrlich (1996) at 44. 
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activities, and on the certainty and severity of punishment; the distribution 
of preferences for crime 1159have a stable distribution throughout the 
population; the objective of law enforcement is the maximisation of social 
welfare1160; and, the behaviour of all individuals leads to an equilibrium, or a 
long-run level of crime.  The competitive advantage of this model is its 
capacity to take into account the interaction between the different 
elements. 
 
In the market model of crime, the supply of offences reflects a risk-neutral 
individual’s decision to engage in illegal activity which in turn is based on 
the expected net balance of the risks and rewards of doing so, and the 
availability of legitimate and illegitimate activities.  On the other side of the 
market are the demand for offences, which in the case of illegally obtained 
goods and services is the market for the purchase of such ill-gotten gains 
(for example, what is ‘the market’ for stolen plasma televisions).  Public 
enforcement of the law involves assessing the marginal costs of enforcement 
against the marginal benefits of crime prevention, taking into account the 
potential complementarity and substitutability of different crimes.  The 
market for crime will be in equilibrium when criminals looking at the net 
expected return from crime, and government through law enforcement 
agencies looking at net social welfare, do not feel any need to adjust their  
 
 
                                                 
1159  Including attitudes to risk of undertaking crime. 
1160  The minimisation of social loss resulting from criminal activity. 
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conduct and thus change the prevailing net price of crime.  Empirical 
testing of the integrated market model of crime1161 bears out one of the 
foundation stones of the law and economics of crime literature:  the efforts 
of law enforcement agencies in apprehending and convicting the criminal 
are likely to be more effective than pursuing a specific penalty. 
 
Law and Economics of Regulation and Corruption  
 
Any general reading of the law and economics, and of the corruption, 
literatures will almost inevitably come across the interaction between 
regulation and corruption.  These literatures deal with issues such as: the 
theoretical drivers of regulation, whether it is created and enforced in the 
public interest of society or in the private interest of those doing and those 
being regulated; and the positivist perspective of ‘which causes which’ – that 
is, whether regulation causes corruption, or corruption causes regulation.  
While not a central theme of this study, the interaction between regulation 
and corruption provides an interesting insight into a key relationship in law 
and economics. 
 
An important hurdle in the study of the law and economics of regulation is 
the general lack of a consensus definition of the term ‘regulation’.  For the 
purposes of this study, we take regulation to be the use of legal instruments 
to achieve economic-social policy objectives, and these instruments can be 
used by the regulatory authority to require behaviour under penalty of  
 
                                                 
1161  Ibid at 62. 
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sanctions1162.  Economic regulation tends to address issues both of structure 
and of conduct: the former is concerned with regulating market structures, 
and the entry/exit from participation in a specified market, for example an 
individual holding the professional qualifications required to practice1163; 
and, the latter, with behaviour in a market, for example regarding anti-
competitive conduct such as price fixing or market sharing.  Social 
regulation focuses on social (and/or other non-economic) issues, such as 
consumer, environmental and labour protection matters, although it soon 
becomes clear the two areas are not mutually exclusive (most notably, social 
regulation can have economic impacts, and economic regulation can have 
social impacts). 
 
Both economic and social regulation impact on the efficiency of markets, 
with substantial literatures across several disciplines1164 presenting 
arguments and case studies of how regulations, by design, are intended to 
improve the efficiency of markets1165  and where they reduce the efficiency 
of markets1166.  Regulatory interventions in the operation of markets impact 
on efficiency through two main channels.  The first of these channels is 
static efficiency, which in turn can be divided into productive and allocative 
efficiency: productive efficiency referring to the situation where production 
takes place at minimum cost1167; whilst allocative efficiency means the 
                                                 
1162  Adapted from den Hertog (2000) at 223. 
1163  Commonly found in accountancy, architecture, law and/or medicine. 
1164  Economics, law, public policy and sociology, to name just a few. 
1165   Where they are considered necessary to redress anti-competitive conduct. 
1166 Where they distort and/or impede the dynamics of demand and supply.  Expansive 
discussion of this debate, and review of the arguments and evidence, is outside the scope 
of this study. 
1167 Productive efficiency can also encompass ‘x-inefficiency’ which can arise where 
monopoly firms choose, and are able, to operate at less than optimal efficiency due to the 
absence of effective market competition: Depoorter (2000) at 502. 
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correct range and mix of goods and/or services is produced.  The second is 
dynamic efficiency, which addresses the potential for future gains available 
from the optimal application of scarce economic resources arising from, for 
example, management or technological changes or innovations.  A key 
outcome of dynamic efficiency is either lesser resources are used to produce 
the same quantity/quality of goods and services, or the same amount of 
resources can produce an increased quantity/quality of goods and 
services1168.  Regardless of the efficiency impact of different regulatory 
strategies and interventions, regulation results in what economists call 
‘deadweight costs’1169.  Regulatory interventions, at least in theory, occur 
when the benefits exceed the costs associated with the regulation. 
 
The law and economics of regulation literature places regulatory theory into 
two main categories: public interest theory1170; and the private interest (also 
known as Chicago) theory. 
                                                 
1168 Dynamic efficiency can also mean, in a macro-economic context, the speed with 
which markets clear and economies stabilise in response to wider government or market 
conduct, or exogenous events.   
1169  The loss to economic and social welfare associated with the public administration of 
any regulatory regime, usually measured as some subsidy or tax-revenue equivalent: 
Becker (1983) at 376, and (1985) at 334-335; see also the discussion in this study on 
government failure. 
1170  The footprint of the public choice school of law and economics has been quite modest 
in the area of the law and economics of regulation, and in the small number of scholarly 
studies from the public choice perspective have tended to be grouped under the umbrella 
of the public interest theory. 
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 . Public Interest Theory 
 
Public interest theory, in its simplest form, holds governments intervene in 
markets and/or society to advance the public interest. In a law and 
economics context, and focusing on the regulation of markets and market 
behaviour, regulatory interventions attempt to redress the economic costs 
associated with imperfect competition, unbalanced market behaviour, 
missing markets and undesirable market outcomes.  Under the public 
interest theory, regulations dealing with imperfect competition address 
market characteristics such as cartels and monopolies, for example: by 
prohibiting their creation, or allowing their existence and operation only 
under certain conditions relating to their conduct and regulatory oversight; 
and/or, where there are natural monopolies, optimal productive efficiency is 
most likely to be achieved when output is concentrated in the hands of a 
single producer, regulations are likely to focus on preventing abuse of that 
market power, the treatment of potential competitors for all or part of the 
market and the development of new technologies. 
 
Regulations dealing with unbalanced market operations are intended to 
promote the stability of markets, and facilitate the expeditious realisation of 
market equilibrium (that is, remove, or failing that minimise, impediments 
to signals of demand and supply in markets).  Unbalanced market 
operations-based regulations have application where producers engage in 
destructive competition for reasons of over-capacity, or sizeable and yet-to-
be fully recovered sunk costs of production (usually relating to a substantial  
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capital investment in new production capacity).  In this state of affairs, 
competitors in the market-place may attempt to ‘wait-out’ other players, 
expecting other producers to incur the commercial and financial costs of 
adjustment (usually in the form of exiting the industry), with any sectoral  
rationalisation potentially resulting in a natural oligopoly (that is, only a 
small number of firms supplying the relevant market).   
 
Missing market regulation attempts to deal with circumstances where 
potentially viable and sustainable markets simply do not exist due to 
impediments such as informational problems, or external effects and public 
goods.  Informational problems can take the form of the absence of 
information about potential consumers or producers to counter-parties1171 or 
conditions in a market (demand, supply and/or prices) for consumers and 
producers, the absence of which can result in shrinking markets1172. 
However, such problems are more likely to take the form of informational 
asymmetries between market players which can result in outcomes such as 
adverse selection1173 and moral hazard1174.  Adverse selection and moral 
hazard considerations underpin arguments for regulations of certain 
professions and trades, such as builders, electricians and plumbers. 
 
                                                 
1171   Consumers may be poorly informed about potential suppliers, and firms may not be 
aware of potential markets for their products. 
1172   With implications for the emergence of oligopolies and/or monopolies. 
1173     Where the purchasing decisions of insufficiently informed consumers cause higher 
quality goods to be driven out by lower quality goods. 
1174  Where parties to contracts and/or transactions misuse their absolute and relative 
informational advantages, for example relating to the quality and/or risks associated with 
a product or service.  For example, a patient in a surgical procedure may otherwise not be 
fully informed about the risks involved.  
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Missing markets can be remedied, according to public interest theory, 
through the provision of public goods and services within a regulated 
framework.  Such goods and services tend to have several core 
characteristics: they are generally not commercially viable for the private 
sector to supply; it is impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to exclude 
people from consuming or otherwise benefiting from supply if they fail to 
pay; and, consumption by one person does not preclude another person 
from also consuming that good or service1175.   
 
Finally, public interest theory posits a remedial role for regulation in dealing 
with undesirable results from the conduct of liberal markets.  The 
benchmark for determining what is or is not ‘undesirable’ is often 
judgemental, and involves referencing economic outcomes against social 
aspirations:  regulation involves a trade-off between economic efficiency 
and social equity objectives.  As such, the primary function of regulation 
moves from focusing upon the economic efficiency to the social equity of 
the use of scarce resources1176.   
 
Not surprisingly, the public interest theory approach to regulation has 
attracted a spectrum of criticism.  These criticisms range across:  challenges 
to the underlying tenet of the public interest theory, that of market failure, 
with respondents pointing out liberalisation of markets, rather than 
                                                 
1175 Conventional examples include road and sea safety, public law and order and national 
defence services, and access to the radio spectrum.   
1176 Prominent examples include standardised pricing and implicit cross-subsidisation for 
publicly provided postal and transport services, where the unit cost-surplus’ of short-
distance/urban carriage are higher, with the differential used to subsidise, longer 
haul/remote area services. 
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increased regulation of them, will better address the perceived problem1177, 
and claims ‘government failure’ from poor regulatory design and 
implementation impose greater economic and social costs than the original 
‘market failure’ claimed to justify the regulatory intervention1178; the 
assumption government has perfect information on the perceived problem, 
and is able to identify and implement efficiently the optimal regulatory 
response1179; the assumption government regulation is costless (that is, does 
not of itself create information-search, or product-transaction costs) and 
efficient (by intervening to remedy a perceived problem in one part of the 
economy, it does not create otherwise avoidable inefficiencies elsewhere in  
the economy1180.   
 
 . Private Interest Theory 
 
The Chicago school of law and economics were early critics of the public 
interest approach to regulation, either: questioning the need per se for 
regulatory intervention and proposing a long-term contracting approach to 
remedying the ‘market failures’ claimed to justify regulatory interventions; 
or, advocating what could politely be called ‘the private interest theory of 
regulation’1181, or more acerbically ‘the capture theory of regulation’1182.  The 
                                                 
1177  Thinking which provided the fundamental force behind the deregulation movements 
which began in the 1970s, and continued for the following three decades, in many 
western industrialised, transitional, and some developing, economies. 
1178  See Coase (1960) at 18; Posner (1974) at 340 and (1975) at 807.  The prevalence of 
government failure over market failure is sometimes regarded as ‘Coase’s Second 
Theorem’, a topic addressed elsewhere in this study. 
1179  To which Noll (1983) at 377 responded by arguing the public interest theory of 
regulation be recast from pursuing optimality or perfection in redressing market failures, 
just superiority over market-based alternatives. 
1180  Posner (1974) at 340. 
1181  Stigler (1971) at 3. 
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Chicagoans regard regulation, like taxation, as another mechanism by which 
governments can achieve their redistributional and/or re-allocative 
functions1183. 
 
The long-term contracting approach to regulation1184 holds there is no 
situation where regulation by public sector agency can be guaranteed to 
deliver optimal social welfare.  Rather, where a regulatory agency seeks to 
constrain a monopolist (or even oligopolists) to competitive levels of pricing 
and production, the better approach is a public auction of a defined 
franchise contract to either manage the natural monopoly (where it is in 
public ownership) or to operate in the monopoly/oligopoly space (where it 
is in the private sector).  In this situation, the auction mechanism would 
require those participating in the bidding process to offer a package of price, 
quantity and other characteristics which would converge on the 
competitive outcome1185, and facilitate the transfer of any potential 
economic rents (above normal profits) from the private to the public 
account.  Key provisions which the parties would need to include in any 
contracts would include: duration (balancing the relative merits of longer vs 
shorter term lengths); pricing (including inflation-based adjustment rules); 
quality of service (set as specified requirements vs aspirations, and any 
penalties); adjustment clauses (where conditions change); and, the treatment 
of cross-subsidises (for example, of household consumers of utility 
services)1186.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
1182  Posner (1974) at 335; Peltzman (1976) at 228. 
1183  Posner (1971) at 23.  
1184  The seminal work in this area being Demsetz (1968); see also Priest (1993). 
1185  Demsetz (1968) at 65. 
1186  Priest (1993) at 309–312. 
 282  
This long-term contracting model for improving regulatory effectiveness 
was extended in the form of the contestable markets approach to 
regulation1187, the central tenet of which was that where there was free 
entry and exit from a market the threat of potential competition would 
deliver superior efficiency than could be achieved under governmental 
regulation. In this situation, dominant market players, whether they be 
private sector monopolies or oligopolies, would conduct themselves in a 
manner close to how they would behave in a competitive market, lest any 
deviation from such behaviour motivate new rivals to enter their market 
space.  The contestable markets approach, however, does not call for ‘no 
regulation at all’, rather it advocates government, when designing 
regulatory interventions, should direct their efforts to tackling barriers to 
entry to markets by potential competitors and to promoting an environment 
which facilitates market-competition1188.   
 
Under the private interest/capture theory, regulation originates at the 
behest, and/or over time ultimately comes to serve the interests, of the 
regulators themselves or the firms/industry being regulated1189.  In the case 
of regulator self-interest, regulators design and implement regulations to 
advance their own private interests, whether this takes the form of the  
 
                                                 
1187  The foundational works in this area were those of Baumol (1982) and Baumol et al 
(1982). 
1188   In the situation of a monopoly or oligopoly market, the better role for regulators is to 
encourage, rather than discourage, new entrants to the relevant market(s); the least 
desirable are regulations which impede contestability by creating barriers to entry and/or 
exit. 
1189  The seminal work in this area being that of Stigler (1971). 
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opportunity to extract rents (such as bribes1190), expand their bureaucratic 
empire, defeat or exclude competition from alternative regulatory 
agencies1191 or to advance a political or social agenda1192. 
 
In the first stream (the behest approach), the firms/industries concerned 
seek regulation as a means of controlling the behaviour of existing 
operators, and/or the entry of new (competitor) players thus providing legal 
protection (via regulation) for what competition law might otherwise 
prohibit (pseudo cartelisation)1193.  In the second stream of thinking (the 
‘serving their own interests’ approach), the regulatory agency avoids 
conflicts with the regulated firms/industries as it requires their co-operation 
in obtaining necessary information and indeed, even justifying its own 
existence if the relevant firms/industries at their own initiative ‘fix the 
problem’ which motivated the original regulatory intervention, while 
regulators may well be looking, post public service, for second or semi-
retirement careers in the firms/industries they had previously regulated. 
 
The capacity of private interests to engage with, and exploit, the regulatory 
processes for their own advantage tends to be a function of the vigour and 
the size of the group: private interests more passionate about, and 
committed to, their sectional agenda tend to be more effective in achieving 
regulatory capture than their less energised counterparts; and, smaller  
 
                                                 
1190  McChesney (1987) at 105. 
1191  McKenzie and Macaulay (1980) at 304. 
1192  Ibid at 298, who consider the case of regulators with anti-free market politics. 
1193  Demsetz (1968) at 65; Stigler (1971) at 5 – 7; Posner (1971) at 345; McChesney (1987) 
at 105. 
 284  
groups tend to operate more effectively than larger groups, given the likely 
greater homogeneity of their interests (and in some cases, their geographic 
concentration) and ability to concentrate on a narrower agenda, have lower  
transaction costs of membership and compliance, and greater ability to deal  
with ‘free rider’ problems (that is, restricting the benefits to those directly 
participating in the process, and excluding any gains flowing to non-
members)1194.  For these reasons, producer interests are more likely to, and 
more effectively, engage in regulatory capture than consumer interests. 
 
To some Chicagoans, the regulatory process is merely a mechanism for the 
redistribution of wealth, with participating interests seeking to (implicitly) 
tax other parties outside of, and transfer the gains to, their own group1195.  
Key challenges for participants – whether politicians on the supply side or 
producers/consumers on the demand side of the regulatory equation – in 
designing and administering such an arrangement include narrowing the 
base of effective opposition (those losing from the redistribution), not 
placing an excessive burden (loss) onto a single or small number of groups 
such that they are motivated to mobilise against the regulation, and 
ensuring the effectiveness of the regulations1196. 
 
The private interest theory of regulation sees the role of politicians not as 
honest or mere brokers, but rather as active players, in the regulatory 
process.  In this approach, the activist–politician engages in the regulatory 
process to extract rents to his/her advantage both by creating regulations  
 
                                                 
1194  Posner (1971) at 345–350; Peltzman (1976) at 213; Becker (1985) at 330. 
1195  Stigler (1992) at 459; Becker (1985) at 330; Peltzman (1976) at 212. 
1196   For example, to market entry which sustain higher-than-market-determined prices. 
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which benefit an affluent or influential vested interest, or threatening to 
create regulations which adversely impact such interests1197, in return for 
consideration such as organising votes, financial contributions or even bribe 
payments1198.  In the latter case, the activist-politician may gain by forgoing 
his/her legislative discretion to impose some regulatory-based burden on the 
potentially impacted group, for example constraining their market activities, 
or reducing their economic and/or social rents obtained from existing 
regulation through targeted deregulation1199.   
 
One potential response by those subject to the attention of the activist-
politician is to form coalitions to defend their interests, although such 
arrangements can provide information to aggressive politicians on potential 
targets for new and/or additional rent-extraction1200.  The adverse economic 
and social costs of such regulatory gaming by predatory politicians also 
include the tendency for entrepreneurs and others in the private sector to 
inefficiently skew their investment decisions toward capital which is short- 
lived, mobile or salvageable (that is, not firm-specific, but potentially 
saleable) as a form of insurance against political risk and even 
expropriation1201.  Insofar as the activist-politician prices his/her regulatory  
 
                                                 
1197  The activist-politician does not necessarily have to implement their threat to ensure a 
beneficial rent extraction, rather the threat only has to be sufficiently credible to the 
other party. 
1198  Peltzman (1976) at 213. 
1199  Such rent-extraction by politicians is not limited to those who were party to the 
original regulation, but can engage future politicians who may also seek rents from the 
beneficiaries of regulation to prevent potentially adverse changes to the established 
regulatory regime (for example, partial and/or selective deregulation): McChesney (1987) 
at 102–104. 
1200  McChesney (1991) at 86. 
1201  McChesney (1987) at 108. 
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action/inaction agenda on their knowledge of the capacity to pay of the 
targeted firm, industry or sector, the latter have greater incentive to conceal 
such information, motivating (what is for them a rational decision to engage 
in) less than fulsome and transparent corporate and financial reporting (for 
example, concealment of profits, and tax avoidance).  Such hunting and 
avoidance behaviours come at a cost to economic efficiency and thus social 
welfare. 
 
Not surprisingly, the Chicago theory of regulation has attracted criticisms 
ranging across its inability to explain: the incapacity of firms to prevent the 
creation, or ongoing operation, of regulatory agencies which are contrary to 
the former’s interests; situations where the regulatory agency serves the 
interests of third parties ahead of those being directly regulated, such as 
consumers before firms by a competition regulator); cases where 
firms/industries are self-admittedly providing involuntarily goods and 
services in forms, means or ways (that is, other than what they would do in 
the absence of the regulation); where they are compliant with regulations 
which are directly contrary to the profit maximisation objectives of the 
enterprise, as distinct from actively seeking to have them at least modified, 
if not repealed; and, social, in contrast to its primary focus on economic, 
regulation1202. 
                                                 
1202    den Hertog (2000) at 235 -236, and at 241–243. 
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. The Regulation – Corruption Nexus 
 
As noted earlier in this study, regulation is a covariate1203 of corruption, 
which in turn raise the question of ‘which causes which’?  Does corruption 
cause, or precede, regulation; or does regulation cause, or precede, 
corruption?  In the former situation, corrupt actors both outside and within 
government use bribery and other forms of corruption to generate 
advantageous regulatory environments, for example in the form of anti-
competitive or protective regulations which earn them economic rents.  In 
the latter situation, those with regulatory powers, both of creation and/or of 
enforcement, solicit and obtain corrupt payments for the production and/or 
selective enforcement of targeted regulations.    
 
Scholarly research generally indicates a bidirectional causal relationship 
between corruption and regulation: corruption drives regulation1204, and 
regulation drives corruption1205, with no definitive modelling of which may 
causally precede the other1206.  While a meta-analysis (study-of-studies) 
would suggest the weight of scholarly opinion may appear to favour the 
regulation-causes-corruption view, there are sufficient studies pointing in 
the other direction (corruption-causes-regulation) to say the matter still 
remains to be finally settled.  Nevertheless, dedicated quantitative modelling  
                                                 
1203     One of the factors which are potentially related to corruption. 
1204  Aidt and Dutta (2008) at 337; Kaufman and Wei (1999) at 12; Hellman and 
Schankerman (2000) at 571; Ogus (2004b) at 333. 
1205  Fredriksson (2000) at 459; Johnson et al (2000) at 504; Damania et al (2004) at 372; 
Dreher and Schneider (2006) at 10. 
1206  In effect, it is not possible to unpack the directionality: Guriev (2004) at 489. 
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on the corruption-regulation relationship1207 has shone some useful light on 
some of the inter-relationships between corruption and regulation, 
including higher incidences of corruption tends to lower the level of 
regulatory compliance1208 and involve the creation and enforcement of 
higher cost/lesser efficient regulatory regimes than would otherwise have 
been the case1209. 
 
Another dimension of the corruption-regulation nexus is the quantum of 
the bribe price which can be charged or the payment which can be offered, 
with the transaction amount generally being greater in situations where: the 
corrupt official has greater monopoly power in their regulatory domain 
and/or higher levels of discretion in regulatory enforcement1210; the cost of 
compliance by the impacted firm or industry with the regulation is higher 
and hence, their increased willingness-to-pay, presumably up to that cost, to 
avoid the regulation1211;  there is less competition in the sector or industry 
and as such greater monopoly rents available for extraction by the corrupt 
official and/or greater willingness-to-pay on the part of existing players to 
avoid pro-competitive regulations1212; the firms/industry are simply more  
 
 
 
                                                 
1207  That is, scholarly studies using rigorous quantitative methods where the corruption-
regulation nexus was a key, as distinct from an ancillary, research question. 
1208  Damania et al (2004) at 363. 
1209  Aidt and Dutta (2008) at 338. 
1210  Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 118; Ades and DiTella (1997a) at 504; Kaufman and 
Wei (1999) at 5; Wei (1999) at 17; Ogus (2004b) at 331. 
1211  Ades and DiTella (1997a) at 510. 
1212  Ibid. 
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profitable, and thus have a greater capacity-to-pay, as a result of inherent 
entrepreneurship and commercial endeavour1213; and, price regulation is 
involved such that the returns from laxer regulation, in terms of higher 
prices which can be charged by producers, are greater1214. 
 
 Summary and Conclusion 
 
The law and economics of crime literature overwhelmingly, at least by 
volume, sits within the Rational Choice framework. Individuals engage in 
criminal conduct, either as a one-off, an occasional or a career activity, 
based on relative expected utilities: in essence, do/will the risks exceed the 
rewards from criminal behaviour.  For society, criminal law enforcement 
will proceed up to the point where the marginal costs equal the marginal 
benefit after which enforcement is likely to be sub-optimal.  Such 
estimations are made more complicated by the tendency for individuals to 
have different attitudes to risk, and for societies to have non-fixed marginal 
costs and benefits across space and time). 
 
A related challenge for law enforcement policy-makers, and indeed agencies 
such as police and prosecutors, is whether to pursue maximal or optimal 
enforcement – the former being enforcement to the point of exhaustion, the 
latter to the point of greatest efficiency.  Given criminal law enforcement is 
financed by limited taxpayer funds, in reality enforcement is likely to 
proceed to ‘constrained optimisation’1215.   
                                                 
1213  Kaufman and Wei (1999) at 7; Svensson (2005) at 32. 
1214  Dreher and Schneider (2006) at 11. 
1215    That is, within the opportunity costs of alternate uses of those enforcement 
resources. 
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An allied issue is maximal or optimal punishment: when sentencing for 
criminal offences, should the judiciary impose the maximum available 
penalty for the offence category; or should the punishment be optimal in 
the circumstances of the particular offence, taking into account the 
particularities of each case?  But effectively imposing optimal punishment 
requires complete knowledge of the true risk/reward profile of the 
individual criminal, something which may be difficult to discern and/or 
subject to deliberate misrepresentation (in a game theory sense) by the 
felon, or creative representation by counsel, during the sentencing phase. 
 
The law and economics of crime literature also usefully underscores the 
various actors in the criminal justice system – those who partake (actually or 
prospectively) in criminal behaviour, and those engaged in the law 
enforcement chain – are effectively participants in a ‘market for crime’.  
Criminals sit on one side of the transaction (the crime), and law 
enforcement agencies on the other side, with the market being in 
equilibrium when criminals (focusing on the net returns from crime) and 
law enforcement agencies (looking at net cost of crime) do not feel any need 
to adjust their conduct and thus alter the prevailing net price of crime. 
 
The law and economics of crime has particular resonance in the interaction 
between regulation and corruption.  Scholarship on this issue has largely 
run along two, not necessarily unrelated, paths: the theoretical course of the 
drivers of the creation of regulation, whether in the public or the private 
interest; and, the positivist course of whether regulations cause corruption,  
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or whether corruption causes regulation. Adopting a meta-analysis 
perspective would suggest the relative ascendency of the private interest 
theory of regulation, and the causal linkages between regulation and 
corruption are most likely bi-directional (that is, each has a causal effect on 
the other)1216.  
 
While the entry into force of a legal instrument may well create new law, 
these events, of themselves, do not necessarily alter the behaviour of 
persons, whether natural or legal.  In short, the mere existence of a law does 
not automatically mean it has an impact, let alone that the law is effective.  
In practical terms, there may be little or no change in the behaviour of 
effected persons (impact) or any change in behaviour may be not be directly 
attributable to the change in the law but simply due to chance alone 
(effectiveness).   
 
Chapter Six, following, applies a suite of rigorous leximetric1217 tests through 
the prism of Empirical Legal Studies to measure the impact and the 
effectiveness of an international legal instrument1218, the OECD Convention 
on the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, on the incidence of corruption in sample of developed 
countries.    This work will progress through three streams of data analysis 
and modelling: first, examining the broad pattern of corruption amongst a  
 
 
                                                 
1216 Also known in economics as “endogeneity”. 
1217   The application of the toolkit of econometrics to the law. 
1218  And, to question the ipso facto assumption of doctrinalists, and ‘black letter lawyers’, 
to the law. 
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cross-section of developed countries as a whole; second, focusing on three 
specific countries with varying incidences of corruption (Denmark, Italy 
and the United States of America); and, finally looking at some of the 
potential commercial, economic and legal drivers of corruption in those 
three countries.   These modelling exercises will, in the wider sense, add to 
our capacity to better understand and to evaluate the effectiveness, or 
otherwise, of laws, and specifically of one legal instrument in particular – 
the OECD Convention.  
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Chapter 6:      Modelling Corruption 
 
“Transnational (anti)corruption (initiatives) involve efforts 
to overcome decades and even centuries of 
embedded patterns of conduct, power and economics. 
New concepts of behaviour and laws will not overcome 
longstanding barriers overnight.” 1219 
 
Introduction 
 
Econometric modelling of corruption is not, per se, a new enterprise.  
Chapter 2, which examined the nature and extent, and the causes and 
consequences, of the corruption problem, reported an expansive scholarly 
and institutional literature on the matter.  However, the literature, whether 
academic and public policy organisational, has been surprisingly silent on 
the impact of various legal interventions on the incidence of corruption 
even in developed countries, let alone more broadly (such as in developing  
and/or transitional economies)1220, 1221.  In short, scholars, legislators and 
policy makers have a fair body of information on the causes and 
                                                 
1219  Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 99. 
1220 To the best of the authors’ knowledge and researches, structural intervention 
econometric modelling has rarely been used in better studies of the applications of 
leximetrics to crime and criminal behaviour.  In two of these cases (Harvey and Fernandes 
(1989), who studied compliance with seat-belt laws by truck drivers; and, Atkinson et al 
(1997), who looked at petty theft (of women’s handbags in a municipal park), the primary 
focii of their studies was econometrics, with the crime data being incidental; used to 
illustrate the methodological point.  In Koopman et al (2008) structural intervention 
methods were only considered as part of a range of analytical tools, while only Vujic et al 
(2012) made intensive use of structural intervention methods, and was published long 
after the modelling reported in this chapter had been completed, analysed and recorded, 
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consequences, but seemingly very little substantive knowledge of the 
effectiveness of laws1222 – and international economic law, in particular - 
and other legal instruments in tackling the problem, of corruption1223.  This 
chapter is intended to make a substantial contribution to our knowledge on 
the effectiveness of the law in dealing with corruption, using leximetric 
techniques (the application of the tools of econometrics to the law) by 
undertaking modelling to assess the impact of a key international legal 
instrument  - the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions1224 – on the incidence 
of corruption in a representative sample of developed countries, using a 
robust data set consistently available over a sufficient length of time.  We 
will be asking, in effect: has a change in the legal framework caused a 
                                                                                                                                            
and the thesis was being finalised.  This study makes much broader and deeper use of 
structural intervention modelling techniques than either of the latter papers. 
1221 One study (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008a) looks at the effectiveness of international laws on 
corruption for their impact on the nature and flows of foreign direct investment.  As such, 
it does not speak directly to the effectiveness of international law on corruption, as is the 
focus of this thesis. 
1222 Recall the scarce literature on theoretical aspects of the effectiveness of laws discussed 
in the Institutional/Neo-Institutional, and the small amount of empirical work on the 
effectiveness of laws reviewed in the empirical, approaches to law and economics in 
Chapter 4 on the Theories of Law and Economics. 
1223 Another approach which could be taken would be to examine and model the 
effectiveness of the OECD Convention as a multi-stage process: the first stage being the 
ratification of the instrument; and, the second stage being the enactment at the municipal 
level by States Parties of implementing legislation. While this approach would have the 
advantage of taking into account the different dates for enacting the respective 
implementing legislation it would also bring with it a number of important disadvantages.  
Primary amongst them would be: introducing qualitative uncertainty into any modelling 
(not all implementing legislation, compliance obligations and enforcement arrangements 
by States Parties are necessarily identical); the difficulty in multi-stage modelling in 
apportioning effects across the different stages (for example, substantive legislative versus 
temporal effects); the difficulty of comparing parameter coefficients and diagnostics across 
the different models; and, dealing with the inherent ‘degrees of freedom’ constraint which 
attach to finite size data series. As such, a multi-stage modelling schema may well produce 
‘more noise than signal’ (or ‘fog than clarity’). 
1224 37 ILM 4 (1998). 
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significant shift in (corrupt) behaviour, and in the direction expected?  
Hopefully, the innovative leximetric modelling techniques used in this 
chapter to evaluate the effectiveness of the law in the situation at hand 
(corruption) will inspire other scholars to extend its use to other areas of the 
law, especially elsewhere at the interface of law and economics1225. 
 
Leximetric Modelling 
 
Leximetrics essentially involves using the expansive methods, techniques 
and toolkit of econometrics to analyse and model a legal problem; the 
measurement, or the quantification, of law1226.   Leximetrics, like its cousins 
in other disciplines1227, involves integrating data with theory to estimate 
quantitative relationships between them (the data and theory), and test 
hypotheses about them.   This integration can be one-way (testing whether 
real-world data verifies a theory) or bi-directional (testing whether real-
world data confirms a theory, with the outcome of the testing being used to 
refine the theory) or judgemental (using real-world data to test several 
potentially competing theories)1228. 
 
 
                                                 
1225 For example, corporations law, environmental law, intellectual property law, labour 
law, taxation law and trade law, to name just a few. 
1226 To paraphrase ‘Leximetrics is the application of statistical methods to problems that are 
of concern to lawyers’:  Ashenfelter, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) at 1 
1227  Econometrics, which emerged as a stand-alone discipline in the 1930s, has spawned a 
number of other forms of ‘metrics across a range of disciplines:  leximetrics (in the law), 
politimetrics (in political science and public policy), psychometrics (in psychology), 
sociometrics (in sociology), and even cliometrics (in history). 
1228  According to Miceli and Baker (2013) at 3: “… good theory should always be 
developed with an eye toward making predictions that can be tested, for according to the 
scientific method, a model that fails the empirical test, no matter how elegant, should 
either be discarded as invalid, or revised.” 
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Leximetrics can have three broad applications, as well as combinations 
between them:  structural analysis; forecasting; and, policy evaluation1229.  
Structural analysis focuses on estimating a model1230 to quantify the 
relationships between the variables of interest1231; forecasting involves using 
the model to predict future values of the variables of interest based on the 
continuity of past relationships1232; and, policy evaluation, primarily to assist 
in evaluating different policy options or to simulate the application of  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1229 For a more expansive discussion of these purposes, see Intrigilator, Bodkin and Hsaio 
(1996) at 4 – 5; Ashenfelter, Levine and Zimmerman (2003) at 1 – 3. 
1230 A quantitative representation of the ‘real world’: Pindyck and Rubenfield (1998) at xiv; 
some have, not unreasonably, called them ‘simplifications’ of the real world: Ashenfelter, 
Levine and Zimmerman (2003) at 3.  In one view “Without models, it would be 
impossible to disentangle the myriad causal relationships that characterise a complex 
social system like the marketplace or the legal system.”: Miceli and Baker (2013) at 2. 
1231  This can require the analyst and the policy maker to identify and think clearly about 
the main, important inter-relationships involved.  For example, between inflation and 
burglary:  is there a relationship between inflation and burglary, and if so is it positive (if 
inflation goes up, then burglary goes up), negative (if inflation goes up, then burglary goes 
down) or no relationship at all (movements in inflation have no impact on burglary).   
Interest is usually centred on what are called ‘elasticities’: if Variable X goes up by 1 per 
cent, then Variable Y will go up/down by Z per cent (Ashenfelter, Levine and 
Zimmerman (2003) at 2; Griffiths, Hills and Judge (1993) at 2), with analytical et al 
focusing on ‘up/down’, and the magnitude and statistical significance of Z. 
1232  For example, if Police Commissioners are advised there is a strong relationship 
between unemployment and motor vehicle theft, then they would need to take into 
account macro-economic forecasts of rising unemployment: asking themselves, ‘if 
unemployment is forecast to rise by 2 per cent next year, then what does this portend for 
the number/type of motor vehicle thefts and what does this imply for my budgeting and 
human resourcing?’. 
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different policies1233 (also known as ‘candidate futures’ analysis1234).  The 
three methods can also be used in combinations, such as structural analysis, 
which in turn drives forecasting and then has application with policy 
evaluation1235. 
 
Leximetrics broadly builds on three main types of modelling, namely time 
series, cross-sectional and pooled data; and, on one main method, namely 
regression modelling, although in a number of forms, primary single 
equation and multi-equation models. Time series modelling, as its 
nomenclature suggests, involves the use of data series across time, and is 
particularly useful in situations where the analyst/policy maker has little 
interest in casuality but is more interested in short-term forecasting1236.  
Cross-sectional data focus on a number of actors (individuals, firms, nations) 
at the same point in time, and has resonance in behaviourial studies and 
undertaken and reported as probability models1237, 1238.   Panel (also known as 
                                                 
1233 For example, an Attorney General may be considering a change to the criminal law.  
Officials may have developed and presented four credible alternatives for the 
government’s consideration.   Leximetric modelling could be used to assess the linkages 
between sentencing for a crime and the incidence of the crime.  
1234 Intrigilator, Bodkin and Hsaio (1996) at 4. 
1235 For example, the above-mentioned Attorney-General commissions the modelling of 
the linkages between sentencing and the incidence of a crime (the structural analysis).  
He/she then commissions forecasts of the incidence of the crime based on four sentencing 
law change scenarios (the forecasting), and then compares the forecasts to inform 
decision-making on which the sentencing law change options to progress (the policy 
evaluation). 
1236 Pindyck and Rubenfield (1998) at xv; Woodridge (2000) at 8 - 10. 
1237 For example, a law-/policy-maker may be interested in voter attitudes to ‘get tough on 
crime’ policies, so they commission a sample of, say, 2000 people on a given date.  This 
data set is then analysed to profile voters ‘warm/neutral/cold’ on such policies.  Repeated 
cross-sectional data collections, such as the World Competitiveness Yearbook data used in 
this study, are particularly useful in policy evaluation, most notably for assessing the 
effects of events when the data are collected before and after the event of interest, for 
example a change in law enforcement strategy and/or the legislation of a new statute or 
repeal of an old one.  For a good general discussion see Woodridge (2000) at 6 – 8. 
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longitudinal) data combines cross-sectional and time series data, focusing on 
the same actors (individuals, firms, nations) at different points in time1239. 
Leximetric modellers can generally be expected to default to regression 
methods when the objective is to determine and measure casusality1240.  
Such models can be single equation (where a number of variables are used 
to explain a single outcome of interest) or multi-equation (where there are 
several outcomes of interest, which may or may not determine each other, 
with a broad suite of variables which can explain these outcomes)1241. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1238  Pooled cross-sectional data are an extension of cross-sectional data.  Essentially, it 
involves combining cross-sectional data.  Following the above-mentioned ‘get tough on 
crime’ survey, rather than doing a single survey in a single location (say, Sydney), the 
survey taker may conduct two identical surveys in two different locations (say, Sydney 
and Perth) each of 1000 respondents, and then combine (pool) the results for analysis (it 
would have the added advantage of facilitating testing for geographic effects in attitudes).   
For a good general discussion see Woodridge (2000) at 10. 
1239 Following the ‘get tough on crime’ example, the survey taker might sample the SAME 
400 people on each of five occasions, with any changes in results likely reflecting shifts in 
attitudes by respondents rather than changes in respondents per se (as can happen with 
repeated cross-sectional data).   While analytically attractive, data collection can be 
especially costly and administratively demanding due to the need to contact and re-
engage the same respondents in each wave.  Again, for a good general discussion see 
Woodridge (2000) at 10 – 13. 
1240 One of the earliest (and few rigorous) leximetric models was that of Becker (1968), for 
which he won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1992.  In Becker’s schema, the amount of 
time spent on criminal activities was the outcome of ‘the wage of illegal activity’, the wage 
of legal activity, the probability of apprehension for criminal conduct, the probability of 
conviction if caught, expected sentence if convicted and age of the person. 
1241 Such modelling can have superficial appeal to more simplistic law-/policy-makers, on 
the basis a more elaborate model must be ‘better’ than a simplier one, which is more ofen 
than not misguided.   Multi-equation models can be particularly data, resource and 
technically demanding, and may not necessarily be the most efficient approach in all 
situations.   More elaborate modelling may not be justifiable when considered against the 
time, cost, degree of precision and frequency of use.   
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Leximetrics is a multistage process involving, inter alia: the collection and 
suitability of the necessary data1242; the identification of the relevant 
theories or hypotheses to be tested1243; the selection and construction of a 
model to be estimated1244; the estimation of the parameters1245; and, what 
inferences can reasonably be drawn from the modelling work1246,1247.   
However, influential educators in the area usefully remind that modelling 
can be as much about art as science (most notably in the judgements which 
have to be made at different stages of the modelling process)1248.   Like its 
econometric antecedent, leximetrics is not without its limitations.   
                                                 
1242  Which can involve challenges, such as simple availability (national data collection 
agencies may simply not collect or report such data, as can be the case in crimes such as 
kidnap or sexual offences against minors), while suitability can reflect the desire for 
monthly or quarterly data when only annual data is collected and reported. 
1243 Which can be undermined by the absence of suitable metrics, although this hurdle can 
often be overcome by the use of proxy indicators (‘if we don’t have the perfect metric, 
then we will have to make do with the ‘next best’ thing’).   However, this in turn can 
generate debates over the adequacy of the proxy being used, with tests of robustness often 
involving the use of different metrics or proxies. 
1244 Which is informed by the purpose of the task at hand (whether testing theories/ 
hypotheses; forecasting; or policy evaluation), and the nature of the data.  
1245 The coefficients and associated diagnostics of the modelling, which indicates the 
nature and the rigor of the relationships, and whether they align with the theoretical 
expecations.  For example, when spending on policing was increased by the government, 
did the crime rate decline as expected, and/or as much as was expected? 
1246  Of particular importance in most modelling is ‘how strong where the results?’.   
Where the results sufficiently unequivocal to allow law-/-policy makers, amongst others, 
to make ‘strong form’ statements, or marginal such that the quantitative analysis only 
serves to confirm the intuitive pre-assessment of ‘well, we can’t really say one way or the 
other’. 
1247  Scholars have used other leximetric techniques of varying complexity, such as 
comparisons of coefficients across different conditions (Jonah and Lawson, 1984; Welsh, 
Carpentier and Hubbell, 2001), tests of equality of outcomes before and after a legislative 
change (Muller, 1982; Asch et al, 1991) and more rigorous breakpoint (also known as 
event/intervention) modelling methods (Garbacz, 1992; Gonzalez-Val and Marcen, 2012; 
Vujic et al 2012). 
1248 Pindyck and Rubenfield (1998) at xiii.  For example, any effort to model the causal 
relationship between unemployment and, say, burglary, would require the modeller (and 
or those commissioning him/her) to define ‘unemployment’ (inter alia, the number; the 
rate; original or seasonally adjusted; male or female; full time or part time; ‘blue collar’ or 
‘white collar’; adult or youth; or, the various combinations thereof). 
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Amongst the most prominent of these are: simply the availability of suitable 
data1249; the suitability of administrative data1250; inherent features of the 
data being used1251; the directionality of data1252; parameter stability1253; and, 
the challenges associated with unobservable (also known as latent) 
variables1254, 1255. 
                                                 
1249 Not everything a law- or policy-maker may wish to have data on is either available per 
se, or readily available in the form needed.  For example, individual’s attitudes to risk (-
averse; -neutral; -taking), which are fulcrum in, inter alia, the Rational Choice and the 
Behaviorialist approaches to law and economics. 
1250  Data sets collected for administrative purposes often lack statistical rigor (for example, 
they are unlikely to be a random, or even a representative, sample), and can have key 
categories with very small sample sizes, which weaken their utility for data analysis:  
Gtriffiths, Hill and Judge (1993) at 8.  However, administrative-sourced data sets are often 
superior to the alternative, which is nothing at all. 
1251  Such as the need to take into account seasonality in time series data (for example, 
some crimes of violence may be more likely to occur in hotter than in colder weather), 
areality (what is the appropriate level of geographic aggregation of the data) and 
collinearity (relationships between the explanatory variables used in the modelling – for 
example, unemployment and personal income may both cause crime, but unemployment 
usually also causes personal income).   One particularly important criticism is what has 
become known as the ‘Lucas Critique’ which argues, in essence, changes in policy settings 
almost inevitably result in changes in model parameters, thus undermining the utility of 
the model(s): discussed by Intrigilator, Bodkin and Hsaio (1996) at 10. 
1252 Generally summarised as the endogeniety and the collinearity problems, where the 
direction of causality is not limited to the explanatory to the dependent variables, but can 
also flow the other way as well as between the explanatory variables:  Griffiths, Hills and 
Judge (1993) at 5 – 6). 
1253  The parameters estimated in a model can change with time, which can be problematic 
in some time series analyses (although a boon in others) but an important dividend in 
repeated cross-sectional designs. 
1254   Contrary to the misconceptions of non-leximetricians, variables which are difficult or 
impossible to measure and are thus not specifically included in the model do not ‘just go 
away’ because of their non-inclusion.  Rather, such variables default to the ‘residual term’ 
in the model – in effect, a catch-all for ‘everything else not otherwise specified’: 
Woodridge (2000) at 4.  See following footnote for an illustrative list of potential latent 
variables with resonance for criminal leximetrics. 
1255   All too often the analyst, and the law-/policy-maker are interested in variables which 
simply cannot be measured.  Prominent examples include ‘criminal tendencies’, ‘family 
upbringing and values’, ‘contempt for the law’, ‘risk aversion’, ‘empathy with one’s fellow 
citizens’, ‘remorse for one’s wrongful conduct’.   Leximetrics can, however, attempt to 
quantify such attributes for modelling purposes using techniques from the Structural 
Equation Modelling stream, most notably the data-demanding MIMIC (multiple 
indicators, multiple causes) models. 
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The data analysis and modelling undertaken for this study and reported in 
this Chapter will proceed on fairly conventional lines commencing with a 
review of the data set and some descriptive statistics on the incidence of 
corruption amongst the countries under review, before moving on to what 
in leximetrics is known as exploratory data analysis.   This stage involves 
tests of equality for the means, medians and standard deviations, and 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) testing for changes in the incidence of 
corruption before and after the entry into force of the OECD Convention.  
The next stage of leximetric analysis will involve a more rigorous 
examination of the presence, nature and statistical significance of structural 
breaks in time series of the corruption metrics under review using 
mainstream breakpoint and parameter stability tests, with the final stage 
being still-more rigorous regime shift specification testing.  This analytical 
approach will be undertaken in two sweeps, the first being for the selected 
OECD countries as a whole, and the second being a more intensive 
examination of three countries, namely Denmark, the United States and 
Italy1256.   The leximetric analyses will conclude with modelling examining 
some of the potential commercial, economic, public policy and regulatory 
causes of corruption1257. 
                                                 
1256  Denmark was selected as representing a ‘low incidence of corruption’ country, the 
United States as a ‘mid incidence of corruption’ country, and Italy as a ‘high incidence of 
corruption’ country. 
1257   Using comparable data series derived from the IMD-WCY reports to exploit greater 
comparabilities in the respective series, most notably common respondents within 
individual samples.  Such modelling may be of value to anti-corruption campaigners, in 
identifying and prioritising policy levers of potentially greater impact. 
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The Data Set 
 
The data set is compiled from the World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY) 
over the period 1992 to 2006, produced annually by the International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD), based in Lausanne, 
Switzerland1258,1259.  The original data set is obtained by sample survey 
methods, based on around 1600 business respondents spread across some 50 
countries (an average of 32 respondents per country), providing assessments 
of a range of commercial, legal, political and social factors which are 
considered to underpin the competitiveness of nations.  The data sets used 
in this thesis are the primary results/ original data reported by the WCY for 
each country, generally in the form of averages of respondents by country 
by topic for each of the years’ under review1260.  Performance indicators 
examined by the annual WCYs include: institutional framework 
(consistency of government policy, flexibility and transparency in 
government policy making, incidence of corruption, risk of political 
instability): the broader commercial environment (the prevalence of a ‘black 
economy’, the incidence of labour regulation, the relative treatment of 
foreign and local investors, and the presence of investment incentives); 
globalisation (national attitudes toward globalisation, and the degree of 
openness to foreign influences); and, management performance  
                                                 
1258  For additional information on the IMD see http://www.imd.ch/. 
1259  For readers interested in replicating or extending the results reported in this thesis, 
the data set used in this Chapter can be found in Appendix 6.1. 
1260 That is, they have not been subject to further re-estimation, such as weighting or 
transformation (for example, normalisation or standardisation).   They are simply the ‘raw 
numbers’ as reported by IMD in each of the annual World Competitiveness Yearbooks. 
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(adaptability, entrepreneurship, and attitudes to corporate social 
responsibility).  The data are reported in a continuous form in the range of 0 
to 10, where a low/high score reflects the perception of respondents the 
nation concerned performs poorly/well on the specific criteria1261.  The 
scaling also allows analysts to undertake a relative rating of the nations 
concerned1262. 
 
The nations’ subject to assessment in the WCY’s have varied across the 17 
year period (1992 – 2006) under review1263.  Whilst there has been a fairly 
consistent core group of countries (largely western, industrialised nations) 
across the whole period, other countries have entered and exited the  
                                                 
1261  Perceptions of corruption are a good approximation for the incidence of corruption, 
and of the legal realities in nations:  Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) at 73.   Foster, 
Horowitz and Mendez (2012) at 231 find a reasonably strong practical (r = between 0.63 
and 0.67) and statistically significant (in both cases, less than 0.05) correlation between 
perception and actual measures of the incidence of corruption.  Olken (2006) comes to a 
similar conclusion, attributing any differences between actual and perceived corruption to 
reflect the effort put into concealment by the corrupt parties.  For a considered discussion 
on the absolute and the relative merits of actual vs perception based metrics of corruption 
in applied research and analaysis see Banerjee (2012) at 46-51, who generally conclude 
both metrics have advantages and disadvantages. 
1262While there are numerous proxy measures for corruption, many of which have 
appeared in the leximetric modelling literature, the use of a single integrated data set (in 
this case the annual WCY series) have the important advantage of building on the 
cognitive consistency of respondents. 
1263  The study adopts this time frame on the basis of access to the primary data, which was 
provided at no cost to the author by a most generous librarian in a public sector 
organisation who must necessarily remain anonymous, but without whom this chapter 
would not have been possible.  While the WCY commences in 1992, it continues to be 
released annually, around October of each year.  However, at a cost of some $A 2000 per 
calendar year, the acquisition of additional data was prohibitively expensive.  Given the 
generally stable pattern of the data after around 2001 it is most unlikely the addition of 
later years would have delivered any net marginal benefit to the data analysis. 
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sample.  This study will focus on the 22 developed countries1264 which have 
consistently appeared in the sample across the entire period.  This approach 
will ensure the analysis remains tractable and is not confounded by the 
inclusion of two qualitatively different groups (namely, developed and 
developing countries) or rendered unstable by the entry and exit of new 
countries within the main groups1265.  Table 6.1 reports the three main 
country groupings: developed, developing, and those who appeared non-
consistently in the sample.  The latter two groupings have been excluded 
from this study. 
                                                 
1264  This study adopts the categorical allocation made by the IMD between developed and 
developing countries.   However, some may cavil with the allocation of countries such as 
Singapore and South Korea to the developing country list. 
1265 While a sample of 22 countries may be regarded as small, it is still a large and 
representative share of the relevant population.  Further, given the time series cross 
sectional design and the high degree of sampling rigour involved in its collection, the 
modelling results should be considered robust. 
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Table 6.1:  Categorical Allocation of Countries 
 
Developed Developing  Non-Consistent  
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
USA 
 
Brazil 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Korea (Sth) 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
 
Argentina 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Iceland 
Israel 
Luxembourg 
Philippines 
Poland 
Russia 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
 
 
The need for tractability, and the availability of consistent data across time, 
also bounds the selection of the international legal instrument whose 
effectiveness we intend to study in more detail.  Chapter 5 of this study 
analysed several major international legal instruments intended to eliminate 
corruption, or failing that at least reduce its incidence and impact.  These 
instruments were: the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption  
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(adopted in 1996) 1266; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (1997)1267; the Council of Europe’s 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999)1268; the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (2003)1269; and, the African Union 
Convention on Combating and Preventing Corruption (2003)1270.  
Examination of the effectiveness of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, and of the African Union Convention on Combating and 
Preventing Corruption are precluded by the absence of the necessary 
country-specific information in the various annual WCYs, while the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption must be put aside from this study 
for want of sufficient observations1271.  Of the two remaining instruments, 
this study will focus on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ahead of the 
European Union’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption for reasons of 
statistical rigor (the larger sample size of the OECD grouping ahead of EU 
member countries indicates the data analyses are likely to be more robust 
and more generalisable), and the greater breadth of coverage of the OECD 
countries (in particular, the inclusion of the United States) suggests the  
 
                                                 
1266 35 ILM 724 (1996). 
1267 37 ILM 4 (1998). 
1268 38 ILM 505 (1999). 
1269 43 ILM 37 (2004). 
1270 43 ILM 5 (2004). 
1271  To ensure rigorous and robust statistical analysis of the UNCAC using the techniques 
applied in this study would require time series data covering the period 2004 to around 
2018 – the collection of which extends well beyond the time frame for the submission of 
this thesis. 
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influence of this instrument is likely to be more pervasive.  Hence, this 
study will go forward by applying a suite of leximetric tools to a data set of 
corruption indicators to a group of developed countries1272, testing the 
underlying question:  has the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions had a 
(statistically) significant impact on reducing corruption in developed 
countries in the aggregate? 
 
The Aggregate Model  
 
The first section of this chapter will examine the general outline and 
attempt to develop an aggregate model of the broad pattern of corruption 
amongst the 22 developed countries under review.  This initial ‘big picture’ 
will be both informative for itself (of the general patterns and relationships 
underpinning corruption)1273, and provide wider context for the subsequent 
sections which will undertake focused modelling and analyses of more 
specific issues germane to our broader research question. 
                                                 
1272  The developed countries under review are largely, but not totally, members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the exceptions being: 
South Africa, which is included in the IMD-WCY list of developed countries, but is not a 
member of the OECD; and, South Korea, which is not included in the IMD-WCY list of 
developed countries, but is a member of the OECD.  However, given the economic weight 
of the IMD-WCY list, it can be regarded as a reasonable proxy for the OECD, given it is 
not reasonably practicable to re-calculate all of the indicators used to remove South Africa 
and include South Korea in the data set. 
1273 Unfortunately, it has not been possible to consider, and expressly model, each and 
every variable which may possibly have some influence on corruption.  Some broader 
indicators, such as institutional quality, are captured by variables such as government 
economic policy settings, labour and price regulation, and trade barriers. 
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. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The following two Figures provide a general overview of the burden of 
corruption in the 22 developed countries over the 17 year period under 
review1274.  The first Figure reports movements in the average and the 
standard deviation (the conventional measure of the variability of the data 
set) of corruption in the sample of countries, whilst the second Figure 
reports movements in the best and worst performers in the group1275.  Figure 
6.1 shows a clear step down in the level of corruption1276 amongst developed 
countries in the period 1992 – 2006, from an average of 6.9 index points in 
the six years from 1992 to 1997, to just under 6.4 index points in the 9 years 
from 1998 to 20061277.  Similarly, there has been a general step down in the 
variability in the performance of developed countries in the period under 
review – from around 2.2 index points in the 1992 – 1997 period, to just 
under 2.1 index points in the 1998- 2006.  Looked at another way, at the 
start of the time frame under review (1992), the developed countries being 
examined had an average corruption score of 6.9 index points, with 
 
 
                                                 
1274   The higher the corruption index, the ‘more virtuous’ the nation is on corruption 
matters. 
1275  The full data set for these two Figures can be found in Appendix 6.2. 
1276  As the data set is a survey of respondent’s perceptions of the incidence of corruption 
in each country, analyses and commentary in this study implicitly refer to perceptions of 
corruption.  But, as previously noted, perceptions of corruption are good approximations 
for the incidence of corruption (and legal realities) in individual nations:  Kaufman, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2006) at 73. 
1277  Whether this constitutes a statistically significant shift will be examined in more 
detail later in this chapter. 
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a standard deviation of 2.2 index points; by the end of the time frame (2006) 
these figures had declined to 6.4 and 2.1 respectively, meaning both the 
incidence of corruption had increased1278 and its variability declined, albeit 
modestly.  By comparison, Figure 6.2 reports the average performance for 
the best (the maximum line) and the worst (minimum line) performers.  
The best (‘cleanest’) country performers (those scoring an average of 9 index 
points or better) over the 1992-2006 period were, in descending order, 
Denmark (9.3 index points), Finland (9.1) and New Zealand (9.0)1279, whilst 
those at the other end of the range (the poorest/ least ‘clean’ performers) 
include South Africa (3.6 index points), Greece (3.3) and Italy (2.8).  An 
interesting feature of Figure 6.2 is the seeming stability in the average score 
of the better performers, and the oscillation in that for the poor performers:  
the virtuous appear consistently so, the bad appear inconsistently so. 
 
                                                 
1278 Recall:  the corruption index measures ‘cleanlines’’/ absence of corruption. As such, a 
decline in the corruption index reflects a fall in ‘cleanliness’ or a rise in corruption. 
1279   Australia ranked fifth overall across the 17 year period, with an average corruption 
score of 8.3 index points. 
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Figure 6.1:  Corruption in Developed Countries I 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2:  Corruption in Developed Countries II 
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. Tests of Equality  
 
Insights into the stability of the data series can be gained from applying tests 
of equality – for the mean (average), the median and the variance – for two 
sub-series: the first covering the period 1992 to 1996; and, the second 
covering 2002 to 2006.  In effect, dividing the overall data series into two 
components, ostensibly before and after the identified breakpoint (of 
1998)1280, allowing a little space either side thereof.  Essentially, tests of 
equality assess whether the mean, the median and/or the variance for the 
two data sub-series are statistically significantly1281 different1282 from each 
other.  The results of these tests are reported in Table 6.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1280  Discussion of which is to come. 
1281  Statistical significance will be reported in this chapter in terms of the p-value for the 
applicable statistical test, and represented in the text as p-value, and in tables and figures, 
where appropriate, as “p = (value)”. 
1282  The null hypothesis is that the mean/median/variance, as the case may be, are equal 
between the two sub-series. 
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Table 6.2:  Tests of Equality 
 Mean Median Std Dev1283 
    
1992 to 1996 6.51 7.84 2.17 
2002 to 2006 6.96 6.78 1.95 
1992 to 2006 6.73 7.21 2.07 
    
Test   p =       p =         p =  
    
t-Test 0.100 … … 
Welch F-Test 0.101 … … 
Med Chi-Sq … 0.019 … 
Siegel-Tukey … … 0.031 
 
Using the conventional 5 per cent (0.05) threshold for testing for statistical 
significance, Table 6.2 reports:  there is no statistically significant difference 
between the means of the two sub-series, with the conventional t-test 
producing a p-value of 10 per cent, and the Welch F-Test a p-value of 10.1 
per cent;  there is a statistically significant difference between the medians 
of the two sub-series, with the Median Chi-Square Test reporting a p-value 
of just 1.9 per cent (ie below the 5 per cent threshold); and, there is also a 
statistically significant difference between the variability of the two sub-
series, with the Siegel-Tukey Test producing a p-value of 3.1 per cent (again,  
 
 
 
                                                 
1283  Testing for the equality of the variance is reported, in the EViews software package, 
based on the standard deviation which is just the square root of the variance.  As such, 
while the estimated values of the standard deviation for each sub-series may be 
numerically different from those for the variance (which can be easily obtained by just 
squaring the standard deviation), this form of reporting does not impact upon the relevant 
test statistics. 
 313  
 
below the 5 per cent threshold). Statistical inference: while there is no 
statistically significant difference between the means (averages) of the two 
sub-series, such differences can be found for the medians and the variances.  
This suggests a statistically significant shift in corruption may have occurred 
in the developed countries under review between 1992 to 1996, and 2002 to 
2006. 
 
. Analysis of Variance 
 
While such descriptive statistics provide a useful broad brush of the general 
pattern of the corruption data being examined, they provide only an initial 
glimpse into the nature of the movements in corruption performance.  In 
particular, they do not, of themselves, provide information on whether any 
change in performance is greater within year groups, or between the years.  
Such an insight can be obtained from analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
techniques.  In simple terms, ANOVA can be regarded as a ratio of the 
variance between two groups to the variance within the groups1284.  In 
statistical terms, where the ANOVA is statistically significant 
(conventionally measured by the outcome having a probability due to 
chance of 5 per cent or less; p-value ≤ 0.05) the variance between the groups 
is substantially greater than that within the groups1285.  By way of example, 
an ANOVA of a pair of years (say 1992 and 1993) would compare the 
variance in the observations between those two years relative to the 
variance in the observations within each of the two years. 
                                                 
1284  For good general overviews of pairwise, one-way ANOVA, as is used in this study, see 
Keller (2001) at 407–423; Dielman (2005) at 335–345. 
1285  In the current study, a group means an individual year.   
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The ANOVA technique can provide useful insights from which we can 
make objective inferences about the nature of the variances in our 
corruption data, and provide further guidance toward answering our core 
research question.  Table 6.3, following, reports the p-values of 182 pairwise 
ANOVA estimates: the cell coinciding to 1992 and 1993 reports the p-value 
for the ANOVA for that pair of years, to 1992 and 1994 for that pair of 
years, and so on.  For the purposes of this study, and our research question, 
we are looking for year-pairs with very low p-values, and in particular those 
whose p-values are 0.05 or less (that is, surmount the conventional 
threshold of statistical significance, and hence point to important 
differences between the relevant pair-years)1286.  As can be seen, none of the 
pair-years reaches the threshold for statistical significance – with a great 
many of the reported p-values being very high indeed - indicating the 
variance within the pair-years tends to be relatively greater than the 
variance between them,  However, there is one set of pair-years – 1996 and  
1998 – where the p-value stands out (bolded in Table 6.3 for ease of 
identification) as being relatively low (at 0.15), when compared with the  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1286  For a good overview of the concepts underpinning statistical significance, and the p-
value in particular, see Keller (2001) at 263–266.  As a general approach, the p-value is an 
indicator of whether the outcome of the statistical test is due to chance.  Hence a p-value 
equal to, say, 0.023 would be interpreted as meaning the outcome being reviewed had a 
2.3 per cent probability of being due to chance, which is less than the 5 per cent 
probability conventionally adopted in the social sciences (which includes law and 
economics). 
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other results.  This result would appear to coincide with the sharp drop in 
the average score of the corruption index, reported in Figure 6.1.  Statistical 
inference:  ‘something happened in the 1996 to 1998 period’, although what 
this ‘something’ may be remains to be determined by additional quantitative 
analyses. 
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Table 6.3:   Pairwise ANOVA 
 
     p = 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
         
1992 …        
1993 0.83 …       
1994 0.98 0.82 …      
1995 0.86 0.97 0.84 …     
1996 0.78 0.63 0.80 0.66 …    
1997 0.84 0.99 0.83 0.99 0.63 …   
1998 0.23 0.35 0.24 0.33 0.15 0.32 …  
1999 0.44 0.60 0.44 0.57 0.30 0.57 0.64 … 
2000 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.44 0.21 0.43 0.78 0.84 
2001 0.38 0.54 0.38 0.51 0.25 0.50 0.70 0.93 
2002 0.49 0.66 0.49 0.63 0.33 0.63 0.57 0.92 
2003 0.58 0.76 0.57 0.73 0.40 0.73 0.48 0.81 
2004 0.42 0.59 0.43 0.57 0.28 0.56 0.61 0.98 
2005 0.37 0.53 0.37 0.51 0.24 0.50 0.67 0.94 
2006 0.46 0.63 0.46 0.61 0.31 0.60 0.58 0.94 
         
         
         
     p = 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
         
2000 …        
2001 0.91 …       
2002 0.76 0.87 …      
2003 0.65 0.78 0.87 …     
2004 0.81 1.00 0.96 0.76 …    
2005 0.89 0.99 0.90 0.75 0.98 …   
2006 0.78 0.90 0.94 0.87 0.90 0.88 …  
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. Structural Breaks 
 
An important consideration in determining whether the OECD Convention 
had a statistically significant impact on the incidence of corruption in 
developed countries will be whether, when and how substantial was any 
structural break(s) in the data series1287.  The presence, the timing and the 
magnitude of any such breaks would provide further evidence in support of 
the research question being examined.  Fortunately, econometrics and 
leximetrics, and other quantitative techniques, provide several tools from 
which the analyst can draw reliable inferences about the presence and the 
significance of structural breaks, some of which come from the regression 
and others from the time series suites of techniques1288. 
 
Although not an indicator of the presence, and the practical and the 
statistical significance, of any structural break, measures of autocorrelation 
and partial autocorrelation provide an insight into the processes by which 
the data is formed – in the current case, the ‘freshness’ of respondents’ 
perceptions of the incidence of corruption in the countries under review.  In 
plain English, autocorrelation1289 and partial autocorrelation1290 refer to the 
                                                 
1287   Also known as “intervention analysis”, “impulse functions” and “step functions”.  
Failure to look for, and when found take into account in the leximetric modelling, 
structural breaks can lead to mis-specified models from which inappropriate inferences 
are likely to be drawn:  Clements and Hendry (1998) at 241.   
1288  For a good discussion of these methodologies, which rely on dummy (also known as 
instrumental) variables and are the workhorse approach for determining and measuring 
structural breaks, see for example Enders (1995) at 270 – 276; Pindyck and Rubenfield 
(1998) at 136 – 138; Patterson (2000) at 277 – 285; Bowerman et al (2005) at 551 – 557. 
1289  Autocorrelation reports correlations between data points, including the correlations 
for the intervening periods.  For example, between 2 periods ago and 6 periods ago, taking 
into account all of the intervening correlations, such as those between 2 and 3, 3 and 4 
periods ago, and so on. 
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correlation between observations at different points in time1291.  The higher 
the coefficient for the different measure of correlation, the more correlated 
are the two data points.  In the current context, high correlations would 
suggest past perceptions of corruption tend to be associated with current 
perceptions of corruption; respondents have long memories which are 
difficult to shift.  Table 6.4, following, reports the correlogram, and the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients, for the average of 
the corruption index.  Looking particularly at the partial autocorrelation 
(PAC) coefficients, we can see perceptions of corruption are refreshed fairly 
regularly, by and large annually, and completely so not more than 
biennially (every two years)1292.  Hence, we can progress our quantitative 
analyses in the knowledge any changes in perceptions of the incidence and 
impact of corruption, and thus impact of the OECD Convention, are likely 
to be picked up fairly quickly by our data set.  Statistical inference:  
perceptions of the incidence and impact of corruption tend to be refreshed 
fairly regularly, probably annually or at most biennially. 
                                                                                                                                            
1290  Partial autocorrelation reports correlations between data points, taking out the 
correlations for the intervening periods.  For example, between 2 periods ago and 6 
periods ago, would not take into account the intervening correlations.  Partial 
autocorrelation is conceptually closer to the more commonly understood usage of the 
term correlation. 
1291  For a good overview of these concepts, their applications and estimation procedures, 
see: Pindyck and Rubenfield (1998) at 494–497, and 532–534, respectively; Dielman 
(2005) at 254–262; Maddala (2002) at 227–265. 
1292  Based on the observation the PAC coefficient is 0.54 for adjacent years (that is, lag 1), 
and then 0.03 for those lag 2. 
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Table 6.4:  Correlogram of Average Corruption 
 
     
Autocorrelation 
Partial 
Correlation Lag AC PAC 
          
.   |****   | .   |****   | 1 0.543 0.543 
.   |** .   | .   |   .   | 2 0.316 0.030 
.   |*  .   | .   |   .   | 3 0.157 -0.036 
.   |   .   | .  *|   .   | 4 -0.035 -0.162 
.  *|   .   | .  *|   .   | 5 -0.143 -0.090 
. **|   .   | .  *|   .   | 6 -0.228 -0.112 
.  *|   .   | .   |*  .   | 7 -0.115 0.142 
. **|   .   | . **|   .   | 8 -0.217 -0.232 
. **|   .   | .  *|   .   | 9 -0.237 -0.085 
.  *|   .   | .   |   .   | 10 -0.178 -0.034 
.  *|   .   | .   |   .   | 11 -0.121 0.032 
.  *|   .   | .  *|   .   | 12 -0.121 -0.116 
          
 
The ‘short memory’ (high refresh rate) of perceptions of the incidence and 
impact of corruption can also be seen in Table 6.5, which reports the results 
of two simple regressions, which examine the impact of perceptions of 
corruption one year ago on current perceptions of corruption (Equation 1), 
and of perceptions of corruption two years ago on current perceptions of 
corruption (Equation 2).  The main indicators to note are:  in Equation 1, 
the p-value for the variable mean (-1), that is perceptions of corruption last 
year, is statistically significant; while the p-values in Equation 2 for both 
mean (-1) and mean (-2), that is perceptions of corruption 1 and 2 years ago,  
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fail to reach the threshold for statistical significance.  Statistical inference:  
perceptions of the incidence and impact of corruption tend to be refreshed 
fairly regularly - basically annually – and hence are responsive to new legal 
and policy developments, both of a positive and negative nature, effecting 
the corruption problem1293, 1294.   
 
Table 6.5:   Lagged Perceptions of Corruption 
Dep Var = Mean     
      
 Eq 1  Eq 1     Eq 2    Eq 2  
 Coeff. p =     Coeff.   p =  
      
C 2.91 0.07 2.80 0.17  
Mean (-1) 0.55 0.03 0.50 0.14  
Mean (-2)  … … 0.07 0.82  
      
      
Adj R-sq 0.282  0.169  
S.E. of regression 0.238  0.260  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.03  0.16  
AIC   0.10  0.34  
SC   0.19  0.47  
      
    
 
                                                 
1293 However, looking at the Adjusted R Squared diagnostic in Equation 1, past perceptions 
of corruption only explain around 28 per cent of the current perceptions of corruption, 
meaning other factors (still to be identified) explain the great bulk (some 72 per cent) 
thereof. 
1294 This result would suggest perceptions of corruption follow what is leximetrics would 
be considered a ‘random walk’ pattern.  As such, the inclusion of leading and lagging 
variables in the modelling is not likely to produce practical or statistically significant 
results.  At the same time, any such modelling would confront the ‘degrees of freedom’ 
constraint: that is, for a data series of finite size, the insertion of additional variables into a 
model increases the risk of getting erroneous results – known in leximetrics as the ‘Type 
1/ Type 2 error trade-off’. 
 321  
. Breakpoint Tests 
 
A commonly used statistical technique for identifying structural breaks in a 
data series is the Chow Breakpoint Test.  The basic idea of this test is to fit 
the preferred equation separately for each sub-sample (that is, before and 
after an analyst-defined ‘breakpoint’) and to see whether there are 
statistically significant differences in the estimated equations. A statistically 
significant difference indicates a structural change in the relationship1295.  
Table 6.6, following, reports the p-values for the dummy variable1296 
representing each of the designated years, using Equation 1 from Table 6.5 
as the preferred model for testing1297.  To interpret Table 6.6 we would ask, 
using for example 1996 as our hypothetical breakpoint year, whether the 
average level of corruption before 1996 was statistically significantly 
different from that from 1996 and beyond (we can see the relevant p-value 
does not meet the conventional 0.05 per cent threshold of statistical 
significance, so 1996 does not appear to be a breakpoint year)  Using the 
Chow Breakpoint Test, we can see (per the bolded p-values) it is possible 
any of the years 1997, 1998, 1999 or 2000 could be breakpoint years.  Such 
an imprecise result, pointing to several possible breakpoint years, is not 
particularly surprising given the pattern of change presented in Figure 6.1 –  
 
 
                                                 
1295  For a wider discussion, see Pindyck and Rubinfeild (1998) at 133–134.  For a more 
technical exposition, see Johnston and DiNardo (1997) at 113–116; Quantitative Micro 
Systems (2007) at 165–166. 
1296 The conventional, workhorse procedure of econo-/ lexi-metrics for such analyses: see, 
for example, Enders (1995) at 270 – 276; Bowerman et al (2005) at 551 – 557. 
1297  There were insufficient observations to perform this test on years prior to 1996, and 
after 2004.  However, given the pattern of the data series, as reported in Figure 7.1, it is 
unlikely there would have been any breakpoints in these periods. 
 322  
 
one of a period of instability over three or four years, rather than a clean-
break (to which this test is better suited).  Statistical inference:  there was a 
statistically significant break in the average level of corruption in developed 
countries in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s, although we cannot 
precisely date the timing of the break. 
 
Table 6.6:  Chow Breakpoint Test 
Year F-stat p = 
   
1996 3.24 0.08 
1997 29.95 0.00 
1998 5.48 0.02 
1999 6.31 0.02 
2000 9.40 0.01 
2001 1.36 0.32 
2002 0.81 0.52 
2003 0.33 0.80 
2004 0.02 1.00 
 
A partial solution to this problem may be found in the use of dummy 
variables to test for any statistically significant changes in the level of 
corruption for each of the individual years under review1298.  Where a 
statistically significant shift is found in the level of corruption, we may be 
able to use this outcome as an indicator of a structural break, especially if 
the year coincides with one of those identified in the Chow Breakpoint Test.  
Table 6.7 provides a summary of the p-values for each of the year dummy 
                                                 
1298  For a wider discussion, see Pindyck and Rubinfeild (1998) at 139–141; Maddala (2002) 
at 301–341.  For a more technical exposition, see Quantitative Micro Systems (2007) at 
28–32. 
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variables used in the individual equations; the full results, from which this 
Table is extracted, can be found in Appendix 6.3. 
 
Table 6.7:  Year Dummy Variables 
 Coeff. p = 
   
1993 -0.80 0.21 
1994 0.14 0.58 
1995 0.15 0.61 
1996 0.59 0.06 
1997 0.26 0.49 
1998 -0.51 0.03 
1999 0.13 0.63 
2000 -0.24 0.44 
2001 -0.41 0.11 
2002 0.04 0.89 
2003 0.20 0.53 
2004 0.01 0.96 
 
A review of Table 6.7 highlights several points:  the first, a technical issue, is 
there are no estimates for 1992, or for 2005 and 2006, as there are 
insufficient observations in the data set to permit reliable estimation.  
However, this is not an important issue in the broader context of this study 
as these were not years of interest identified in the Chow Breakpoint Test.  
Only the year 1998 had a statistically significant dummy variable when 
applied to the conventional threshold of 5 per cent (or 0.05), and pointed to 
an 0.51 index point rise in the average level of corruption in the 22 
developed countries under review.  Statistical inference:  using the year 
dummy variable technique it would appear the important structural break 
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in our data series most likely occurred in 19981299, when the average 
corruption ranking dropped by a statistically significant 0.5 index points or 
around 8 per cent of its then prevailing average, pointing to a deterioration 
in corruption conditions (or a more corruption-sensitive sampling frame). 
 
The Chow Breakpoint Test and the use of year dummy variables each 
contain a number of disadvantages: in the former case, the possibility that 
application of the Test may well identify several potential breakpoints, 
which can occur when the data set contains a period of instability (as 
distinct from a ‘clear cut break’); and, in the latter, the technique is a 
somewhat crude, and second best, method for identifying structural breaks.  
In both cases, the analyst is required to ex ante form an opinion as to the 
likely, or the potential, location of any breakpoint(s).  The Quandt-Andrews 
Breakpoint Test can be used in such situations, having the particularly 
desirable feature of being able to test for unknown structural breaks (that is, 
those which may be present, but not known to the analyst)1300.  Our 
application of the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test1301 examines the data  
                                                 
1299  This comment does not deny the rather curious case of the year 1996.  While the p-
value was only marginally non-statistically significant (at 6 per cent, compared to our 
threshold of 5 per cent), the level of practical significance (coefficient of +0.59) is rather 
difficult to rationalise in the broader context of our research question:  perceived levels of 
freedom from corruption rose in anticipation of the OECD Convention.  Without taking a 
major diversion down the complicated pathway of rational expectations models, perhaps 
the best we can say is the then potential of the OECD Convention raised awareness of 
corruption issues amongst IMD-WCY respondents in 1996.  Testing whether this actually 
happened is beyond the scope of this study, and will have to await further scholarly work 
at some time in the future. 
1300  For a more technical exposition, see Quantitative Micro Systems (2007) at 166 – 168. 
1301  For the specification:  mean = constant + b*mean(lag 1) + error. 
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set for 8 possible structural breaks (one each for the years 1995 to 2002, 
inclusive1302.  The Test starts from the basic (null) hypothesis of no structural 
breaks. 
 
Table 6.8:  Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test 
 
Statistic Value    p =   
    
Max. LR F-stat (1998) 17.91  0.003 
Max. Wald F-stat (1998) 17.91  0.003 
 
Table 6.8, above, reports the outcome from the Quandt-Andrews 
Breakpoint Test (for an unknown breakpoint) finding the most likely date 
for a breakpoint to have occurred was in 1998.  This result is consistent with 
our findings from the use of the year dummy variable technique, and 
provides confirmation of the results of the iterative application of the Chow 
Breakpoint Test.  Statistical inference: using the Quandt-Andrews test, the 
(most statistically significant) breakpoint in our data series is the year 1998. 
 
. Parameter Stability 
 
An important assumption underpinning any econometric/leximetric 
modelling, in particular that using regression-based techniques, is the 
stability of the parameter values (the coefficient for each of the variables 
used in the model).  That is, ostensibly asking “does the effect of each the 
explanatory variables used in the model on the dependent variable remain  
 
 
                                                 
1302  The years 1992-1994 and 2003-2006 being omitted for technical estimation reasons. 
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fairly stable over the entire period under review?”.  For data series across 
longer periods of time, where there are indications of variability and/or 
where there are structural shifts in the data, the assumption of parameter 
stability should be explicitly tested for its validity.   
 
Econometrics/leximetrics generally offer the analyst two methods for 
assessing parameter stability: the CUSUM Test (which focuses on the 
mean/average of the residuals of the model specified); and, the CUSUM 
Squares Test (which deals with the variances of the residuals of the model  
specified)1303.  Reporting of the CUSUM Test, and the CUSUM Squares Test,  
however, does not take the form of a simple statistic, with associated 
measures of statistical significance, but rather the form of a graphical 
representation which traces out the pattern of the stability/instability across 
time.  This desirable feature allows the analyst to more readily identify the 
timing, and the possible magnitude, of any structural changes but, 
unfortunately, not to make any definitive statement about their statistical 
significance.  The evaluation process revolves around the visual examination 
of the graphical representations, and involves two elements: first, an 
assessment of the (horizontal) stability of the CUSUM/CUSUM Square line –  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1303  Examination of the residuals of a specified model is commonplace in better 
econometric/leximetric studies, being used as a method for assessing the validity of a 
model and whether, and possibly how, it might be improved upon.  For a more technical 
exposition, see Johnston and DiNardo (1997) at 119-126 (although this discussion does 
include a worked example comprehensible to those not necessarily statistically inclined); 
and, Quantitative Micro Systems (2007) at 172–174. 
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in effect, asking “is the line consistently stable, or are there jagged 
movements and/or shifts in direction in the line?”; and, second, “how does 
the CUSUM/CUSUM Square line compare to the boundaries of the 5 per 
cent level of statistical significance – in particular, are there any places 
where the line breaches the boundaries of statistical significance?”.  The 
results1304 are reported for the CUSUM Test in Figure 6.3, and for the 
CUSUM Squares Test in Figure 6.4. 
                                                 
1304  Using the model:  mean = constant + b*mean(lag 1) + error,   The vertical (y) axis 
represents the value of the parameter, while the horizontal (x) axis reports time. 
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Figure 6.3:  CUSUM Test  
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Figure 6.4:  CUSUM Squares Test 
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Looking first at Figure 6.3, which reports the outcomes for the CUSUM 
Test, we can make several observations:  the CUSUM line rises at a slight 
gradient up to year 1997, before turning down in year 1998, after which it 
remains fairly stable over the remainder of the period under review (that is 
out to 2006); the CUSUM line shifted from being positive to being negative, 
suggesting perceptions of corruption shifted from being upward-reinforcing, 
to downward-reinforcing1305; and, movements in the CUSUM line did not 
breach the boundaries for statistical significance.  A visual review of Figure 
6.4 provides a somewhat similar message, with the shift year again 
appearing to be 1998 although the CUSUM Squares Test line does breach 
the threshold for statistical significance over the period 1998-2001. 
Statistical inference: taken together, the two estimates (CUSUM and 
CUSUM Squares) point to a substantial shift in the parameter stability of our 
model specification, reinforcing other findings of some form of structural 
change in the year 1998. 
 
. Regime-Shift Specification 
 
A conventional issue in econometric/leximetric modelling is generally to 
find the ‘best available’ model to explain a given research question.  This 
chapter has examined several specifications not to explain corruption per se, 
but to examine the impact of a given legal-policy intervention (in this case, 
the OECD Convention) on the incidence of corruption amongst a group of 
developed countries (many of whom are OECD members).   
 
                                                 
1305 In the current context, declining ‘cleanliness’/ an increase in corruption. 
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An implicit finding of the specification and testing of a number of different 
models has been to discover that the simple linear design is not likely to 
constitute the best possible specification.  Indeed, the presence of a 
practically and statistically significant break-point at year 1998 violates the 
underlying simple linearity (that is, a monotonic straight-line) of the 
specification being tested.  Such a finding therefore raises the question ‘if 
not that specification, then what specification’?  In short, if not the straight-
line specification, than what design better explains the relationship?  A 
widely used technique for answering this question is the regime-shift 
model1306, which enables the analyst to quantify: the shift in the intercept 
term resulting from the policy intervention; the shift in the slope of the 
model (that is, the marginal effects of the policy intervention); and, both the 
intercept and the slope shifts together, Table 6.9, following, reports the 
results of four models: the base model, which views corruption in developed 
countries as a function of corruption in those countries the previous year 
(variable: devel (-1));  an intercept model, which estimates the impact of the 
OECD Convention on corruption in those developed countries (variable: 
oecd); the slope model, which looks at the marginal impact of the OCED 
Convention on the incidence of corruption in the developed countries 
under review (the interaction term: oecd*devel(-1); and, the intercept and 
slope model which estimates both the slope and the intercept effects of the 
OECD Convention.  
                                                 
1306 Sometimes also known as ‘piecewise’, ‘spline’ or ‘switching’ models.  For a discussion 
of these modelling techniques see Pindyck and Rubenfied (1998) at 136 – 138. 
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Table 6.9: Regime-Shift Specifications 
 Base Model  Intercept Model Slope Model  
Intercept and  
Slope Model  
          
 Coeff p = Coeff p = Coeff p = Coeff p =  
          
C 1.91 0.15 6.23 0.00 5.81 0.00 12.37 0.00  
DEVEL(-1) 0.71 0.00 0.09 0.71 0.15 0.52 -0.79 0.14  
OECD … … -0.42 0.01 … … -7.93 0.06  
OECD*DEVEL(--) … … … … -0.06 0.01 1.10 0.07  
          
Adj R-sqd 0.507  0.712  0.702  0.774  
S.E. of regression 0.187  0.143  0.145  0.126  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  
AIC   -0.385  -0.867  -0.834  -1.064  
SBC  -0.294  -0.730  -0.698  -0.881  
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Several points from the four models warrant special mention.  First, the 
improvement in the explanatory power of the models as the OECD Convention 
is taken into account, both singularly (as the variable oecd) and in combination 
(when interacted as oced*devel(-1)).  The addition of the OECD Convention 
variable in the intercept model raises the explanatory power of the latter model 
(over the base model) by a substantial 20.5 per centage points (from 0.507 to 
0.712), while the inclusion of the interaction term (oecd*devel(-1)) in the 
intercept and slope model adds another 6.2 per cent points (from 0.712 to 
0.774, or less than one-third of the OECD Convention variable on its own).  
The second point concerns the statistical significance of the three variables:  
when the OECD Convention variable is introduced into the modelling schema, 
the impact of past perceptions of corruption (devel(-1)) moves from being 
statistically significant to non-statistical significance; whilst both OECD 
Convention and the interaction variable (possibly under the influence of the 
OECD Convention component) are statistically significant in all three of the 
models in which they are used (albeit at the 10 per cent level in the intercept 
and slope model).  Looking at the intercept, the slope and the combined 
models, one can inter the OECD Convention both caused a shift in the 
perception of corruption performance in 1998, and underpinned a sustained 
but downward direction in the corruption index, implying a deterioration in 
the corruption performance of the developed countries under review. 
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. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This section has focused on the research question: has the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions had a (statistically) significant impact on reducing corruption in 
developed countries?  Although other questions may have been asked – for 
example, of the impact of other international legal instruments on different 
groups of countries, and/or of major multilateral instruments (like the much 
broader, in scope and membership, United Nations’ Convention), we have been 
constrained by the need to keep the analysis both robust and tractable1307, 
whilst working within the constraints of currently available data1308. 
 
In coming to a substantive answer to this research question, this chapter has 
analysed several pieces of statistical evidence:  a visual examination of an index 
of the average level of corruption in the 22 countries under review points to a  
clear downward spike in the latter part of the 1990s; there was a statistically 
significant shift in corruption between the early part of the 1990s and the early 
                                                 
1307   For example, while it may have been intellectually interesting to attempt to replicate the 
analyses undertaken in this thesis using different data sets and/or techniques, as an indicator 
fo the robustness of the results, such modelling would likely generate more ‘signal than 
noise’.  This would likely reflect any differences in the results between modelling exercises 
could simply highlighting variations in the data collection frames/methods, in the definitions 
of the concepts, and/or the time frames in which the data were obtained.  
1308  While it may have been more interesting to examine the impact of the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption, the instrument only entered into force in 2003, with 
ratification taking additional time in many UN member counties.  As such to undertake 
dynamic econometric-leximetric modelling of the type reported in this study would have 
required the collection of any 8 or more years of data (pushing back formal submission of this 
study to around 2018), well outside the rules of the University of Sydney. 
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part of the 2000s;  an analysis of variance of year-pairs over the 1992 to 2006 
period indicates ‘something happened in the 1996 to 1998 period’, although we 
had to look further for clearer insights; perceptions of the incidence of 
corruption tend to be refreshed fairly regularly, probably annually, suggesting 
use of time series methods of statistical analysis are likely to prove fruitful; a 
Chow Breakpoint Test, a conventional tool used when looking for structural 
breaks in time series data, demonstrates there was a statistically significant 
break in the average level of corruption in the late 1990s and into the early 
2000s, although we cannot precisely date the timing of the break; dummy 
variable techniques point toward a breakpoint occurring either in 1996 or more 
likely in 1998, when the average level of perceived corruption dropped by a 
statistically significant 0.5 index points or around 8 per cent of its then 
prevailing average; a superior technique, the Quandt-Andrews Test, indicates 
the most statistically significant breakpoint in our data series is likely to be for 
the year 1998; while tests of parameter stability (CUSUM and CUSUM Square) 
come to much the same conclusion.  Taken as a whole, the evidence points to a 
structural break in corruption occurring in 1998, the year after the entry into 
force of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions.  Although the difference is 
statistically significant, its practical significance is likely to be more modest: a  
reduction in the corruption performance index of a mere 0.5 index points or 
around 8 per cent of its then prevailing average.  Such an outcome suggests the  
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OECD Convention led to deterioration in the corruption performance of the 22 
developed countries under review1309.  More likely, the advent of the OECD 
Convention had the effect of raising awareness amongst observers of the 
incidence and impact of corruption, who reacted negatively to what they 
saw/had not previously noticed. 
 
Three Countries (Time Series) 
 
The preceding section examined in some detail the implications of the OECD 
Convention for the average corruption performance of a group of 22 developed 
countries. The section applied, innovatively, a number of econo-/lexi- metric 
techniques to estimate the practical and statistical significance of the 
Convention on the group of countries as a whole.  This section takes the 
analysis one step further, moving from the impact of the Convention on the 
average performance of the 22 developed countries to look at its impact, both 
in terms of practical and statistical significance, on a sub-sample of three 
nations – one high performer, one middle performer, and one low performer 
on the index of corruption performance1310.    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1309  Recall: the higher the corruption index, the ‘cleaner’ the nation is on corruption matters. 
1310  The selection of a representative set of high, middle and low performers is common 
practice in econometric and leximetric modelling, not least of which to ensure the tractability 
of the analysis. 
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 . Descriptive Statistics 
 
The high performer chosen was Denmark, which consistently topped the 
‘league table’ with the highest median score (9.31 index points) and lowest 
variability (standard deviation = 0.16 index points) of all of the 22 developed 
countries examined over the 1992-2006 period1311; the middle performer was 
the United States of America, which sat close to the centre of the sample, with 
a median score of 6.73 index points and a standard deviation of 0.57 index 
points1312; while the lowest performer was Italy, with a median score of 2.85 
index points and a standard deviation of 0.69 index points1313.  The annual 
results, in index point form, for each of the three countries, can be seen in 
Figure 6.51314. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1311  Denmark implemented the OECD Convention through amendments to its Criminal Code 
(per L 232 – 1998/99). 
1312  The United States implemented the OECD Convention via its International Anti-Bribery 
and Fair Competition Act of 1998 (Pub. L 105 - 366), which amended its Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd - 1). 
1313   Italy implemented the OECD Convention through its law Act No. 300 of 29.9.2000. 
1314  Readers should recall a ‘high score’ on the WCY scale of corruption indicate a low 
incidence of corruption, as the survey question asked whether the relevant country is largely 
free of corruption. 
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Figure 6.5:  Corruption in Three Countries 
 
 
 
A visual inspection of Figure 6.5 brings out a number of points:  the very stable 
trend of Denmark, which exhibits virtually no real change over the 1992-2006 
period (consistent with the very low standard deviation reported above);  the 
two-period nature of the corruption index for the  United States, improving 
modestly between 1992 and 1997, before dropping noticeably in 1998 and then 
remaining roughly flat before dipping in 2006; and, Italy, which demonstrated 
a general, but still modest, upward drift in its performance over the period 
under review (although still remaining at a level around one-third of the best 
perfoming Denmark and one-half that of the middle performing United States).  
The difference in patterns for the respective performances of the three  
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countries was echoed in the absence of any meaningful practical, and no 
statistically significant, correlations between them.  For Denmark/United 
States, the correlation coefficient was 0.33, and the p-value for statistical 
significance was 0.24; for Denmark/Italy, the figures were – 0.06 and 0.84, 
respectively; and, for the United States/ Italy, they were -0.17 and 0.56, 
respectively.   
 
 . Analysis of Variance, and Tests of Equality 
 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing found similar results, with between 
country variances being statistically significant at less than 1 per cent for all 
three countries as a group, and for each of the country pairs (Denmark/United 
States; Denmark/Italy; and, United States/Italy) in their corruption 
performances.  That is, the differences between the three countries are 
statistically significantly greater than the differences within them over time,  
Tests of equality1315, of means, of medians, and of variances, of the three 
country pairs rejected the null hypotheses of equality of their means, medians, 
and variances for all three pairs, with the single exception of the variances of 
the United States/Italy pair.  Statistical inference:  the three countries really are 
separate and distinct from each other in their corruption performances. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1315  Using both ANOVA F-test, and Welch F-test for the equality of means; Median Chi-
Square test for equality of medians; and, F-Test for equality of variances. 
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 . Auto-Correlation 
 
Denmark, the United States and Italy also appear to have different memory 
profiles, in terms of the influence of past perceptions of the incidence of 
corruption on current perceptions thereof.  Denmark and the United States 
appear to have at best a one-year past memory, although Italy would seem to 
have a longer memory, as can be deduced from Table 6.10 following, reporting 
estimated partial auto-correlations.  
 
Table 6.10: Partial Auto-Correlations 
     
 Denmark Denmark 
United 
States 
United 
States Italy Italy 
Lags Coeff. p = Coeff. p = Coeff. p = 
       
1 0.35 0.14 0.39 0.10 0.69 0.00 
2 -0.25 0.30 -0.06 0.22 -0.45 0.01 
3 0.22 0.49 -0.05 0.39 0.12 0.02 
4 -0.14 0.65 -0.17 0.44 0.05 0.04 
5 -0.04 0.73 0.15 0.59 0.13 0.08 
6 -0.10 0.77 -0.07 0.71 -0.22 0.13 
 
Table 6.10 indicates the partial auto-correlations for Denmark and the United 
States achieve their highest absolute values for year lag 1 (that is, ‘last year’), 
with coefficient values of 0.35 and 0.39 respectively, although in neither case 
are they statistically significant at the conventional 5 per cent threshold (p-
values = 0.14 and 0.10, respectively). By comparison, Italy demonstrates both  
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practically and statistically significant partial auto-correlations for recent past 
years (lags 1 and 2, with coefficient values of 0.69 and -0.45 respectively), with 
both periods being statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  Also 
noteworthy, is while the values of the coefficients for Italy for lagged years 3 
and 4 tapper off, they continue to be statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level (p-values = 0.02 and 0.04 respectively).  Statistical inference:  both 
Denmark and the United States demonstrate at best a fairly weak short term 
memory, ‘remembering’ corruption performances in the previous year only, 
while Italy has a much stronger memory in both practical and statistical 
significance terms stretching back at least 3 to 4 years.  Looked at another way, 
Denmark and the United States refresh their perceptions of corruption 
annually, while Italy appears much slower to adjust. 
 
 . Breakpoint Tests 
 
An important issue for this study is the impact of the OECD Convention on the 
incidence of corruption within the developed countries under review.  This 
question was examined in the previous section for the group of countries as a 
whole using a number of approaches, such as: breakpoint tests (for example, 
the Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test); dummy variables for the OECD 
Convention (with the year 1998 being nominated as the year in which any 
structural shift in ratings attributable to the Convention would have been 
expected to have been seen); and, parameter stability tests (CUSUM and  
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CUSUM Squared) for a simple regression model (where corruption in a given 
year is driven by corruption in the preceding year).  The results of simple 
regressions for each of the three countries – Denmark, the United States, and 
Italy - are reported in Table 6.11.  In each model, the incidence of corruption 
for each country in a given year is deemed to be determined by the incidence 
of corruption for that country in the previous year.  For example, corruption in 
Denmark ‘this year’ is caused by corruption in Denmark ‘last year’1316, and 
similarly for the United States and for Italy. 
 
Table 6.11:  Basic Regressions for Three Countries 
 
Dep Var = Denmark Denmark USA USA Italy Italy 
 Coeff p = Coeff p = Coeff p = 
       
Constant 6.08 0.03 2.88 0.20 0.89 0.10 
Dep Var (-1) 0.35 0.22 0.57 0.09 0.69 0.00 
       
Adj R-sq 0.051  0.157  0.508  
AIC -0.654  1.732  1.450  
SBC -0.563  1.823  1.542  
 
As can be seen in Table 6.11, past experience tends to play differing roles in 
each of the three countries: not being statistically significant in Denmark (p-
value for lagged value of the dependent variable = 0.22); barely statistically 
significant (at the 10 per cent level) for the United States (p-value = 0.09); and, 
strongly statistically significant for Italy (at much less than 1 per cent).   
 
                                                 
1316  Or in modelling syntax: y = a + b*yt-1 + e. 
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The Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test was applied to each of these models to 
identify the most likely time-of-occurrence of any structural break in the time 
series of the incidence of corruption in each of the three countries under 
review.  This Test found the most likely year for a breakpoint in the series for 
Denmark was 2000, for the United States it was 1998, and for Italy it was 1996.  
However, and particularly, noteworthy, none of the results came close to 
reaching statistical significance (p-values for the Wald F-Test being 0.91, 0.34 
and 0.99 respectively).   
 
. Parameter Stability 
 
The results of the Quandt-Andrews Test are borne out by the CUSUM and 
CUSUM Squares Tests for each of these basic regression equations, which 
show: only modest movements in parameter values for Denmark, in all periods 
remaining within the bounds of the 5 per cent threshold for statistical 
significance (meaning none of the movements were statistically significant; 
Figures 7.6 and 7.7); a discernible movement in parameter values for the 
United States in the late 1990s, although at all times remaining within the 5 per 
cent threshold bounds (Figures 7.8 and 7.9); and, generally stable parameter 
values for Italy across the whole period under review, breaching the 5 per cent 
bound for statistical significance for both CUSUM and CUSUM Squared only in 
the mid-to-late 1990s, which coincided with its period of improvement in 
corruption performance (Figures 7.10 and 7.11) 
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Figure 6.6:  CUSUM Results for Denmark 
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Figure 6.7:  CUSUM Squared Results for Denmark 
 
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance
 
 344  
Figure 6.8:  CUSUM Results for the United States 
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Figure 6.9:  CUSUM Squared Results for the United States 
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Figure 6.10:  CUSUM Results for Italy 
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Figure 6.11:  CUSUM Squared Results for Italy 
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 . Dummy Variables 
 
Another perspective on the practical and statistical significance of the OECD 
Convention for the three countries under review can be found by looking at 
expanded specifications of the basic models reported in Table 6.11. The 
expanded specifications involve including a dummy variable for the OECD 
Convention, being set at 1 for 1998 (as per the all-countries average modelling 
discussed in the previous section), and 0 otherwise.  The results from the 
expanded models are reported in Table 6.12 following. 
 
Table 6.12:  The OECD Convention’s Effect in Three Countries 
 
 Den Den USA USA Italy Italy 
Dep Var = Coeff. p = Coeff. p = Coeff. p = 
       
Constant 6.43 0.04 0.52 0.79  0.86 0.11 
Dep Var (-1) 0.31 0.31 0.93 0.01  0.71 0.00 
OECD 0.07 0.70 -1.43 0.02 -0.43 0.41 
       
R-sq 0.136  0.554  0.575  
Adj R-sq. -0.021  0.473  0.498  
Pr (F-stat) 0.446  0.012  0.009  
AIC -0.525  1.318  1.527  
SBC -0.388  1.455  1.664  
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As can be seen from Table 6.12, the OECD Convention dummy variable 
(OECD) failed to achieve statistical significance for either Denmark or Italy 
(with p-values of 0.70 and 0.41 respectively).  However, it was both practically 
and statistically significant for the United States, indicating a fall of a sizeable 
1.43 index points (p-value = 0.02) in that country’s corruption rating 
(suggesting the OECD Convention caused a deterioration in the United States’ 
international corruption rating)1317.  Statistical inference:  the OECD 
Convention did not appear to have any effect on the corruption performance of 
either Denmark or Italy, but had a substantial negative impact on that of the 
United States. 
 
 . Regime Shift Specification 
  
Regrettably, it was not possible to further expand the models, to examine 
regime-shift specifications (through the inclusion of an interaction term 
between OECD and the dependent variable lagged one year) for each country 
model due to data limitations1318.  However, we can reasonably presume any 
such interaction term was probably unlikely to be statistically significant for 
Denmark and Italy given previous findings about: the relative timing of the  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1317 Possibly reflecting an increased awareness of corruption issues amongst respondents in the 
United States 
1318  Insufficient degrees of freedom/ observations. 
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breakpoints identified by the Quandt-Andrews Test; and, the lack of statistical 
significance of the OECD Convention dummy variable.  By contrast, such an 
interaction term may well have been statistically significant for the United 
States given the information derived from the Quandt-Andrews Test and the 
application of the OECD Convention dummy variable.  Such questions await 
further research as additional data sets become available. 
 
 . Summary and Conclusion 
 
The first section of this chapter examined the impact of the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions on the incidence of corruption in an aggregated group of 22 
developed countries, which largely constitute the major members of the OECD 
itself.  This section took the analysis one step further, looking at the impact of 
the Convention on three OECD member countries:  Denmark, selected for its 
consistent performance as a low corruption country; the United States, which 
sat near the middle of the panel of countries for the incidence of corruption; 
and, Italy, which was selected for its consistent performance as a high 
incidence country.  This ‘three country’ analysis was assisted by the absence of 
any statistically significant correlations between them, in their respective 
corruption performances. Additional statistical testing, using analyses of 
variance, and tests of equality, confirmed this apparent independence in 
corruption performances. 
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Of particular importance for the primary research question of this study has 
been our ability to construct econometric/leximetric models to rigorously test 
for the impact of the OECD Convention on the incidence of corruption in the 
selected developed countries, and in this section a sample of three nations 
(Denmark, the United States and Italy).  Formal breakpoint tests found the 
most likely break-point years in the incidence of corruption were: for 
Denmark, the year 2000, well after the entry into force of the Convention; but 
for Italy, the year 1996, well before the time of the Convention; and, in neither 
cases were they statistically significant (that is, the measured breakpoints could 
have been a result of chance).  By comparison, the formal breakpoint tests did 
find a breakpoint year of 1998 for the United States (coinciding with the OECD 
Convention), although it too failed tests of statistical significance.  Parameter 
stability testing bore out these results; the OECD Convention did not appear to 
have a statistically significant impact on corruption in Denmark, the United 
States or Italy. An alternate technique, known as dummy variable modelling, to 
examine the same question, produced fairly similar results, albeit with one 
notable exception.  While the dummy variable modelling method confirmed 
the absence of any statistically significant effect of the OECD Convention in 
either Denmark or Italy, it did identify a statistically significant fall in the 
United States’ standing in the international anti-corruption league table: down 
by just over 1.4 index points.  That is, the OECD Convention had a statistically 
significant, adverse, impact on the United State’s anti-corruption status. 
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Three Countries (Regressions) 
 
The previous sections of this chapter have examined and modelled two 
dimensions of the question of the effectiveness of an international legal 
instrument (the OECD Convention) on the incidence of corruption in a sample 
of developed countries. This section asks the complementary question of ‘what 
drives corruption in developed countries?”. Such an inquiry is, axiomatically, 
multi-faceted, with potentially an almost limitless range of cultural, economic, 
historical, political and social drivers, amongst others, of corruption, any or all 
of which may well differ across space and time.  Any effort to ‘model 
everything’ which might possibly have a causal relationship with corruption 
would quickly become intractable.  To maintain a degree of manageability, and 
hopefully clarity of exposition and findings, this section will bound the analysis 
to the three developed countries considered in the previous section (namely, 
Denmark, Italy and the United States), and use a suite of indicators which have 
appeared consistently in our primary data source (the WCY series 1992 to 
2006).  Inevitably, this decision rule means our research question in this sub-
section transforms to ‘what are the commercial, economic and political drivers 
of corruption in a representative sample of three developed countries, namely 
Denmark, Italy and the United States of America?’. 
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 . Explanatory Variables 
 
Having defined the variables we are interested in having explained (the 
incidence of corruption in each of the three countries under consideration), the 
challenge becomes to select the explanatory variables in our model(s).  To a 
large degree, this selection is prescribed by the requirement for the consistent 
availability of usable indicators across the entire period under review (1992 – 
2006).  While the various WCYs have produced a broad sweep of possible 
indicators which could be used to explain corruption, not all were collected for 
all three countries in a consistent matter all of the time.  Some indicators were 
collected for some years, and not for others, leading to difficult-to-overcome 
problems associated with missing variables.  Putting aside those indicators 
where there were potential problems of missing items resulted in a set of 
thirteen potential explanators of corruption being available in the three 
countries under review.   
 
These potential explanators were (in alphabetical order of their mnemonic): CB 
= cross border: cross border ventures can be negotiated with foreign partners 
without government intervention; CCP = cost of capital: the cost of capital does 
not hinder business development in that country; CCR = corporate credibility: 
company managers are trusted by the public; CI = country image: the image of 
your country abroad supports the development of business; CPT = capital and 
property taxes:  such taxes as a percentage of national revenue;  CR = country 
credit rating:  as assessed by international institutional investors; ENT = 
entrepreneurship: managers generally have a sense of entrepreneurship; GEP = 
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government economic policies: the government adapts economic policies to 
changes in the economic environment; LR = labour regulation; labour 
regulations (hiring and firing regulations, minimum wages etc) are flexible 
enough; NC = national culture: national culture is open to foreign influence; 
PC = price controls: government price controls do not effect pricing of products 
in most industries; PTN: protectionism: national protectionism does not 
prevent foreign products and services from being imported; and, SR = social 
responsibility: managers do not neglect their responsibility towards society1319.  
Each of these variables (with the exception of capital and property taxes, which 
is a percentage of total revenue) are scores (out of 10), with a higher score for 
the variable being expected to be directly associated with a better score on the 
corruption variable (CRPT)1320.  For example, as the score for entrepreneurship 
(ENT) rises a country would be ‘cleaner’ on the corruption (CRPT) measure. 
 
 . Correlations 
 
An insight into the relationships between the dependent variable (CRPT) and 
the 13 explanatory variables can be found in the practical and the statistical 
significance of the correlations, reported in Table 6.13 following.  The 
mnemonics ‘r’ report the practical significance, and ‘p’ the statistical 
significance of the correlation between CRPT (corruption) and the variable 
nominated in the left-hand column. 
                                                 
1319 As fully defined and reported in toto in the primary sources. 
1320 Recall: the higher the corruption index, the ‘more virtuous’ the nation is on corruption 
matters. 
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Table 6.13:  Correlations Between Corruption and 13 Explanatory Variables 
 
  Denmark Italy USA 
     
cpt r = 0.06 0.21 0.53 
 p = 0.82 0.44 0.04 
     
ccp r = 0.04 0.68 0.29 
 p = 0.89 0.01 0.29 
     
cr r = -0.37 0.44 -0.49 
 p = 0.17 0.10 0.06 
     
gep r = -0.31 0.42 -0.40 
 p = 0.27 0.12 0.14 
     
ptn r = 0.31 -0.06 0.39 
 p = 0.26 0.84 0.15 
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  Denmark Italy USA 
     
pc r = 0.53 0.71 0.63 
 p = 0.04 0.00 0.01 
     
lr r = 0.07 0.29 0.32 
 p = 0.80 0.30 0.25 
     
cb r = 0.22 -0.10 0.63 
 p = 0.42 0.73 0.01 
     
nc r = 0.15 0.15 0.13 
 p = 0.59 0.59 0.65 
     
ci r = 0.02 0.52 -0.10 
 p = 0.95 0.05 0.74 
     
ccr r = 0.13 0.14 -0.04 
 p = 0.65 0.63 0.90 
     
ent r = -0.18 -0.07 0.10 
 p = 0.52 0.81 0.71 
     
sr r = -0.15 -0.08 -0.20 
 p = 0.59 0.77 0.48 
 
The most interesting finding from Table 6.13 is the small number of 
explanatory variables which appear to be statistically significantly correlated 
with corruption.  Amongst the pair-wise correlations which find statistical 
significance (at the conventional 5 per cent (0.05) level) are: for Denmark, only 
PC (price controls); for Italy, CCP (cost of capital), PC (price controls), and CI  
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(country image); and, for the United States, CPT (capital and property taxes), 
PC (price controls) and CB (cross border ventures).  However, correlation is 
only indicative of coincidence, and not necessarily a reliable guide of causality, 
such matters being better evaluated through regression modelling techniques 
(discussion of which is to come). 
 
 . General-to-Specific Modelling 
 
The regression modelling approach was used to identify the practical and the 
statistical significance of the variables which best explain the incidence of 
corruption in each of the three countries under review.  This approach was 
based on general-to-specific (also known as backward elimination) regression 
modelling, where all potential explanatory variables are included in the first 
specification, and then progressively deleted until a final model specification is 
achieved where all remaining explanatory variables are statistically significant.  
The decision rule for deletion is the variable with the least statistical 
significance (measured as the highest p-value) is dropped from the subsequent 
equation.  This procedure is repeated using this decision rule until only 
statistically significant explanatory variables remain in the model.  The 
sequence of deletion can provide information on the relative (lack of) statistical 
significance of the explanatory variables under consideration; the least 
important are dropped earliest in the process of elimination. 
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For Denmark, the elimination process involved specifying 8 sequential models, 
with the order of deletion being CB (cross border), CCP (cost of capital), PTN 
(protection), CPT (capital and property taxes), ENT (entrepreneurship),  PC 
(price controls), and LR (labour regulation).  For Italy, it involved 6 sequential 
models, with the order of elimination being CCP (cost of capital), NC (national 
culture), CCR (corporate crdibility), GEP (government economic policies), and 
CPT (capital and property taxes).  For the United States of America, the process 
involved 4 sequential models, with the order of exit of the explanatory 
variables being CCP (cost of capital), CCR (corporate credibility), and PTN 
(protectionism)1321.  A summary of the final models for each of the three 
countries can be found in Table 6.14 (full reporting of all of the modelling 
sequences can be found in Appendices 6.5 to 6.7). 
                                                 
1321  Discussion of the reasons for the individual country sequences of elimination of the 
explanatory variables is outside of the scope of this study, and a major undertaking we leave 
for further research at another place and time. 
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Table 6.14:  Summary of General-to-Specific Modelling Sequences 
 
 Denmark Denmark Denmark Italy Italy Italy USA USA USA 
y = crpt Coeff. p = Beta Coeff. p = Beta Coeff. p = Beta 
          
Cons 9.03 0.00 . -12.11 0.02 . 27.11 0.03 . 
CPT … … … … … … 3.39 0.02 1.00 
CCP … … … … … … … … … 
CR -0.34 0.00 -1.43 1.02 0.02 0.74 -3.16 0.02 -1.03 
GEP -0.31 0.00 -1.03 … … … 1.15 0.03 1.77 
PTN … … … 0.85 0.03 0.61 … … … 
PC … … … 1.02 0.05 0.38 0.83 0.02 0.81 
LR … … … -1.65 0.01 -1.61 -0.91 0.03 -0.65 
CB … … … 1.09 0.01 0.59 -1.84 0.04 -0.91 
NC 0.11 0.04 0.57 … … … 1.34 0.03 1.11 
CI -0.25 0.04 -0.66 2.14 0.01 1.31 -0.81 0.02 -1.92 
CCR 0.43 0.01 0.77 … … … … … … 
ENT … … … -0.54 0.03 -0.58 1.75 0.01 2.34 
SR 0.40 0.01 1.27 -3.29 0.00 -2.02 -1.83 0.02 -1.67 
          
Adj R2  0.729   0.835   0.872  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.007   0.006   0.018  
AIC  -1.777   0.586   -0.213  
SBC  -1.446   1.011   0.306  
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Several features stand out in Table 6.14.  Firstly, the high values for the 
Adjusted R-Squared for each of the models (the proportion of the variation in 
the dependent variable, in this case corruption in each of the three countries 
under review, explained by the remaining, statistically significant, explanatory 
variables)1322.  These figures range from just over 87 per cent for the United 
States to 83.5 per cent for Italy, and almost 73 per cent for Denmark, indicating 
these variables account for a sizeable share of the drivers of corruption in each 
of the three countries.  The second is the use of Beta coefficients, which allow 
analysts to better compare the relative importance (and practical significance) 
of each of the explanatory variables.  In short, a higher absolute Beta 
coefficient suggests a relatively more (practically significant) explanatory 
variable than one with a lower absolute Beta coefficient1323.  Using this facility 
allows researchers to gain an insight into the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables, with the three most important being: for Denmark, CR  
 
 
 
                                                 
1322 Some readers may be concerned about the presence and influence of multi-collinearity 
(high intercorrelations) between the explanatory variables used in this modelling.   While 
there are methods available for addressing this issue (for example, the use of factor or 
principal components analyses) they come at the high cost of loss of information on the 
absolute and relative impact of the particular variables subsumed therein. 
1323  Care should be taken by those not familiar in attaching narrative explanations to Beta 
coefficients.   They should be understood as ‘a one standard deviation increase in the relevant 
x variable, causes a (Beta coefficient) standard deviation increase/ decrease (as the prefix 
prescribes) in the dependent variable’.  The Best coefficient is essentially the conventional b-
value coefficient adjusted for the relative standard deviations of the relevant x and the y 
variables.  By way of example, the Beta  = 1.27 for Denmark for social responsibility means a 
one standard deviation increase in social responsibility would be expected to cause a 1.27 
standard deviation increase in Denmark’s corruption performance (recall: an increase in the 
measure suggests ‘a cleaner’/more virtuous performance). 
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(country credit rating; having a negative impact on corruption), SR (social 
responsibility; positive), and GEP (government economic policies; negative); 
for Italy, SR (social responsibility; negative), LR (labour regulation; negative), 
and CI (country image; positive); and, for the United States, ENT 
(entrepreneurship; positive), CI (country image; negative), and GEP 
(government economic policies; negative).    
 
 . Parameter Stability 
 
Parameter stability is also an important issue in this section, just as it has been 
in the previous two sections of this study. Are the parameter/coefficient values 
estimated for the models for the three countries under review stable across 
time, do they fluctuate (and if so, when and by how much), and are any such 
variations statistically significant, or not ?  These issues can be addressed by the 
application of the CUSUM and CUSUM Squares technques to models for each 
of Denmark, Italy and the United States.  The model specifications used in the 
parameter stability testing involve: as the dependent variable, perceptions of 
corruption in each of the three countries; and, as the independent variables, 
the three most important indicators identified using the Beta coefficient  
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selection criteria (reported above)1324. In the latter case, this meant the 
explanatory variables were, for: Denmark, country credit rating, social 
responsibility, and government economic policies; Italy, social responsibility, 
labour regulation, and country image; and, the United States, entrepreneurship, 
country image, and government economic policies.  The results for both 
CUSUM (parameter stability of the mean) and CUSUM Squares (parameter 
stability of the variance) for each of the three countries under review are 
reported in the following Figures.    
                                                 
1324  Parameter stability testing using all of the variables which retained statistical significance 
in the original backward elimination process was not viable because of the limited degrees of 
freedom/ number of observations.   Any results, at best, covered only a short time period from 
which few useful inferences could have been drawn, and/or were subject to relatively higher 
standard errors (and hence less precise estimation). 
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Figure 6.12:  Denmark CUSUM 
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Figure 6.13: Denmark CUSUM Squares 
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Figure 6.14: Italy CUSUM 
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Figure 6.15:  Italy CUSUM  Squares 
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Figure 6.16:  United States CUSUM 
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Figure 6.17:  United States CUSUM Squares 
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A review of the parameter stability of the models for the three countries shows 
fairly similar patterns for the higher and middle performing countries (namely, 
Denmark and the United States), and notably different pattern for the lower 
performing Italy.  In the former cases (Denmark and the United States), the 
CUSUM lines in both cases were fairly flat from the mid 1990s to around 2002, 
before rising in the case of Denmark, and falling in the case of the United 
States, although in neither case did the CUSUM line breach the 5 per cent 
boundary for statistical significance.  That is, any movements in the parameter 
values measured by the CUSUM test were not statistically significant.  
However, the same could not be said for the CUSUM Squares test results, 
which breached the boundaries of statistical significance (at the 5 per cent 
threshold) for both Denmark and the United States between 2001 – 2005.  By 
comparison, both the CUSUM and the CUSUM Squares indicators for Italy 
showed some degree of oscillation over the period under review, but did not 
reach statistical significance at any stage (although it was a close-run between 
2001 and 2003 for the CUSUM test).  Taken as a whole, the general stability of 
the CUSUM tests for the three countries suggests the models perform well in 
explaining corruption in the relevant countries, while the seemingly 
statistically significant movements in the CUSUM Squares test results for 
Denmark and for the United States in the early 2000s are likely to be explicable 
by factors relating to the selected explanatory variables rather than the effects 
of the OECD Convention, coming well after the 1998 breakpoint identified in 
the previous sections of this study.  
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. Summary and Conclusion 
 
This section examined the commercial, economic and political drivers of 
corruption in three representative developed countries:  Denmark (ranked 
highly), the United States (middle ranked) and Italy (lowly ranked) in terms of 
their ‘corruption cleanlineness’. Exploratory data analysis, in the form of 
correlation (magnitude, direction and statistical significance) found only a 
small number of statistically significant correlations, with no consistent 
statistically significant correlations apparent except for price control measures, 
which were found to have a positive, reasonably strong and statistically 
significant impact on the incidence of corruption in each of the three countries 
under review. More rigorous testing of potential causal relationships through 
an iterative process of general-to-specific modelling (also known as backward 
elimination) identified a suite of potential explanatory variables which had a 
statistically significant effect in explaining perceptions of corruption.  For all 
three countries, these variables included country credit rating, government 
economic policies, country image and corporate social responsibility.  Only cost 
of capital was not statistically significant in any three countries; all other 
variables, in various combinations, appeared in at least one of the country-
models.  Tests of parameter stability showed fairly stable values for the CUSUM 
test for all three countries, and the breaching of statistical significance for the 
CUSUM Squares test for Denmark and for the United States between 2001 and 
2005 were only marginal. Taken as a whole, the analysis demonstrates a degree 
of commonality, and a degree of difference, in the causal drivers of corruption 
in Denmark, Italy, and the United States of America. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
 This chapter set out to answer an important question which has received 
scant, if any substantive, attention in scholarly and public policy institutional 
analyses of corruption:  “how effective is the law in tackling corruption?”  
Rather than answer such a general question in a narrative frame, this chapter 
(as part of this broader study) posed the more particular question of: “how 
effective was the OECD Convention on the Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in reducing corruption in a sample of 22 developed (mostly 
OECD member) nations?”, using the analytical tools of econometrics and 
leximetrics.  The question was investigated on three levels: first, looking at the 
impact of the OECD Convention on 22 developed countries in the aggregate; 
second, by a more detailed examination of the impact of the OECD Convention 
on a sub-sample of three specific nations (namely Denmark, the United States 
of America, and Italy); and, finally, (and slightly tangential to our core research 
question, but nevertheless of some practical importance for the wider campaign 
against corruption) an inquiry into some of the potential commercial, economic 
and political drivers of corruption in those three, representative, countries. 
 
The results of the econometric/leximetric modelling used in this chapter are 
likely to be of substantial practical significance to those charged with designing 
and implementing laws intended to tackle corruption, and provide valuable 
insights for scholars and others interested in the analyses of such issues.  
However, they will offer only modest, at best, comfort to anti-corruption  
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campaigners and to anyone looking for ‘single shot, silver bullets’ to slay the 
corruption dragon.  In the aggregate, the OECD Convention had a statistically 
significant impact on corruption in the 22 developed countries under review, 
but only a modest practical significance – a reduction of just 0.5 index points 
on the WCY’s global corruption index, signalling deterioration in corruption 
performance in the relevant developed countries as a group1325.  Paradoxically, 
for champions of the OECD Convention, it would appear the entry into force 
of the instrument may have raised awareness of corruption, leading observers 
to become more sensitive to the issue than they may otherwise have been (who 
then responded negatively to what they previously had not noticed). 
 
The three-country modelling, which examined the impact of the OECD 
Convention on high-performing (more virtuous) Denmark, middle performing 
United States of America, and lowly performing Italy, found mixed results.  
Taken as a whole, across a suite of econometric/leximetric tests, the analyses 
indicate the OECD Convention had no statistically significant impact on 
corruption in Denmark or Italy, but did have a statistically significant impact 
on corruption in the United States where it caused a 1.4 index point decline in 
that country’s corruption performance index – that is, suggesting a 
deterioration in the United State’s corruption performance.  Again, this finding 
probably is more indicative of greater observer awareness of the nature, 
incidence and impact of corruption in the United States, than a deterioration in 
corruption performance in that country explicitly caused by the OECD 
Convention per se. 
                                                 
1325  Recall:  a higher index score represents a ‘more virtuous’ natures in terms of corruption. 
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The causes-of-corruption modelling essentially concluded there was a degree of 
commonality, and a degree of difference, between the main commercial, 
economic and political drivers of corruption in the three nations.  Through an 
econometric/leximetric process known as general-to-specific modelling, we 
identified a number of potential explanatory variables which had a statistically 
significant effect in explaining corruption.  For all three countries under 
review, these variables included country credit rating, government economic 
policies, country image and corporate social responsibility.  Only cost of capital  
was not statistically significant in any of the three countries; all other variables 
considered, in various combinations, produced statistically significant results in 
at least one of the three countries.  In essence, most of the potential causes 
examined did matter, although in combinations and patterns not necessarily 
consistent across Denmark, the United States or Italy. 
 
Distilled to its core messages, this chapter found:  the OECD Convention would 
appear to have raised awareness of the nature, incidence and impact of 
corruption in the sample of 22 developed countries; this increased awareness 
led to a negative reaction amongst observers, producing both a statistical and 
practical significant ‘marking down’ of the performance of the 22 developed 
countries as a group; the impact of the OECD Convention was not uniform 
across the group, with the instrument having no impact in some countries (for 
example, high-performing Denmark, and low-performing Italy) but practically  
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and statistically significant impacts in others (for example, middle-performing 
United States of America); and, finally, there are both important commonalities 
and differences in the commercial, economic and political causes of corruption 
in the three countries.  All of which leads to a general conclusion:  broad scale 
international legal instruments are not uniformly effective in impacting 
corrupt behaviour in target countries; and, the causes of corruption are not 
uniform around the world.  In short, to mix one’s metaphors, ‘no one size fits 
all’, and ‘there is no one, magic silver (legal) bullet’ for tackling corruption.  
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Chapter 7:  Summary and Conclusion           
 
“…corruption distorts market forces, undermines the rule of law, 
erodes public trust, and ultimately, threatens political stability.”1326 
 
Introduction 
 
Corruption is a continuing challenge for economies and societies, and the laws 
which govern them; one which has been with us for centuries, if not 
millennia1327.  Few would challenge the view corruption is a real problem 
wherever it is found1328, although legitimate debate can turn on its magnitude, 
and the causes, consequences and potential policy tools to address  
corruption1329. While many economies and societies can survive isolated 
instances of petty corruption with minimal adverse effects, the impact of grand 
corruption is likely more pervasive and costly to a nation’s economic, legal, 
political and/or social  
 
                                                 
1326  Boswell (1999) at 140. 
1327 As Plato observed (The Laws, at 349): “The servants of the nation are to render their 
services without any taking of presents …”. 
1328 The exception being those in the ‘beneficial grease’ camp: inter alia, Leys (1965) at 220; 
Khan (1996) at 683. Colombatto (2003) at 375; Mendex and Sepulveda (2006) at 96, where 
there is government failure; Leff (1964) at 11; Leys (1965) at 223; Huntington (1968) at 386; 
Barreto (2000) at 37; Dutt and Traca (2010) at 857;  Jong and Bogmans (2010) at 385, in 
situations of excessive or inefficient regulation; and, Braguinsky (1996) at 14; Cheung (1996) 
at 1, where corruption can help to accelerate the demise of totalitarian States.   
1329 Addressed at length in Chapter 2, “The Corruption Problem”, of this thesis. 
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institutions, performance and prospects, especially when it takes of the form of 
‘state capture’ - that is, when the institutions of State are subverted for the 
narrow benefit of the corrupt actors1330. 
 
The Corruption Problem 
 
The causes of corruption are many and varied across time and across space (and 
time and space interactively).  Without attempting to be exhaustive, the main 
causal drivers of corruption include: poor economic governance, often reflected 
in excessive or poorly designed governmental interventions in the market 
sector1331; deficient political governance and institutions, evident in weaknesses 
in public sector accountability1332 and unwarranted limitations on the freedom 
of the press1333; weak market institutions, typified by the absence of clear and 
transparent laws and regulations1334; shortcomings in the  design, nature and 
extent of public sector taxing and spending policies and practices, most notably 
taxation laws which involve a substantial degree of discretion by taxation  
 
 
                                                 
1330 Hellman et al (2000b) at 2; Lambsdorff (2002b) at 104; for a good general discussion of the 
‘state capture’ approach to corruption, see Kaufman and Vicente (2011). 
1331 Wolf and Gurgen (2000) at 3; Aidt, Dutta and Sena (2008) at 196; Clausen, Kraay and 
Nyiri (2011) at 212. 
1332 Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) at 278. 
1333 Lederman et al (2001) at 2; Treisman (2000) at 404; Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 10; Naim 
(1995) at 247; Frelie et 1l (2007) at 838; Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2012) at 3. 
1334 Boardman and Recanatini (2000) at 1; Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) at 21; Goel and Nelson 
(2010) at 444. 
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officials1335; systemic inadequacies in the processes by which civil servants are 
appointed, promoted and remunerated, in particular where such decisions are 
based on nepotism and/or patronage1336; and, the distorting and rent-seeking 
nature of discretionary, activist industry- and/or trade-policies, especially 
where licences, subsidies or other targetable benefits can be bought and sold by 
corrupt actors1337. 
 
The consequences of corruption manifest themselves in a range of forms, with 
the outcome for any nation or society dependent on its institutional structures, 
and its state of economic development and growth.  At the very least, petty 
corruption can diminish and/or distort economic, legal, political and social 
outcomes, relative to what they would otherwise have been; at worst, grand 
corruption, especially where it takes the form of entrenched state capture, can 
lead to the breakdown of a nation’s economic, legal and political systems – that 
is, State failure1338.  Amongst the main adverse economic and social effects of 
corruption is its tendency to: widen income and wealth inequality1339, and 
increase poverty by undermining the effectiveness (even the existence) of  
 
 
                                                 
1335 Tanzi (1998) at 11; Chand and Moene (1999) at 1138; Hindriks et al (1999) at 396–397.   
1336 Murphy et al (1991) at 521; Alam (1989) at 444; World Bank (1998) at 3; Robertson-Snape 
(1999) at 595Wei (1999) at 18; Wamey (1999) at 1. 
1337 Ades and Di Tella (1997a) at 1023; Mauro (1998b) at 11; Khan (1996) at 685; Moran (1999) 
at 575; Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) at 44; Harma (2000) at 33; Treisman (2000) at 435; 
Torrez (2002) at 387; Cheung et al (2011) at 5; 
1338 Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 3. 
1339 Gupta et al (1998) at 1; Li et al (2000) at 155; Mauro (1998a) at 263; Wei (1999) at 2; 
Olofsgaard and Zahran (2008) at 166; Hodge et al (2011) at 482. 
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social welfare systems, and impairing access for the children of the poor to the 
education system and hence the opportunity to build their own human 
capital1340; introduce and then perpetuate biases with national taxation systems, 
by encouraging tax evasion, poor tax administration, and exemptions (legal and 
illegal) which disproportionately favour the politically well-connected1341; 
undermine the competitiveness and the efficiency of the business and market 
sectors, by sapping entrepreneurial endeavour, reducing investment, 
employment and productivity, with otherwise productive energies being re-
directed away from wealth-creation activities1342; twist the allocation of 
economic and social resources, with key infrastructure decisions (for example, 
spending on roads, bridges, schools or hospitals) made on the basis of their 
potential for corruption rather than optimal economic or social net benefit1343; 
and, of particular importance for developing and/or transitional economies, 
distort foreign direct investment by encouraging greater investment in 
politically favoured and/or less efficient investment1344, or skewing investment 
decisions toward debt-based financing which is more vulnerable to 
economically and socially destabilising ‘capital-flight’1345. 
 
 
                                                 
1340 Mauro (1998a) at 263; Gupta et al (1998) at 29; Wei (1999) at 2; Olofsgaard and Zahran 
(2008) at 166; Hodge et al (2011) at 482. 
1341 Gupta et al (1998) at 7; Freisdman et al (2000) at 461. 
1342 Murphy et al (1991) at 522; Fisman and Svensson (2000) at 3; Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) at 
13. 
1343 Mauro (1998a) at 263; Gupta et al (2001) at 767; Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at 3. 
1344 Brunetti et al (1997a) at 23; Brouthers, Gao and McNicol (2008) at 673. The resources 
sector being more vulnerable because of factors such as licensing and the higher sunk costs 
associated with developing facilities such as mines, and oil and gas systems. 
1345 Rivera-Baitz (2001) at 727. 
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Any number of potential policy tools to address for corruption has been 
proposed across time and space, some with the bold and ambitious objective of 
completely eradicating corruption, others more modestly aiming to manage, 
limit or just reduce its incidence and impact.  The longevity and spatial reach of 
corruption point to its resilience, and thus its capacity to survive the best 
designed and directed, and most intensive assaults upon it.  While there is no 
‘one size fits all’ solution to the problem of corruption, important options 
which warrant consideration by those committed to combating corruption 
include: destabilising corrupt relationships, by creating distrust between the 
parties to the corrupt transaction(s) and by promoting greater transparency in 
vulnerable environments1346; clear demonstrations of principle-driven will from 
those in key governmental and other leadership positions1347; acting promptly 
and decisively on  nascent instances of corruption which have potential for 
wider contagion effects1348; more effective legal penalties and processes for 
those on the supply and the demand sides of the corrupt transaction, ranging 
across pecuniary (for example, seizure of proceeds of crime) and custodial 
penalties1349; and, expanded use of ‘social marketing strategies’1350,  which can  
 
                                                 
1346 Naim (1995) at 251; Klitgaard (2000) at 5; Lambsdorff (2002a) at 221. 
1347 Gray and Kaufman (1998) at 9; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) at 133; Chand and Moene 
(1999) at 1130; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590 – 592; Kingston (2008) at 90. 
1348 World Bank (1997) at 102; Chand and Moene (1999) at 1130; Goudie and Stasavage (1998) 
at 130. 
1349 Block and Lind (1975b) at 488; Witte (1980) at 80; Posner (1980) at 414; Polinsky and 
Shavell (1991) at 618; Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 2; Quah (2001) at 458;  
1350  Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) for an extended discussion of the various options and 
strategies available and used.  See also George and Lacey (2000) at 578 – 587. 
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take the form of effective engagement of civil society organisations such as 
business and consumer groups, labour unions and the free media, to highlight 
cases of corruption and create a culture in public life dissuasive of 
corruption1351.  The instruments of international finance and governance, such 
as the lending policies and practices of global institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank1352, and of international law, 
such as specific and general purpose treaties addressing corruption issues, can 
also be brought into play1353.  
 
International Law 
 
The footprint of international law on corruption issues has, over time and 
space, been at best light, largely reflecting the design, nature and modalities of 
this legal vehicle.  For much of its history, international law has been regarded 
primarily as a system for addressing the rights and obligations of States through 
which they can avoid or contain disputes between them1354.  However, more  
 
 
                                                 
1351 See Kindra and Stapenhurst (1998) for an extended discussion of the various options and 
strategies available and used.  Bardhan (1997) at 1334, questions the sustained effectiveness of 
such interventions. 
1352 World Bank (1997) at 101; Kaufman (1997) at 129; Wei (1999) at 22; Wolf and Gurgen 
(2000) at 4; Zagaris and Ohri (1999) at 78-83; Posadas (1999/2000) at 399-401; Harms (2000) 
at 204-207;  Wallace-Bruce (2000) at 372-374; Shams (2001) at 95-99; Thornburgh (2003) at 
139; Posadas (1999/2000) at 399-401. 
1353 Which was the main focus of Chapter 3 – “International Law and Corruption” – of this 
thesis. 
1354 Shearer (1994) at 4; Dixon and McCorquodale (2003) at 1; Blay (2003) at 2. 
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recently (mainly since the early part of the twentieth century) the scope of 
international law has expanded to include rules relating to, inter alia, the 
creation and functioning of international organisations, and their relationships 
with States-Parties, and between States and individuals.  The topics of 
international law have also expanded considerably from their earlier foci on 
peace, security and comity between nations into ‘modern’ matters such as 
global banking and finance, economic and social development, intellectual 
property rights and, as we have seen in this study, combating corruption.   
 
Despite the long history of corruption and of international law, they have 
operated largely on separate paths for much of their existences.  Indeed, it is 
probably only in the last 25 or so years there has been effective engagement 
between international law and corruption, in the form of the emergence of a 
number of plurilateral and multilateral international legal instruments 
targeting corruption1355.  This potentially ‘new approach’ of using international  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1355 For a short history of co-ordinated international legal efforts to combat corruption over 
the past century see Anechiarica (1999) at 380–387. 
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law to deal with the scourge of corruption reflects factors such as the changed 
economic and political dynamics of international relations in the post-Cold  
War period1356, the liberalisation of international commerce, industry and trade 
(reflected in the rise of globalisation)1357, and the increased recognition of the 
costs of corruption by public policy makers, legislators, and the academic and 
business communities1358.   
 
Amongst the most prominent of the international legal instruments addressing 
corruption, which form the foundation for the legal analyses of this study, are 
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption1359, the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions1360, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of 
Europe1361, the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption1362, and the 
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption1363.  
Issues addressed within these legal instruments range across definitions of 
corruption and other key terms used, jurisdiction, public sector 
administration/functioning, application to the private sector, criminal offences 
and penalties, and enforcement and sanctions1364.  While these international  
                                                 
1356 Webb (2005) at 193. 
1357 Nesbit (1998). 
1358 Shams (2001) at 92. 
1359 43 ILM 37 (2004).   
1360 37 ILM 4 (1998). 
1361 38 ILM 505 (1999). 
1362 38 ILM 505 (1999). 
1363 43 ILM 5 (2004). 
1364  Considered at length in Chapter 3, “International Law and Corruption”, of this thesis. 
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legal instruments have attracted criticism from the commercial and the 
academic communities for their various shortcomings against normative 
expectations1365, they are generally superior to what prevailed before their 
creation and what would be the situation in their absence – a vacuum. 
 
Law and Economics 
 
Another perspective on the role and the effectiveness of the law in addressing 
legal-economic issues, such as corruption, and indeed of corruption itself has 
come from the law and economics branch of legal scholarship.  Corruption is 
economic because it involves the inefficient transfer of scarce resources 
(usually capital and entrepreneurship) from better to usually less advantageous 
uses, and legal because corruption is generally illegal in mature legal systems.   
                                                 
1365 For example, over: the failure to prohibit improper payments to political parties, party 
officials and candidates - Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19; Nesbit (1998) at 1305; Shams 
(2001) at 100; George et al (2000) at 516; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 97; Corr and Lawler 
(1999) at 1305; Posadas (1999/2000) at 381; Webb (2005) at 196; the failure to address the role 
of the briber-taker/-solicitor - George et al (2000) at 518; Miller (2000) at 160; Loren (2001) at 
328; Harms (2000) at 161; Pierros and Hudson (1998) at 99; Nesbit (1998) at 1305; the failure 
to cover family members of the applicable persons/groups - Posadas (1999/2000) at 381; and, 
the often wide grants of discretion to States Parties in designing and implementing their 
compliance arrangements - George et al (2000) at 517; Brademas and Heimann (1998) at 19; 
Miller (2000) at 140; Harma (2000) at 49. 
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The law and economics perspective on legal issues utilises the toolkit of 
microeconomics (the economics of the individual, the household, and/or the 
firm) and in particular the price mechanism to better understand the nature 
and the dynamics of corruption1366.  These price signals have been imported 
into the law, both explicitly and implicitly: the former, for example, as a 
pecuniary penalty for breaching the law; the latter, for example, in the 
consequences of the changed behaviour of those impacted by the new law or 
regulation (for example, a business ceasing to trade in the newly/more heavily 
regulated area of economic activity)1367. 
 
Theoretical perspectives from the law and economics movement germane to 
the corruption problem come from the: Chicago (libertarian) school of law and 
economics, which sees a maximal role for markets and for competition, and a 
minimal role for government and regulation, as well as giving priority to 
efficiency over distributional or equity considerations1368;  the Austrian school, 
where the individual is a pro-active player in the world around them, pursuing 
their preferred objectives1369; New Haven school, which sees an important role 
for government in remedying market failure where it occurs1370, with 
legislatures being responsible for balancing efficiency and distributional 
                                                 
1366 Posner (1985a) at 92; Posner (1987b) at 5; Ulen (1992) at 114–118; Parisi (2004) at 5. 
1367 A number of case studies have sought to estimate explicit prices for different forms of 
corrupt activity: World Bank (1998) at 3; Alam (1989) at 444; Robertson-Snape (1999) at 590; 
Carrilla (2000) at 258–259. 
1368 Posner (1985) at 192; Posner (1987) at 5; Landes and Posner (1987); Posner (1992); Kaplow 
and Shavell (1994) at 675. 
1369 Sechrest (2004) at 19. 
1370 Rose-Ackerman (1992) at 6-9; Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 59. 
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issues1371; Virginia (Public Choice) school, which focuses on non-market 
decision-making by actors in complex activities which generate political 
outcomes1372, including the incentives which drive the creation of legislation 
and regulation1373; Institutional school, who place institutions at the centre of 
analysis, being mechanisms of collective action used to control individual 
behaviour1374; Neo-Institutional school, which extended their predecessors’ 
emphasis on the role of institutions by stressing these mechanisms were 
initially created and remain in existence to assist society to continuously 
improve its wealth producing capacity through engaging in contracts and 
exchange1375; Critical Legal Studies school, which challenged the libertarian 
arguments of the Chicagoans, seeing the law as a political and/or social, rather 
than an economic, mechanism1376; Rational Choice school, which frames the 
interaction of law and economics in cost/benefit terms, with an individual, 
natural or legal, engaging in an activity when the benefits/rewards exceed the 
cost/risks1377; Behaviouralists, who challenge the perfect rationalism in all 
situations of the Rational Choice school, stressing instead what they regard as 
the imperfect nature of human behaviour1378; Game Theorists, who regard 
analyses in general, and law and economics in particular, as being founded on 
                                                 
1371 Rose-Ackerman (1994) at 54; Cooter (2005) at 222; see also Kaplow and Shavell (1994) at 
667. 
1372 Stigler (1971) and (1976), and Peltzman (1976) on regulation; Shughart and Tollison 
(1986), Faith and Tollison (1983), Stigler (1976), and Peltzman (1980) on legislatures; and, 
Tullock (1965) and Downs (1967) on bureaucracies. 
1373 In the law and economics context, see Parisi and Klick (2004) at 437. 
1374 Commons (1934); Hale (1952). 
1375 Eggertsson (1990) at 317; North (1993) at 245 
1376 Kornhauser (1984) at 365; Trubeck (1984) at 589; Hutchinson and Monahan (1984) at 213. 
1377 Veljanovski (1980) at 177; Hoffman and O’Shea (2002) at 342. 
1378 Jolls et al (1998a) at 1475 -1476; Jolls (2007) at 2; Rachlinksi (2011) at 1676, 
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rigorous quantitative modelling of the initial and sequential conduct of other 
actors in the legal-economic process1379; and Legal Empiricists, whose primary 
interest is in the application of rigorous quantitative methods to legal issues1380.  
Sadly, none of them expressly theorise corruption within their respective 
frameworks. While each has something to say on the issue of law and 
economics, any preferences must be normative in nature, with this study 
holding that each perspective has, to varying degrees, something useful to say 
on the corruption issue.  
 
Where the law and economics movement has applied its conceptual and 
theoretical perspectives directly and specifically to crime and the criminal law 
– largely through the prisms of the Chicago and the Rational Choice schools – 
it regards criminal behaviour as emanating from fundamentally rational 
decisions.  Essentially, a rational individual will engage in criminal activity 
where the rewards/benefits exceed the risks/costs of doing so, or more 
particularly where the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs of crime to 
them personally1381.  By comparison, society will pursue enforcement to the 
point where the marginal benefit from curtailment converges with the 
marginal costs of doing so1382.  Quantification of these benefits and costs, for 
individuals and for societies, is made more challenging by the varying attitudes  
                                                 
1379 Rosenberg and Shavell (1985) at 4; Cooter et al (1982) at 226; Ayres (1989) at 1297; Katz 
(1990b) at 233-238. 
1380  Heise (1998/99) at 815; Croson (2002) at 927 – 928. 
1381 Becker (1968) at 176; Stigler (1970) at 529; Ehrlich (1972) at 262 and (1973) at 522; Bar-
Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) at 15. 
1382 Easterbrook (1983) at 292.   
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to risk across individuals and by societies as perceptions of the incidence and of 
the fear of crime shift across time.  Ultimately, the law and economics 
approach to crime emphasises the various actors in the criminal justice system 
– whether as actual or prospective criminals, as policy-/law-makers, or as 
enforcement agencies – are essentially players in a ‘market for crime’.  In this 
market, criminals sit on one, while law and enforcement agencies sit on the 
other, side of the transaction.  The ‘crime market’ is in equilibrium when the 
criminals (who focus on the net personal return from crime) and the public law 
enforcement agencies (who focus on the net social welfare costs of crime) do 
not feel any need to adjust their conduct and thus alter the implicit prices of 
crime and criminal behaviour1383. 
 
While scholars from law, from economics, and from law and economics have 
developed a rich cornucopia of theories of law and economics, sadly their 
theorising has not extended to the treatment of corruption within their 
respective frameworks.  Nevertheless, we can still speculate how the different 
schools/ movements of law and economics may have theorised: the Chicagoans, 
building on Coase’s Second Theorem, arguing corruption is simply the result of 
government and its growing interventions in the operation of markets; the 
Austrians, regarding corruption as merely another feature of the market place 
the entrepreneur has to confront; the New Haveners seeing corruption as an 
indicator of market failure, resulting in less efficient markets and diminished  
 
                                                 
1383 Ehrlich (1996) at 44. 
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fairness; the Public Choice (Virginians) would likely see corruption as 
reflecting the prevalence of the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats over 
that of the wider electorate; the Institutionalists, would see corruption as a 
metric of institutional failure, resulting in a weakening of economic, legal and 
political rules; to the Critical Legal Studies movement, corruption would likely 
reflect the inherent failures of the freer market, libertarian approach to law, 
economics, politics and society; both the Rational Choice and Behaviourialists 
regarding corruption as the outcome of a conscious and deliberate cost-
benefit/risk-reward assessment by participants, although different in the 
cognitive processes involved in such decision-making; while the Game 
Theorists and Legal Empiricists would likely be normatively indifferent to 
corruption, focusing instead on quantitative analysis and modelling of the 
processes, the drivers and the outcomes of corrupt activity and behaviour. 
 
Modelling Corruption  
 
The incidence and impact of corruption around the world, but in developing 
and transitional economies in particular, suggests in many ‘corruption markets’ 
the rewards for existing and potential players exceed the costs and risks of 
participation.  While scholarly studies have examined different legal and non-
legal strategies for at least containing, if not reducing let alone eliminating,  
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corruption1384, the legal instruments considered have generally been of a 
municipal legal nature (although some have extra-territorial reach1385).  By 
contrast, this study has broken new ground (and hopefully made a substantial 
contribution to scholarly knowledge and research) by applying rigorous 
leximetric methods to test the effectiveness of international laws in tackling 
corruption1386.   The leximetric analysis and modelling undertaken in this study 
progressed along a conventional, multi-stage path, commencing with the usual 
exploratory data analysis (taking the forms of visual inspections of graphs, tests 
of equality, and analyses of variance) before moving on to more rigorous 
methods (such as intervention analysis, which involved testing for structural 
breaks in the key data series; consideration of the presence and patterns of 
auto-correlation again in the key data series) and then moving further still with 
more intensive modelling techniques (such as breakpoint, parameter stability 
analyses and regime-shift modelling specifications). 
 
The leximetric modelling and analysis found the international law (in this case, 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions1387) had only a very small practical effect on 
corruption, seemingly only raising awareness of, and concern about, the 
incidence of corruption in the countries studied; it was not the extensive 
                                                 
1384 As reviewed in Chapter 2, “The Corruption Problem”, of this thesis. 
1385 For example, OECD – FPO – Commentaries, Para 26; OECD – FPO, Article 4 (2); 
AUCPCC, Article 13 (1) (d). 
1386 This thesis may also have made a second, incidental, contribution to research: the macro-
econo-/lexi-metric modelling undertaken in this thesis (as outlined and reported in Chapter 6, 
“Modelling Corruption”) could usefully help fill the gap in ‘law and (macro-) economics’ 
scholarship. 
1387 37 ILM 4 (1998). 
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remedy for corruption for which some may have been hoping.  A more detailed 
case study of three countries (one ‘clean’, one in between, and one ‘infected’ by 
corruption) reinforced this conclusion: the creation of new international legal 
obligations had no real effect on the best and the worst performers in terms of 
their incidences of corruption, although it did raise awareness of domestic 
corruption in the middle-performing nation.  Taken as a whole, broad-scale 
international legal instruments do not appear to be consistently effective in 
tackling corruption in applicable countries.  However, this does not mean 
international law should be discarded entirely in the fight against corruption, 
rather it should be considered as just one part of a broader suite of anti-
corruption initiatives.   
 
Analytical Challenges 
 
Law and economics, and particular leximetric, studies such as this thesis (which 
apply the quantitative toolkit of econometrics to legal problems) are not 
without their own challenges.  One of the most important is obtaining robust 
data on the key variable of interest: in the current context, corruption.  In 
leximetric terms, corruption is, ostensibly, a subjective and intangible 
(sometimes known as latent) metric.  Unlike other areas of law and economics, 
one cannot objectively measure the metric of interest.  In labour law, the 
scholar may be interested in the impact of new industrial relations laws, so 
he/she can look at ‘hard data’ on, for instance, the actual number of industrial  
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disputes using data collected by the national statistical agency; in trade law, the 
scholar may want to assess the effectiveness of a bilateral free trade agreement, 
so he/she can look at subsequent changes in the levels or patterns of imports or 
exports across the national borders of the two participating nations.  Scholars 
(and doctoral candidates) interested in the law and economics of corruption 
have been (and are likely to continue to be) limited to surveys which tap 
perceptions of the incidence and impact of corruption amongst both general 
and informed respondents.  Fortunately, however, this reliance on ‘perceptions 
of corruption’ has become generally accepted practice amongst scholars’1388 
active in the law and economics of corruption domain; for better or for worse, 
it is the best, often the only, available data. 
 
Another important challenge involves the selection of the particular leximetric 
method for data modelling and analysis.  To a large degree, this challenge can 
be addressed by identifying the most appropriate leximetric method for the 
research question at hand, and the treatment of inter-relationships between the  
metrics being used (in particular what econo-/lexi-metric modellers call 
endogeneity).  In the current study, given the focus on the effectiveness of laws 
before and after a change in the law, the best approach was time series analysis 
(dynamic leximetrics) with particular attention to structural break-point  
 
 
                                                 
1388 Studies have found perceptions of corruption to be a good approximation for the incidence 
of corruption, and of the legal realities in nations:  Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) at 
73; Foster, Horowitz and Mendez (2012) at 231. 
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methods.  While the leximetric methodology for such analyses is fairly well 
settled, it too is not without its own challenges, in particular the capacity of 
readily available methods to identify multiple (as distinct from single) 
structural breaks in a times series of data.  At the the same time, there can often 
be plausible, alternate leximetric approaches, each with varying degrees of 
merit, which could be applied to the data series at hand to explore ‘interesting’ 
issues which arise during scholarly research.  In the current context, these 
leximetric options include: latency methods (such as structural equation1389, and 
state space, models); dynamic response techniques (such as vector auto-
regression and error-correction models); spatial procedures (such as contagion 
models); multi-equation systems (such as multivariate regression, seemingly 
unrelated regression, and structural equation models); and, multivariate 
methods (such as cluster, dynamic factor and multivariate regression models); 
to name just a few.  
 
The endogeneity issue (of inter-relationships between the variable used in the 
econo-/lexi-metric modelling) hangs like a cloud over all such exercises, in 
particular the question of the ‘direction of causality’.  In the current context, 
for example: do lower civil service wages cause corruption, or does corruption 
cause lower civil service wages; does low respect for the law cause corruption, 
or does corruption diminish respect for the law?  While the leximetric toolkit 
contains rigorous quantitative methods to examining, and addressing, 
                                                 
1389 For an application of the Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modelling 
approach in the law and economics of corruption see Bjornskov (2011). 
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endogeneity in modelling1390, expansive use thereof has been rare and 
exceptional in better analyses of the law and economics of corruption1391.  
Inclusion of all such modelling in a single thesis would likely become little 
more than a demonstration of the author’s proficiency in the various 
techniques, stretch the patience of the reader/ examiner (being subject to an 
avalanche of algorithms, graphs and diagnostic tables of figures), and 
undermine the tractability of the study; but, are worthy paths of inquiry for 
further, focused scholarly (hopefully, post-doctoral) research and publication. 
                                                 
1390 Such as Granger-Causality tests, instrumental variables in regression (although these bring 
their own sets of challenges relating to relationships with other variables in the models), and 
systems equation modelling (which generally require much larger, robust data sets on 
corruption than are readily available at the current time). 
1391 See, for example, Clausen, Kraay and Nyiri (2011) at 235-240. 
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1992 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.0 8.8 3.4 6.7 4.3 6.6 7.1 6.2 6.9 6.7 5.4 5.3 4.7 5.9 
Austria 7.1 2.7 6.2 8.4 5.8 7.0 7.0 5.4 9.0 6.2 5.8 6.8 6.3 6.7 
Belg/Lux 5.7 11.0 6.1 8.0 2.6 8.2 6.2 4.4 8.2 7.2 5.2 5.9 6.0 5.6 
Canada 8.4 8.8 5.8 8.3 3.4 6.5 7.9 6.6 7.8 7.4 6.4 6.1 5.5 5.5 
Denmark 9.2 4.3 7.3 7.2 6.2 8.7 8.2 8.4 9.4 5.6 6.9 7.2 6.4 6.6 
Finland 9.2 3.9 1.5 7.6 5.5 5.4 6.9 4.9 8.3 3.6 5.3 6.4 6.2 5.2 
France 5.8 5.0 3.9 8.7 2.7 6.0 7.8 4.2 6.5 4.7 5.1 5.7 5.2 6.2 
Germany 7.8 3.1 6.1 9.0 7.4 8.0 7.3 4.9 8.9 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.8 6.1 
Greece 3.1 3.4 1.3 4.7 3.3 8.1 6.5 3.8 6.5 5.8 5.0 4.7 5.5 4.6 
Ireland 7.6 4.8 4.7 6.8 3.9 8.2 6.7 5.4 8.9 6.1 4.3 5.7 6.0 5.1 
Italy 1.7 2.3 3.0 7.9 0.6 7.0 7.2 2.5 7.3 6.3 4.0 5.3 6.7 4.6 
Japan 6.3 10.2 7.3 9.2 2.9 5.4 7.0 5.9 8.0 3.8 4.2 7.2 6.7 5.7 
Netherlands 8.6 3.8 6.7 8.8 5.7 8.6 7.5 3.9 8.7 7.8 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.4 
New Zealand 9.4 8.2 5.5 6.2 4.7 8.2 7.7 8.2 8.2 5.5 6.2 5.4 5.1 5.3 
Norway 7.6 2.9 3.1 7.8 4.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 7.7 3.9 5.7 5.9 4.4 6.1 
Portugal 4.5 1.5 1.2 6.3 6.3 7.6 7.3 3.3 7.0 6.4 5.0 5.7 4.5 3.9 
South Africa 5.9 5.0 2.6 3.7 0.7 3.8 7.1 6.9 5.3 6.2 2.9 6.1 6.8 5.5 
Spain 4.0 3.8 1.5 7.6 5.4 6.6 7.0 3.0 7.0 6.6 4.9 5.1 5.4 4.3 
Sweden 8.7 3.3 4.5 7.8 5.8 7.5 7.1 4.8 8.0 5.8 6.1 7.4 6.6 5.9 
Switzerland 8.5 8.6 6.5 9.2 4.3 5.7 8.0 7.8 8.6 6.7 5.7 7.0 6.6 6.4 
UK 8.4 12.6 3.8 8.5 5.0 7.8 8.3 7.5 8.2 5.3 5.4 5.7 5.4 4.9 
USA 6.7 10.3 6.3 8.8 4.7 7.2 … 6.9 7.8 7.2 4.7 5.5 6.0 5.3 
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1993 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.6 8.8 4.9 6.7 4.3 7.4 8.3 6.0 7.6 7.2 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.9 
Austria 6.3 2.8 5.5 8.4 5.2 7.2 7.1 5.6 9.4 6.4 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.7 
Belgium 6.7 9.8 6.1 8.0 4.3 8.8 6.0 4.8 8.9 7.8 4.9 6.4 6.2 5.6 
Canada 8.4 8.5 5.7 8.2 4.4 6.2 7.9 6.4 7.9 7.5 6.5 5.9 5.5 5.5 
Denmark 9.3 4.1 4.8 7.3 6.1 9.2 8.5 8.8 9.5 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.8 6.6 
Finland 8.8 2.9 2.0 7.0 4.2 6.9 7.6 5.6 8.1 5.0 5.0 6.2 5.3 5.2 
France 5.3 2.4 2.9 8.6 4.0 7.0 7.8 4.3 7 5.8 5.6 6.4 5.7 6.2 
Germany 7.6 2.3 5.3 9.0 4.1 7.9 8.5 4.3 9.1 6.9 4.4 6.4 6.0 6.1 
Greece 3.5 5.6 0.9 4.7 4.5 8.4 7.4 4.1 7.8 7.3 3.9 4.9 5.7 4.6 
Ireland 8.3 4.4 3.0 6.9 4.9 8.8 8.0 5.5 8.7 7.4 4.4 6.0 5.5 5.1 
Italy 0.9 1.3 1.4 7.6 3.5 7.1 6.3 2.7 7.6 7.2 3.5 5.4 6.2 4.6 
Japan 5.0 9.0 7.8 9.1 5.5 4.9 6.7 6.7 8 5.1 4.3 7.3 6.7 5.7 
Netherlands 8.3 2.3 6.7 8.8 4.8 8.2 8.3 3.4 9.2 8.2 6.6 6.7 5.9 6.4 
New Zealand 9.3 1.3 6.2 6.2 6.2 8.5 9.4 8.6 8.7 7.0 6.6 5.9 5.7 5.3 
Norway 8.4 2.7 3.1 7.6 3.9 6.4 6.8 4.6 7.7 5.7 5.8 4.9 4.5 6.1 
Portugal 5.4 2.0 2.0 6.5 6.0 8.5 6.6 3.5 7.9 8.1 5.3 5.7 4.2 3.9 
South Africa 4.0 5.8 3.2 4.0 3.6 3.0 6.3 6.8 4.6 5.7 3.2 6.4 5.9 5.5 
Spain 2.7 5.0 1.5 7.6 3.9 7.6 7.2 2.2 7.7 7.1 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.3 
Sweden 8.4 3.4 2.4 7.6 5.2 7.9 7.9 3.8 8.9 7.3 6.1 6.6 6.6 5.9 
Switz 8.2 7.5 6.9 9.2 4.7 4.9 7.0 8.1 8.1 5.7 4.9 7.0 6.4 6.4 
UK 8.5 8.1 5.8 8.5 3.9 8.0 8.7 7.7 8.5 6.0 5.3 5.8 5.2 4.9 
USA 7.2 10.5 7.0 8.7 3.8 6.5 8.6 6.9 8.1 7.0 4.8 5.9 6.2 5.3 
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1994 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.6 9.8 5.6 6.8 5.6 8.0 7.6 6.0 8.0 8.2 6.0 6.2 6.2 5.9 
Austria 7.1 2.7 6.5 8.5 5.5 7.6 7.3 5.4 9.0 6.5 6.9 6.4 6.2 7.0 
Belgium 5.3 2.7 5.9 8.0 3.3 8.9 7.0 4.0 8.9 8.2 5.2 6.0 6.5 5.8 
Canada 8.7 10.3 6.5 8.2 4.1 7.7 8.3 6.3 8.2 7.5 6.8 5.9 5.7 5.7 
Denmark 9.5 4.0 7.1 7.7 5.8 8.9 8.2 8.1 9.3 7.3 7.4 7.2 6.2 6.8 
Finland 8.9 2.6 6.2 6.9 5.4 7.8 8.3 4.4 8.8 6.2 5.2 7.0 6.2 5.7 
France 6.9 6.0 4.2 8.8 4.9 7.2 7.6 4.3 7.8 6.2 5.6 6.4 6.0 5.5 
Germany 7.6 2.7 6.8 9.0 5.2 8.3 8.8 4.5 9.2 6.8 5.2 6.0 5.7 5.9 
Greece 3.3 6.5 1.2 4.9 2.8 8.6 7.4 4.7 8.1 7.8 3.9 6.0 6.6 4.5 
Ireland 8.6 4.4 6.3 7.0 5.3 9.1 8.2 5.6 9.2 7.6 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.3 
Italy 1.8 2.6 3.3 7.4 1.9 7.2 6.6 2.6 7.5 7.5 4.0 4.7 6.5 4.7 
Japan 3.8 9.4 7.3 9.2 3.3 4.7 6.7 5.7 7.8 6.3 3.7 7.2 5.6 6.2 
Netherlands 7.9 3.6 7.8 8.9 4.8 8.6 7.9 3.3 8.6 8.6 6.7 6.9 6.2 6.4 
New Zealand 9.5 0.7 7.7 6.5 6.4 9.2 9.7 8.5 9.0 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.9 6.1 
Norway 8.5 3.1 7.4 7.8 6.1 6.6 7.5 5.3 8.0 6.4 6.4 6.4 5.5 6.4 
Portugal 5.6 2.0 1.9 6.7 6.3 8.6 7.4 3.5 8.2 8.0 5.3 5.7 4.3 4.4 
South Africa 4.6 1.6 4.1 3.8 3.1 4.1 6.1 6.7 4.6 6.2 3.2 6.3 6.4 5.6 
Spain 3.7 4.8 2.9 7.5 4.7 7.7 7.3 2.6 8.3 7.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 4.9 
Sweden 9.1 3.4 5.8 7.4 5.0 8.2 8.4 4.0 8.6 7.5 6.3 7.0 7.0 6.5 
Switzerland 8.4 7.0 8.2 9.2 5.3 6.3 7.2 8.0 8.6 6.3 6.5 7.6 6.7 6.5 
UK 8.2 7.9 6.1 8.5 5.0 8.7 8.7 7.8 8.9 6.7 5.9 6.1 5.9 5.0 
USA 7.2 11.2 7.9 8.9 4.9 7.3 8.3 7.5 8.3 6.8 5.2 6.3 7.0 5.5 
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1995 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               
Australia 8.9 10.0 4.7 6.9 5.5 8.4 7.9 4.6 7.9 8.2 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 
Austria 7.2 2.6 6.8 8.6 5.5 8.0 6.7 4.6 9.2 6.8 5.9 7.1 6.3 7.1 
Belgium 4.8 2.8 5.9 7.8 4.1 8.6 7.0 3.5 9.0 8.0 5.3 6.3 6.6 6.1 
Canada 8.5 11.3 5.4 8.1 4.6 7.5 8.5 6.1 8.4 7.9 6.6 6.4 6.0 6.1 
Denmark 9.3 4.1 6.8 7.9 4.9 9.1 8.2 8.0 9.2 7.4 7.5 7.2 6.5 6.3 
Finland 8.7 2.7 4.6 6.9 5.3 8.4 8.4 4.6 9.0 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.7 5.7 
France 4.9 5.3 4.8 8.8 4.9 7.3 7.8 4.1 7.9 5.9 5.5 5.8 6.0 5.9 
Germany 6.9 2.7 6.7 8.7 4.9 8.5 8.7 4.2 9.3 7.3 5.7 6.1 6.0 6.3 
Greece 2.9 4.4 1.2 4.9 3.4 8.6 7.0 4.3 7.6 7.6 4.0 4.6 6.1 4.4 
Ireland 8.6 4.2 5.9 7.1 5.6 8.7 7.9 5.2 8.8 8.0 5.5 6.3 6.3 5.5 
Italy 2.6 2.4 3.0 7.2 3.1 7.1 6.4 2.8 8.0 7.5 4.0 5.5 6.2 4.5 
Japan 5.5 10.5 6.9 9.1 3.8 4.5 6.0 5.9 7.5 5.7 4.1 6.9 5.3 6.0 
Netherlands 8.2 3.7 7.4 8.8 5.4 8.5 8.0 3.7 8.9 8.6 7.0 6.9 6.5 6.2 
New Zealand 9.6 6.1 6.6 6.7 7.5 8.8 9.5 7.1 9.2 7.3 7.2 6.4 6.6 5.8 
Norway 8.5 2.6 7.4 7.9 6.0 6.8 7.8 4.7 8.2 6.9 6.6 6.4 5.8 6.3 
Portugal 4.6 2.5 3.0 6.7 5.4 8.5 7.2 4.0 8.3 8.4 5.2 6.0 4.4 4.5 
South Africa 4.0 1.6 3.6 4.0 5.0 4.7 6.5 5.2 4.1 6.1 4.7 6.3 6.3 5.4 
Spain 2.7 4.8 2.7 7.4 3.8 8.0 7.1 2.9 8.5 7.3 5.3 5.3 5.1 5.1 
Sweden 9.0 3.2 3.8 7.5 3.8 8.6 8.8 3.9 8.5 8.0 6.6 7.5 6.6 6.4 
Switzerland 8.3 7.3 8.6 9.2 5.0 6.4 7.5 7.8 8.6 6.5 6.1 7.6 6.9 6.8 
UK 8.4 7.7 6.0 8.7 4.9 8.2 8.9 7.3 8.9 6.2 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.2 
USA 7.4 11.4 7.4 9.1 4.6 7.8 8.7 6.6 8.5 7.3 5.1 6.2 7.0 5.7 
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1996 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 9.0 3.0 4.9 7.1 4.5 7.4 7.7 3.0 7.6 8.1 6.2 6.1 5.6 6.0 
Austria 7.2 0.7 7.9 8.6 4.9 7.5 8.1 4.2 9.3 5.9 7.0 6.6 5.8 7.0 
Belgium 5.9 1.2 6.8 7.9 3.7 7.2 6.8 3.5 8.7 8.4 6.2 6.2 6.5 5.8 
Canada 8.8 0.7 6.4 8.0 4.9 6.6 7.6 6.6 8.1 8.1 8.3 6.8 6.7 6.2 
Denmark 9.6 1.9 7.0 8.0 5.1 8.6 8.7 8.1 9.3 7.5 7.9 7.3 6.6 6.5 
Finland 9.2 1.2 6.0 7.1 4.6 7.7 8.6 3.4 8.9 6.1 6.4 7.5 6.8 6.1 
France 6.0 2.3 4.5 8.9 3.9 6.3 8.0 4.0 7.7 6.0 6.2 5.6 6.1 5.7 
Germany 7.3 1.1 7.6 9.1 3.3 7.3 8.9 3.4 9.0 7.1 7.3 6.2 5.7 5.8 
Greece 3.0 1.2 2.6 5.0 3.3 6.9 6.9 4.9 8.0 8.0 4.0 5.3 5.9 4.8 
Ireland 8.8 1.7 6.7 7.3 5.2 8.2 8.4 5.5 9.0 8.8 7.6 7.0 6.7 5.5 
Italy 3.0 2.1 3.0 7.2 2.3 7.0 6.9 2.6 8.3 7.9 3.6 5.6 6.7 4.3 
Japan 6.0 3.2 6.4 9.2 2.6 3.5 6.5 4.0 6.9 5.0 5.5 6.7 4.2 5.7 
Netherlands 8.3 1.9 7.9 8.9 5.4 7.7 7.7 3.5 8.6 8.6 7.8 7.1 6.5 6.4 
New Zealand 9.2 2.1 6.0 6.9 7.5 7.9 9.3 6.7 8.7 7.6 8.6 6.9 7.1 6.0 
Norway 9.1 1.2 7.6 8.2 6.5 7.5 7.7 4.4 8.3 6.5 7.3 7.2 5.9 6.7 
Portugal 5.1 0.8 2.4 6.8 4.2 7.5 6.9 3.3 8.1 8.3 4.9 5.6 3.9 4.2 
South Africa 4.6 2.1 3.4 4.5 4.8 5.1 7.0 4.4 4.5 6.9 5.4 6.1 5.6 5.5 
Spain 3.7 1.8 2.7 7.4 4.0 7.0 6.9 2.6 7.5 7.3 5.6 5.4 5.4 4.9 
Sweden 8.8 1.5 3.7 7.4 3.3 8.0 8.1 3.9 8.8 7.6 7.4 7.0 6.8 6.4 
Switzerland 8.0 2.5 8.2 9.2 3.6 5.1 7.3 7.4 8.0 6.1 7.3 7.3 6.1 6.6 
UK 8.5 3.6 6.3 8.8 5.2 6.8 8.5 7.0 8.5 6.9 6.7 5.3 5.9 5.0 
USA 7.4 3.2 7.9 9.1 4.9 6.3 8.7 6.8 7.9 7.6 8.3 5.8 7.2 5.6 
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1997 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.8 5.6 5.8 7.2 5.3 7.5 7.7 3.9 8.4 8.3 7.0 6.3 5.8 5.8 
Austria 6.8 1.3 6.8 8.6 5.7 7.4 7.8 4.6 9.3 5.7 7.6 6.4 5.0 7.0 
Belgium 4.0 2.4 6.6 8.0 3.8 8.5 6.8 2.8 8.7 8.1 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.4 
Canada 8.0 4.5 8.0 7.9 6.1 8.0 8.5 6.5 8.6 8.0 8.2 7.2 6.9 6.3 
Denmark 9.5 3.6 8.2 8.1 4.9 9.5 8.7 7.5 9.3 7.2 8.4 7.4 5.8 6.7 
Finland 9.2 2.2 8.3 7.3 6.5 8.8 8.3 4.1 8.9 6.3 7.3 7.8 6.4 6.5 
France 5.6 4.7 6.1 8.7 4.3 7.7 8.1 2.8 7.5 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.2 5.5 
Germany 6.7 2.2 7.8 9.1 3.6 7.5 8.8 2.4 9.0 6.7 6.9 6.4 4.3 5.3 
Greece 3.1 2.2 3.2 5.0 4.6 8.7 7.2 3.9 8.6 7.8 4.0 6.0 6.8 5.1 
Ireland 8.1 3.3 7.5 7.5 6.7 8.8 8.7 6.1 9.2 8.5 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.5 
Italy 3.0 4.4 3.6 7.2 3.1 7.1 6.6 2.1 7.3 7.4 3.5 4.5 6.5 4.1 
Japan 4.4 6.6 7.7 9.1 2.2 4.2 6.5 5.3 7.2 5.1 6.3 6.7 4.3 5.4 
Netherlands 8.0 3.8 7.8 8.9 7.0 8.3 8.1 4.2 8.7 8.7 8.1 7.9 6.1 6.5 
New Zealand 9.4 4.0 6.0 7.2 7.6 9.3 9.3 8.6 9.1 7.3 8.7 6.5 7.4 6.2 
Norway 8.6 2.4 9.0 8.3 6.3 7.6 8.3 5.2 8.7 6.2 7.6 7.4 5.5 7.0 
Portugal 5.0 1.7 4.0 6.9 5.8 8.2 7.3 4.5 8.7 8.4 6.1 5.4 4.6 3.8 
South Africa 3.6 4.2 2.1 4.6 4.5 5.6 7.4 2.9 5.4 6.6 3.9 6.2 5.7 5.5 
Spain 5.4 3.6 5.4 7.4 6.2 7.5 7.3 3.4 8.2 7.3 6.4 5.9 5.6 4.7 
Sweden 8.5 3.5 7.1 7.4 4.2 8.1 7.9 2.5 8.4 7.5 7.4 6.6 6.1 6.4 
Switzerland 7.9 4.9 8.7 9.2 4.4 6.0 7.2 6.6 9.2 6.3 6.7 7.4 6.0 6.4 
UK 8.2 7.3 7.2 8.8 6.2 8.4 8.8 8.3 8.2 7.0 6.8 6.2 5.6 4.8 
USA 7.6 6.3 7.7 9.1 5.5 8.1 8.9 7.0 8.5 7.7 8.4 6.2 6.6 5.6 
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1998 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.1 2.6 6.9 7.3 5.5 7.3 8.4 3.8 8.0 8.5 6.2 6.1 5.4 6.2 
Austria 5.9 0.6 7.1 8.7 5.1 7.5 8.0 2.9 8.7 5.5 7.0 6.4 5.5 6.4 
Belgium 2.9 1.2 6.7 8.1 4.2 8.1 6.1 2.7 8.0 7.7 5.3 6.0 5.8 6.0 
Canada 8.3 3.8 7.8 8.2 6.5 7.3 8.5 5.6 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.0 6.1 6.6 
Denmark 9.4 1.7 8.3 8.3 5.4 8.5 8.4 7.6 8.6 6.9 8.0 7.4 5.9 7.4 
Finland 9.2 1.1 8.1 7.7 7.0 8.3 8.6 4.6 8.6 6.4 6.8 7.6 6.7 7.3 
France 4.7 2.3 6.5 8.8 2.9 6.9 7.9 2.0 7.1 6.0 5.2 5.7 5.4 6.0 
Germany 5.8 1.1 7.4 9.1 2.8 8.1 8.4 2.3 8.9 6.3 6.6 6.4 5.4 5.6 
Greece 2.3 1.1 2.7 5.3 4.7 8.1 6.4 3.5 8.0 7.6 3.9 5.2 6.4 4.5 
Ireland 7.2 1.7 7.1 7.7 7.5 8.4 8.2 6.2 8.9 8.2 8.4 6.8 6.8 6.0 
Italy 2.6 2.2 4.6 7.5 4.7 7.1 7.1 2.3 7.4 6.8 4.4 5.1 5.9 5.1 
Japan 2.7 3.4 6.1 9.2 2.5 4.9 6.4 4.9 6.3 5.2 5.6 6.1 3.4 4.8 
Netherlands 7.4 1.9 8.0 9.1 7.1 8.2 8.1 4.8 8.6 8.8 8.1 7.3 6.9 7.0 
New Zealand 9.0 1.9 4.8 7.3 6.2 8.6 9.1 7.5 8.7 7.0 8.1 6.5 6.7 6.7 
Norway 8.3 1.2 8.5 8.6 6.0 7.3 8.0 4.6 8.1 6.0 6.9 7.0 5.8 7.0 
Portugal 4.0 0.8 5.1 7.1 5.6 8.2 7.5 4.0 8.3 8.6 5.9 5.9 5.0 4.6 
South Africa 3.5 2.1 2.8 4.6 5.2 6.5 7.4 2.5 5.9 6.4 3.6 6.0 5.8 6.0 
Spain 2.7 1.8 6.7 7.6 6.4 7.5 7.2 3.2 7.9 7.3 6.3 5.7 5.9 5.6 
Sweden 4.3 1.9 7.2 7.6 3.7 8.3 8.4 2.4 8.2 7.4 7.4 6.9 6.4 7.1 
Switzerland 8.7 2.4 8.6 9.2 4.6 6.6 7.6 7.2 8.7 6.5 6.6 7.4 6.6 6.4 
UK 7.1 3.7 5.2 8.8 6.0 7.8 8.6 7.4 8.4 7.1 6.8 5.7 5.3 5.7 
USA 6.2 3.1 7.8 9.2 6.3 7.3 8.5 6.9 8.0 7.8 8.1 6.5 6.6 6.1 
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1999 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 7.9 2.7 7.5 7.4 6.5 7.2 8.1 5.3 7.8 8.4 6.8 6.3 5.8 6.2 
Austria 5.9 0.6 7.4 8.9 5.7 7.4 8.2 3.8 9.1 5.8 7.2 6.9 5.9 6.9 
Belgium 4.2 1.3 7.8 8.4 4.9 8.3 7.1 3.2 8.5 8.0 5.1 6.5 6.1 6.2 
Canada 8.4 3.8 7.0 8.5 6.2 6.9 8.3 5.9 7.9 7.8 8.3 7.0 6.4 6.9 
Denmark 9.3 1.7 8.0 8.5 5.7 9.0 8.1 7.2 9.1 6.8 8.1 7.2 5.8 7.5 
Finland 9.3 1.1 8.4 8.1 7.3 8.4 9.0 4.9 8.9 6.8 7.4 7.6 7.2 7.2 
France 5.2 2.5 6.9 9.0 3.8 6.8 8.3 2.4 7.3 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.4 5.9 
Germany 6.1 1.0 8.2 9.3 4.0 7.9 8.6 2.3 9.1 6.4 7.4 6.5 5.7 6.3 
Greece 2.9 1.3 4.0 5.5 5.2 7.6 6.5 3.9 8.3 7.5 5.0 6.2 6.7 5.1 
Ireland 6.5 2.0 7.8 8.0 7.2 8.6 8.3 6.2 9.0 8.2 8.5 6.9 6.2 6.4 
Italy 2.5 2.3 6.7 7.9 4.0 7.3 6.8 2.1 7.7 7.0 4.3 5.5 5.9 5.3 
Japan 4.6 3.2 5.9 8.8 3.7 4.9 7.0 5.2 7.1 5.6 5.3 6.1 3.5 5.7 
Netherlands 7.6 2.0 8.5 9.2 7.1 7.9 8.0 5.1 8.9 8.9 8.3 7.0 6.9 7.0 
New Zealand 9.0 2.1 5.9 7.4 6.5 8.9 9.2 7.2 9.1 7.2 8.0 6.7 6.4 6.8 
Norway 8.3 0.9 4.5 8.8 5.1 6.7 8.1 4.4 8.0 6.2 6.8 6.7 5.7 7.1 
Portugal 4.3 0.8 6.7 7.6 5.9 8.7 7.8 3.8 8.5 8.3 6.1 6.4 5.7 5.4 
South Africa 2.3 1.9 2.0 4.7 4.8 6.1 7.5 1.6 6.6 6.1 3.4 5.9 5.7 5.8 
Spain 5.9 2.0 7.9 8.0 7.2 7.9 7.7 4.2 8.4 7.0 6.2 6.7 6.2 6.0 
Sweden 8.1 2.1 7.8 7.9 3.7 8.2 8.4 2.3 8.7 7.6 6.6 7.0 6.3 7.1 
Switzerland 7.2 2.6 8.5 9.3 5.2 6.4 7.6 7.4 8.8 6.5 7.1 6.9 6.1 6.6 
UK 6.9 3.7 4.7 9.1 6.0 7.6 8.1 6.6 7.9 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.2 5.6 
USA 6.0 3.1 7.5 9.1 6.4 7.1 8.1 6.4 8.1 7.8 7.5 6.3 6.2 6.2 
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2000 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.2 2.7 7.6 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.6 5.1 8.2 8.3 7.4 6.1 6.1 6.5 
Austria 6.7 0.6 7.4 8.9 5.5 7.6 8.1 3.7 9.1 6.2 6.7 7.2 6.4 7.6 
Belgium 5.0 1.3 7.3 8.5 5.4 8.0 7.1 3.3 8.6 8.2 5.3 6.8 6.0 6.6 
Canada 8.3 3.7 7.3 8.4 6.0 7.4 8.6 6.5 7.9 7.7 8.2 6.9 6.5 6.8 
Denmark 9.2 1.8 7.6 8.5 5.9 8.9 7.8 7.4 9.0 6.8 8.0 7.2 5.8 7.7 
Finland 9.2 1.1 8.7 8.4 7.5 8.7 9.0 5.5 9.2 7.3 7.7 7.6 7.1 7.6 
France 9.5 2.4 7.3 9.1 4.5 6.8 8.3 2.8 7.7 5.7 6.0 5.5 5.7 6.0 
Germany 5.0 0.9 8.1 9.2 4.7 8.0 8.4 2.9 9.1 6.5 7.4 6.1 6.1 6.4 
Greece 5.4 1.3 4.0 5.9 5.5 7.7 6.9 4.4 8.5 7.4 5.4 6.1 5.5 4.9 
Ireland 1.3 2.0 8.3 8.3 7.2 8.6 8.6 6.2 9.2 8.1 8.6 6.7 7.0 6.2 
Italy 6.0 2.4 6.1 8.1 3.8 6.9 7.0 2.5 7.5 7.1 4.7 6.0 6.3 5.2 
Japan 2.8 0.1 6.6 8.7 4.8 5.4 7.3 5.5 7.3 6.0 5.9 6.4 4.0 5.9 
Netherlands 2.1 2.0 8.8 9.1 7.4 8.3 8.3 5.3 9.0 9.0 8.6 7.4 6.9 7.6 
New Zealand 7.8 2.0 5.8 7.4 6.7 9.3 9.1 6.7 9.0 7.3 7.7 6.4 6.2 7.2 
Norway 8.8 1.1 7.5 8.8 5.1 6.4 8.2 4.8 8.1 6.5 6.6 6.7 5.3 7.0 
Portugal 2.9 1.0 6.5 7.8 5.4 8.3 7.1 4.1 7.8 8.0 6.2 6.2 5.2 5.5 
South Africa 3.7 1.6 3.3 4.6 5.7 6.2 7.7 2.1 6.4 5.8 3.6 5.9 5.8 6.4 
Spain 3.6 2.1 7.6 8.2 6.6 7.6 7.4 4.1 7.9 6.8 6.5 5.7 5.7 5.6 
Sweden 2.7 1.9 8.1 8.1 4.8 8.3 8.6 3.4 8.7 7.9 7.4 7.1 6.5 7.0 
Switzerland 5.3 2.9 8.5 9.3 5.7 6.8 7.8 7.5 8.8 6.5 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.7 
UK 7.6 4.0 5.9 9.0 6.0 8.0 8.3 6.2 8.3 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.2 5.9 
USA 6.8 3.0 8.3 9.1 6.6 6.7 8.3 6.9 8.0 7.7 7.9 6.6 7.1 6.6 
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2001 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.2 2.8 6.7 8.2 6.4 8.0 8.1 5.7 8.0 8.3 7.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 
Austria 6.9 0.1 6.6 8.7 6.6 8.7 8.4 4.7 9.1 6.7 6.8 7.2 6.6 7.1 
Belgium 5.2 1.5 6.5 8.3 6.0 8.3 6.8 3.0 8.1 7.9 4.7 6.3 6.7 6.1 
Canada 7.8 3.7 6.8 9.0 6.4 7.3 8.0 6.2 8.5 8.2 7.8 7.1 6.7 6.6 
Denmark 9.0 1.8 7.1 8.9 5.0 8.5 7.6 7.2 8.9 6.6 7.8 6.8 5.6 6.9 
Finland 9.5 1.1 8.0 8.9 7.5 9.0 9.0 5.0 9.3 7.3 8.3 7.5 6.9 7.5 
France 4.2 2.4 5.9 9.4 3.3 7.1 7.7 2.1 7.5 5.7 5.3 5.6 5.4 5.5 
Germany 6.9 0.9 6.9 9.5 5.4 8.0 8.0 3.0 8.8 6.8 7.2 6.2 5.9 6.6 
Greece 3.0 1.3 5.5 7.0 5.4 8.2 6.2 4.3 8.1 7.3 4.6 6.1 6.2 4.9 
Ireland 5.5 2.0 7.9 8.9 7.5 8.6 8.1 6.4 9.1 7.9 8.4 6.5 6.9 6.1 
Italy 3.3 2.4 5.5 8.4 4.0 7.7 6.8 2.6 7.1 7.2 4.5 5.6 6.2 5.1 
Japan 4.3 3.0 6.5 8.8 2.8 5.8 7.2 4.3 7.7 5.8 5.4 5.7 3.9 5.8 
Netherlands 8.0 2.0 7.8 9.5 6.5 8.6 7.7 4.9 9.0 8.8 8.0 7.0 6.9 7.2 
New Zealand 8.8 2.0 4.7 7.9 4.2 8.8 9.3 4.4 8.3 7.5 6.0 6.3 6.0 6.3 
Norway 8.1 1.1 5.5 9.0 4.0 5.2 7.1 3.9 7.0 6.4 6.1 6.0 5.2 6.3 
Portugal 3.9 1.0 6.4 8.4 3.5 8.1 7.2 3.7 7.2 8.0 5.2 6.0 5.3 5.0 
South Africa 2.6 2.9 3.4 5.5 5.1 7.1 7.3 2.4 6.8 6.1 2.7 5.8 5.1 6.4 
Spain 5.6 2.0 6.3 8.6 6.3 7.2 7.1 3.6 7.3 6.8 6.4 5.9 5.8 5.5 
Sweden 8.6 1.8 7.6 8.7 5.2 8.5 8.5 3.8 8.8 7.8 7.5 7.0 6.7 7.0 
Switzerland 7.2 2.9 7.9 9.6 5.7 7.1 7.9 7.5 8.8 6.7 7.2 6.4 6.6 6.6 
UK 6.8 3.9 5.2 8.9 5.0 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.8 6.8 6.2 5.7 5.2 5.7 
USA 6.6 3.0 7.0 9.2 6.9 7.2 8.1 7.3 7.9 7.9 8.0 6.5 7.1 6.6 
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2002 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.0 3.0 6.5 8.0 6.2 7.5 8.0 5.4 8.1 8.4 6.5 6.2 6.9 6.3 
Austria 7.5 0.6 6.7 8.8 5.0 8.0 7.9 4.3 9.3 7.3 7.0 7.5 6.2 7.4 
Belgium 5.3 1.5 5.6 8.7 3.9 7.7 6.9 2.9 8.5 7.6 4.9 6.7 6.1 6.3 
Canada 7.5 3.6 7.1 8.7 5.3 6.8 8.4 6.4 8.5 8.7 7.7 7.2 7.8 7.1 
Denmark 9.3 1.6 6.7 8.8 5.8 8.5 7.9 6.9 8.9 6.4 7.7 7.6 5.6 7.9 
Finland 9.5 1.2 7.8 8.6 6.5 8.9 8.6 5.4 9.5 7.4 8.2 8.1 6.1 7.7 
France 5.1 3.0 6.0 9.2 2.9 7.0 7.6 1.8 7.6 5.7 5.0 5.7 5.1 6.2 
Germany 6.6 0.9 6.4 9.3 2.7 7.2 7.5 1.9 8.7 7.0 6.8 6.5 5.2 6.9 
Greece 2.5 1.9 6.1 7.1 4.0 6.8 7.1 3.8 8.1 7.3 4.4 5.7 6.6 4.8 
Ireland 6.1 1.7 7.1 8.4 6.5 8.2 7.9 6.0 8.9 7.7 8.3 6.8 6.8 6.2 
Italy 3.3 1.8 5.4 8.3 4.6 7.0 6.9 3.3 7.2 7.2 4.7 5.4 7.7 4.4 
Japan 5.2 2.8 5.4 8.6 3.0 4.9 7.0 4.1 6.8 5.7 5.5 5.8 3.8 5.3 
Netherlands 7.4 2.2 7.1 9.3 5.7 8.3 7.7 4.5 9.1 8.6 8.0 7.5 7.4 7.3 
New Zealand 9.0 2.1 5.4 7.6 5.0 8.3 9.1 4.8 8.6 7.7 7.2 6.0 7.1 6.5 
Norway 8.0 1.0 3.8 9.0 4.6 5.9 7.5 4.3 8.0 6.3 6.2 6.5 5.7 7.3 
Portugal 3.9 1.1 6.0 8.0 2.9 7.5 7.1 2.5 8.1 8.0 4.8 5.4 4.9 4.6 
South Africa 2.8 2.5 3.5 5.0 4.3 6.1 7.3 2.7 7.1 6.4 2.4 6.2 5.8 6.6 
Spain 5.3 2.2 6.7 8.3 5.6 7.2 7.2 3.8 8.1 6.9 6.4 5.7 5.2 4.8 
Sweden 8.6 1.9 6.4 8.6 4.5 8.5 8.5 4.0 8.8 7.8 7.2 7.1 6.1 7.5 
Switzerland 7.7 3.2 8.0 9.4 4.6 6.2 7.3 7.8 8.8 6.9 7.3 6.2 6.8 6.7 
UK 7.1 4.4 6.4 9.2 4.9 7.2 7.3 5.9 8.0 6.6 6.7 5.8 6.5 5.8 
USA 7.0 3.0 8.2 9.2 6.2 6.5 8.1 7.9 8.6 8.0 8.0 7.3 9.1 6.8 
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2003 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.1 2.9 6.9 8.5 6.2 7.8 8.3 5.4 8.3 8.2 7.4 6.3 6.5 6.4 
Austria 7.8 0.6 6.0 9.1 4.8 7.5 7.7 5.1 8.9 6.8 7.3 7.5 6.5 7.6 
Belgium 5.7 1.5 5.6 9.0 3.7 7.6 6.7 3.2 8.2 7.8 5.6 6.7 5.5 6.0 
Canada 7.8 3.5 6.6 8.9 5.2 6.2 8.2 6.3 8.1 8.5 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.8 
Denmark 9.5 1.7 6.6 9.1 5.5 8.4 7.1 6.8 8.8 6.5 7.4 7.4 5.8 7.8 
Finland 9.6 1.1 8.3 9.1 6.2 8.7 8.9 5.2 9.3 7.4 8.2 7.9 6.3 7.8 
France 6.1 3.1 5.7 9.3 4.3 7.0 8.0 2.5 8.1 6.0 4.7 6.2 5.0 5.9 
Germany 6.6 0.8 5.9 9.4 1.6 7.6 7.8 1.2 8.7 6.6 4.9 6.4 5.2 6.7 
Greece 2.6 1.4 5.2 7.5 3.8 7.4 7.1 3.9 8.2 7.5 4.1 5.7 6.2 4.8 
Ireland 5.0 1.8 7.5 8.9 5.4 8.3 7.2 6.0 9.1 7.6 8.0 6.8 6.3 5.7 
Italy 3.5 1.7 5.2 8.6 3.8 7.2 6.8 3.6 7.6 7.4 4.5 5.7 5.8 4.6 
Japan 5.6 2.8 5.5 8.3 2.5 5.5 7.3 4.6 7.1 5.9 5.4 5.9 3.6 5.5 
Netherlands 7.2 2.1 6.7 9.5 4.1 7.6 7.4 3.9 8.8 8.0 7.5 6.7 6.1 6.8 
New Zealand 9.2 1.9 5.1 8.1 4.6 8.5 9.3 5.1 9.1 7.8 7.3 6.2 6.5 6.3 
Norway 7.7 1.0 2.4 9.3 3.9 6.7 7.6 5.0 8.3 6.7 5.8 6.3 5.2 7.4 
Portugal 3.7 1.1 6.0 8.4 4.7 7.3 7.1 3.0 8.1 7.9 4.2 5.0 4.0 4.0 
South Africa 3.2 2.5 3.5 5.3 5.0 6.1 6.9 3.0 6.5 6.1 4.0 6.1 5.2 6.5 
Spain 5.8 2.2 7.0 8.7 5.4 6.7 7.0 3.7 8.1 6.6 6.1 5.5 5.6 4.9 
Sweden 8.1 1.6 6.1 8.9 4.1 7.9 8.1 3.4 8.8 7.3 6.3 6.7 5.6 7.2 
Switzerland 7.5 2.7 7.8 9.6 4.2 6.1 7.5 7.6 8.5 6.3 7.5 6.2 6.2 6.2 
UK 7.6 4.3 5.7 9.4 4.1 7.7 7.4 5.5 7.9 6.5 6.5 5.3 4.9 5.1 
USA 6.5 3.0 7.6 9.3 5.3 6.4 7.7 7.1 8.1 7.5 7.0 5.7 7.3 5.3 
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2004 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.4 2.6 6.8 8.4 6.6 8.0 8.2 5.0 8.2 8.5 8.2 6.6 6.6 6.7 
Austria 8.2 0.6 6.8 9.0 5.3 7.9 8.0 5.3 8.9 6.9 8.0 7.6 6.5 7.4 
Belgium 5.3 1.4 6.0 8.7 3.6 7.6 6.6 3.0 8.7 7.4 5.4 6.9 5.8 6.5 
Canada 7.5 3.5 7.3 9.0 6.0 7.3 8.3 6.0 8.3 8.5 8.3 7.2 6.8 6.9 
Denmark 9.1 1.7 7.6 9.1 6.1 8.3 7.5 7.8 9.1 7.2 8.2 7.6 5.9 7.7 
Finland 9.4 1.1 8.0 9.1 4.9 8.3 8.1 5.3 8.9 6.8 8.2 7.9 5.6 6.8 
France 6.2 3.1 5.9 9.2 3.3 7.0 7.9 2.6 7.9 5.4 4.9 6.3 5.6 6.3 
Germany 6.4 0.8 6.2 8.7 2.6 7.3 7.7 1.9 8.6 6.3 6.5 5.7 4.9 5.8 
Greece 2.7 1.6 5.4 7.3 3.7 6.0 6.1 3.7 7.7 7.0 4.7 5.9 5.8 5.0 
Ireland 5.5 1.6 7.2 8.8 5.5 7.4 6.8 5.2 8.6 8.3 8.5 6.9 6.4 5.8 
Italy 2.9 2.2 5.6 8.3 2.8 6.4 6.9 4.1 6.8 6.7 4.6 4.6 5.0 4.1 
Japan 5.4 2.8 6.4 7.7 3.7 5.2 6.8 5.6 6.9 5.5 6.4 6.3 4.2 5.9 
Netherlands 6.8 2.1 7.0 9.2 4.0 7.5 7.1 4.0 8.4 7.9 7.6 6.5 5.9 6.4 
New Zealand 8.6 1.9 5.6 8.1 4.2 8.4 9.0 3.6 8.7 7.7 7.6 6.0 6.5 6.6 
Norway 7.5 1.0 7.2 9.3 4.2 6.4 7.0 4.7 8.3 6.1 5.8 6.3 4.7 7.2 
Portugal 4.0 1.2 6.5 8.0 4.1 7.1 7.4 3.4 8.3 7.6 4.7 5.2 4.6 4.3 
South Africa 3.4 2.0 3.9 5.5 5.1 5.9 7.1 2.4 6.6 6.5 4.8 5.8 5.7 6.9 
Spain 5.8 2.3 7.6 8.6 6.0 7.0 6.7 4.2 7.7 6.5 6.9 5.5 5.4 5.0 
Sweden 7.5 1.6 6.9 8.9 3.7 7.8 7.5 4.0 8.7 7.4 7.4 6.0 5.6 7.1 
Switzerland 7.5 2.7 6.8 9.4 4.0 5.2 6.5 7.7 8.0 5.6 8.0 6.4 5.6 5.8 
UK 6.8 4.3 6.0 9.2 4.4 7.0 6.9 4.7 7.4 7.1 7.3 5.6 5.3 5.3 
USA 6.6 3.0 7.9 9.3 5.6 6.2 7.6 6.4 7.9 6.9 6.8 6.4 7.5 5.8 
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2005 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 8.3 2.7 6.0 8.7 6.0 7.3 7.9 4.2 8.4 8.4 8.0 6.3 7.5 6.6 
Austria 7.3 0.5 6.7 9.2 4.8 7.3 8.5 5.3 9.1 6.6 7.7 7.0 7.5 7.4 
Belgium 6.2 1.5 6.4 8.9 2.6 7.3 6.7 2.7 8.5 6.9 5.1 6.2 7.1 6.1 
Canada 7.0 3.4 7.4 9.2 5.2 7.1 8.2 6.5 7.9 8.3 8.0 7.1 7.4 6.6 
Denmark 9.1 1.8 7.4 9.3 6.0 8.3 7.6 7.6 8.8 7.1 7.9 7.5 7.9 7.5 
Finland 9.4 1.1 8.1 9.2 4.8 8.3 8.5 4.8 9.4 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.6 7.1 
France 6.1 3.3 5.3 9.3 3.0 6.3 6.5 2.3 7.8 5.0 5.1 6.2 6.2 6.1 
Germany 6.5 0.9 5.9 9.2 2.5 7.0 7.8 2.4 8.5 5.9 6.1 5.3 6.1 6.0 
Greece 2.6 1.7 5.5 7.8 3.0 5.7 6.5 3.5 7.3 6.8 4.8 5.0 5.7 4.5 
Ireland 5.7 0.6 7.3 9.1 5.9 7.0 7.2 5.0 8.5 8.3 8.7 7.0 6.5 5.9 
Italy 2.9 3.5 5.3 8.5 2.8 5.9 6.7 3.9 7.3 6.4 4.5 4.7 5.0 4.3 
Japan 5.6 2.8 6.4 8.3 3.9 5.6 6.9 5.8 7.0 5.8 6.2 6.4 7.9 6.0 
Netherlands 7.0 2.0 6.9 9.3 4.0 7.4 7.5 3.7 9.0 8.0 7.1 6.4 6.5 6.6 
New Zealand 8.5 1.9 4.2 8.3 4.7 8.1 9.0 4.3 8.9 7.6 7.9 5.8 7.2 6.7 
Norway 6.9 1.0 7.7 9.4 4.3 6.3 7.5 4.4 8.1 6.3 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.8 
Portugal 4.1 1.2 6.3 8.4 2.9 6.3 7.3 3.2 8.1 7.3 4.4 5.1 5.4 4.3 
South Africa 2.9 1.5 3.9 5.9 4.5 6.5 6.8 2.5 6.3 6.5 5.6 6.1 5.5 6.8 
Spain 5.4 2.6 7.3 8.8 3.5 6.4 6.7 3.3 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.5 5.9 4.6 
Sweden 7.7 1.6 6.6 9.2 3.3 7.1 7.6 3.8 8.2 7.1 7.1 6.5 7.4 7.1 
Switzerland 7.7 2.5 7.2 9.5 3.8 5.6 6.7 7.5 8.9 6.0 7.8 6.7 7.5 6.6 
UK 6.8 4.2 5.3 9.4 3.9 6.8 6.4 5.0 7.2 6.6 6.9 5.5 6.1 5.2 
USA 6.4 3.1 7.4 9.4 4.9 6.4 7.6 6.6 7.6 6.6 6.4 6.7 7.8 6.0 
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2006 CRPT CPT CCP CR GEP PTN PC LR CB NC  CI CCR ENT  SR 
               Australia 7.9 2.8 6.5 8.7 6.4 7.6 8.2 6.0 8.5 8.2 7.9 7.2 6.2 6.5 
Austria 7.8 0.6 7.3 9.1 5.5 7.9 8.5 5.8 9.3 7.3 8.0 8.0 7.1 7.5 
Belgium 5.3 1.8 6.2 8.9 3.0 7.1 7.6 3.1 8.4 7.3 5.0 6.6 5.6 6.1 
Canada 7.3 3.3 6.8 9.2 4.9 6.4 8.2 6.3 8.3 8.4 8.2 7.3 6.4 6.6 
Denmark 9.3 1.8 8.0 9.3 6.8 8.1 7.9 8.2 9.3 7.4 7.3 8.1 6.6 7.8 
Finland 9.4 1.1 7.7 9.3 4.9 8.3 8.7 4.4 9.4 7.2 7.8 8.3 6.1 7.0 
France 7.3 3.3 5.6 9.2 2.9 6.6 7.5 3.1 7.5 5.2 5.6 7.1 5.6 6.0 
Germany 6.6 0.9 6.6 9.1 3.0 7.0 7.4 2.5 8.3 6.1 6.5 6.5 5.3 5.7 
Greece 2.9 1.6 5.9 7.5 3.8 6.2 6.8 3.6 7.7 6.9 4.9 6.2 6.0 5.0 
Ireland 6.4 2.1 7.7 9.1 6.6 7.9 7.8 5.3 9.0 8.7 9.0 7.6 6.4 6.3 
Italy 2.8 2.6 5.4 8.3 2.7 5.9 6.8 4.0 7.1 6.4 4.1 5.2 4.8 3.9 
Japan 5.7 2.7 6.6 8.5 4.9 6.0 7.5 6.1 6.9 5.8 6.8 6.7 4.8 6.6 
Netherlands 7.5 2.0 7.0 9.3 4.1 7.0 7.6 3.6 8.7 8.1 7.2 7.1 5.7 6.6 
New Zealand 8.9 1.9 3.9 8.4 4.4 8.0 8.4 4.4 8.8 7.7 7.7 7.1 6.1 6.4 
Norway 7.2 1.1 7.9 9.4 4.8 7.3 8.2 5.5 8.7 6.5 7.2 7.3 5.6 7.0 
Portugal 3.8 1.4 6.1 8.1 3.9 6.3 6.7 3.4 7.9 7.3 4.4 5.4 4.2 4.6 
South Africa 2.9 1.6 4.6 6.2 4.9 6.2 6.8 2.8 6.7 6.9 6.0 6.0 5.7 7.0 
Spain 5.3 2.8 6.4 8.9 3.4 5.6 5.9 3.8 7.1 6.1 5.7 5.7 4.9 4.6 
Sweden 8.0 1.6 6.9 9.3 3.6 7.1 7.6 3.5 8.1 7.6 7.7 7.3 5.7 7.0 
Switzerland 7.7 2.5 7.7 9.4 4.7 6.0 7.0 7.4 8.3 6.5 7.9 6.8 6.3 6.6 
UK 6.7 4.3 5.4 9.3 3.9 6.8 7.2 5.2 7.9 6.7 7.5 6.2 5.1 5.4 
USA 5.6 3.0 6.9 9.3 5.3 6.2 7.4 6.8 7.8 6.8 6.6 6.9 6.8 5.6 
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Appendix 6.2:  Descriptive Statistics on Corruption 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis J-B  p = Count 
           
1992 6.92 7.60 9.40 1.70 2.10 -0.94 3.05 3.23 0.20 22 
1993 6.78 7.90 9.30 0.90 2.35 -1.00 2.99 3.64 0.16 22 
1994 6.94 7.75 9.50 1.81 2.26 -0.81 2.43 2.72 0.26 22 
1995 6.80 7.77 9.57 2.55 2.33 -0.61 1.91 2.46 0.29 22 
1996 7.10 7.69 9.55 2.98 2.12 -0.71 2.21 2.43 0.30 22 
1997 6.79 7.74 9.50 3.00 2.14 -0.51 1.84 2.17 0.34 22 
1998 6.09 6.63 9.44 2.30 2.43 -0.27 1.66 1.93 0.38 22 
1999 6.41 6.81 9.34 1.46 2.19 -0.80 2.80 2.36 0.31 22 
2000 6.28 6.72 9.17 2.85 2.11 -0.32 1.83 1.62 0.44 22 
2001 6.36 6.87 9.53 2.60 2.11 -0.32 1.88 1.53 0.46 22 
2002 6.48 7.05 9.47 2.47 2.08 -0.46 2.20 1.37 0.50 22 
2003 6.57 6.90 9.65 2.56 2.02 -0.42 2.31 1.10 0.58 22 
2004 6.43 6.70 9.38 2.74 1.92 -0.46 2.38 1.14 0.57 22 
2005 6.37 6.64 9.41 2.55 1.91 -0.57 2.67 1.28 0.53 22 
2006 6.46 6.93 9.35 2.76 1.99 -0.56 2.39 1.48 0.48 22 
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Appendix 6.3:       AR(1) MA (1) with structural break dummy variables 
 
Dep Var Eq 1 Eq 1  Eq 2 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 5 
MD Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = 
           
Intercept NSM  … 6.36 0.00 6.12 0.00 6.33 0.00 6.36 0.00 
ar(1) NSM  … 0.62 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.64 0.00 
ma(1) NSM  … -0.97 0.00 -2.34 0.01 -2.39 0.01 -0.96 0.00 
y92 NSM  … … … … … … … … … 
y93 … … -0.80 0.21 … … … … … … 
y94 … … … … 0.14 0.58 … … … … 
y95 … … … … … … 0.15 0.61 … … 
y96 … … … … … … … … 0.59 0.06 
y97 … … … … … … … … … … 
y98 … … … … … … … … … … 
y99 … … … … … … … … … … 
y00 … … … … … … … … … … 
y01 … … … … … … … … … … 
y02 … … … … … … … … … … 
y03 … … … … … … … … … … 
y04 … … … … … … … … … … 
y05 … … … … … … … … … … 
y06 … … … … … … … … … … 
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 Eq 1 Eq 1  Eq 2 Eq 2 Eq 3 Eq 3 Eq 4 Eq 4 Eq 5 Eq 5 
           
           
Adj R Sq    0.46  0.83  0.83  0.55 
Std Err    0.23  0.13  0.13  0.21 
Pr F-Stat    0.03  0.00  0.00  0.01 
AIC    0.14  -1.02  -1.01  -0.05 
SC    0.32  -0.84  -0.83  0.14 
Inverted  AR Root   0.62  0.90  0.88  0.64 
Inverted  MA Root   0.97  2.34  2.39  0.96 
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AR(1) MA (1) with structural break dummy variables 
 
Dep Var Eq 6 Eq 6 Eq 7 Eq 7 Eq 8 Eq 8 Eq 9 Eq 9 Eq 10 Eq 10 
MD Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = 
           
Intercept 6.35 0.00 6.49 0.00 6.60 0.00 6.40 0.00 6.39 0.00 
Ar(1) 0.70 0.00 0.72 0.03 0.13 0.53 0.73 0.00 0.88 0.00 
ma(1) -0.96 0.00 -0.09 0.84 2.29 0.01 -1.00 0.00 -2.63 0.01 
Y92 … … … … … … … … … … 
Y93 … … … … … … … … … … 
Y94 … … … … … … … … … … 
Y95 … … … … … … … … … … 
Y96 … … … … … … … … … … 
Y97 0.26 0.49 … … … … … … … … 
Y98 … … -0.51 0.03 … … … … … … 
y99 … … … … 0.13 0.63 … … … … 
y00 … … … … … … -0.24 0.44 … … 
y01 … … … … … … … … -0.41 0.11 
y02 … … … … … … … … … … 
y03 … … … … … … … … … … 
y04 … … … … … … … … … … 
y05 … … … … … … … … … … 
y06 … … … … … … … … … … 
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 Eq 6 Eq 6 Eq 7 Eq 7 Eq 8 Eq 8 Eq 9 Eq 9 Eq 10 Eq 10 
           
           
Adj R Sq  0.37  0.45  0.83  0.37  0.90 
Std Err  0.25  0.23  0.13  0.25  0.10 
Pr F-Stat  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.06  0.00 
AIC  0.29  0.16  -1.01  0.30  -1.52 
SC  0.48  0.35  -0.82  0.48  -1.33 
Inverted  AR Root 0.70  0.72  0.13  0.73  0.88 
Inverted  MA Root 0.96  0.09  -2.29  1.00  2.63 
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AR(1) MA (1) with structural break dummy variables 
 
Dep Var Eq 11 Eq 11 Eq 12 Eq 12 Eq 13 Eq 13 Eq 14 Eq 14 Eq 15 Eq 15 
MD Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = Coefffic p = 
           
Intercept 6.35 0.00 6.32 0.00 6.39 0.00 NSM  … NSM  … 
ar(1) 0.73 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.74 0.00 NSM  … NSM  … 
ma(1) -0.96 0.00 -0.95 0.00 -1.00 0.00 NSM  … NSM  … 
y92 … … … … … … … … … … 
y93 … … … … … … … … … … 
y94 … … … … … … … … … … 
y95 … … … … … … … … … … 
y96 … … … … … … … … … … 
y97 … … … … … … … … … … 
y98 … … … … … … … … … … 
y99 … … … … … … … … … … 
y00 … … … … … … … … … … 
y01 … … … … … … … … … … 
y02 0.04 0.89 … … … … … … … … 
y03 … … 0.20 0.53 … … … … … … 
y04 … … … … 0.01 0.96 … … … … 
y05 … … … … … … NSM … … … 
y06 … … … … … … … … NSM  … 
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 Eq 11 Eq 11 Eq 12 Eq 12 Eq 13 Eq 13 Eq 14 Eq 14 Eq 15 Eq 15 
           
           
Adj R Sq  0.33  0.35  0.31     
Std Err  0.26  0.25  0.26     
Pr F-Stat  0.08  0.06  0.08     
AIC  0.37  0.33  0.39     
SC  0.55  0.51  0.57     
Inverted  AR Root 0.73  0.75  0.74     
Inverted  MA Root 0.96  0.95  1.00     
 
Note: NSM = near singular matrix, which indicates insufficient observations available to perform the statistical calculations 
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Appendix 6.4:  Partial Autocorrelations for Three Countries  
 
 Denmark Denmark USA USA  Italy Italy 
Lags Coeff. p = Coeff. p = Coeff. p = 
       
1 0.35 0.14 0.39 0.10 0.69 0.00 
2 -0.25 0.30 -0.06 0.22 -0.45 0.01 
3 0.22 0.49 -0.05 0.39 0.12 0.02 
4 -0.14 0.65 -0.17 0.44 0.05 0.04 
5 -0.04 0.73 0.15 0.59 0.13 0.08 
6 -0.10 0.77 -0.07 0.71 -0.22 0.13 
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Appendix 6.5:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Denmark 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1  Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS 11.13 0.37 .  CONS 11.28 0.07 . 
CPT -0.07 0.74 -0.44  CPT -0.07 0.51 -0.45 
CCP 0.00 0.97 0.02  CCP 0.00 0.96 0.02 
CR -0.70 0.34 -2.92  CR -0.71 0.09 -2.95 
GEP -0.52 0.29 -1.75  GEP -0.52 0.07 -1.74 
PTN -0.09 0.78 -0.20  PTN -0.09 0.65 -0.20 
PC -0.33 0.51 -0.94  PC -0.34 0.21 -0.95 
LR 0.20 0.54 0.67  LR 0.20 0.32 0.67 
CB 0.01 0.99 0.02  CB … … … 
NC 0.20 0.33 1.04  NC 0.20 0.09 1.05 
CI -0.29 0.39 -0.78  CI -0.29 0.17 -0.77 
CCR 0.57 0.41 1.02  CCR 0.58 0.09 1.04 
ENT 0.10 0.45 0.37  ENT 0.10 0.23 0.37 
SR  0.68 0.34 2.19  SR  0.68 0.09 2.17 
         
R-sq  0.967     0.967  
Adj R Sq  0.544     0.772  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.480     0.180  
AIC  -2.402     -2.535  
SBC  -1.741     -1.922  
DW   2.680     2.685  
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Appendix 6.5:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Denmark (cont) 
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3  Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS 11.37 0.02 .  CONS 10.20 0.01 . 
CPT -0.07 0.40 -0.46  CPT -0.08 0.30 -0.52 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR -0.71 0.03 -2.97  CR -0.65 0.01 -2.72 
GEP -0.51 0.02 -1.72  GEP -0.53 0.01 -1.78 
PTN -0.09 0.46 -0.22  PTN … … … 
PC -0.34 0.11 -0.96  PC -0.33 0.09 -0.92 
LR 0.19 0.16 0.66  LR 0.24 0.06 0.80 
CB … … …  CB … … … 
NC 0.20 0.03 1.05  NC 0.18 0.01 0.93 
CI -0.28 0.04 -0.76  CI -0.31 0.02 -0.82 
CCR 0.59 0.02 1.05  CCR 0.57 0.01 1.02 
ENT 0.10 0.13 0.37  ENT 0.09 0.11 0.34 
SR  0.67 0.02 2.15  SR  0.68 0.01 2.19 
         
R-sq  0.967     0.957  
Adj R Sq  0.847     0.851  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.056     0.024  
AIC  -2.666     -2.533  
SBC  -2.100     -2.014  
DW   2.723     3.219  
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Appendix 6.5:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Denmark (cont) 
Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5  Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS 8.23 0.00 .  CONS 7.92 0.00 . 
CPT … … …  CPT … … … 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR -0.53 0.01 -2.20  CR -0.42 0.01 -1.76 
GEP -0.55 0.00 -1.86  GEP -0.51 0.00 -1.72 
PTN … … …  PTN … … … 
PC -0.21 0.12 -0.60  PC -0.14 0.29 -0.39 
LR 0.23 0.06 0.78  LR 0.25 0.06 0.85 
CB … … …  CB … … … 
NC 0.17 0.01 0.89  NC 0.14 0.02 0.74 
CI -0.29 0.01 -0.77  CI -0.28 0.02 -0.75 
CCR 0.49 0.01 0.88  CCR 0.45 0.01 0.81 
ENT 0.07 0.16 0.27  ENT … … … 
SR  0.76 0.00 2.44  SR  0.67 0.00 2.14 
         
R-sq  0.940     0.910  
Adj R Sq  0.832     0.791  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.014     0.012  
AIC  -2.328     -2.058  
SBC  -1.856     -1.633  
DW   3.151     3.178  
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Appendix 6.5:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Denmark (cont) 
Model 7 Model 7 Model 7 Model 7  Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS 7.55 0.00 .  CONS 9.03 0.00 . 
CPT … … …  CPT … … … 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR -0.32 0.00 -1.35  CR -0.34 0.00 -1.43 
GEP -0.46 0.00 -1.56  GEP -0.31 0.00 -1.03 
PTN … … …  PTN … … … 
PC … … …  PC … … … 
LR 0.19 0.09 0.65  LR … … … 
CB … … …  CB … … … 
NC 0.12 0.02 0.60  NC 0.11 0.04 0.57 
CI -0.30 0.01 -0.80  CI -0.25 0.04 -0.66 
CCR 0.37 0.01 0.66  CCR 0.43 0.01 0.77 
ENT … … …  ENT … … … 
SR  0.61 0.00 1.95  SR  0.40 0.01 1.27 
         
R-sq  0.891     0.845  
Adj R Sq  0.782     0.729  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.006     0.007  
AIC  -1.994     -1.777  
SBC  -1.616     -1.446  
DW   2.808     2.523  
 
418 
Appendix 6.6:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Italy 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1  Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS -11.27 0.16   CONS -10.94 0.10 . 
CPT 0.58 0.15 0.41  CPT 0.59 0.09 0.42 
CCP -0.12 0.35 -0.26  CCP …. …. …. 
CR 1.33 0.11 0.97  CR 1.08 0.05 0.78 
GEP 0.17 0.19 0.26  GEP 0.17 0.15 0.26 
PTN 0.66 0.24 0.47  PTN 0.79 0.14 0.57 
PC 0.66 0.24 0.24  PC 0.60 0.22 0.22 
LR -2.05 0.12 -2.00  LR -1.62 0.05 -1.59 
CB 0.69 0.17 0.37  CB 0.68 0.12 0.37 
NC 0.46 0.30 0.32  NC 0.31 0.39 0.21 
CI 2.19 0.12 1.35  CI 1.72 0.05 1.06 
CCR 0.39 0.23 0.25  CCR 0.38 0.20 0.24 
ENT -0.61 0.15 -0.66  ENT -0.46 0.09 -0.50 
SR  -3.70 0.06 -2.27  SR  -3.33 0.01 -2.04 
   .      
R-sq  0.998     0.993  
Adj R Sq  0.972     0.950  
Pr (F-Stat)  0.125     0.042  
AIC  -2.328     -1.171  
SBC  -1.667     -0.557  
DW   2.388     3.190  
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Appendix 6.6:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Italy (cont) 
Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3  Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS -13.28 0.03 .  CONS -15.64 0.01 . 
CPT 0.69 0.03 0.48  CPT 0.55 0.05 0.39 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR 0.98 0.02 0.71  CR 1.18 0.01 0.86 
GEP 0.19 0.07 0.29  GEP 0.16 0.13 0.25 
PTN 1.09 0.01 0.78  PTN 1.05 0.01 0.75 
PC 0.83 0.06 0.30  PC 0.85 0.08 0.31 
LR -1.36 0.02 -1.33  LR -1.37 0.02 -1.33 
CB 0.78 0.05 0.43  CB 1.08 0.01 0.59 
NC … … …  NC … … … 
CI 1.49 0.03 0.91  CI 1.53 0.03 0.94 
CCR 0.37 0.17 0.24  CCR … … … 
ENT -0.38 0.06 -0.41  ENT -0.35 0.09 -0.38 
SR  -3.25 0.00 -2.00  SR  -3.09 0.00 -1.90 
         
R-sq  0.989     0.976  
Adj R Sq  0.947     0.917  
Pr (F-Stat)  0.012     0.008  
AIC  -0.839     -0.235  
SBC  -0.273     0.285  
DW   3.060     2.522  
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Appendix 6.6:  General-to-Specific Modelling: Italy (cont) 
Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 5  Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6 
CRPT Coef. p = Beta  CRPT Coef. p = Beta 
CONS -16.85 0.01 .  CONS -12.11 0.02 . 
CPT 0.36 0.16 0.25  CPT … … … 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR 1.09 0.02 0.79  CR 1.02 0.02 0.74 
GEP … … …  GEP … … … 
PTN 1.06 0.01 0.76  PTN 0.85 0.03 0.61 
PC 1.19 0.03 0.44  PC 1.02 0.05 0.38 
LR -1.33 0.03 -1.30  LR -1.65 0.01 -1.61 
CB 1.03 0.02 0.56  CB 1.09 0.01 0.59 
NC … … …  NC … … … 
CI 1.67 0.03 1.03  CI 2.14 0.01 1.31 
CCR … … …  CCR … … … 
ENT -0.39 0.11 -0.42  ENT -0.54 0.03 -0.58 
SR  -3.00 0.00 -1.84  SR  -3.29 0.00 -2.02 
         
R-sq  0.955     0.929  
Adj R Sq  0.873     0.835  
Pr (F-Stat)  0.007     0.006  
AIC  0.277     0.586  
SBC  0.749     1.011  
DW   2.581     1.786  
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Appendix 6.7:  General-to-Specific Modelling: United States of America 
Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1  Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 
CRPT Coef.    p-val Beta  CRPT Coef. p-val Beta 
CONS 3.86 0.93   CONS 3.31 0.90  
CPT 7.06 0.31 2.08  CPT 7.10 0.11 2.09 
CCP 0.02 0.97 0.02  CCP … … … 
CR -1.58 0.66 -0.52  CR -1.54 0.48 -0.50 
GEP 1.90 0.36 2.91  GEP 1.94 0.09 2.97 
PTN -0.86 0.58 -0.90  PTN -0.89 0.31 -0.93 
PC 1.38 0.51 1.34  PC 1.42 0.16 1.39 
LR -0.85 0.32 -0.60  LR -0.85 0.12 -0.60 
CB -2.77 0.27 -1.38  CB -2.76 0.08 -1.37 
NC 2.58 0.30 2.14  NC 2.57 0.10 2.13 
CI -1.71 0.32 -4.07  CI -1.72 0.11 -4.09 
CCR 0.01 0.86 0.19  CCR 0.01 0.67 0.21 
ENT 1.95 0.19 2.62  ENT 1.97 0.04 2.63 
SR  -2.27 0.25 -2.07  SR  -2.29 0.05 -2.09 
         
R-sq  0.984     0.984  
Adj R Sq  0.770     0.885  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.351     0.095  
AIC  -0.615     -0.746  
SBC  0.046     -0.132  
DW   1.771     1.809  
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Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3  Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 
CRPT Coeff. p-val Beta  CRPT Coef. p-val Beta 
         
CONS 12.68 0.33   CONS 27.11 0.03 . 
CPT 6.55 0.04 1.93  CPT 3.39 0.02 1.00 
CCP … … …  CCP … … … 
CR -2.27 0.07 -0.74  CR -3.16 0.02 -1.03 
GEP 1.79 0.03 2.74  GEP 1.15 0.03 1.77 
PTN -0.65 0.18 -0.67  PTN … … … 
PC 1.14 0.02 1.12  PC 0.83 0.02 0.81 
LR -0.94 0.03 -0.66  LR -0.91 0.03 -0.65 
CB -2.76 0.03 -1.37  CB -1.84 0.04 -0.91 
NC 2.52 0.05 2.08  NC 1.34 0.03 1.11 
CI -1.58 0.05 -3.74  CI -0.81 0.02 -1.92 
CCR … … …  CCR … … … 
ENT 2.01 0.01 2.70  ENT 1.75 0.01 2.34 
SR  -2.27 0.02 -2.07  SR  -1.83 0.02 -1.67 
         
R-sq  0.982     0.963  
Adj R Sq  0.914     0.872  
Pr (F-Stat) 0.025     0.018  
AIC  -0.767     -0.213  
SBC  -0.200     0.306  
DW   2.158     2.343  
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